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

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

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

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

KRISHNA-KALI

(From an old painting)

CALCUTTA

THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

JANUARY, 1929

TEN YEARS LATER

Dr. J. W. Gregory's article[1] shows that he has not lost interest in Calcutta University and that his pencraft is as facile as it was ten years ago. But when I read his essay what gave me the greatest pleasure was the tribute which he paid in its closing paragraph to the personality and public service of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee.

Sir Asutosh was one of the great men of his age. In his heart glowed an unquenchable love of Bengal. To Bengal he had consecrated his life. From what he conceived to be his duty to her, no yearning for cloistered quiet could seduce him. Leisured study; travel to the sacred shrines of India; escape from the multitudinous entanglements of public business; withdrawal from the preoccupations of the world,—all these things at times he longed for. For them his love of learning; his throbbing pride in Indian history; his piety; his insight into the sacred things which lie behind the veil of sense, fitted him as few are fitted. But Bengal needed him, and he gave himself to Bengal. No claim, however obscure the claimant and however inopportune, found him deaf, if conscience told Sir Asutosh that Bengal might gain if the petitioner were heard. No opposition, however grave, could make him flinch. Venomous

[1] The Calcutta Review, October, 1928 : "*The Reform of Calcutta University.*"

tongues wounded him, but did not weaken his purpose. He was the scholar *en vedette*. A Nehemiah of his time.

Dr. Gregory's paper has carried my thoughts back ten years when I was getting ready to leave England for the work on the Calcutta University Commission along with him, Professor Ramsay Muir and Sir Philip Hartog. Well do I remember how earnestly some acquaintances who knew India warned me in London against Sir Asutosh; what stories they told of his want of scruple, of his ferocity, of the power of his will. They made me feel that a terrible adversary was waiting for me in India. Sir Asutosh met us in Bombay. He told me afterwards, when we had become close friends and had entered into the intimacy which ended only with his death, that some of his acquaintances in Calcutta had assured him that I was coming to India with a report ready drafted in my pocket: that I, who had never been in India before, had been prime with cut and dried recommendations; and that he could not expect me to look into the needs, the difficulties, the achievements of his beloved University with an open mind. At our first meeting, therefore, and for some time afterwards, he and I were always on our guard. But his quick insight soon convinced him that we had come resolved on seeing things as they really were and on doing our best to serve the cause of education in Bengal. And from the first we felt his passionate devotion to his country, his massive mind, his love of laughter, the brave directness of his speech. The mist of understanding melted. We were simply comrades undertaking a difficult piece of work.

But then it was that the real crisis came. Behind all questions of educational policy lie the problems of social philosophy. What was it, each of us was asking himself, what was it that Bengal needs: what is her destiny as a province of India and as one of the peoples of the world? For what fate, for what form of ultimate responsibility must the boys and girls, the young men and women, of Bengal be prepared? To what goal beyond the horizon leads the road of education in Bengal?

These fundamental questions underlay our first interchange of ideas, shone in our eyes, jutted out suddenly in unpremeditated talk. We must discover how we stood on these deep matters. They could not be shirked, or put off. Whatever the issue we must put ourselves to the test of finding out each what the others really thought. And especially between him and me was candour indispensable. We must probe our minds to the bottom and ascertain whether we were at variance or at one.

Then began the days which forged our friendship. Early each morning in Calcutta, he and I met on the Maidan. Day by day for two hours we walked together alone. I remember feeling once that the day was fateful and might break our intimacy for ever. But we put ourselves to the test. And that morning, when he joined his sons who were waiting for him with his carriage, we parted with the knowledge that our minds went together and that we had the same hopes and fears.

Dr. Gregory may well think of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee as of one to whom the wide circle of those who knew and valued his work would rejoice to see the highest honour done. But I do not feel sure that Sir Asutosh himself would have liked the name of the University in Calcutta to be changed.

II

However this may be, I am only too well aware that an absence of ten years from India disqualifies me from offering suggestions as to the practical steps which it would now be wise to take in the interests of the University of Calcutta. Things have moved quickly both in India and in England since 1919. One has to know the strength of the stream of public opinion in order to judge what course the boat should take. Many subtle factors go to the making of a wise judgment on academic policy.

And one indispensable factor is intimate knowledge of the play of contemporary feeling. Dr. Gregory, I suspect, is more favourably situated than I am and can perhaps draw upon more recent knowledge than is at my command.

But the deeper drift of educational thought and feeling is oceanic. All the world is worried about examinations. How valuable they are when rightly used. But what a millstone round our neck! With his unfailing *flair* for what is interesting, Dr. Gregory refers to examinations in his essay. If he had more elbow-room, I think he would have reminded his readers that the new state of feeling about examinations is hesitant. There is no swing-back of the pendulum to the old blind faith in examinations divorced from teaching. In England (and indeed in many parts of the British Commonwealth) we recognise the convenience of the external examinations of London University. We do not like them, but we cannot do without them. The solitary student, we feel, ought to have his chance. The late learner who cannot afford to go to College ought to have some examination to turn to after burning his midnight oil. The London University external examinations are severe, stainless, authoritative, though necessarily imperfect as tests of what in the wider sense we know as education. Without them, we in England would find a demand for a degree-giving University springing up in every ambitious town. It may be as Dr. Gregory says (though I don't feel sure) that London University external examinations (or something Indian as faultlessly honest and impartial as they are) could be used more largely in Bengal. But .....

Sir Philip Hartog, who has one of the acutest minds and one of the most sympathetically scientific, has suggested[1] that, as examinations cannot be dispensed with but seem to need reform, scientific inquiry is needed. Not an ordinary Commission of Inquiry. But a small standing commission with funds

[1] *Examinations and their relation to culture and efficiency* : Constable, London, 1918.

for investigation and experiment, like the Committee on Solar Physics. Sooner or later this suggestion will be acted upon. But in this kind of question, our British reaction-time is slow.

The fact is that education can only be handled with proper insight by a Government when the latter's social philosophy is clear. In England there is zeal for education. The changes made during the last ten years, the money spent on those changes, the petering out of prejudice against educational expenditure, are wonderful. There has been nothing like it, since the Reformation, in British history. But our social philosophy is still uncertain. The ultimate aims of education are therefore either not discussed or just taken for granted. When our English arrears have been made up, we shall find ourselves obliged to consider seriously what we want our educational efforts and expenditure to achieve. The English are rather good at social philosophy when they tackle it. Sooner or later they will put their minds to the fundamental question of national education. But at present the most influential classes —the Cabinet, London intellectuals, dons at Oxford and Cambridge—are indifferent to, or ill-informed about, the problem of education *as a whole*. Britain is brainy. But the contribution which it is making to the scientific study of education (as distinct from its administrative development) is insignificant. Don't however be hasty in blaming the British for their backwardness in this matter. We dislike one-sided generalisations about social philosophy and education. We know that the problem which confronts humanity is not simple but complex. We feel that we are not ready to reach a generalisation. The mist is too thick. The true formula will be a complex two-sided formula, not an improvisation. Therefore we don't believe in the permanence of Mussolini's solution: we think a good deal of American theorising (including even much of Dewey's) shallow and misleading: and we cannot stomach the kind of thing Count Keyserling emits.

III

This waiting attitude is all very well when those who adopt it know why they have to wait and keep their minds alert and their eyes watchful for any sign of a break in the mist. But the mischief is that what in the best minds is hesitation takes, in less distinguished minds, the form of cowardly evasion. Within my memory—which now runs back for nearly 60 years—there has been a distinct decline in moral courage among British politicians, administrators and dons. I think that this decline is temporary and will not last more than thirty years more. But if it were not for the tonic impression which is always left by contact with ordinary citizens when the latter are called upon to face a grave issue, I should have no doubt that Britain is showing signs of deliquescence. Ingenuity in polite evasion, skill in negative criticism, preference for avoiding any discussion of first principles, are now distinctive marks of a well-known and successful type of British administrator in our home affairs—political and academic. Generally these defects are unconscious. In the worst cases, they are assumed because profitable to a man's chances of advancement. Unfortunately these defects are infectious. In the public life of Bengal nothing is more weakening to the welfare of the community than lack of moral courage. I fear that we in England are not at present by our example helping India to shake off this disease.

IV

Dr. Gregory's essay has set me thinking about our Calcutta University Commission Report. The evidence, printed in volumes VII to XII inclusive, will, I think, prove to be of permanent value. We have nothing like it for any earlier period. We were careful to give every one an opportunity of sending in a written statement of his views on a range of topics which covered the whole field of our inquiry. And we were

honest in printing what we received. Those volumes are a mirror of all shades of contemporary opinion.

And, if it is not presumptuous of me to say this about a work in which seven of us took immense pains for nearly two years, I think that what we ourselves wrote in our Report has stood the test of time.

But our Report, as published, is too long. We could not help writing at length in the first instance, because the facts were complicated and the issue many-sided. But what we ought to have done, and wanted to do, was to take the first five volumes of our Report when it was finished and reduce what we had written to a smaller scale. It would have been possible, in six weeks or less, when our minds were full of the subject, to rewrite those first five volumes in a shorter compass. We should have liked to reduce the five volumes to one or two. But Dr. Gregory had taken his passage to Africa and could not wait any longer in Calcutta. So the hope of condensing our Report to manageable and more readable size had to be given up.

M. E. SADLER

CONCEPT OF LAW

What is Law?

The law has its roots in the affections which men have for the institutions under which they grow up.

Garies is of opinion that *self-interest* or *Egoism* is one of the roots of law ; he finds support of his theory from the laws of Manu, which had been the security of the basic principles of Brahmanism relating to the state and law. "To act solely from a desire for rewards is not laudable, yet an exception from that desire is not to be found in this world : for on that desire is grounded the study of the Veda and the performance of the actions prescribed by the Veda. The desire for rewards, indeed has its roots in the conception that an act can yield them, and in consequence of that conception sacrifices are performed ; vows and the laws prescribing restraints are all stated to be kept through the idea that they will bear fruit. Not a single act here (in this world) appears ever to be done by a man free from desire." (Manu II, 2, 3 and 4.)

In the creation of the law, the power of the will may be modest, but cannot be neglected.

International and civil wars, diseases and conditions of reproductions, have selected law-making humanity. The people conquered in war loses the means of enriching itself and of influencing the commercial world. Moral selections, commercial struggles, quarrels between parties and classes, and professional intrigues and rivalries, all pertain to the social world, but constitute biological facts. Although law is an intellectual and abstract thing, it is a biologic fact to recognize what sort of human animals are those who toil over the law.

Man, in the course of history, has acquired the power of thinking entirely alone, of reasoning objectively, of being

different from his neighbour, and he has always developed in this direction because the social organization likewise has followed a unity of direction. Naturally—physiologically—the peoples ought to think the same thing, have the same habits, the same ways of living, the same methods of work. All those who live together resemble one another, and like to live together because they do resemble one another. Law is then the obligation not to disturb this harmony, and for that reason, to do as others do upon every occasion. "The development of the individual and of each individual good must be in harmony with that of all other individuals and goods in society, and the harmonious development of all individuals in unison and of all goods of life making up the one supreme good is the end of law. (Ahrens.) According to Fichte, the world was only a system of individual egos, each seeking self-realisation, and Law was the moral order which regulated this self-expansion of all the egos without conflict and in harmony with each other.

Civilization tends towards the formation of more and more *populous* organisms; it brings into business and family relations, people who are very unlike, and creates complicated economic and administrative machinery wherein labour becomes more and more divided. Pursuing different occupations, deriving different ideas and traditions from their origin and physiology, fellow-citizens no longer have so limited a social consciousness, and individual thought is liberated. Thus the development of civilization tends to the emancipation of the individual and the destruction of the social bond.

Law is a social affair, in that society is a condition of its existence; its only "raison d'être" is in enabling certain men to dwell in peace and harmony, and in removing the difficulties created by community life or even by that of a simple neighbourhood. The law is a social fact by reason of its function. It estimates the mutual interests of persons destined to live together and does this with all the more minutest details as this common life is continuous and intimate. The tendency of

the law is to express sentiments of sympathy, and the desire to live in peace and harmony with one's neighbour.

Every juridical fact is a psychological phenomenon. Celebrated legal texts have been encompassed with legends which manifest the state of mind of those who formulated and of those who accepted them. In the various acts of human life, the brain does not take the same part, does not play the same rôle.

(*i*) There are some which are the product of reflection, of reason.

(*ii*) Others are preceded by emotions, and executed in a moment of anger, fear, or pity.

(*iii*) In other cases, a man obeys forces which are foreign to him ; sometimes it is impossible to resist them. Obedience to a material force always remains a psychological phenomenon.

Law and politics are the romance, in which each plays a part to a greater or less extent, and which creates for every one an interest in life. It is very difficult to say through whom, through whose authority, a law has become a law. The majority of juridical institutions in every period are produced outside of the law under the form of usages. When the lawmaker concerns himself with them, they are already formed. The legislative function is summed up in a simple act of compliance. In ancient civilizations, the sovereign is by no means the lawmaker ; he intervenes in order to occasion respect for usages, which he makes no pretence of knowing anything about. Usages become juridical when they are sanctioned by tribunals ; but tribunals do nothing but point out established usages.

The law is very rich in rational process of the intellect. Law is nothing but reason ; and reason is not always science. Law is intellectual life, and the life of the most reasonable man is not determined by a succession of rigid and scientific decisions.

What is law from the philosophical point of view and what are its elements ? It is a self-evident truth. The idea of justice, moral obligation, duty and subjective right remain entirely foreign to it and arise from metaphysics.

Metaphysical Law.

Metaphysical conceptions are not submitted to the calculation of probabilities. Metaphysics consists of a series of hypotheses upon the unknown, conducted according to the methods of rational logic. It is justified in pure logic. The word "metaphysics" is to some synonymous with vagueness and absurdity. Practical life can dispense with metaphysical entities even less than theoretical life can. The beautiful, the good and the just can find no positive justification, yet humanity cannot deprive itself of these conceptions. In the same way, conscious belief in an ideal of justice has directed men in the building of the law, and this belief is an element in history which cannot be neglected.

Kant was a landmark in both philosophy and jurisprudence, and the advance, from Grotius to Kant, in legal philosophy, can be best followed, if we understand that from Descartes to Kant in philosophy.

Metaphysical law is a kind of logic. Morality is the study of the good while metaphysical law is the study of the just. Each of these entities should remain independent; they may very well be contradictory to one another. What is good may be just or unjust; what is just may be good or evil. It may be good to exercise a certain restraint on personal liberty in order to turn a people from vice and lead him to virtue, but this can never be just.

For centuries and centuries metaphysical thought has been labouring to put the ideal of justice into juridical reality. Positive law is essentially an organizer. Its essential aim is order. An injustice which does not disturb the established order concerns it only to a slight extent. Law should give satisfaction to all, especially to the most restless. Whereas in metaphysical law, an injustice remains an injustice even when it is patiently endured. The gravity of the injustice is determined

not by the unrest which it brings to society, but by the degree of its divergence from the formula *Suum Cuique.*

Positive law draws its inspiration from the just ; but it follows also the directions of the useful, of the moral and even of the prejudice. Certain rules of positive law are absolutely indifferent to the idea of justice. In order to maintain order, positive law should foresee, make regulations, and lay down principles by which future controversies should be decided.

In positive law, sanction is the distinguishing characteristic of the juridical regulation, and that the necessity of sanction differentiates law and morality. For metaphysical law such a proposition would be untenable. Metaphysical law is not an ideal positive law, but a science of simple logic. It does not seek what "ought to be," but what conforms or does not conform to the *Suum Cuique.*

The rôle of Justice in Law.

What is Justice? Justice consists in allowing each his place in the Sun and the right to develop himself by his own efforts. The Latin equivalent *Suum Cuique,*—to everyone his own. An Arab proverb says, "A King without justice is a river without water," and the king personifying the law, it may be said, "A law without justice is a river without water." Arabic language possesses a rich terminology for expressing the idea of justice. The wealth of the vocabulary is generally a trustworthy index of the development of the idea and the importance attached to it. Justice gives juridical science its *Raison d'être.* The conception of justice is purely subjective. It would be produced by a certain mental state. As it is not the result of any logical toil, it is of an emotional or sentimental nature. It is obvious that the sentiment and the emotion of justice play a large part in social life. The sentiment is particularly respected as being the manifestation of an idea of justice.

The essential point is that justice be most truly respected in the individual. A government derives its chief justification from its works. Civil and criminal justice is justice of the first degree. Political justice is justice of the second degree. It results from this fact that in order to obtain efficient protection for their individual rights, private citizens are obliged to pay something to their governments. If they give something from their patrimony and do not obtain this protection, they are deprived of the expected equivalent and the rule *Suum Cuique* is violated.

In public international law certain rules deal directly with the physical being of individuals and constitute rules of justice of the first degree. Acts of injustice committed against individuals are more serious in theory, but less dangerous in practice than acts of injustice committed against collectivities.

For the Arab philosophers, the reason which reveals justice is not the ordinary reason of the public engaged in the struggle for life, but it is the reason of the best minds at the most serious moments of their existence. Justice is unveiled to him who meditates upon death, to him who, above all earthly interests, can contemplate law as a pure and simple abstraction that directs humanity without appealing to its passions. The thought of death prepares one to understand justice.

The manifestations of the idea of justice in legal history have occurred under (*a*) concrete and practical form, (*b*) abstract and theoretical form.

In the days when metaphysics of law flourished, some are seen to affirm the transcendency of the idea of justice as an emanation from divinity.

Plato's theory of justice—the Virtue, that guided by wisdom, co-ordinates and regulates all the individual virtues and faculties, and brings about harmony in the real practical life of the individual as a member of the society. He holds that the essence of justice is in Reason. Aristotle defines justice as Equality.

The idea of the just is a theoretical idea. Its basis is metaphysical, for it is through metaphysical conception that we attribute to the *Suum Cuique* an ideal character.

What is Right?

Socrates preached that right and wrong should depend on the inner judgment of man and not on the objective arbitrary standards set by the might of the strong, and established the principle of free thinking and self conviction. Aristotle lays down that right and justice constitute the foundation and essence of the state.

Idea of Liberty.

The idea of liberty results from that of justice, through the fact that he who is resticted in his liberty has not at his command the disposition of his person or his goods, accordingly, "he does not have his own." Liberty, implies the absence of hindrance to individual activity whether physical or moral; the disposition without hindrance of the physical or moral person by his own self. To confine a man in prison, to compel him to work upon some specified piece of work, or to prevent him from saying what he thinks, is to take away from him that which belongs to him in the most intimate and indisputable way,—it is accordingly depriving him of his own. Liberty is one of the most essential elements of justice. Liberty is in itself absolute and unlimited. It can only be restricted by the liberty of others. The liberty to commit reprehensible and immoral acts, provided they harm no one—is as indispensible to justice as that to commit laudable and moral acts.

Since every personality has the same right to expand without limitation, each is obliged to endure restrictions which are necessary to the expansion of the personality of others. Thus each one's liberty and property are limited by the liberty

and property of others. One fulfills his duty towards others when he respects their rights. The whole of the justice of equilibrium is summed up in respect for the liberty, the personality and the property of others.

Rousseau held that by the Social Contract, the person and activities of each individual member were left to the control and guidance of the general or common will of the community instead of his own and the natural liberty of man was therefore not transferred (as it was inalienable) to any body outside himself, but to himself regarded no longer as an isolated individual but as merged in the whole. This conception of the inalienability of natural liberty by contract and that of a corporate general body and will, are the peramount contributions of Rousseau to politics and jurisprudence.

Kant became the apostle, in modern days of freedom, of free will emancipated from external motives and bound only by the law of its own free rational will. So the cardinal mandate of Law and Justice is—" So conduct your affairs that the free use of your will is compatible under a general law, with the freedom of every one else," or in other words, " Act in such a way that your liberty may accord with that of every one else." Kant's formalism led to the abstract form of liberty being taken as the cardinal principle of nature and the basis of all laws and legislation. It was the liberty of the will of the individual wholly purged of all considerations of the tendencies, motives, necessities, or utility which might lead the will to some definite line of concrete activity. Kant's formalism failed to recognize that law and its principles are not eternal, but must change and grow along with history, civilization and environments of the peoples and societies.

Montesquieu said, " Liberty is the ability to do what we ought to do, the ability to do good," " the freedom to devote one's self to the State," " the freedom to take part in public life." Liberty is everywhere a relative thing, as it is everywhere a sentimental thing.

Origin of Law.

Montesquieu suggests that laws are the creation of climate, local situation, accident or imposture. He overestimates the force of the accidental and external causes in the shaping of the law, and underestimates the stable and inherited qualities of human nature or the race which go to form and develop the law. Montesquieu undoubtedly demonstrated the relativity of law and held that law should answer the needs of each country and age; but he did not attain any unity or philosophy underlying the relativity.

Hugo held that law, in fact, is formed in all states, in its earliest stages, independently of legislation ; and nothing can be more conclusive than the evidence of the history of legal systems of Rome and England. The Common law of England, and Equity law of both England and Rome, were formed and developed independently of legislation. The language of a people as well as its manners and customs had formed themselves naturally, without enactments or commands of any human, or divine legislator, or contract of the members universally agreeing to abide by a common set of words or mode of special conduct definitely selected for the purpose, and this is the same with law. The positive law of a people also, like its language and manners, forms and develops itself as suited to the circumstances and course of conduct happening or obtaining in the life's history of the people—in the natural course of the unfolding, development or self-realisation of the natural spirit or genius.

Savigny, also, likens the law of a people to its language. Neither depends on chance or human choice, *i.e.*, the voluntary will of the different individuals who compose a people. These phenomena—Law, language, custom, government—have no separate existence, but one force and power in a people bound together by its nature, and our minds give them separate existences. What makes it a single whole is the common conviction of the people, the like feeling of inner necessity to

which all attribute a contingent and arbitrary origin. The organic evolution of law with the life and character of a people develops with ages ; and in this it resembles language. As in the latter, as in Law, there can be no instant of rest, there is always movement; and development of Law is governed by the same power of internal necessity as simple phenomena. Law grows with a nation, increases with it, dies at its dissolution and is a characteristic of it. Savigny argues that Law is prehistoric in all societies, found already established like their language, manners and political organisation, even in those remotest periods of their history in the past of which we can gather any information or proof ; and is stamped with the special national characteristic of each. All of these, including Law, are consequently natural manifestations of popular life and by no means product of man's free will ; in our consciousness, the notion of positive law is always connected with that of necessity which would be impossible if Law were a creation of our free will. Law, like language of a people, pre-supposes a spiritual unity which must be the basis of communal life. An indeterminate accidental aggregate of men without this unity cannot have a common language, law, or customs. Law is considered as a product of the people's life—as a manifestation of its spirit. Puchta attaches greater weight to the conception of spiritual unity and regards it as the necessary manifestation of a force acting in the organism of popular life and independently of the consciousness of the individuals who make up the whole. Law, according to Puchta, proceeds from the popular spirit (general will) like a plant from the germ with its form and line of development fixed in advance and independently of the common life. Law arises out of the conviction of the people as a whole. * * *

Law, like language, is independent of social functions, and is composed of purely conventional elements and of logical elements. The categorical idea of law is a pure function of the abstract logical intelligence. Law is self-evident truth.

The life, the customs, the beliefs of a people have a real influence upon the form of the law.

Criminal Law.

Criminal law is charged with the work of selection, to purify society—to suppress the bad elements and to select a better humanity. To remove a malefactor from society is to better the social group from a moral point of view. Criminal law has existed from the day when some power, collective or individual, lay or religious, tribe, family, state, public or secret society, king or even brigand, first took charge of maintaining or helping to maintain the general safety. It punishes guilty acts directly or assists in repressing them. It is the power which chooses and applies the punishment. It monopolizes the right to punish. It combats private vengeance. The monopoly of punishment becomes a constant attribute of sovereignty, desired not only by those who are capable of maintaining order, but also by those who are powerless to do so. To maintain order, three organizations are necessary, (1) a good police which watches and arrests malefactors, (2) a good magistracy—to prosecute with energy and sentence with clearness of judgment, and (3) a penal system which is really repressive. Primitive societies had poor police forces, and insufficient means of proof; civilized societies generally have excellent police forces, and magistracies.

Previous to all civilization, might was right and the weakest disappeared unnoticed. When men became grouped into families or tribes, it was to the interest of the group to prevent itself from diminishing and to assume the defence of its members. Anger and self-interest drove each collectively into trying to inflict the greatest injury upon its rivals. But the families were nearly equally armed and so there was not a declaration of open warfare but each chose its own time and means. The most powerful, courageous, vigorous and innocent were liable to succumb in the struggle of snares and ambuscades,

as well as the weakest and most guilty. There was no selection, either physical, moral or intellectual, for no strength, strategy, or sympathy could protect any one.

Criminal law has always stood forth as the protector of the good, of those who create a disturbance only because they are driven to it.

In Criminal Law, the state prosecutes a malefactor, and at the same time the state ties our hands to prevent our taking revenge for the wrongs we suffer.

Crime is spoken to be an act which inflicts injury upon another. There are a large number of acts which are repressed by the State in its own interest.

In primitive groups individuals resemble one another psychologically and physically. By virtue of their identity of physical conformation, they possessed the same tendencies and the same good and bad qualities, and since they were impelled by inclination, by their own nature, to obey the social consciousness, it seems that crime, injury to that consciousness, ought to have been unknown. For the development of penal law, there was necessity of individual thought, which was opposed to common mind and which reacted against it.

Individual tendencies are manifested among the most primitive peoples in one of the most important elements of penal law, *viz.*, the taking of the law into one's own hand, or private vengeance. Crime was not then an injury to the "Common Consciousness" but to individual interests. It is certain that crime often derives its specific character from the fact that it contradicts the prevailing opinion. We cannot understand the history and development of criminal law, if we do not take into account (*a*) the individual sentiment of vengeance, (*b*) the collective sentiment of reaction against injuries to common beliefs and (*c*) the political idea with respect to civil and religious authority. From these three elements the most varied combinations have been formed. The following ideas have directed the destiny of penal law, *viz.*, (*i*) the anger of the victim, (*ii*) popular

indignation and (*iii*) the will of the authority which interposes its intervention.

Jhering's formula " The history of punishment is a constant abolition. The more cultivated a people becomes, the less cruel it is in the repression of offences."

Development of Law.

The consideration and explanation of concrete factors—the changes and developments of the human institutions were taken up in the first half of the 19th century, philosophically by the Metaphysical school and historically by the German Historical School and they made it a common point to regard Law and other human institutions as essentially evolving entities. Juridical science is composed of various elements such as social aims (institutions), artificial technique (construction), pure logic, and metaphysics (legal philosophy or the idea of right). Law develops largely because of conditions under which it is administered, and to which it must be applied ; and this truth is illustrated by the variation of the law as to servitudes and easements of light in Mohammedan and Byzantine countries.

Savigney's Theory of the Development of Law.

As in the case of language, and the other manifestations of social life, the law develops in the earlier stages spontaneously and uninterruptedly under the same principle of internal necessity, which explains its first appearance. In a civilized society the different sides of national activity, hitherto developing upon the people as a whole, individualise and separate from each other, and are taken up by different classes or sections of the people, like the jurists, linguists and scientists, each class being henceforth exclusively occupied with its own especially assigned function. In the hands of the specialists, Law—like language and science—becomes richer in ideas, more complex and technical. It now assumes a variety of aspects—political and technical.

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Now there is, so to speak, a double existence ; on the one side a general national life, on the other, the distinct science of the jurists. The relation of law to the general life of the people might be called its political element ; its connection with the juristic science, its technical element. The correlation of these two elements varies with the elements of the life of a people but both participate, more or less, in the development of law.

Religion.

The Law, the institutions and the legal customs of primitive people are very closely connected with religion. The king is a descendant of a national divinity ; the judge and the lawmaker transmit to the people the will of the gods which becomes transformed into law. Law is not exclusively of religious origin but the influence of religion is considerable. Every religion is a system of rites, of beliefs and of sentiments. Legal systems influenced by dogmas and ritualism are formalistic ; and those in which sentiment predominates are psychological and subjective. Virtues are sentiments. The Christian religion is an emotional religion. Patriotism is collective and secular, although in antiquity, it was based upon religion. Man must have a social guardian who follows him into his private life and regulates his passions. By chance or instinct religions and societies have discovered this guardian. Ever since there have been thinking man, law has been in continual contact with religion, morality and philosophy. The theologicians start from the moral point of view. They wish to prevent men from sinning and to prepare him in this life for his eternal destiny.

Religion signifies the notion of the absolute, and the direct relations of all finite realities to it. This idea is responsive to an instinctive feeling. A religious man arranges his conduct conformably to this impulse, and accordingly religion becomes for him a source of rules of action, consisting of commands and prohibitions.

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Sentiment.

Sentiment enters into law from every direction. Juridical aims are all of sentimental origin. But they are not entirely sentimental. One may propose to himself to satisfy an affection or to realize an ideal through the law. The ideal was a sentiment, but it is no longer so ; it is an extinct sentiment. It has become an idea, a principle, and belongs to an intellectual life. Between emotion and sentiment there is an essential distinction. Sentiment is a capacity for emotions which may or may not be realized.

" Our duty, our only duty, is to triumph by all means, not in our personal interest, but for the idea which we represent, and for the future of humanity."

It is quite certain that when law is in accord with the general sentiment of the people, they feel no need to change it. Reformers very often intend to give pleasure to the whole or a part of the general public. Emotional life comprises general and social elements. Legislator may be looked upon as the spokesman of a definitely determined sentiment which demands a law to defend itself or to attack an adverse sentiment. Sentiment is a powerful but blind force. Jhering holds that selfishness is the source of all human sentimentality. Intellectual power is a more recent acquisition than sentimental value. Primitive sentimentality must be developed with the primitive intelligence and not with the intelligence of civilized man. Individual sentimentality exercises due moderation and discretion, and such a recognition is indispensible to the complete understanding of the creation of the law.

Imitation.

A great many animals like to imitate ; and it is one of the great pleasures of savages ; children develop this tendency but this tendency disappears with the adult civilized man.

Emotions of Social Contact.

(i) Altruism.

"Love thy neighbour as thyself. Rejoice in his good fortune and help him to realize it. Suffer in his misfortune, go to his rescue." These precepts express charity, moral emotions. The idea of justice is formulated in "Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you."

(ii) Jealousy.

Animals are jealous of one another. Man derives this evil tendency from his animal nature. Animal jealousy is simple, rudimentary and accidental; in the human heart, it is complex, developed and continual. It furnishes a picture of the real state of feeling in society and its shades are found in almost all human institutions.

Jealousy is the fear of losing the goods to which we cling; distrustful aversion towards those who may take them away from us.

Mere envy is the desire to take from others what we ourselves do not possess.

Malevolent envy is the desire to destroy something of another's that makes him happy, without any personal advantage to ourselves.

To these three sentiments there correspond three social forces. Democracy is envy; Aristocracy is jealousy; as for malevolent jealousy, it is the lot of abnormal persons and for those who are unclassed, either because from a high position they have fallen low or having started in the lower ranks they are slow in their ascent.

There is no human being however unrelated or closely associated with us with whom we are not in competition to a certain extent. Husband and wife, brothers and sisters, parents and children, are to a certain extent, opponents of one another. Each strives to play a certain part in the family life and is afraid of seeing himself effaced or deserted in

consequence of the too great success of the one whom he loves most.

Jealousy is not an evil when it is not exaggerated, that is, when it is sufficiently distributed and not concentrated upon a single point. It is a factor in life and progress, provided its circulation is regular.

Social life has made us irritable, distrustful and sadly sensitive in regard to the success of others.

We cannot conceive of a law which would consist of reason and logic solely and no sentiment.

In the making of laws and the practice of law certain minds prefer to be guided by sentiment, others by ideals. There is not a text of law which has not a sentimental cause, but this cause may be more or less immediate. In the study of law no one can neglect the emotional life. Without sentiment, substance would nearly always be lacking. It may be said, as many legal philosophers have done, that sentiment is the substance and juridical science is the form of laws. It may be said that emotional life is quite as much the form as the substance of the law. The work of the legislator and of the philosopher is to transform emotional ideas into ideals or principles which can act through their logical force.

Morality.

The morality may be expressed thus: "If I steal and it becomes known, I shall be ashamed and shame is disagreeable." Or under its religious formula: "If I steal God will know it and I shall be ashamed before Him." This last feeling is evidently more efficacious. The secular formula is not a very reliable rule of conduct. It does not prevent the individual from doing what he wishes to do, when he is sure of not being seen. It does not forbid him to do wrong but to allow himself to be caught. Moralists have taken two different positions in regard to the feelings of pride and shame. Some have wished to destroy them in order to

substitute a higher and more complete and rational morality. Others have attempted to transform the social sentiment into a subjective sentiment. Every man has his own ideas of morality and justice. The ideas of justice, moral obligation, duty and subjective right arise from metaphysics. Many civilizations have not distinguished law from morality. Morality is the study of the good; metaphysical law is the study of the just. Each of them should remain independent; they may be contradictory to one another. What is good may be just or unjust; what is just may be good or evil.

Morals regulate the internal relations of men, operating on external relations only in so far as they are the expression of internal relations. The object of morals is the perfection of the individual through himself, and thereby the perfection of mankind. The morally acting and morally thinking man recognizes that he is a member of mankind, and feels a sense of obligation to contribute through his own perfection his share in the attainment of the destiny of the individual as well as of humanity in general. Morality is essentially an influential factor in the development of legal system. More than law it has to do with the security of family life and its objects.

Personality.

Man has no subjective right except that of his own person. But through his activities, his labour, he creates new objects which would not exist if he had not existed. From labour arises property, which represents the industrial and moral activity of the individual. The rights of physical integrity, physical freedom and physical freedom spring directly from a recognition of personality or a recognition of capacity for rights.

Biology.

The history of life began before humanity. The destiny of man is no doubt of a peculiar nuture, but he owes his prosperity

to former stages of evolution. His psychology, his morality, his customs depend in part upon the same physiological causes which influence other living beings. Biology is indispensible to the study of primitive man, of our original institutions. There are a number of biological phenomena which are the causes of juridical facts.

Race.

The pure race presents a unity of character and of ideals which permits it to become solidified for a common labour. Peoples of mixed races appear as disquieted by various ideals, incapable of labouring upon a single work and able to prosper only under liberal institutions.

The theory of race and its application to the law merits a detailed study.

Industrial inventions.

The majority of industrial inventions are designed for the use of the public at large and are social in purpose.

Political Economy.

Political economy and its laws are of great importance in explaining the creation of institutions. The invention of money effected a great transformation in human psychology. Money created avarice. Attachment to money means the simple possession of money which is one of the sources of the most profound satisfaction to man. With the civic emancipation and partly as a cause leading to the same, the birth of the new science of Economics grown out of the demands of developing commerce and industry.

The Economic Science in the 16th and 17th centuries advocated the interference of law in favour of promoting national wealth by protection—by the favouring of trade and of the

productive industries and interdiction of exportation of raw materials and precious stones.

In the eighteenth century the spirit of freedom and individualism soon asserted itself in economics as in political and legal sciences. Quesnay preached "Natural Economics" and demanded absolute non-interference of Law in economic development in the shape of protection or trade restrictions.

Colbert favoured trade, Quesnay looked upon agriculture as the primary source of material wealth and wanted it to be relieved of all burdens and taxes.

Adam Smith and Richardo, in England, and T. B. Say, in France, transformed the science altogether. The unprecedented development in the beginning of the eighteenth century of the manufacturing industries and the industrial class through the introduction of machinery, threw agriculture into the shade; and the science of economics had henceforth the new task of grappling with the question of capital and labour and proper adjustment. Later development of the Science attached importance to labour as the sole value producing agent in economics, *i.e.*, the principle that the average quantity and quality of labour expended for an object, determines the value of economic commodities. The raw material being the same, the internal value of the manufactured article will vary with the quality and quantity of labour spent upon it. The cost of production determined the natural value of every commodity; and the natural value of labour is the actual cost of production of the labour, *i.e.*, the minimum cost of the necessary maintenance of the labourer and his family. The law of supply and demand and the law of competition are inexorable natural laws. Free trade and competition, freedom to individuals to accumulate wealth by lawful means, freedom of contract regarding wages and prices, and other fundamental natural rights are most conducive to the prosperity of the individual, and necessarily to that of the aggregate of individuals, on the society, nation or state.

In the name of individual freedom, it indirectly encouraged and developed class distinction. It regarded the society as a mechanical aggregate of the individual members, and at least encouraged the policy of law that allows the individual anyhow to seek his self-interest if only he can do so without transgressing upon the law of torts or crimes. The benefit of this policy, both of law and economics, was monopolised by the newly grown rich industrial class, and the favour, protection, or privilege, or class distinction, openly advocated by the Mercantalists was, in effect, indirectly, and under an illusory name and theory of justice and freedom fostered in the 19th century by Adam Smith's school.

St. Simon (1760-1825) felt aggrieved by the inordinate value attached and excessive favour shown by the state and the law to the royal family, the officials and the capitalists, and their undue apathy and neglect of the classes who live upon their labour and talents. He proceeded to show that the industrial class, in the largest sense of the term, including scholars, artists, cultivators, manufacturers, labouring classes and merchants, constitutes the core and mainstay of society, and provides it with its means of subsistence and other necessaries, as well as with its luxuries and aesthetic and cultural requirements. He said that if the nobility and capitalist were lost, the gap would be easily filled up by others, whereas if the productive classes were lost, the society would lose her soul and die out. He was of opinion that society should, therefore, be reconstructed so that the most important section of the community (the fourth state) may be raised up with regard to their moral, intellectual and physical condition and freed from their economic bondage.

Nature of Things.

The legislator observes the nature of things in order to realise juridical aims. A great many of the distinctions that different legislations make between personal property and real

property spring from the fact that the first is easily transportable and the second is not. The legislator also distinguishes between fungible and non-fungible things, etc.

Geographical Environment.

The influence of the geographical environment upon human customs and institutions has been noted for many years. The climate, altitude, proximity to the sea and fertility of the soil undoubtedly influence the character of human beings as well as that of animals. For example, a country that is very poor and mountainous predisposes its inhabitants to a life of rapine to the prejudice of richer neighbours; this appears very natural.

Instrumental Inventions.

Inventions produced by the human brain pass rapidly from the passive rôle of created objects to the active rôle of creating beings. Man who fashions a tool, at the very same instant in which he becomes master of this tool, becomes also its slave. He has to adopt his muscular and his intellectual efforts as well as his mode of life to the nature of his tool. His family life, his social organization, his sentiments, his thought, and his social or religious ideals will be more or less influenced by the creation of every new instrument. The following inventions exercise tyraninical power over humanity: (1) Military inventions of any importance cause an upheaval of social condition. (2) Progress in the matter of instruments of production. (3) Progress in means of transportation has transformed human intelligence. (4) Instruments of distraction. The printing press—hand, motor and rotary—bears down on human thought with heavy tyranny. Periodicals, newspapers rob the greater part of humanity of which is left it for reflection.

Psychology.

Psychology is nothing more than the description of mental activity taken at any particular moment. Psychology has been

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defined as the science of individual facts of consciousness. Every psychological fact is an organic work concerning which the animal or the man who performs it has a more or less complete consciousness. If this organic work is brought about by society, if it is produced in an animal living with other animals, under a particular form that the work could not have had if this animal had lived in isolation, it would no longer constitute a psychological, but a social phenomenon; it would be the object of study of the science of facts which result from life in society, *i.e.*, of social science or sociology. Individual psychology sets aside the fact that man is a social being. Sociability is a feeling of pleasure which the individual experiences in forming part of a group, in living in common with other men even when the needs of the material or the individual life do not demand it. This sentiment exists in varying degrees, in the breast of nearly every human being and plays an important part in life. The human heart and brain are not developed in solitude. We are made in the image of the social environment through which our ancestors have passed. If these ancestors lived, and we are still living in caves, we could possess neither very profound knowledge, refined feelings. Knowledge, wit, talent and genius are formed by social contact.

Social environment signifies the totality of social things with which the human being is surrounded from the cradle to the grave, that is to say, with other men and with the things which those other men have created. The individual is subjected to this new environment and is its product.

The superiority of the human animal can only be understood by the necessity which has compelled him to struggle against obstacles which other animals do not understand.

As regards social science, experimental verification is very difficult.

Kant holds knowledge as limited to phenomenal world and its relations, and to be acquired by the scientific process of induction from the facts of experience. He holds to the scientific

method alone—the method of natural sciences, physical (mathematical and chemical) and biological, for that alone certainty of results can be obtained. The facts concerning Law and State, though they concern human associations, are not thoroughly amenable to scientific treatment, for their causes (motives and purposes) are often beyond the reach of scientific observation and their modes of operation are uncertain. He builds up a new science, which he calls Social Physics or Sociology, in which the phenomena of intellectual and moral life of human being are treated scientifically.

In his development of this science of Sociology, Comte adopts the organic conception of society, eschews the individualistic conception, and regards the individual as wholly a resultant product of the social and other forces and environments. His whole position is founded upon the same idea of the necessary correlation of every kind of social phenomena, including law, that had impressed the Historical and Organic jurists.

Man and his Institutions.

The basis of our institutions is in the human will. Man alone has a history, a past where the energies of groups and individual have been in continual action—where laws, customs, and manners have been minutely examined, modified and transformed through the centuries by free and conscious beings. If human decisions are included in universal determinism, as is every other physical or biological phenomenon, the action of the will has no importance and is never the real cause of the Law. On the other hand, if the sequence of causes be broken and an indeterminate element be introduced, then we can no longer construct a scientific work. It is enough if we hold the will as a synthesis of an aggregate of incalculable causes.

The Will and Action in Psychological Life.

The will is a positive phenomenon whose exterior manifestations we can discern, but whose intimate nature does not

concern us. Even mere animals have an aim to their action. They act in order to obtain a certain result. The animal obeys the final cause before acting. Man has desires and aims of action to guide him, and something more distant and exalted,—ideals to which he consecrates his entire life, and which he does not even hope to realize in his life-lime. If every human action is preceded by a desire, then the will is the only director. What past generations desired and willed correspond exactly to what they have done. Juridical monuments of the past express the desires or ideals of the legislators and of those who helped in the development of law or custom. Observed from without, every one of our movements can be explained as having a premeditated end. It is the nature of man that he proposes to do right before knowing what he will do to do right. Savigny considers law as developing from tendencies natural to man, harmonizing itself with the environment which produces it. Never was the formation of law entirely unconscious, nor was it voluntary. No doubt our actions are preceded by an act of will. In the creation of the law, the power of the will may be modest, but has considerable influence. In order to direct consciously his own destiny, man would have to understand the functions of the law before realizing them, and to realize them as he conceives them. Every legal system is a combination of institutions, just as every man is a combination of intellectual and moral elements.

The individual mind existed at every epoch in conflict or in combination with the collective mind. Division of labour has been of great psychological importance, but it has not created the individual nor destroyed the passion of crowds and of opinion.

Primitive man was a creature of instinct and primitive society, an instinctive institution. Originally man was ready to sacrifice himself and others, without reflection, to society. His idea of general prosperity was to render each individual stronger and happier. Man becomes transformed by degrees

from an instinctive into an intelligent being. He reasons about the object of his actions, his laws and his customs. Society is no longer the end in which the individual should become absorbed, but its *raison d'ître* is in the happiness which it ought to diffuse, and the unhappiness which it ought to prevent; and man becomes the rational aim of civilized organizations. The powers of the State are the guarantees of our personal development. Civilized States are established by a series of revolutions. Every revolution is an insurrection against thoughtlessly accepted tradition, and its object is the substitution of of a premeditated social bond for that of instinct and tradition. It is in the nature of living beings to become raised from lower forms toward higher forms by a slow and steady transformation. It is the lot of every living being to pass from birth to death by a series of periods of growth and of decay which constitute the whole of its life. It evolves by virtue of its own vital force, but also under the influence of the natural forces surrounding it. The living being has its own energy, possesses in itself the direction of its own destiny ; but is dependent upon its environment. A living body may not remain such without undergoing at every instant a series of incessant transformation. Life involves continual toil, and through this continual toil the being increases in size, develops, reproduces itself, becomes weaker and dies.

A moral evolution also takes place among individuals corresponding to the physical evolution, but the phenomenon of moral evulution is more complex.

It is an established fact in the history of all people and of all times, that the same classes do not remain indefinitely in the upper ranks of society. In proportion as there arises in the inferior classes an individual of talent, he proceeds by his own efforts to assume a position in the first rank. When there gathers in the lower strata a crowd of malcontents who have all the requirements necessary to make them rise, such as talent, energy, etc., this compressed force, sooner or later, breaks the social barriers.

Some philosophers asked what was the aim of human existence. According to some the most ideal, the most disinterested virtue was to be desired, while others appreciated material pleasures. The aim of life would be health ; health is the totality of conditions most favourable to the preservation of life. We live in order to live and in order that the social organism of which we form a part may live. Some believe that the destiny of man is to serve God upon earth ; for others the ideal is the equal distribution of sufficient food. History plays a large part in the religious or philosophical convictions of individuals.

Institution.

Human will is the basis of our institutions. In each line of our old laws we read of sentiments of love and devotion to family and native land. Man possesses a certain conscious or unconscious attachment for his institutions. Human thought is the product of institutions and institutions the product of human thought. The origin of institutions is attributed to religion. Institution is the ensemble of process by which a social aim, the form of social relations is realised. Every command or institution which is useful and in conformity with morality or justice is certainly a favoured rule. A law is vicious where it is useful, but contrary to morality and justice. Institution is defined as an "established thing." The nucleus of the idea "institution" is only the habitual repetition by one or more persons, or one or more animals, of any act whatsoever. An institution is nothing else but habit. There are individual institutions which do not differ in their essence from collective ones. Each person may create his own economical, religious and family institutions. Institutions are changing constantly, and these changes constitute a large part of history. The intellectual development of the whole of the nation, the material prosperity of the people, or even the sentiment of national pride may each be taken separately as the criterion to measure institutions. Love of institutions contains the poetry of habit for the conservative, the poetry of vision for the

radical. Political economy is of great importance in explaining the creation of institutions. The progress of institution is regular.

Hegel's Philosophy of Law and Government.

The state shall not exist for the individual nor yet the individnal for the state, but the state and citizens shall enter in common the service of a definite cultural ideal, whereby the community and the members thereof shall advance, each according to his capacity, the PROGRESS of MAN.

HARICHARAN BISWAS

VI

THE CHARACTER OF THE TEACHER

The teacher who stands up for the first time before a new class has two problems to solve before he can hope for any success. They are, in the order in which they present themselves, the pupil himself, and the subject, or subjects to be taught. Wherever in the school life a student begins the study of a subject new to him (that is to say at the beginning of the elementary schools and in the secondary schools and colleges, when the student begins to specialise) his teacher will find his chief concern is rather with what the student already knows than with what he is about to learn, just as the engineer who goes about to build a bridge, must first make a complete study of the river's bed. When once the foundation has been laid, the builder can forget it, and devote all his attention to the bridge itself. There is no fear that he will build any of the visible parts unconnected with the rest of them.

Now, it is not a simple matter by any means, to find out the contents of another mind, any more than the nature of the river bed is immediately apparent. The man who must do it ought to be pre-eminently the sort of man that likes his students better than he likes his subject. If he does, it follows by a well-known law of human nature that his students will like him, and the state of feeling which promotes mutual understanding will be thereby engendered. We may take it that this mutual liking is for all practical purposes what constitutes a good teacher in the beginning stage, and for that stage it is more important that the teacher should know his students, than that he should be a first-class honour's man in the subject he has to teach. He will have to deal with an enormous variety of character, and previous experience, all of which he must realise as completely as possible before he can lay a sure foundation.

This wide breadth of outlook is very seldom found associated with the power of concentration required for first-class expert knowledge of anything but human nature. It is not likely for instance, that the typical senior wrangler is a man very fond of children, or of very young men and women of all kinds, or in any sense a man of the world. It is very likely, on the other hand, that he will be quite unable to see any difficulty whatever in the elementary stuff he would have to teach.

The kind of man that thinks the first forty-six propositions of Euclid are really axiomatic, requiring no proof (There are such men! They are the stuff of which senior wranglers are made) is less fitted to teach an ordinary elementary class in mathematics than a patient ass, who is periodically astonished that so many of his students are able to get through the first book at all even with all the help he can give them. It is perhaps not too much to say that at all stages except the very last the teacher ought to be naturally more stupid in the subject he teaches (not in his knowledge of the mind) than his students are. We forget after a time the very nature of the difficulties we had to surmount at the first break-in on a new study. The teacher who takes the same work year after year, tends continually to drop the fundamental work, which familiarity leads him to despise. It becomes an old, bald and uninteresting tale to him, and he tends to think that it must be the same to his students. The greater the difficulty he experiences in apprehending it himself, the longer he remembers that difficulty, and is so much longer able to sympathise with and help those whom he is leading in the same paths.

Those bodies who appoint teachers of elements, should fix it in their minds that teaching power is much more important than academic qualifications in the subject to be taught.

The Chair of a University is usually filled quite rightly by the man most eminent in the subject he is to profess, regardless of his teaching power. Everyone assumes that he, having demonstrated his possession of an unique penetration in some

path of knowledge inaccessible to other people, will take the difficulties of teaching in his stride, and no one believes it more firmly than the professor himself. He is not surprised that only a small proportion of his students seem to know what he is talking about. His unchecked success in his own line has long since convinced him that the majority of mankind is comparatively idiotic. There is no escape from this state of affairs. The kind of man who alone is fit to fill such a position must inevitably have concentrated with great intensity on the subject he professess for the whole of his adult life. In those things which lie beyond that subject, he is a child compared to other people who have not been able or willing to so focus their attention. He is so innocent that he doesn't even suspect his own ignorance. The assurance with which he assumes his infallibility in everything is only paralleled by the similar assurance of the man as ignorant of everything as he is of matters beyond his province.

It is obvious that a staff made up of men of the above type requires very careful handling. The individual must be given entire freedom,as regards his own subject, because there is no one competent to direct him. He will retire into his laboratory or his study for days, weeks and often for years, require the expenditure of considerable sums of money, as to which no one but himself can say whether it is really necessary or not, and quite possibly emerge with the cool announcement that his results are negative or at any rate of no perceptible use to anyone. He will not, and cannot be directed to pursue his researches in any direction that to ordinary people may seem more useful. It is almost impossible to bind him down to any time table or to any syllabus. He cannot co-operate with his fellow professors because they each speak what amounts to a language of his own. The one whose speciality is expression has nothing original to express and the one who could tell us nothing new, is inarticulate except to those of his own kidney. (We thus arrive by another road, at the conclusion of last chapter, that it

is worse than useless to send unfit students forward for higher stages of instruction.)

The administrators of Universities, must choose the best man in his profession irrespective of his teaching powers, and give him only students to whom a mere hint is sufficient, and who will drag his knowledge from him. They must give him entire liberty in his own subject, and on no account allow him to interfere with anything else. Under these conditions, he and his students, will probably devote all their time to research, be insatiable in their demands for financial assistance, and be extremely impatient when asked for accounts or results. It can't be helped. It is this freedom and unworldliness that constitute a University. The history of modern civilisation has shown repeatedly that a University run on these lines is the one incorruptible source of material, and sipiritual progress.

In the first two sections of this article, we have tried to describe first, the teacher who should meet the student at the beginning of his career, and then, the teacher, who will be responsible for the last stages, in the education of the few who are found fit to explore the present boundaries of knowledge. In a complete and considered scheme of national education, the majority of the teachers would of course be intermediate in character between these two extremes, tending to the first type in the elementary stages and to the second in the advanced stages. They should all have followed some other kind of work for a few years before they became teachers. This is usually the case with the present day technical teacher, but it ought to be condition for all teaching posts. The salaries offered ought to be such that they will draw from practice (practice here means any kind of work outside the school) not necessarily the best, but at least good average men, with a taste for teaching. They should not be so low that only men who have failed to make a living in any other way will accept them. A salary scale for teachers should be constructed to make it a matter of indifference financially whether the individual earned his living

as a teacher or otherwise. It should not be high enough to attract those who have no special desire to teach for teaching's sake.

A great deal of the practical man's complaint about the uselessness of Education, arises from and is justified by the fact that large numbers of teachers have never been anything else but teachers. The defect is not one of a single generation's growth. There is a kind of Academic succession in which one teacher prepares his successor who immediately follows in his footsteps; a very detached mode of thought and feeling thus growing up and diverging more and more from the world at large, until it ceases to have any vital connection with it. This academic succession is almost universal in the elementary schools, in classical and literary subjects in the secondary schools, and very usual in the pure sciences such as Mathematics and Chemistry. On the modern technological side it is almost absent.

It is by no means an undiluted evil. Very careful study of its virtues as well as its vices must precede any attempt to modify it if the result is not to be as bad as, or worse than, the present system. The teacher who has never had to fight for his living in the commercial world has usually made fewer bargains with the devil than the man who has. While not in reality a better man (being an untested one), he nevertheless believes that it is possible to follow a very pure code of ethics, throughout one's whole life, and he accordingly teaches it or rather implies it by the atmosphere which he creates about the whole of his work. His students (those who do not themselves become teachers), pass out into the world, and attempt to apply this higher morality there, and either fail altogether from the worldly point of view, or modify it more or less until it becomes workable. They are the best men who stick to it and accept the consequences, and though they are failures as individuals it would be rash to say without qualification, that they have failed in vain. It is well for the world that such attempts as theirs should be made from time to time, even

though they do end on the cross. On the other hand, it is very difficult to call a halt to a deal with the devil. The majority of the students (those who elect to live on a somewhat lower plane rather than perish on a high one), will nearly always tend to go too far, and finally to develop a dangerous cynicism.

The ethical aspect of the academic tradition is of course only one side of it: possibly not the most important. There is an intellectual aspect as well, which finds its expression in the uncompromising demand for such subjects as Latin, Greek and Euclidean Geometry, as an indispensable mental training. When an Academic person says that Latin and Greek are absolutely necessary, he means, though he does not say it, that they are indispensable for any one who wants to live in and see the world, as he lives in it and sees it. If this is gently suggested to him he usually retorts, not without a considerable basis in reason, that his world is the only one worth living in.

The conclusion of the matter is, that if the pupils are to be trained for a better world than this, with a reasonable certainty that they will fail in business, an education under the Academic succession is the best thing for them; but if, on the other hand, it is desired that they should scoop in as much wealth for themselves as possible, with the least possible effort, they should have nothing beyond the three R's or if they do it should be imparted to them by teachers who have demonstrated in actual practice their enthusiasm and ability in a similar way of life. Both extremes are pernicious, and there is very little to choose betweeen them. The present need of education in India is a swing towards the worldly side, not forgetting that it could easily be too great; as it undoubtedly has been in America, where the enormous Endowments of the Universities is paralleled only by their intellectual and spiritual sterility

L. D. COUESLANT

THE KAMA DANCE.

I. Bewitched

Thy ankle-bells have cast a spell on me,
Who saw thee dance but once at Vasanta-time,
When Chandra's light illumined all the glade,
And Kama's flowered dart bound me to thee.
I watched thy slender form and lovely face,
And saw thy swaying dance as one bewitched ;
Thy little ankle-bells have captured me,
And I enslaved, sue only for thy grace.
Sri Krishna's music on his magic flute
Could not enchant men more than thou hast me,
Nor all the Nautch-girls of old Indra's court,
In song and dance, render thy beauty mute.

II. The Kama Dance

Throbbing drums and crimson moon
Glowing o'er the jungle trees ;
Drums that beckon with their rhythm,
Calling on the evening breeze.
Will she greet me with a smile
If I join the Kama Dance ?
Long I've waited for her answer,
Yearning for a kindly glance.

I am young and strong and eager,
Other maids have looked at me,
But the beauty of Jasmina
Still is all that I can see.
This is Vasant, mating-season,
And the Moon-god glows above,
Oh Jasmina, haste and follow,
Come and join the Dance of Love !

III. Song of Vasant

Oh sweet the yellow marigold
Above the lintel of thy door,
And sweet the jasmine in thy hair,
But sweeter thou, whom I implore.
The drums beat joyously to-night,
And flute-songs charm the lover's ear;
But thy soft voice of melody,
Is all the music I would hear.

The ruby chain around thy neck
Is beautiful and rare to see;
But thy red lips and hennaed-hands
Are jewels richer still to me.
'Tis Vasant-time and Spring is here,
Sri Kama guide thee to my arms,
That I may hold thee close for aye,
Nor want aught else save thy dear charms.

IV. Jasmina's Song

All day I've woven jasmine-chains
To bind my Bamba's manly form,
For when I choose him I must give
These ropes of love, him to adorn.
To-night the Moon-god calls to me,
To claim my love as one apart
From other youths, who long have sought
To win my favour and my heart.
In vain I try to still the pulse
That beats in rhythm to the drums,
Yet would not haste, lest I seem bold,
So hidden wait until he comes!

V. Jasmine-Chains

Singing softly, she walked along
With joyous heart and sang a song :
" Soon will I make a jasmine-chain
For my love, my love, so brave and strong !"
Only the palm-trees leaning there
Heard her sing of her lover fair,
They whispered sadly, for they knew
That her song would change to despair.
Again she walked, but silently,
" Alas, my song is mute," sighed she ;
" The jasmine-chain lies on his bier,
And my heart is dead within me."

VI. Mating-Drums

The mating-drums call out to-night,
And happy voices raised in song
Mock her who would have joined the feast
In dancing-ground, at moonlight.
Drooping and desolate with pain,
Jasmina sits alone and weeps
For Bamba, her lover who is gone,
Nor hears the drums that call in vain.
" Oh Beloved, come and take me,
Let me join thee in the Ghost-dance,
For I hear the drums deep pulsing,
Bamba, come and set me free !"

LILY S. ANDERSON

THE EAST IN ENGLISH LITERATURE.[1]

The earliest forms of intercourse between England and the East, of which we have any historical record were the Crusades (1095 A. D. to the 13th century).

The indirect result of the Crusades was the introduction of the civilisation of the Orient into the Western world. Subsequently commercial relationship was instituted between Asia and Europe. European culture too owes much to the civilisation of the East and specially to Arabia.[2]

In the 15th century the Turks owned in Europe, Bosnia, Albania, Bulgaria.

Another source of intercourse between the East and the West was Alexander's invasion of India in B. C. 300. Of the Indian influence on Europe, an authoritative historian says :—

"It is safe to say that the influence of Buddhist ideas on Christian doctrine may be traced in the Gnostic forms of Christianity, if not elsewhere. The notions of Indian philosophy

[1] This paper was originally read before the Athenaeum Club of the Benares Hindu University in 1925 and has since then been revised and partly rewritten. Since my writing this paper the following works dealing partly with my subject have come to my notice :—

(1) India in English Literature by R. Sencourt. (Simpkin and Kent).

(2) Indian Characters in English Fiction by P. Krishnaswami, Empire Review, January, 1926.

(3) Some Indian Associations of English Literature by P. Seshadri, Hindu University Magazine, January, 1926.

In this connection I should also mention Dr. James H. Cousin's "The Orientation of English Literature" (in "The Renaissance of India"), Dr. Dunn's "India in Song" (Oxford University Press, 1918) and Professor Seshadri's "India in English Song" (Central Hindu College Magazine, 1919) from which I have derived some guidance.

[2] *Cf.* Charles Seignobos—"History of Mediaeval Civilisation," Ch. VIII.

and religion which filtered into the Roman Empire flowed through channels opened by Alexander." The Buddhist missions of Asoka included visits to distant Hellenic kingdoms and perhaps even to Europe. During the rule of the Kushana Kings, commerce with the West was carried on both by the overland and sea-routes. "During the first and second centuries of the Christian era the trade between Southern India and the Roman empire was extensive."

Marco Polo the Venetian visited India in 1294-95 and the records of his travels were known to Chaucer, the father of English poetry. In 1487 a Spaniard, Pedro de Cavilharn reached Malabar and in 1498 Vasco da Gama landed at Calicut after rounding the Cape of Good Hope. Sir Hugh Willoughby was instrumental in opening trade relations between England and Persia. In 1589 Hakluyt published a letter of Rev. Father Thomas Stevens (a Wiltshire Jesuit father) who remained at Goa for forty years. James Lancaster came to Cape Comorin in 1591. John Mildenhall coming to India by the overland route, visited the Emperor Akbar's Court in 1599 and next year the East India Company was formed, a step destined to lead to great issues in future. Two letters of Mildenhall were published by Purchas. Ralph Fitch's narrative was published in Hakluyt's "Principal Navigations" (1599-1600), Vol. II and Samuel Purchas left an account of Akbar's empire in his "Pilgrimage or Relation of the World" (Book V, Chap. VI). Captain Hawkins landing at Surat in 1608 stayed at the court of Jehangir for two years and a half and seven years later Sir Thomas Roe came to India as the accredited ambassador of James I to the Moghul Court, entrusted with the task of negotiating a treaty giving security to English trade. His chaplain Edward Terry left an account of his Indian experiences (A Voyage to East India, 1622) and Roe himself is responsible for a description of the country and its government. "Roe's Journal is chiefly useful as a faithful record of the manner in which business was done at a Court

saturated with intrigue, treachery and corruption" (Akbar the Great Moghul by V. A. Smith, page 383).

The travels of adventurous Europeans have opened up the avenues of knowledge of Tibet.[1]

Direct Reference to the East in English Literature.

The Anglo-Saxon Period.

One of the very earliest references to the East that we find in Anglo-Saxon literature is in the "Fates of the Apostles," one of the signed poems of Cynewulf whose date has been fixed in the second half of the 8th century or its close. The following occurs in one place of the poem: "Daring was the deed of Thomas in India; he bore the rush of swords. Brave in battle, Simon and Thaddeus warred in the Persian lands." This obviously refers to the St. Thomas legend current in South India. Vincent Smith disbelieves in the martyrdom of the saint but accepts the suggestion of Bishop Medlycott that he might have first visited an Indo-Parthian king and then travelled to Southern India. In any case there must have been some basis for such a legend. The Portuguese poet Camoens also mentions the St. Thomas story in the "Lusiad."[2] The scene of action of the story of the same poet's "Elene" is also laid in the East.

In course of his treatment of Alfred the Great's service to England, Stopford Brooke remarks: "We hear that he sent a messenger to visit the Christian Churches in India" and "he sent messengers even to the East."[3]

[1] The historical portions are based on Myers, Grant, Seignobos, Smith, Roberts, Lipson, and other historians.

[2] P. 331-4; Mickle's Translation, Bohn's Library.

[3] English Literature from the Earliest Times to the Norman Conquest, page 240 (Macmillan).

The Anglo-Norman Period.

One of the results of the Norman conquest was the introduction of the " Romantic tale " into England through French sources. " The Normans had begun to throw the stories of the East into new forms." In the 11th century two translations from Latin were made into the literary language of Wessex— " The letters of Alexander to Aristotle from India " and " The wonders of the East." Stopford Brooke says, " The breath of a new world was in them, new thought, new manners, a new way of living, a new imaginative range. " Among the romances of the Anglo-Norman Period, there are some legends which were obviously inspired by the Crusades and the struggle between the Paladin and the Saracen has been interwoven with magic tales, *e. g.*, "William of Pallerne," " Robert of Sicily," " Richard Coeur de Lion," " Floris and Blanchefleur," etc.

In " Floris and Blanchefleur, " a translation from French by a poet in the reign of Henry III, " the Oriental air of softness and luxury " is reproduced faithfully. This popular story of the Middle Ages, originating in the East, attained a wide circulation in Western Christendom, probably through the agency of the Crusades.

" These Oriental romances differed from the Saxon romances in their more fantastic and sentimental treatment. Some of them became Westernised to suit the fiercer taste of the Saxon, and the more vigorous inclination of the Norman, and they played a part in modifying our literature, and tinging with softer outline our romance " (Dr. A. Compton-Rickett, D. Litt., Page 42).

Middle English Period.

Sir John Mandeville or Maundeville, the oldest Anglo-Saxon prose-writer who lived in the 14th century, travelled for thirty years in the East and wrote his " Voyage and Travaile " on these experiences. " Among other things he left a long account of Arabia and how roses came into the world. Then

follow descriptions of the 'Watching of the Spar-hawk' in an American castle, the customs of the Ind, and the great Cham (Khan) of Cathay (Chinese Tartary)."

Then we come to

> "Dan Chaucer, the first warbler, whose sweet breath,
> Preluded those melodious bursts, that fill
> The spacious times of great Elizabeth
> With sounds that echo still."

In Chaucer's "Knight's Tale," there is mention of a king of Inde:

> "The grete Emetreus, the king of Inde,
> Upon a stede bay, trapped in stele
> Covered with cloth of gold diapred well,
> Cam ryding lyk the god of armes Mars."

Chaucer, very likely is referring to some Greek king of the Indian borders. Demetrios, the fourth king of Bactria, can probably be identified with this monarch. The Knight himself had fought in Gernade and Africa against the Moors, had been to Lyeyes, Satálye and fought beside the Lord of Palatye against the heathens in Turkye.

The Docteur of Phisik knew the best medical authorities. Professor Pollard remarks in this connection: "When Greek learning became pedantry the torch of medical learning kindled at that of the Greek schools was kept alight at Damascus and Bagdad."

The notorious "good wif of Eathe" had visited the shrine of the Three Kings of the East at Coloigne.

The Squire's narrative in the Canterbury Tales is conspicious as "being one which has most resisted all attempts to discover an immediate original for it, and because of its connection with the characteristics of Arabian fiction."

We need not here enumerate the tale. It is a story of Camuscan (Chengiz Khan) of Tartary and the Magic horse of Brass, the Mirror of Glass, the Naked Sword and the Ring of Canace, which were the presents sent by the king of Arabie and

of Inde, through one of his messengers. Chengiz means no other than that Great Khan. Chaucer has confused Cambyskan with Kublai Khan, grandson of Chengiz, who held his court at Sarray (Sarai) and who is mentioned by Marco Polo.

The one great scientist of the age of Chaucer, Roger Bacon desired to see the establishment of a school of Greek and Oriental philology, in order that the culture of the East might be accessible to the nations of Europe. But his dreams were doomed to disappointment. Bishop Grosseteste who occupied in Bacon's earlier days a position equal to that of the present day Chancellor was responsible for " a speaking brazenhead " based on Arabian philosophy. In Spenser's " Faerie Queene " (III-2-21) Merlin makes a glassy globe and presents it to King Ryence which showed the approach of enemies and discovered treasures. Warton remarks, " This fiction, which exactly corresponds with Chaucer's Mirror, Spenser borrowed from some romance, perhaps of King Arthur, fraught with Oriental fancy."

The Tale of the Man of Lawe told to him by a merchant begins with " In Surrie whilom dwelt a companye of chapmen riche." Surrie is Syria and the Prophet Mohamed and his laws as well as an Eastern Sultan and his mother a second Semiramis (Semyram) are introduced. The scene of the Prioresses Tale is laid " in a great citie " in Asia. In the Monk's Tale we hear of Nebuchadnezzar and Balshazzar, famous Eastern potentates. Darius, the famous Persian emperor, is again and again mentioned in this tale and on one occasion in the Wife of Bath's Prologue. This nasty woman speaking of her husband says :—

> " I was to him as kinde
> As any wyf from Denmark unto Inde. "

The Pardoner's Tale of three rioters who went in quest of Death, and found him in finding a hidden treasure is an old story from the East, retold in Chaucer's own style. (Pollard.)

Chaucer's knowledge of the East probably came through Italy where he sojourned on several occasions on ambassadorial business, and there he must have met men of the mercantile class who narrated their travels and adventures to him.

The Elizabethan Period.

The Elizabethan period opened up new avenues of the Englishman's knowledge of the world and for the first time in history direct trade relations were established between England and the East in the time of the Virgin Queen. The Elizabethan dramatists made extensive use of the descriptions of travels in Haklyut (1553-1616) and Purchas (1578-1626). Marlowe's great play "Tamburlaine" (1587) is on an eastern theme. Marlowe's Timur is a Scythian shepherd who is obsessed with the idea that his mission in life is to be the "Scourge of God." The mightiest kings of the East own him as their liege-lord and the captives are dragged along the wheels of his chariot. "Marlowe's Tamburlaine and the Timur of history are very much akin. In "The Jew of Malta" there is an Eastern character, Selim Calymate, son to the Grand Seignior of Turkey for whom Barnbas devised a treacherous murder.

In Spenser's "Faerie Queene" (Book I, Canto V) we come across the following lines:

"Soon after comes the cruel Sarazin,
In woven maile all armed warily;
And sternly lookes at him who not a pin
Does care for looke of living creatures eye.
They bring them wines of Greece and Araby,
And daintie spices fetch from furthest Ind,
To kindle heat of corage privily;
And in the wine a solemne oath they bynd
T' observe the sacred lawes of armes, that are assyned.[1]

[1] Further references to the East in the works of the Elizabethans and Jacobeans :—
Cf. Roger Ascham—"The Schoolmaster"—p. 37 (Dent's Edition).
Spenser—"Faerie Queene" (Ch. VI, Bk. XXXV).
Beaumont and Fletcher—"Island Princess" (Act I.). Dekker—"Honest Whore."
Donne—"Love's Progress." Ben Jonson—"Nephene's Triumph." Davenant—"Love and Honour."

SHAKESPEARE.

The late Dr. Dunn in a paper on "The East in Shakespeare" read before the Shakespeare Association in Calcutta (22nd April, 1922) suggested "I believe that in the work of Marco Polo and in the English Bible, Shakespeare who died before the East of modern geographical discovery could have meant much to him, had drunk deep of a pure stream of oriental inspiration." Of the three recorders of Elizabethan travels and adventures Hakluyt, Purchas and Coryat, Shakespeare knew Hakluyt. To the Elizabethan mind the East was a vast treasure-house of wealth. In "Antony and Cleopetra" Shakespeare has imagined a royal pageant on the Nile.[1]

His "Merchant of Venice," refers to "Tripolis" (Act I, Sc. III). In Act II, Sc. I of the same play, the Prince of Morocco, one of the suitors for Portia's hands, brags when about to take his chance :

> "By this scimitar
> That slew the Sophy and a Persian prince
> That won three fields of Sultan Solyman,
> I would out-stare the sternest eyes that look."

Sophy meant in Elizabethan days the same thing as Shah in

[1] "The barge she sat in, like a burnish'd throne
Burn'd on the water : the poop was beaten gold ;
Purple the sails, and so perfumed that
The winds were lovesick with them ; the oars were silver
Which to the tune of flutes kept stroke, and made
The water which they beat to follow faster,
As amorous of their strokes. For her own person,
It beggar'd all description ; She did lie
In her pavilion-cloth-of-gold of tissue—
O'er picturing that Venus where we see
The fancy outwork nature ; on each side her
Pretty dimpled boys, like smiling Cupids,
With divers-colour'd fans, whose wind did seem
To glow the delicate cheeks which they did cool,
And what they undid did." etc. (Act II, Sc. II).
And again in Act III, Sc. VI there is further reference of this natu:

modern English. The word is a corruption of "safi" meaning "chosen" or "elect" and was a title borne by the rulers of Persia.[1] Sultan Solyman the Magnificent of Turkey (1490-1566) has been mentioned in the preliminary notes or historical background. The Prince of Morocco again exclaims before unlocking the golden casket :

> "The Hyrcanian deserts and the vastly wilds
> Of wide Arabia are as thoroughfares now
> For princes to come to view fair Portia;"
>
> (Act II, Sc. VII.)

and thus pays a flattering compliment to her beauty. Hyrcania was a province of the ancient Persian empire, noted as a breeding place of tigers. *Cf.* Macbeth (Act III, Sc. IV). Bassanio who thinks carefully before opening the leaden casket says :

> "Ornament is but the guiled shore
> To a most dangerous sea ; the beauteous scarf
> Veiling an Indian beauty ; in a word
> The seeming truth which cunning times put on
> To entrap the wisest."
>
> (Act III, Sc. II.)

The expression Indian is evidently used in a contemptuous sense here, meaning "Ethiop" or "African Negro."

The sad news of the wreck of Antonio's vessels bound with merchandise for the marts of the world then known makes Bassanio question :

> "But is it true Salerio ?
> Have all his ventures failed ? What, not one hit
> From Tripolis, from Mexico and England,
> From Lisbon, Barbary and India?"

[1] *Cf.* "Twelfth Night," Act III, Sc. III : "I will not give my part of this sport for a pension of thousands to be paid from the Sophy" (Fabian) ; in the same play there is another reference to the Sophy.

Venice in those days was the gateway of Europe and it is but natural that a Venetian should talk in this vein. (*Cf.* "Once did she hold the gorgeous East in fee"—Wordsworth.)

Gremio in "Taming of the Shrew" describes his house within the city as

> "Richly furnished with plate and gold;
> Basins and covers to leave her dainty hands;
> My hangings all of Tyrian tapestry;
> In ivory coffers I have tuffed my crowns;
> In cypress chests my arras counterpoints,
> Costly apparel, tents and canopies,
> Fine linen, Turkey cushions boss'd with pearl."

and Gremio would present all these to Bianca if she would only be his. (Act II, Sc. 1.)

In "All's Well that Ends Well" Helena speaks of the "flinty Tarter's bosom" with little gratitude. In the same play we find the reference "Thus Indianlike, religious in mine error I adore the sun."

In the character of Othello, Shakespeare crossed the bounds of racial prejudice and English insularity and created a noble specimen of valour, when to the Elizabethan mind, the Moor stood for all that is mean and cowardly. The background of this play was formed out of the struggles between Venice and Turkey in the 16th century. Victor Hugo in his estimate of Othello's character and personality remarked:

"Othello is to be conceived as belonging to the same race that produced a Saladin and a Haroun-al-Raschid, the same race that in the great days of yore confronted our chevaliers with its Sheiks, our Princes with its Emirs, our Emperors with its Caliphs." (Introduction to "Othello"—Calcutta University Press Edition.)

After the foul murder of Desdemona, when Othello was disarmed, he requests his friends to tell the Senate thus :

" Then must you speak
Of one that loved not wisely but too well ;
Of not easily jealous, but being wrought
Perplex'd in the extreme ; of one whose hand
Like the base Indian, threw a pearl away
Richer than all his tribe ; of one whose subdued eyes
Albeit unused to the melting mood,
Drop tears as fast as the Arabian trees
Their medicinal gum."

The base Indian in these lines is rather puzzling and as Arabia was famed for its physicians Shakespeare certainly knew of the medicinal drugs of that country. Ere he stabs himself Othello adds :

" Say besides, that in Aleppo once,
Where a malignant and turban'd Turk
Beat a Venetian and traduced the state,
I took by the throat the circumcised dog
And smote him thus."

And he plunged the dagger into his heart. When mysterious ships pass before Sebastian through the witchery of Prospero, Sebastian exclaims :

" A living drollery. Now I will believe
That there are unicorns, that in Arabia,
There is one tree, the phoenix's throne."

The phoenix, the famous eastern bird is invoked in a poem by Shakespeare :

" Let the bird of loudest lay,
On the sole Arabian tree,
Herald sad and trumpet be,
To whose sound chaste wings obey," etc.

Aegean in the " Comedy of Errors " had roamed " clean through the bounds of Asia." A reference to Persia is found

in the same play. Turkish tapestry is mentioned in this play. (*Cf.* Antipholus of Ephesus orders Dromio of Syracuse to tell his wife to send the purse of ducats from the "desk that's cover'd o'er with Turkish tapestry.")

The queen of the fairies, Titania, in "A Midsummer Night's Dream" tells Oberon of a votaress of her order who, "in the spiced Indian air, by night, full often hath she gossiped by my side." The islands of the Indian Ocean were famed for their spices. Oberon's fairy kingdom lay in the far East. ("the farthest steep of India," Act II, Sc. I, also Milton—Comus, Lines 140, etc., and Paradise Lost, Canto I, Line 780 "Beyond the Indian mount.")[1]

Lady Macbeth in one of her dream-walks talks in the following manner:

> "Here's the smell of the blood still,
> All the perfume of Arabia will not
> Sweeten this little hand."

In "Romeo and Juliet," "a Tarter's painted bow of lath," and "a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear" are mentioned. The cities of Asia Minor are frequently mentioned in "Pericles" and "Antony and Cleopetra."

In "Henry VIII," there are references to India:

> "To-day the French
> All clingnant, all in gold, like heathen gods
> Shone down the English; and to-morrow they
> Make Britain India."

and

> "As bountiful
> As mines of India."

In the "Merry Wives of Windsor," the following lines show a definite knowledge of the East:

[1] *Cf.* "Here now my metal of India?" (Twelfth Night, Act II, Sc. V); *ibid*, Act III, Sc. III, Malvolio's face with more lines than in "the new map with the augmentation of the Indies," hinting perhaps at the map designed by Emmerie Mollineaux in 1599.

"They shall be my East and West Indies, and I will trade to them both," and in "As You Like It" we find

> "From the East and Western Inde,
> No jewel is like Rosalind."

In the "Merry Wives of Windsor" (Act. II, Sc. I) there is a reference to the subtlety of Chinese intelligence, the origin of which is probably due to its mention by Wm. Watreman in "Fardle of Facions" (1555).

Hence it can safely be asserted that Shakespeare was aware of the new Western world of discovery and of the old Eastern world rediscovered. Dr. Dunn however was led away by the superficial aspects of the Eastern influences in Shakespeare and his assertions are sometimes wrong and misleading.

MILTON.

In Milton, however, the references are more detailed and accurate, probably because he was fortunate enough to make use of all the available literature on the subject. Moreover in his time the interest in the East became more pronounced. The rebel angels coming in battle array in Paradise Lost (Book I) were worshipped in Syria, Damascus and other places. On their approach ten thousand banners rose into the air "with Orient colours waving." In the Pandemonium Satan sat

> "On a throne of Royal state, which far
> Outshon the wealth of Ormus and of Ind,
> Or where the gorgeous East with richest hand
> Showers on her kings barbaric pearl and gold," (Book II.)

Satan's journey towards the Gates of Hell has been likened to the voyage of a fleet:

> "Close sailing from Bengala or the Isles of Ternate and Tidore,
> Whence merchants bring their spicie drugs."

When the faithful angels in Heaven are celebrating festivities in honour of the Father and the Son, Satan alights upon the bare convex of the world's outermost orb like

"A vulture on Imaus bred
Whose snowie ridge the roving Tartar bounds,
Dislodging from a Region scarce of prey
To gorge the flesh of Lambs or yeanling kids
On Hills where Flocks are fled, flies towards the springs
Of Ganges or Hydaspes, Indian streams ;
But in his way lights on the barren plaines
Of Sericana, where Chinese drive
With sails and wind their canie waggons light." (Book III.)

The "odorous sweets" of Eden seemed to Satan in the very same way pleasant as to the sailors who travel beyond the Cape of Good Hope, while the North-East wind wafts to them from the spicy shores of Arabia the Sabean odours. These men slacken their course to feel for a longer time the sweet scent and the Fiend too stopped his flight to enjoy the vernal delight and joy of Eden (Book IV ; also *cf.* Paradise Regained, Book II, L. 360, etc.)

In course of his look-out for some subtle means by which he could enter the Paradise, Satan compassed the earth. From Darien in Western America he reached as far as the land where flow Ganges and Indus for a hiding place and then somewhere on the Tigris he involved himself in rising mist waiting to beguile Eve in the form of a serpent. The mother of mankind made her first gown with leaves of the fig tree. The fig tree, Milton says, was well known to the Indians and

"In Malabar or Decan spreads her arms
Braunching so broad and long, that in the ground
The bended Twigs take root, a pillar'd shade
High overarch't, and echoing walks between ;
There oft the Indian Herdman shunning heat
Shelters in cool, and tends his pasturing herd
At loophole cut through thickest shade."

(Book IX.)

Milton might have been thinking of the Indian banyan tree.

When the grand council of Lucifer was awaiting his return from making the great mischief to mankind, the boundaries of Pandemonium were left desolate by his followers in the same way

> "As when the Tartar from his Russian Foe
> By Astracan over the snowie plains
> Retires, or Bactrian Sophi from the homes
> Of Turkish Crescent, leaves all waste beyond
> The Realme of Aladule in his retreat
> To Tauris or Casbeen."

And on his approach the Peers of Hell "raised from their dark Divan" (Book X), a congratulatory hurrah. The "Divan" was a piece of furniture borrowed from the Turks and Persians.

The arch-angel Michael unfolded before Adam a vision of the future of mankind and from a high hill the first man saw

> "City of old or modern fame, the seat
> Of mightiest empire, from the destined walls
> Of Camblau, seat of Camain Can
> And Samarchand by Oxus, Temirs throne,
> To Paquin of Sinoean kings and thence
> To Agra and Delhi of great Mogul
> Down to the golden Chersonese, or where
> The Persian in Ecbatan sate, or since
> In Hispahan, or where the Russian Ksar
> In Mosco, the Sultan in Bizance,
> Turchestan-born."

The Cathian Can must be the great Khan of Central Asia. Temir no doubt is Tamerlane, the fierce conqueror The great Mogul to whose court Sir Thomas Roe came in 1615 when Milton was seven years old was one of the most magnificent monarchs that the world has ever seen (Book XI).

In "Paradise Regained," Satan tries every means to persuade Christ to worship him. In the following fulsome

words he tries to play upon Christ's maturity and ripe judgment.

> "The son
> Of Macedonian Philip had e're these
> Won Asia and the throne of Cyrus held at his dispose."

He then spreads before the eyes of Christ a panoramic view of the kingdoms of the world and Jesus saw :

> "Assyria and her empire's ancient bounds,
> Araxes and the Caspian lake, thence on
> As far as Indus East, Euphrates West,
> And oft beyond ; to South the Persian bay,
> And inaccessible the Arabian drouth :"

Nineveh, Babylon, Persopolis, Bactria, Susa—once the proudest cities of the East and the wonders of the then world—are held before the eyes of Jesus with their splendour but the Redeemer preferred "to guide nations in the way of truth." (Book III.)

Yet not despairing of success, Satan leads Christ to the western side of the mountain where Jesus was fasting and points out the Imperial city of Rome, in the streets of which ambassadors from

> "The Asian kings and Parthians among these,
> From India and the golden Chersonese,
> And utmost Indian isle Taprobane,
> Dusk faces with white silken turbans wreath'd :"

throng in with people of other lands in various habits.

DRYDEN.

Dryden, however, was more precise and exact in his knowledge of the East. Francois Bernier, a French physician, visited the court of the Moghal Emperor Aurangzeb and left a brilliant account of the time. Dryden borrowed materials from Bernier for his heroic play on the last of the powerful

Mogul emperors. It is the story of the revolt of the aged emperor Shah Jehan's sons against their father. A romantic element is introduced in the relations between Aurangzeb and Nurmahal and the lady poisons herself. (See Beers—English Romanticism in the 18th Century, p. 45). In this play there occurs the first description in English poetry of Sati, the Indian custom of self-immolation of the wife after the death of her husband.

In "Annus Mirabilis" (1666), Dryden wailed that so long for the Hollanders only,

> "The heavens had kindly heat,
> In eastern quarries ripening precious dew ;
> For them the Idumaean balm did sweat
> And in hot Ceylon spicy forests grew."

Dryden borrowed the idea of the third line of the above stanza partly from Juvenal, the original being

> "For him the rich Arabia sweats her gum,
> And precious oils from distant Indies come."

In the last stanza of the same poem, Dryden expressed the hope,

> "Thus to the Eastern wealth through storms we go,
> But now, the Cape once doubled fear no more ;
> A constant trade-wind will securely blow
> And gently lay us on the spicy shore."

In Dryden's time the rivalry between Holland and England for trade in the East was very keen and naturally as a patriotic Englishman it wounded his vanity to see the lion's share of the spoils go to the Dutch.

In "Astraea Redux" the same kind of thoughts are present in the mind of Dryden :

> "Our merchants shall no more adventurers be ;
> Nor in the farthest East those dangers fear
> Which humble Holland must dissemble here."

In that religio-satirical poem, "The Hind and the Panther," Dryden refers to the Malayan practice of people running amock and stabbing others till they are killed themselves in times of national calamity. Burnet is named "the Moloch of the times" and he "runs an Indian muck at all he meets."

The Oriental Romance in England.

The Arabian Nights came to be known to Europe in the first quarter of the 18th century. A French Professor of Arabic made the first European translation in 1712 in French and from this translation several other writers borrowed. In England there grew up a vast body of this kind of literature, which was in the main unreal, fantastic, shadowy and imaginative.

Mrs. Lennox (born in 1720) wrote an allegorical story named "Ibrahim." Julia Pardoe, daughter of an English Major, accompanied her father to Constantinople and they were entertained there by natives of high position. Her knowledge of the mode of life and habits and thoughts of Turkish women is considered second only to that of Lady Mary Wortley Montague, who went to Turkey in 1716 and made a close study of Turkish customs and who had a great share in dispelling the Saxon prejudice against the Ottomans. Miss Pardoe's "Flies in Amber" are fruits of her experiences gathered during her travels in the East.

A typical romance of the period was "The Romance of a Harem," wherein one is in touch with the languid and heavily perfumed atmosphere of the Orient. Besides the main plot there are stories like those in the Arabian Nights told by the characters themselves which would have done credit to a Saharjadi. "The Magyar and the Moslem," is a tale of Hungary. The "Yere-Batan-Serai" (the Swallowed-up Palace) was suggested by the great subterranean ruins of

Constantinople. Dr. Johnson's Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia, owes its origin probably to Father Labo's "Voyage to Abyssinia." Swift's Gulliver visited Madras and spent 21 days there, in course of the voyage to Laputa. Mrs. Aphra Behn is said to have lived in India for some time. Goldsmith's "Citizen of the World" is a Chinaman come from Pekin to England.[1] Addison's "Vision of Mirzah," "Alnascuar," "Shacabac and the Barmecides' Feast," the stories of Helim and Abdulla and Hilpa, Harpath and Shallum are certainly due to his study of the Oriental Romance.[2]

"A vast body of worthless literature, the shameless and unintelligent imitation," of the most popular French and English fiction, flooded England for a pretty long time both in the 18th and 19th centuries, but like most novels of the period, they to-day are mere forgotten heaps. One of this type is Mrs. A. M. Bennet's "the Memoirs of a Welsh Heiress interspersed with the Anecdotes of A Nabob." (1785.)

"The Orientalism that is so striking a feature of the later French Romantic Movement," wrote Sir Walter Raleigh, "is exemplified in England by a single work, the 'Vathek' (1786) of William Beckford... The breath of the Romantic Movement stirs in it, and distinguishes it in kind from the exquisitely witty Oriental tales of Count Anthony Hamilton, on which it is modelled. The grotesque extravagance of Eastern supernaturalism only tickled the fancy of Count Hamilton; it held the imagination of Beckford... The stamp of incredulity is on the tale of Hamilton and Voltaire; with them the Eastern imagination is a mere laughing stock for the Western wit; it is Beckford alone who accepting the new fantastic domain as his own by right forgets the world of reality and raises his palace in the shades."

[1] For Goldsmith's appointment in India, see page 31 of Goldsmith by Black (English Men of Letters Series).

[2] Addison's brother Gulstone Addison, Governor of Madras, died in 1701, holding the office for a month in 1701.

The comic side of the Orient was touched by James Morier (1780-1849) in "Haji Baba of Ispahan," where the writer who had an inside knowledge of the life in the East, has given us a novel of the picaresque type. Morier became the founder of a school of novelists who adopted for their subject-matter the life and manners of Persia and India. Of the translators of the Arabian Nights Entertainments, Sydney Grundy who modelled his work upon the German version of Von Moser, John Payne one of the most gifted scholars of the 19th century and Sir Francis Burton, a member of the East Indian Service, deserve special mention. Sir Francis took a keen interest in the language, manners and customs of the Orientals. He wandered in disguise in many parts of Arabia and passed as an Arabian, so excellent was his mastery of the dialect. The outcome of these adventures was the famous "pilgrimage to El Medinah and Mecca." He is the prototype of Lawrence of Arabia of modern times.

The realistic description of the East is found in the works of novelists who had lived long in the East. Thomas Hope in "Anastasius" (1819) pictured life in Turkey, Egypt, Syria and Arabia. James Baillie Fraser's works "Kuzzilbash" (1826) and the "Persian Adventurer" (1830) deal with the period of Nadir Shah and his fortunes up to the sack of Delhi. William Browne Hockley, a member of the Bombay Civil Service in the earlier part of the 19th century, produced "Pandurang Hari" in 1826 and his was the first realistic novel of Indian life in English. This novel was followed by two others "Tales of the Zenana" and "The Memoirs of a Brahmin." Thomas Henry Ottley's "Rustum Khan" (1831) is a picture of the life and adventures of a Moslem soldier in Upper India. "The Confessions of a Thug" by Meadows Taylor is regarded by many competent critics as "the finest realistic romance of Indian life ever penned." Of the many writers who wrote novels on Indian life and history, mostly of the days of the East India Company, mention may be made of Sydney C. Grier,

G. A. Henty, Herbert Strang, A. P. Harcourt, R. E. Forrest, Flora Annie Steel, Major A. Griffiths, F. S. Brenton, Allen Upward, etc. In 1817, there appeared in Calcutta a volume of interest to Englishmen who had lived in the East, "Original Letters from India" (1779-1815) by Mrs. Anthony Fay, the wife of a Calcutta advocate, who died in Calcutta in 1816. This lady claimed that she met with adventures in Egypt and India and that she was imprisoned by Hyder Ali. The Hogarth Press republished it in 1925. Gertrude Atherton, the American novelist in "Julia France and her Times" (1912) gives something of old Calcutta life. Sir Walter Scott seldom went outside his native country for his themes and at first he was diffident in making any attempt to write on Eastern subjects which had been so successfully handled by Morier, Southey, Moore and Byron. Yet his fancy too was kindled by the glamour of the East. Moreover Scott had many links with the East. His brother-in-law was Collector of Salem in South India, his friend Leyden came to Madras in 1800, Heber (afterwards Bishop Reginald Heber) whom he met at Oxford in 1805 came to India in 1823 and died at Trichinapoly in 1826. Leyden and Heber both wrote poems on Eastern themes. Scott's son, an officer in the Hussars, proceeded to Madras in 1839. The Talisman of Walter Scott relates an episode of the Crusades and the two principal figures are the proud Lionhearted Richard of England and the noble Saracen Sultan of Syria.

The disguised palmer in "Ivanhoe" relates the incident of Wilfrid of Ivanhoe unhorsing the bragadoccio Brian de Bois Guilbert in a tournament at Acre in the Holy Land. Colonel Mannering in "Guy Mannering" had a career in the Indian Army (Chapter VII). "The Surgeon's Daughter" tells of the villainy of a lover who lured an English girl to India and then sold her to Tipu Sultan of Mysore. In the same novel Scott introduced a white woman Mrs. Montreville or the Begum Motee Mahal as one of the favoured women of Tipu. Charlotte

Bronte in "Jane Eyre" mentions the Hindu gods—Brahma and Vishnu.[1]

JAYANTAKUMAR DAS GUPTA

(To be continued.)

REMEMBRANCE

Oh! well I mind the time we lay
Beside the singing river there,
When tiny golden sunbeams fled
To hide their glory in your hair!
When pieces of the bright blue Heaven
Tumbled gaily thro' the skies,
Mad with laughter as they raced
To sink their beauty in your eyes!
When blackbirds in the hazel-wood
Threw to earth a wild rich note,
That thrilled with ecstacy to find
Its rapture in your pure white throat!
Oh! well I mind that happy day
Inscribed upon fair memories scroll,
When from mine eyes to thine I poured
The unthought beauty of my soul!

LELAND J. BERRY

[1] Charlotte Bronte's lover, Mr. James Taylor, was at one time Editor of the Bombay Gazette, the Bombay Quarterly Review and the Bombay Saturday Review. (Clement Shorter—"The Brontes and their Circle.")

THE ABSOLUTE SELF

What is my good? It depends on what I really am. Ethics must make *some* assumptions about the nature of the moral agent, and the wider its basis in reality, the better its study. As Aristotle says, the study of man's good should begin with the study of man's nature. But what is my real self? I turn to the dictionary, that epitome of the best common sense of the ages, and read the score of definitions of the word *self*. Common sense is a poor ending, but a good beginning, for if it be not trustworthy in the main, life itself is a delusion. Truth is but common sense tested, harmonized, extended and refined by science and philosophy. The definitions may be reduced by immediate inspection to six :

(1) Self is sameness, permanence, continuity, persistence. For example : I myself, self-arising, self-derived, self-coloured, self-same.

(2) Self is the ' I ' or ' ego,' the subject of successive and varying states of consciousness, including sensing, desiring, reasoning, etc. For example : self-expression, the self and the world, the self as knower.

(3) Self is what is normal, essential, genuine. For example : Now I feel more like myself, To your own self be true, Be yourself, Know thyself.

(4) Self is interest, advantage, welfare, benefit, profit. For example : Self-love, self-denial, the claims of self.

(5) Self is what is individual, personal, unitary. For example : Myself, yourself, itself, former self, better self.

(6) Self is what is independent, intrinsic, sufficient. For example : Self-acting, self-consistent, self-authority.

1

According to the first definition, self is sameness or permanence. I am what persists amid my change and variation. Now according to Kant, substance is what persists or remains identical during a series of temporal changes. It would seem, then, that I am substance. To illustrate: I call a flower a thing, somewhat substantial, because I find there some permanence running through its variety of growth and decay. When I simultaneously smell a fragrance and hear a warble coming from the same place, I properly take the odor and sound to be different modes of the same thing, until I discover that when the bird flies away, the sound no longer comes from the locality of the flower, whereas the odor remains, along with color, shape, size and other modes. This more permanent union, I take to be the thing itself,

However, the shape and size may alter, the odor vanish, and the color fade. The dead and withered flower can be pounded to dust. The dust can be burnt into smoke and ashes. These in turn may enter into new forms by combination with other materials. But according to chemistry, all these things are composed of a limited number of chemical elements whose atoms form different things according to various combinations and proportions. The unity among these various elements is found in an almost regular numerical series called the periodic law of atomic weights. But in the electron theory, physics goes deeper. The atoms are reduced to 'profons' and 'electrons,' or unit electric charges similar one to another under similar circumstances. According to Einstein, their shape, volume and mass vary according to their velocity, which in turn varies according to the energy or concentration of the charge. The magnitude or quantity of charge is assumed constant. Charges that attract each other are called dissimilar, and charges that repel each other, similar, making all charges either positive or negative. But the positive might have been called negative,

and *vice versa*, for the function of a charge lies not in any separate or inner unity, but in its whole behaviour or interaction with others.

In thus reducing all things to an indefinite number of interacting charges, physics attempts to explain and control change. As Alfred Weber says, Parmenides denies change, Heraclitus makes a god of it, but Democritus explains it by positing an indefinite number of infinitely small yet indivisible and extended atoms, chemically the same, combining and separating in the void. Plurality and the void are needed to allow for motion, the condition of perpetual recombination, or process. The more similar the unit elements, the more recombination is based solely on number, or a purely indeterminate series, that allows for endless variety in sensible appearance. Einstein marks an advance on Democritus mainly because his unit elements have more of this desirable similarity, and consequently are more amenable to mathematical calculation, which provides not only for a finer explanation, but also more opportunity for control, the keynote of modern science.

Now what is the persistent identity amid the temporal change of these electric charges? What is substance here? Is it electricity? Force? As a positive science, physics needs no theory of substance, no concept of God for its hypotheses. As Windelband says, 'the external experience, taken strictly, gives us only sequences in time, some of which are repeated with more or less frequency; and the Positivist mechanics, as represented in Germany by Kirchhoff and Mach, would confine itself to the description of these individual or general facts of succession in time. It would exclude the ideas of force and work from the science of the material world.' And this is in line with the contribution of Hume, who shows that force or power as a connection cannot be found either in external events or in the operations of the 'mind.' The problem of substance is too wide for physics or psychology: it must be left for philosophy.

The scientific philosophers Alexander, Russell and A. N. Whitehead conceive these interacting electrons as ' events ' occuring in ' space-time.' Now any event whatever, as Windelband says, may be taken as implying at least two elements in relation. But this relation, as Russel points out, should not be understood as another element or simple. A connection is not an element thrust in between two elements already existing. Nor does it exist before them. The only original thing or substance that persists through all changes is the whole. But this whole is not, as Bradley would have it, a complex of elements and relations, for any given complex is always surrounded by the vague ' beyond ' stressed by Dewey. Rather, the complex is a limitation of finite focus of the whole.

Again, neither element or relation can be taken as the cause of another. If A causes B, what causes A? To avoid going back in time for ever, the assumption must be made that one thing does not really come from another, but as Lotze and likewise Ravaisson point out, is simply a transformation of permanent substance, uncreated and indestructible. This means that every event is ultimately not ' transgredient ' but ' immanent,' that the original cause is substance, and that every transformation is just an effect of this substance. Now the many effects, or apparent things, are definite experiences that limit each other. Hence they are finite. But since the prime cause is one, it cannot be definite or limited. Hence, as Spinoza infers, it is infinite. This infinite is the only true or genuine whole, for contrasted with the finite, any finite group appears merely as a part. Thus the infinite is the absolute whole whose relative events are its parts.

Substance is also the end whose means are modes. It is generally admitted that any part in the whole is determined not merely by certain striking parts in its vicinity, not even by all the parts known, but by nothing less than the very whole. But the relation is not reciprocal: the parts do not determine the whole. For since the whole embraces the unknown as well as

the known, the future as well as the past, its parts are never completely summed. As Bergson, James and Dewey contend, the world is ever in the making. But this is precisely the relation of end to means: The end determines the means, but the means do not determine the end. The final end (not a formal end, or aim) is intrinsic, immediate and diffuse, and so independent of any particular means or set of means. For example if pleasure be the end, I need not read O' Henry; I decide to read De Maupassant. Thus the whole is the end whose means are parts; and substance, in sum is the permanent whole, the one infinite cause and end of existence.

The sameness of permanence running through the flower and all existence is no less than this infinite substance. But according to the dictionary, self means sameness or permanence. This infinite substance, then, may also be called the absolute self. Can I believe that I am ultimately this self-substance? Why not? Is there any essential difference between saying that the flower is a mode of substance, and saying that it is an experience of the absolute self? If substance is the ground of all things, is it not also the ground of my experience? And am I not the ground of my experience? The materials of physics are found in my body. Radium and copper wire are physical objects derived from sensation which is a datum, fact or creation of my self. Is not the natural world my natural experience?

After all, I am not a separate soul or individual opposed to others, or a bit of live thinking over against a dead, external world. Modern science has cleared away these notions. I am something deeper than ideas.....these only express me. Speaking popularly, I may say that I was born at such and such a time, but in reality, was I ever born? The instincts which lie at the basis of my personality go back beyond primitive man to animal life millions of years ago, and how far beyond no one knows. I have no consciousness of birth or death. I seem to be infinite. If the relation between self and

experience is demanded, I am the whole of which my experience comprises the parts, the one of which my experience is the many. Hume and Russell are right—the self cannot be found in experience. For it embraces experience. But I am not a mere bunch of experience, nor even the unifying principle thereof, but the real thing itself in which experience arises, Aristotle's unmoved mover and final end reconstructing my world day by day. I am the individual, as Spencer says, for whose pleasure nature and society exist. With Maine de Biran I can say, "I feel or perceive myself as-free cause, therefore I am really cause." What else can persist amid change than that which, as Lotze says, recognizes such changes as its own? But such recognition comes only from the self.

Now the identification of self and substance gained by a consideration of reality is confirmed by a study of knowledge. Epistemology here supports ontology. I can find nothing outside myself, for the moment I find it, it is mine. I know, of course, that things exist external to my body, and believe that many things exist which man has never experienced and perhaps never will. I ever agree with modern realism that public objects are not created or exhausted by private cognition, but are progressively revealed and understood thereby. But after all, I am the one that posits these independent objects: they are not independent of my self. Even the unknown, while beyond my knowledge, is not beyond my experience, for I can think of it. In sum, the universe depends on the thinker, but the thinker must not then be conceived as a point in the universe. His thinking indeed takes effect at a point, but it is rooted in the absolute.

This position, of course, is absolute solipsism. Now solipsism has been traditionally deprecated, but not as genuinely absolute; it has never been carried out to its conclusion, and so has been left in a tentative, hypocritical position. Protagoras, for example, declares that man is the measure of all things, *but* he thinks of man as men, as plural, limited

beings. Tommaso Campanella finds the self a being that acts, knows and wills within limit, but uncritically assumes another being to explain this limit. Descartes rests his whole philosophy on the self, but lags in an outside God for scientific and theological purposes. On the basis of individual experience Barkeley states that to be is to perceive or be perceived, but to explain the order of nature makes a leap to a divine mind and will outside the self. To Fichte, the world is a creation of the self as the self, yet he calls it not-self. Schopenhauer sees the self as the real will supporting the world as its idea, but then interprets will according to the plural, limited strife he observes in the world as idea. In sum, traditional solipsism is inconsistent in taking the self as at once the original subject-matter *and* a private being from which escape is desirable.

When, however, the self as knower, is identified with the self as substance, solipsism may be accepted as a spiritual monism. For instance, if I am absolute, your behaviour is included within my self. But by analogy I must concede also that my behaviour is included within your self. Then you also are absolute. But since there cannot be two absolutes, you and I are identical, and *our* behaviour is included in *the* self. In other words, my experience here and now is continuous with the universal experience of which my absolute self is the whole. This position agrees in outline with the statement in the Upanishads. 'That art Thou,' with the doctrine of Shankara that Atma is Brahman, with the declaration of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, 'The Father and I are one,' with the affirmation of Plotinus that the human soul is originally identical with the absolute, with the vision of Spinoza that the individual in the intellectual love of God is not mode but substance itself, and with Kant's postulate of the noumenal self. This solipsistic theism or spiritual monism has invariably been ruined in the past by an infection of dualism, but modern civilization and science have made possible a new and genuine monism.

2. Consciousness.

According to the second definition, self is the subject of successive and varying states of consciousness. This is clearly a technical definition taken from accepted psychology. The self is the ground or support of conscious states. But what are these states? Not separate entities, says James, but mere arbitrary distinctions in the one active, continuous stream of consciousness. Thus consciousness in general may be called the ground or subject of any state. Moreover, a state of consciousness, according to James, is not 'mental' as opposed to 'physical;' it is an experience of reality itself, which may be taken in relations either mental or physical. Now the self is also the ground of these actual states. Hence the self may be identified with consciousness, which in turn may be equated not with mind, but with soul and spirit.

The term consciousness, like the term self, is often used in a limited, dualistic sense as opposed to what is 'unconscious' either in man or nature. But since the time of Leibnitz, there has been an increasing tendency to speak of everything as more or less conscious. Ravaisson declares that inanimate nature differs from plant, animal and human nature only in the *degree* of its spirituality. All motion is at bottom a *tendency*. Inertia is a tendency to conserve motion. What seems automatic in nature is simply tendency degraded into habit. Lotze measures spirit in nature and man by the degree of self-identification present in any finite being or monad. Fechner affirms that consciousness embraces and pervades the 'dead' past and the 'inorganic' stretches of nature. L. T. Hobhouse speaks of a World Soul increasingly self-conscious according to the degree of organic correlation effected by any structure in nature and humanity. Finally, J. C. Bose continues to discover new instances of consciousness in the behaviour of vegetable life.

Thus a given mode or monad of consciousness may be called more or less conscious than another in so far as it is

more or less awake, that is, sentient, active, and knowing. In other words, the terms 'unconscious' and 'sub-conscious' are merely relative, and refer to dim, as contrasted with brilliant consciousness. Compared with a busy city street, a lonely spot in the country may be called noiseless, but it is actually noisy compared with a sound-proof chamber. Likewise, sleep is so less conscious than waking life that it may be called unconscious, but actually it must be highly conscious compared with death. And death, it must be remembered, is only a lower form of life, which in turn is somewhat conscious. If retrospection often fails to reveal any content of consciousness during sleep, consciousness is not necessarily absent, but rather filled with a content whose recall is difficult because unassociated with any practical event in waking experience. The same is true of the past. As Bergson says, the diffuse and indiscriminate experience of the deep past manifests itself only in so far as it is appropriate and useful to present action.

3. Pleasure.

According to the third definition, self is what is normal, essential, genuine. That is, self is what is typical and real. Now I feel my real self when I am living efficiently and abundantly, in short when I am creating. This activity is one of pleasure. As James Ward says, pleasure is present 'in proportion as a maximum of attention is efficiently exercised;' and by attention he means activity. Now pleasure must not be confused with pleasantness. As R. S. Woodworth says, pleasantness is a last mite of feeling, simple and unanalyzed, whereas pleasure is the name for a whole state of mind which may be very complex, including sensations and thoughts in addition to feelings of pleasantness and unpleasantness. As Dewey says, pleasantness and unpleasantness occur together, and either may be the dominant state or direction of action: in so far as a tendency is attaining success it is pleasant,

unpleasant in so far as meeting with frustration. Thus, pleasure must always include both pleasantness and unpleasantness.

Aristotle cannot decide whether pleasure is activity itself or the perfection and accompaniment of activity; but both propositions will be satisfied if pleasure be defined as perfect activity, the infinite whole of activity in which any particular action is grounded. It is pure act, pure creativity. Thus, if I am ultimately what is genuine and normal, I am pleasure. This pleasure, as the infinite whole of activity, is reality; as the end of all desire, it is goodness. It is thus all-powerful and all-good: it is God. Just as pleasure includes both pleasantness and unpleasantness, so goodness includes both good and evil, and God both righteousness and sin.

Socrates, the father of ethics, recognizes happiness, well-being or pleasure as *the* good, goodness or virtue, and identifies it with wisdom or intelligent activity. Aristotle likewise holds pleasure to be the universal end. 'The fact that all brutes and all men pursue pleasure,' he states, 'is a certain indication of it being in some sense the supreme good.' And in modern times Bentham too sees pleasure as the all-embracing end of man. 'His only object,' he declares, 'is to seek pleasure and to shun pain, even at the very instant he rejects the greatest pleasures or embraces pains the most acute.' As all-embracing, universal stimulus and end, pleasure is the original motive, final cause, standard and sanction of all action.

This is absolute psychological hedonism. The mistakes of historical hedonism as elaborated and practised are due mainly to the common sense assumption that pleasure is a finite object, aim or inducement rather than the infinite activity, cause and incentive. Cyrænicism and Epicureanism, following this defect implicit in the work of Socrates, and concentrating interest on a few objective 'pleasures' tend to confine life and so prevent real pleasure which is abundant activity. Cynicism

and Stoicism, avoiding this confinement to particulars to the confinement of universals such as routine, law duty. Plato and Aristotle cannot accept infinite pleasure good, because they both take form or limit as prior to unli matter, contemplative reason as superior to creative .r Kant preaches sound doctrine when he proclaims that goc or the standard of good lies not in consequences or ex goods, but in the active good will which is its own motiv sanction, somehow cosmic and self-determining, and inc dent of varieties of particular wish. But he also takes fc *a priori*, and rejecting material pleasure, lands in undes legalism and stringency.

Modern hedonism in Bentham, J. S. Mill and Sid marks no important advance on Epicureanism, but rathe: to its confusion by opposing the individual to society. wise, modern perfectionism in T. H. Green, Rashdal Mackenzie fails to improve the ethic of Stoicism by its tionary conception of development. A formal rational goc in the distant future is even worse than a formal rational ness present and immanent. The naturalistic evoluti ethic of Spencer, Alexander and Leslie Stephen suffers frc same defect; only the form is conceived as immanent i: human nature rather than as transcendent. The basic of all these theories from Socrates up to the present Dewey says, the supposition that moral good or value apart from deliberate action, in brief, the view that goc is object rather than activity.

Dewey himself holds that morality arises only in th vity of deliberation and decision demanded by some crisi duced by conflict among natural or non-voluntary actions. moral judgment neither creates nor chooses good; it re nizes good into a new and more satisfactory form. Goo or the highest good, is the meaning experienced in harmo: natural goods. In the original undisturbed and pers background of habit which constitutes the vague and enc

' sense of reality ' or ' feeling ' the indefinitely plural goods of behavior are accepted, welcomed and prized, but not reflectively valued. When these goods are threatened with invasion, a tension or conflict arises between resistance and desire in which the unique uncertainty of emotion is at once pleasant and unpleasant. This conflict can be adjusted, integrated or finally settled only by means of the control of cognition in the act of knowing, which discovers and elaborates ' signs ' or valid connections that enlarge resources and modify habits.

Now these sign provide for an aim, or ' end-in-view,' an instrumental target to guide procedure and form a unified self. As situations overlap, these aims become generalised and systematized into rules, laws, ideals and principles, in whose light the contemplated act is bathed in the imaginative publicity of a social court. The approval of this court, or ' conscience,' makes the act right or social. In so far as this court is universal, the right is valid or moral, and conduct obeys the ideal. The nature of this ideal, however, is not structural and transcendent, but functional and immanent. It is only a means to the final end of immediate enjoyment. This final or decisive good, says Dewey, ' is never reflected on or made and end-in-view, since it is that which finally cuts off, or decides, the reflection.' It is the end of valuation, not valuable, but invaluable. As Bergson says, the meaning of life, the culmination of evolution, the destiny of man, and the supreme good is joyous creation, best exemplified in the inventive hero, whose intense, generous and ingenious activity elicits much from little, kindles the lives of his fellows, and adds to the richness of the world. Now this invaluable end, meaning of harmony and joyous creation I should call pleasure, God, or the absolute self, and add that the same cosmic self that consummates natural goods is also the agent that welcomes and integrates them, the infinite motive of the process from start to finish.

4. VALUE.

According to the fourth definition, the self is interest, advantage, welfare, benefit, profit—in short, worth or *value*. Things, events, ideas and aims may be valuable, but I am invaluable. That is, I am the standard of value itself—value absolute. For example, let me take a flower like the one that served to illustrate substance. I call the flower valuable because in some way it suits or pleases my *self*: But to elaborate: as I enjoy its coloring and fragrance, it is an *end*, with a value intrinsic or immediate. But when it is used to adorn the table for a dinner party, it is a *means*, with a value now extrinsic or instrumental. The flower is valuable both as an end, and as a means to a further end. The dinner party, in turn, is an end as immediate enjoyment of food and conversation, but also a means to the maintenance of my social prestige. This, in turn, is intrinsic or satisfying, yet also extrinsic or useful in advancing my work in life. I enjoy my work, but I do it not merely for its own sake, but mainly to achieve a great task or fulfil the purpose of a lifetime. This achievement is an end, yet also a means to a wider end for society. This end, in turn, is a means for the next generation of humanity, and so on indefinitely.

Thus any finite end may also be a means to a further end. But is there an infinite end, an absolute and solely immediate value? Such an end Plato and Plotinus attempted to systematize as the one divine ideal of Truth, Goodness and Beauty, the standard, goal and source of all essence and existence. Such an end Aristotle attempted to formulate as the one divine form, the only pure form, that is the form for which all lower forms are matter, and which is not matter for any higher form. While agreeing that truth, goodness and beauty are one and divine, I must make a fresh start, for I cannot accept the dualism between form and matter which underlies the apotheosis of form or ideal. Consideration of the flower's substance leads to the positive sciences of biology, chemistry and physics;

while consideration of the flower's value leads to the normative sciences of logic, ethics and aesthetics.

Logic attempts to define and elaborate the end of *thought*, the parmanent value called truth that underlies all science. Now what is truth? The common sense answer is that truth, whether in a mathematical proposition, a natural law or a historic hypothesis, is correspondence of idea with existence, of belief with fact. Now if this existence be taken as some outlying 'reality' beyond sensible 'appearance,' it must be unknowable, and hence any attempt to discover correspondence between idea and existence in this case is futile and absurd. But if, as James, Dewey and Bradley declare, existence is just experience, the attempt to discover correspondence between an idea and some other experience is certainly justifiable. But what is this experienced fact with which an idea must correspond? Simply a generally accepted object. Hence correspondence of belief with fact virtually means, as Durkheim and Royce point out, correspondence of private belief with public belief.. Now as correspondence overlaps and ramifies into a network it becomes coherence, consistency or harmony. This view is accepted and elaborated by L. T. Hobhouse, who holds that truth is the mutual support or harmony of independent inductions, inferences, laws, axioms, methods and postulates, all based directly or indirectly on the original facts present in sense-perception, that is, on immediately present public objects. Any judgment is true if it forms an integral part of this system of knowledge.

What, now, guarantees the truth of this system itself? For it is always changing, always in need of improvement, and never complete. What is absolute truth? C. S. Pierce suggests *practice* as a test of truth. James follows by taking utility in practice as truth itself. The function of an idea, says James, is to lead to its object, to indicate in advance 'what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions

we must prepare.' Thus an idea is a means to practical success or satisfaction, while truth is a means to practical success or satisfaction *on the whole and in the long run.* But what is the test or standard of success on the whole? How can it be decided which of two or more actions will contribute to satisfaction in the long run? If ideas are to be tested by actions, by what are actions to be tested? Are not actions also more or less true or right in so far as they measure up to or participate in an absolute standard called truth?

What, then, is truth? Pragmatism does well to point out the truth-value of action, life, impulse—in a word, *novelty.* But in the hands of James it fails to establish a rational test of idea or action. A synthesis is needed between novelty and harmony: truth should be defined as harmoniz-*ing*, as the making of novel harmony, new order, as creativity or love. This proposal is in line with the deeper pragmatism of Dewey, who defines goodness (or truth in action) as the meaning experienced when various conflicting impulses and habits issue in orderly release in action. A scientific theory is true, of course, if it fits an established system of thought, but it is truer if it breaks up this system for a time, in order to construct a new and more comprehensive system. Similarly in conduct: an act is right or true if it fits an accepted moral code, but it is truer if it breaks up this code for a time, in order to construct a new and more comprehensive code. The highest moral life must be prophetic and miraculous as well as co-operative and peaceful.

Thus truth or validity, as L. T. Hobhouse endeavors to show, applies to both thought and action indifferently, for thinking is just 'restrained action.' Truth is not merely a species of goodness, as James would have it; truth *is* goodness. Truth is usually assigned to thinking, and goodness to conduct, but both thinking and conduct may be good and true. The terms 'good' and 'desirable' refer to individual satisfaction; 'true' or 'right,' to conformity or social approval; but

ultimately both thinking and conduct are good if judged true by the universal society, and true if found good by the absolute self. Thus an idea may be a means, but truth is not a means. It is the absolute standard, identical with goodness, pleasure or love.

Beauty, like truth and goodness, is also the same as absolute pleasure. Plotinus, who marks the culmination of ancient philosophy, maintains with Plato that beauty is the essence of both the soul and the cosmos, the supreme real value of life, the eternal presence shimmering in all beautiful objects; and Thomas Aquinas, the keenest philosopher of the middle ages, cannot improve on this profound insight. In modern times, the first dominant notion of beauty appears in France as a feeling of the *real*. In England, Hutcheson stresses the point that the standard of the beautiful is the *immediate sense* of beauty. Describing beauty simply as taste, influenced by custom and association, Hume and Adam Smith free it completely from any one finite or objective standard, and imply that anything whatsoever may partake in beauty. The definition of the beautiful as 'what pleases anyone' suggests the identification of pleasure with beauty, the standard of the beautiful.

Aesthetics, which begins with Baumgarten as a theory of sense-perception, follows Leibnitz in regarding beauty as sensory *perfection*. In laying emphasis on the aspect of perfection, Kant fixes beauty as *value*. Whatever its content, says Kant, beauty is disinterested pleasure or satisfaction, the universal, necessary pleasure above conformity to any definite end. Schiller and then Schopenhauer characterize this pleasure as free from antecedent wish or will. As Bradley says, beauty is 'the *self-existent* pleasure.' Recent theory on the whole stresses the cosmic, creative nature of this independent pleasure. According to Windelband, Mackenzie and Edman, psychology is tending to regard feeling in general as the 'thing-in-itself,' that is, the real thing itself or substance. The 'In-feeling' theory recognizes that any object may become aesthetic by self-feeling.

Says Edman, all experience has an aesthetic coloring. Everyone has haunting premonitions of beauty. This means, as Plotinus implies, that beauty is the cosmic self-feeling manifested to some degree universally.

The fact that beauty is expressed chiefly in art indicates that beauty is pure act, perfect creativity. According to Edman, the excess energy of play or spontaneous pleasure becomes in art creative production. 'The genuinely gifted sing, paint, write poetry, apart from fame and reward, from the sheer pleasure of creation.' And this creation appears not only in production, but also in appreciation. As Windelband says, to enjoy the beautiful means to some extent to create the beautiful. The development of an aesthetic object in the imagination must proceed in the same way as the creation of a work of art. When, for example, we seek the best point of view for enjoying a landscape, we compose lines and colors just as does the artist who paints the picture. In both cases comes the same selection, the same new synthesis. We enjoy objects only because we are incipient artists. Croce even declares that basic intuition or perception itself is essentially aesthetic communication or expression, that is, already creative art, waiting only for the superior vision and technique of the art specialist to attain outward embodiment.

The rare beauty of objects created by fine art often obscures the truth that all creation, whether internal or external, whether fine or industrial art, whether in nature or man, is to some extent an expression of beauty or absolute creativity. Schelling considers the universe God's work of art. Edman records that the creation of the beautiful, which is the peculiar gift of the artist is sought and practised to some degree by all men. The form of beauty is not so often exquisite as useful. 'A telegram,' says Edman, 'may convey the very apex of felicity, yet not be at all felicitous in its form or in the music of its words.' Thus, as Socrates proclaims, what is useful is beautiful. Fine art is not the only art, and when it results in mere refinement

of form, its value is relatively low. But precisely because of its almost perfect control of form owing to its use of the most plastic materials, its capacity to preach truth is the greatest. It inspires by suggestion. As Keats sings, Truth is Beauty; Beauty, Truth.

Hegel shows that fine art is not intrinsic but prophetic. In fine art the mind enjoys by anticipation the victory over the external world that science reserves for it. 'The artist,' says Edman, 'may become the most influential of prophets, for his prophecies come to men not as arbitrary counsels, but as pictures of Perfection intrinsically lovely and intriguing.' With the advance of science and industrial art under the inspiration of these pictures of Perfection or Creative Love, the materials of common experience that are now hard and obdurate will become as plastic as those of fine art, and man will be able to embody the ideal of a beautiful city as even now he can express a haunting melody. Thus, truth, goodness and beauty are one, for each is a name or attribute (not quality or mode) of absolute creativity. But this absolute, I have decided, is my deepest self. Hence I conclude further that my absolute self is the one absolute value of truth, goodness and beauty.

5. Individuality.

According to the fifth definition, self is what is individual, personal, unitary. What is an individual? Some one that differs from another, replies common sense. The more difference, the more individuality. Says Windelband, 'Individuality is far greater in the human race than amongst animals, and greater in civilized man than in savages.' This difference applies not only to mankind but to all existence. Every organism is an unrepeated unit. One dog is more clever than others. No two peas are alike. Grains of sand vary in structure. Even electrons are supposed to differ in position when in nothing else. Near the human level, individuality becomes personality, obviously intellectual, self-knowing and

objective to itself. But no fixed line can be drawn in the whole process; the more the individual knows itself and becomes a person, the more can it criticize and reconstruct its basic, material conditions.

Thus, as Fichte suggests, every personality includes a clear determining element working on an obscure mass. Personality culminates in the genius, who not only knows himself most clearly, but also represents an unusually wide background or obscure mass of the general mind. As Windelband says, the essence of personality is that the individual is more than a mere specimen of the species. The significant personality, such as Luther or Goethe, even grows into the prevailing speech: receiving everything from it, he shapes it afresh for new generations: in him speaks the people as a whole. The work of the hero is creative because he directs common action towards a common end. The genius or hero differs so much from his fellows precisely because he includes so much of their experience.

The greater the difference, the greater the inclusion: this is true of individuality in general. Any amoeba differs more from any piece of food it ingests than this piece differs from another, because its life includes theirs. A man differs more from any ape than this ape differs from another, because man's native equipment both embraces and surpasses the ape's. It is therefore logical to postulate one supreme individual that differs infinitely from all other individuals precisely because he includes them all. This supreme individual, or whole, may be called God or the absolute self. As Bradley says, a complex whole is felt as a single experience, and the absolute whole is a sentient individual.

Now this conclusion presents the problem of the whole and its parts, the problem of the one and the many. How can the whole include its parts and yet differ from them? The answer is that, strictly speaking, whole and part should not be opposed as two subject-matters: the part *is* the whole in a special mode. Thus the whole in all modes includes and differs from the whole

in any particular mode; difference lies within the whole. The mistake of nominalism and empiricism is to suppose that the whole or universal is achieved by a summation of parts or particulars, whereas it is the whole that is original; the part is the whole limited to a certain expression by the selective or abstractive activity of attention. As Plato says, any part is an instance of its universal, and ultimately every particular is an instance of the one supreme universal or 'Idea' of 'The Good.' But his doctrine of the non-being of matter virtually denies this by giving to particulars a basis in *two* subject-matters, Being and Non-Being. It is precisely this dualism that hides the individuality of the whole, for it assumes that individuality comes from Non-Being rather than Being. But in truth, the individuality of any part is due entirely to the whole, which is the perfect and infinite individual. Thus the parts are related only by their identity with the whole, and every individual is at bottom the supreme individual. I differ from you not in essence but in expression. I am the supreme individual or absolute self expressed here and now in certain definite instances, but ultimately in all.

While Plotinus is handicapped to the very end by the dualism of his master Plato, he nevertheless unwittingly provides for the solution of dualism by identifying the individual with the *infinite*. Plato and Aristotle, true to Greek culture, regard the supreme One as perfection in the sense of form or limit, but Plotinus, perhaps under the influence of Indian Vedantism, treats it as perfection in the sense of infinite power, the source of emanation. When the human soul unites with God in mystic ecstasy, it really becomes what it was originally: it simply discovers its own real self. Dualism is now logically impossible, for Plotinus has on his hands *two* creative Infinites, God and Matter. He is indeed fain to unite them, but his loyalty to Plato forbids: God is reality, goodness and beauty, while Matter is unreality, evil and ugliness; God is unity, permanence and rest, while Matter is plurality, change and

motion: how can the opposite characters of these two Infinites be united?

Bruno, the first modern philosopher, and a spiritual descendant of Plotinus through Augustine, Scotus Erigena, Lullus, Nicholas of Cusa, Paracelsus and Telesio, boldly attempts to end this dualism in the name of scientific monism. There cannot be two infinites, he says; if the universe is infinite, as science declares, then God and matter are one. But the ancient dualism between the one and the many still holds over. The individual is finite, a different subject-matter from the infinite, not matter itself, but a *reproduction* of matter in plural, transient monads. This pluralistic tendency of dualism is fulfilled in the clean-cut pluralism of his follower Leibnitz, who breaks up matter or substance completely into independent, separate, self-sufficient *points* of substance, or monads. Likewise, Leibnitz monadistic successor Lotze, in one phase of his argument, declares that to be real is to remain one of a number of units while inducing or suffering change. And B. P. Bowne, who bases his work on Lotze, brings the tradition up to date when he defines the real as what can act and be acted upon. Thus, the contemporary common sense belief that the individual is essentially a separate thing different from other individuals is inherited from Plato, who was unable to adhere perfectly to his conviction that the individual is just an instance of the original one.

6. God.

According to the sixth and last definition, the self is what is independent, intrinsic, sufficient. But this is equivalent to the conceptions of the self as substance, value, consciousness. In a word, the self is absolute, like the God intended by Plotinus and his Christian followers Augustine, Scotus Erigena and Anselm, and like the God implicit in all religions, even the most simple, who, as W. A. Brown points out, is at once real,

worthy and personal. The self, then, is God. As Windelband says, God is not another value added to truth, goodness and beauty, but just this complete value recognized as real and conscious. Thus A. A. Hodge is on right lines when he defines God by enhancing man's excellence to an infinite and perfect degree, by discovering the permanent value in nature and human experience, and by interpreting the person and work of the supreme man, Jesus Christ. To the idea of God India contributes infinite reality, Greece absolute value and Israel loving personality, but it remains for Jesus to show by his life that the absolute individual is one with the human individual here and now. In other words, God is not merely *a* person, but *the* person, the *self*.

If substance is God, then the reality of science and philosophy is, as Scotus Erigena declares, identical with that of religion. But the founder of Scholasticism regarded this reality not as the self, but as a transcendent realm opposed to the self. Hence at the dawn of the modern age it fell before the blows of experimental science on the one hand and vital religion on the other. The dualism between 'heaven' and 'earth' was now displaced by a dualism between 'inner' and 'outer.' To science belonged the outer, visible realm; to religion, the inner realm of the invisible. Now this dualism in turn can be resolved only if the self be recognized as the one subject-matter of both science and religion, and the motto 'Know thyself' common to Greece and India become at once a secular axiom and a sacred command. Substance, God and the self are the same, and substance may also be called matter.

In the worship of God, religion is the end of which science, philosophy and theology are the means. The special sciences, positive and normative, formulate the laws of the various aspects of the self, and lay the basis for human control. In summing up the sciences, philosophy seeks a universal explanation from which to derive a conviction for life, and a system

of control over nature and society. Theology is the art which makes the results of philosophy immediately available for daily practice. Thus, as Santayana points out, theology is essentially symbolic. But if genuine, it symbolizes present fact rather than mere tradition or fancy. Just as the sculptor must know anatomy, so must the theologian have a knowledge of the structure of God based on science and philosophy. The task of theology is not to deal with 'the sacred' as opposed to 'the secular,' but to make the secular sacred; and not to deal with one religious tradition as distinct from another, but to symbolize the truths common to them all. From the sharing of truth, the best will emerge. The supremacy of any religious dogma, like that of any work of art, is measured by its capacity to include, suggest, liberate and inspire. If Jesus actually becomes the revelation of God to all men, it will be only because he best awakens, harmonizes and fulfils their deepest needs and desires. Thus thelogy is really not a rival science or philosophy, but the aesthetic expression of their results.

Any system that rivals scientific philosophy by regarding God as an outside, other person, has not yet emerged from Comte's first or 'theological' stage of human thinking, which locates *will* or impulse beyond the self, as in fetishism, polytheism and pluralistic theism. But the 'sacred' attitude of this stage is only a bit more confused than the 'secular' attitude of the second or 'metaphysical' stage, which locates *tendency* or force beyond the self, as in materialism, vitalism and dualism. If theology is to work in the third or final stage, it must, like science, adopt the experimental attitude. As Comte himself saw in his later years, this very attitude implies the self as background. Science is only an instrument of the will, and the will, in turn, is governed by love. Man is not only the proper object of worship, but also the key to the understanding of the world. He unites value and reality. And when he is fully recognized as one with God, positivism unites with absolutism, humanism with theism.

Strictly speaking, man is not a mode of God, but God in a mode ; not a creature but a creator. As orthodox Christian theology implies, he is normally holy or divine. Hence he is self-determining and immortal. The craving for everlasting life is, as Windelband says, the Faust-impulse to experience more than earth can supply ; as Goethe says, the demand of creative virtue to be rewarded by more virtue ; as Kant says, the moral postulate of freedom to construct and obey the ideal in the face of the existent. In sum, it is love demanding everlasting expression. This craving can be easily understood in the light of the truth that man *is* God, and so *must* live on for ever. According to science, the natural realm, the germ-plasm or race, and the influence of personality are at least indefinitely persistent if not everlasting. Moreover, moments of spiritual exaltation yield the conviction of immortality. But the main support of faith in individual immortality is the basic philosophic position that the individual is substance, a position identical with the proclamation of the life of Jesus that man is one with God.

The world is to God as experience is to the self. It is God practically limited to a certain area, ' finite,' as Einstein says, but ' unbounded.' Thus, God is not apart from the world, as in deism, nor identical with the world, as in pantheism. Nor yet is God in the world, as in immanentism, nor is the world in God, as in pantheism ; for both of these positions imply dualism. The world is not original, not another subject-matter opposed to God, but God Himself expressed in time and space. This position may be called monistic theism. God is continually creating the world out of Himself : it is the form of which He is the substance. The mistake of dualism is to assert that the world changes while God remains unchanged ; whereas the monistic position is that *God* changes, and this change is the world. God persists amidst change : the world repeatedly dies and is born again. Thus, as Brown maintains, the world is neither illusory nor independent, but worthily actual and dependent on God.

* * *

I have now discovered what I really am: substance, consciousness, pleasure, value, individuality, God. In doing so, I have already defined my good: it is myself. My duty and pleasure, then, is to be my real self, to enjoy maximum expression, supreme creativity. As Will Durant so tersely says, 'The prime moral conflict is not between the individual and the group, but between the partial self of fragmentary impulse and the co-ordinated self of conscious purpose.....Every individual is a society, every person a crowd.' Moral responsibility is the responsibility of the individual to himself. 'To be whole, to be your deliberate self, to do what you please, to follow your own ideals (but to follow them!) to choose your own means and not have them forced on you by your ancestors, to act consistently, to see the part *sub specie totius*, to see the present act in its relation to your vital purposes, to think, to be intelligent,—all these are definitions of virtue and morality.' I should add that these are also definitions of religion, since the whole self is God. And when I look for central guidance in being myself, I can find no better than Jesus Christ, the very incarnation of wholesome creativity. In fellowship with Him, my thinking becomes genuine prayer, and my society the Church universal.

WENDELL THOMAS

LOVE-WORDS

Edith, I am love-mad,
Pause a-while,
That I can hear your sweet voice,
See you smile.
Passion shakes me rudely
In its grips,
Bodily I'm yearning
For your lips.
God! what hell is longing
Stalked by fear!
When are hours so lonely,
Or as drear?
I am dazed by moon-song
In the night,
Your spirit lives beside me
Holy-white.
Love, your sweet eyes shining
In my soul,
Keep my faith before me
Pure and whole.
Whisper—only whisper—
At my breast,
All will then be peace, Love,
Peace and rest.
To my arms resigning
Closer creep,
And Night shall kiss us proudly
Into sleep.

LELAND J. BERRY

A TYPHOON

We had worked out of the Celebean Sea round the south end of the Island of Mindanao, and thence N. E. for Japan.

The days were fine and the nights cool, for it was the first week in October, and we who had roasted in Red Sea Ports and borne with the misery of fever in Indian ones thanked God that we were at last on the other side of the Equator from the sun, and heading for cooler and less inhospitable climes.

All went well; and about the 12th parallel of N. Latitude we picked up a fresh northerly breeze, which seemed to us the gift of life and put vigour into us with every breath. The only ones who had cause for a grouse were the cooks and stewards, for, fore and aft, all needed extra food to bring them back to normal condition.

For two days this weather continued, except that the wind, still keeping northerly, increased to a moderate gale, but there was no sea with it. The barometer had fallen five-tenths of an inch, but was still what one would call a good glass, standing at 29·60.

Our Old Man seemed fidgetty, a very unusual thing; and he would gaze anxiously at the sky, as though he would wring a forecast from its blue depths or from its stray wisps of cloud; but always it was with the same baffled expression he lowered his eyes.

He was a silent man, and rarely spoke except to give necessary instructions; but now he muttered to himself from time to time, and I heard him say to one of his officers: "It may be only an ordinary breeze, the glass is still good, and the sky tells me nothing; but I don't like it." He kept the deck all day, and in the afternoon I caught another short phrase: "I wish the wind would shift," he said. That was all, but we wondered

what was going on behind those anxious eyes and hard old face. What was he worrying about? Why did'nt he go to his berth, or to the chartroom to read and write as was his custom? Was the Old Man losing grip of himself and taking fright at this steady breeze we had been butting into for the last two days? The sea still was moderate and the sky clear; but we were soon to realise that there was some foundation for the Old Man's instinctive dislike of the appearance of the weather. Towards sunset the sky was overcast with great woolpack clouds that seemed to come from nowhere, with practically no way upon them; the wind fell lighter without changing its direction; and the sunset was a sight never to be forgotten. Both to East and West the heavens were fiery red. The waters beneath, crimsoned with the reflection, threw up the glare to the low clouds. Between the clouds were spaces lately blue and now of an indescribable green that gave out a garish light I have no name for.

It was wonderful and beautiful; but it had another message for the Old Man. He no longer bore that baffled look: there was work to be done.

The mate had gone below, but was sent for to get the hands out while there was still light to secure all bunker hatches, close up and caulk the doorways leading into the shelter deck and poop and see that dummies were screwed down on side, poop, and forecastle ports.

Deep were the growls; but it is the unwritten law of the sea that "Growl you may but go you must;" and fortunately the weird light lasted long after sunset, so that by 7-30 P.M., since the men worked well, all was snugged for the expected storm. It was not till then we noticed that the ship was slowed down.

Still the weather was fine, and men going off watch at 8 P.M.; and the day-men who would have all night in, washed their grimy hands and faces preparatory to going to bed. Many and original were the prayers that ran round the forecastle for

that dark figure we could see standing near the binnacle ; but the dark figure neither heard nor cared much about their prayers. He had other things to think of. The men who came on watch at 8 P.M., were set to stretch life-lines, fore and aft, to give men who ran along the decks in heavy weather something to hang on by and to guide them in the dark.

This job kept us going until after 9 P.M., and by that time the sea had risen considerably, the wind had increased and the night was of inky blackness. Great sheets of lightning flashed around the horizon. From time to time the Old Man would anxiously take a bearing of the wind.

At about 11 P.M. he seemed to have come to some decision, for he went to the chartroom, and on his return to the bridge a few minutes later I heard him say to the officer : "We are in the left hand semi-circle of a typhoon and very near the track of the storm's centre, which by all the rules of the game in this region ought to travel in a north-westerly direction. But this one as I figure it is moving due west, so that if I take the wind on the Port Quarter and run for it, I may, from our position, be involved in the centre, since we do not know the extent of the storm-field nor its onward rate along its path. Go and tell the Engineer to open out to 6 knots. That is about as much as it is safe to give her in this sea. Tell him I have resolved to cross the front of the storm, and if I need more speed I will send word to him."

As the speed increased it was not difficult for the youngest of us to see that 6 knots was enough. Before, we had been scarcely moving, and had made fair weather of it ; but under the increased speed we soon found what a terrible sea was running at us. From out the darkness great bodies of water broke on board ; the ship was smothered in sea, and, as she laboured, there was the continuous roar of water from her wash ports, and the heavy banging as a sea rushing at us would catch them open and fling them shut with a mighty blow. The fury of the wind increased and the squalls became heavier

and more frequent. By midnight the wind was screaming past as if the legions of hell were coming to attack us, and still it blew from the north.

Occasionally the Old Man took a bearing of the wind, but he never wavered from his intention. When he increased the speed he knew (or thought he knew) his position in the storm field. At 2 A. M., we had changed the direction of the wind one point, so that it was now North-by-East, and all the crew had come aft to the bridge, passage along the decks being too dangerous ; the sailors sheltered to leeward of the chartroom, and the stokers in the bunkers. At 4 A. M., the wind was N. N. E., and increasing in strength, the darkness intense ; the very sky seemed to be crushing down upon us, while thick mist drove across the glare of our masthead lights and strong men prayed for the light of day. If only they could see, it would not be so bad, but this utter darkness and the murderous seas that swept the whole ship fore and aft—what chance had these poor mites against such a monstrous foe! The older ones prayed God that the hatches would stand the terrible battering and pressure put upon them, for if a hatch burst now it meant death, and they would never see the light of day they prayed for. At last it dawned, and those who had so longed for it that they might have a fighting chance were appalled by the sight that met their bloodshot eyes. Among them were some hard cases, men who feared neither man, death, nor devil, but this, was something they had never imagined, they were face to face with the power of the Almighty.

The topmasts were lost in the low-lying clouds that rushed past at the rate of 80 to 100 miles an hour ; great white-tipped pyramids of sea rose on every side and hissing as with venom, attacked the ship from every point of the compass, while as high as sight could reach was one sheet of spindrift blown from their crests. The ship and her cargo, weighing over 13,000 tons, was lifted and played with on these hissing crests, just as at the shooting gallery of some fancy fair a celluloid ball may

be seen played with by a jet of water. Often more than two-thirds of her total length of 400 feet was in suspension, and as the tortured hull descended a great sea rushing from windward would catch her under the bilge and throw her over on her broadside, then as she struggled to right herself another mountain of water would rush up her weather-side and clean over her. Then, as she gained the upright position once more, but hampered by the weight of water in her well-decks, she would again and again be swept by the terrible seas. It seemed as if God had determined on the destruction of this beautiful work of man's hands. Could she, manipulated by man, withstanding the wrath of God ? Was there a God ? If so, was he utterly merciless ? Had he no pity for these poor children of his creation ? If their lives were forfeit let their lives be taken and relieve them of this terrible suspense : if they have played with and laughed at death, forgive them, they are but men. Death is immortal and sure to win in the end : do not let Death play with them and deride their misery : they are not afraid to die, and whatever wrong they have done surely this punishment has atoned for it.

Such were my thoughts as I took in the terrible scene, and though my own life were forfeit with the lives of the others, I could look on this Titanic struggle from the outside, and it was as a spectator I watched every move of the battle between man and the elements, and wondered how much longer it could last.

Worse was to come. By 8 A. M., the wind was North-East, which shewed that the Old Man had been correct in his estimate of the path of the storm and his own position in the storm-field. He was now across the front of it, that is in the front quadrant of the right-hand semi-circle, and was still determinedly working his way out from the dreaded centre. The barometer was still falling and the wind between the squalls had a velocity of at least 100 miles per hour. In the squalls no man could keep upright without holding on, and in one of them the tarpaulin of No. 5 hatch was ripped off.

Fortunately it was only the top one, and all hands rushed to secure the hatch with lashings, for to start a wedge now meant death. No sooner was this completed and the men clear of the after deck than the whole after end of the ship was submerged through the ship lifting her head so steeply to a sea that she put her stern clean under ; then, whilst held down by weight of this water another great mountain of sea broke over her amid ships, smashing the starboard life-boat, bursting in one of th- bunker hatches and several doors on that side. Great volumee of water poured into the engine-room, stoke-hold and bunker.

Here indeed was work for men ; and no man shirked it, though many a fearful glance was cast to windward before the hatch was secured. Had she shipped another such sea while the work was going on not one of them would have been left alive. Barely had they finished and got the salt from their eyes when the corresponding hatch on the other side was stripped. Bruised and bleeding, hungry and weary, these men had again to put up a fight to keep the enemy out of their ship. This hatch, fortunately, was to leeward of the deck-house, and less dangerous to work at, yet before they were through with it, the wind, during a squall, got under a steel plate three sixteenths of an inch by 7 feet by 12 feet, used for covering the stoke-hold gratings and hinged to the top of the house. The plate was torn from its fastenings and blown over their heads into the sea.

At 10 A.M. the wind was E.N.E., and the barometer still falling. The vessel was still at the mercy of the storm, but still being driven outwards from its centre with all the power the Old Man dared to use. There had been no food for anyone, for the galley was flooded, the store-room door had been burst in, and all the stores in it destroyed by the sea. The same sea had gutted the pantry and all living accommodation was flooded, all the ports in the starboard bow had been driven in and the forecastles gutted.

The Old Man moved about as if he did not care, but his eyes were everywhere. He never spoke except to give a sharp

order. The men watched him with pleading in their eyes, trying to glean some hope from his stony face, but in it they could read neither hope nor despair.

At 12 noon the wind was E. and the ship had weathered the worst quadrant of the storm-field. But the barometer was still falling and there was hardly any interval between the squalls, the wind force being between 150 to 200 miles per hour. The sea was an inferno in which it was hard to believe a ship could live, and the men were battered, bruised, and worn out with continuous work. The force of the wind was now such that they dared not move on the open deck, and only the strongest could get from place to place, holding on, crawling at the risk of being blown away, picked up by the sea, and washed overboard. The Old Man eyeing them, must have felt the helplessness of his position, for if anything happened now that was the end. He would go fighting, and so would every man of them, but they would have no chance.

So the afternoon passed, until at 4 P. M. there was a lull, the wind being now at E.S.E., and the ship in the rear quadrant of the right-hand semi-circle of the storm.

The Old Man worked his way to the chartroom, and soon returned announcing cheerfully, in a voice that the men could hear "The glass has ceased falling," then to the mate "Thank God! Take a final look round before dark: it would be a pity to lose her now, after coming through that."

He did not speak again until the watch was being relieved at midnight. Then he walked over to the two officers, and pointing to a rift in the clouds, said:

"There's a star. It's a fine night now and I'm going down. Call me at 5 A.M., or before then, if you want me. Good-night, Gentlemen!"

"A SAILOR"

FOOT-TRACK

(From Dr. Rabindranath Tagore's *Lipika*.)

It's a foot-track. Leaping out of the woodlands it glistens through the lea by the brook. It then winds through the village, past the linseed fields and the shady common, and glides out I know not whither. I saw them that went by it—and they were many—some with a veil and some without it,—one to draw water,—another back with a full pitcher.

The day is done and it's getting dark. Once did I take this path as mine own. I know better now,—I have been commissioned to walk this path but once and no more.

To get back thro' the lemon-shade, past the grange and the ancient fanes by the brook—back again to the land of known faces midst known voices and looks—and to say, "Well met!" —O, that's not given to me. For it is a path for onward move and there's no going back.

Through the grey even do I look behind to-day and the way appears to be a song-wreath of forgotten foot-prints set to some twilight tune.

All the tales of all the pilgrims have been done into one lone dash of dust, reaching out from the sunrise into the sunset —from one golden portal into another.

"O path of many a foot-mark, keep not the stories of the far time bound up in thee and silent. Whisper them unto me for my ears are on thy dust."

The path points its finger to the night and is mute.

"O path of many a foot-mark, where are they gone—the thoughts and longings of all thy walkers?"

The silent path speaks not. It only flashes a hint from sunrise to sundown.

"O path of many a foot-mark, the steps that fell like flower-showers on thy heart—where are they to-day?"

The path knows not its goal, where lost flowers and hushed songs reach—where in the starlight there's a luminous carnival of quenchless anguish.

HRISIKESH BHATTACHARYYA

CONVOCATION ADDRESS OF THE ANDHRA UNIVERSITY[1]

University Aims and Ideals

MR. CHANCELLOR,

I am deeply sensible of the honour of being invited by Your Excellency to address the Convocation of the Andhra University this year.

One of the most remarkable phenomena we have witnessed during the past decade has been the springing up of a great many new Universities in India. Counting only those which have received the official blessing, thirteen new Universities have been established since 1915, the first of these being at Benares, at the inauguration ceremony of which I was present, and the last at Chidamboram which Your Excellency's Government have just brought into existence. It is not without interest to enquire into the reasons which have caused this remarkable outburst of new Universities. Broadly speaking it may be ascribed to a feeling of intense dissatisfaction with the administration of the older Universities, a growing conviction that they failed to satisfy the educational requirements of the country. The same feeling of dissatisfaction is indicated also in the attempts at reform made by the older Universities. Calcutta inaugurated the new University era in India in 1914 by bringing into existence almost overnight a University College of Science and Departments of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts and Science. Punjab University, which I visited in the year 1919 to give a special course of lectures, has gone ahead with the creation of University Laboratories and Honours Schools.

[1] Delivered by Prof. C. V. Raman, M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S.

Allahabad reconstituted itself in 1922 as a teaching University. Bombay and Madras are trying to move, though very slowly. They possess the respectability of age and can therefore afford to be conservative.

Andhra is one of the products of this remarkable University movement. It came into existence by a process very familiar to the biologist, that is the process of fission of one cell into two. The parent cell naturally transmits its characters including all its weaknesses to its progeny. Madras for seventy years has been an examining and affiliating University. Andhra is precisely the same, with the difference that it cannot claim the respectability of age and suffers from the disadvantage of having no particular place with overwhelming claims to be regarded as its educational nucleus. A further complication has arisen from the fact that Andhra is geographically not really a single unit. The Circars and the Ceded Districts have agreed, at least for the time being, to have a common University. We cannot, however, overlook the fact that their interests are not completely identical.

The most vital defect in the organisation of Andhra University at present is that, as remarked already, it possesses no real cultural centre. The real academic life of Southern India in the past had centred in the city of Madras with its many colleges and institutions, particularly the Presidency, Christian and Pachaiyappa's Colleges, the Engineering, Law and Medical Colleges, which between them brought together teachers and students from all parts of the Presidency with not wholly unsatisfactory results. Andhra has cut herself off from Madras, but she has yet to find her own soul. She has no doubt some fourteen collegiate institutions within her jurisdiction, but none of these has yet acquired the prestige and influence necessary to give it the status of a University College.

You have yet to build your University and in building it, you must be careful to lay your foundations well and truly. You must envisage clearly in your minds what it is you really

wish to achieve and set about doing it in the right way. There is a feeling abroad, which is often voiced from high places, that you have only to do away with affiliating Universities, and put in their places unitary and residential and teaching Universities, and that by doing so you would straight away usher in, educationally, a new heaven and a new earth. Let me warn you that this is only a half-truth and a very dangerous half-truth. It is possible to have a unitary teaching and residential University which is quite as bad as any affiliating, examining and territorial University. A residential University which propagates ignorance, communalism and religious fanaticism under the guise of education, is even worse than an affiliating University which leaves its students severely alone to learn whatever they can. Whether a University is good or bad is determined entirely by the ideas and ideals that inspire its activities. No University can be great which has not men of outstanding ability as its teachers, which does not attract the ablest and most ambitious students, and does not provide its teachers and students with opportunities for the highest and most original kind of work. A University is a Republic of Learning. It needs, of course, material resources in the shape of well-equipped laboratories and work-shops, libraries, lecture-halls, hostels, residences and play-grounds. But above all it needs great men as teachers. There is no tragedy more deplorable, no waste more appalling than to have huge buildings filled lavishly with books and apparatus and equipment and spacious lecture-halls and to find within them mediocre teachers and misguided students doing an inferior type of work. A tragedy of this kind is much commoner in India than many of you realise.

The essence of University work is that it marches with the frontiers of human knowledge. You require for it men who are explorers in the unknown territories and sailors on the uncharted seas of new knowledge. It is such men and such only that can inspire young minds with real enthusiasm for work, that can infuse their followers with courage and a spirit of

emulation, and can lead them to victory in the quest of knowledge. Without such men as leaders, the army of seekers after knowledge will flounder and get lost in the bogs of ignorance. The real aim and purpose of your University organisation must be to ensure that you get the ablest men to be found anywhere as the teachers of your rising generation and to give them generously the material resources they require for their work.

The urgent task ahead of you is to create a centre in Andhra where real University work can be organised and carried on under the most favourable auspices. At the same time you have to devise some machinery by which your scattered colleges which are at present doing an elementary type of work, can be looked after and improved, so that they can act as satisfactory feeders for the central organisation, and meet local needs as preparatory institutions. Surveying the whole of Andhra I feel that by far the most suitable location for a great University centre is to be found at Waltair. It lies on the great highway between the older Universities of Madras and Calcutta, being within quick and easy reach of both. It has a fine climate and beautiful surroundings, which should make work possible and agreeable right through all the seasons of the year, and make it easier to secure the services of scholars from other Universities for short periods and thus secure a stimulating academic atmosphere. It has already a medical faculty and an engineering school ; you have also an intermediate college which will act as a local feeder for the University. There is reason to hope that ere long Waltair will develop into a great port and a wealthy emporium of commerce. Its position as a sea port and commercial town should render it possible to obtain supplies and services for the University quickly and cheaply. Waltair is not too far from the wealthy districts of the Krishna and the Godavari deltas to adequately serve their needs for the highest type of University work, provided adequate residential facilities are provided for the students, and this I believe would be quite practicable. There is reason to believe that local support will be

forthcoming sooner or later in aid of the finances of the University. Thus in all respects, it seems admirably suited as a location for a great teaching University.

My feeling is that to be a real success, the teaching organisation at the headquarters of the University should undertake not only Honours and Post-Graduate work, but also work for the ordinary degree classes above the Intermediate standard. Such teaching carried on directly under the auspices of the University is, in my opinion, likely to be of real benefit to the younger generation of Andhra. It will serve to bring even those whose abilities or resources do not permit them to take up Honours or Post-Graduate work, into contact with University teachers of real ability and thus colour their mental outlook in a manner that must be of lasting advantage to them in their future life. I do not propose that all the existing degree colleges outside the University headquarters should be shut down. There would no doubt be certain colleges, as for instance Anantapur College, where degree work would be permitted to continue. But it would certainly be better if the less strongly equipped colleges should concentrate on improving their intermediate teaching, and leave the degree work to be done under the auspices of the University, or in such of the colleges outside the University headquarters as are sufficiently well-staffed and well-equipped to be given the status of University colleges.

I think it is essential that all colleges which are permitted to undertake degree work should agree to come under University control to a greater extent than at present. In their case University affiliation should be replaced by University management exercised through the intermediary of a semi-independent Governing Body in which the University Executive is represented, and whose proceedings come up to the Syndicate for review. While such a constitution will leave a reasonable amount of independence to the colleges, it would serve to ensure that their affairs are regulated in a manner more in accordance with University ideals than is the case at present.

The creation of a centre of University teaching as outlined above will certainly be expensive, but I cannot see that it can possibly be put off or avoided. A capital expenditure of 30 lakhs and an annual recurring expenditure of 6 lakhs would be a reasonable estimate of the cost, considering the range of subjects to be covered and the extent of the population whose needs have to be met by the University. With a little judicious pressure from Your Excellency on the Finance Department of the Local Government and upon the wealthy aristocracy of Andhra, the money will, I have no doubt, be forthcoming. This leads me on to consider the question of the financial relations between the Government and the University. The present arrangement under which the University receives what I may refer to as an unemployment dole, seems to me wholly indefensible. The policy of a close linking up of the colleges and the University indicated above, involves as a corollary that all money spent by Government on collegiate teaching, should pass through the University Budget, so that the University may have an effective voice in the distribution of the available funds. It would certainly make for improved efficiency if all the grants to colleges (as distinguished from High Schools) are made on the recommendation of the University. The quality of the work done in the colleges is a matter that affects the University vitally, and I can conceive of no authority more competent than the University to advise whether financial assistance is really needed and deserved by any particular institution in the area.

It is a matter of most serious concern to every one connected with Andhra University that no facilities of any kind exist at present in its jurisdiction for higher scientific, technological and literary studies. It is a most pressing duty of the University to organise such studies, and it may rightly be claimed that Your Excellency's Government is under an obligation to provide funds on the most generous scale for this much-needed expansion.

From University organization we naturally pass to University aims and ideals. The man in the street is prone to regard a University as something which enables his sons (perhaps also his daughters) to pass examinations and obtain degrees and ultimately to secure some sort of remunerative employment. This is not altogether an unreasonable view to take. But it is rather a superficial one, and a University which regards itself as a degree-giving organization and nothing more, will soon find that its alumni are not wanted by any employer who needs talent. There is a fundamental fallacy involved in regarding University work as merely a glorified kind of school teaching which leads to degrees instead of to school-leaving certificates. School and University alike serve the interests of a community. But to imagine that the ideals of School and University are identical is to commit a grave blunder, which will in the long run injure the interests of the community. To my mind the true aim of University work is the advancement of knowledge and not the imparting of instruction. In the Republic of Learning there is room for many different degrees of ability, knowledge and training, and the leaders may well be required to help their followers over the difficult places on the road to knowledge. But you require as your leaders men who have courage and vision, and themselves know the true road to knowledge which is by personal study and research and investigation. One who does not know the road himself will only lead others astray. You require leaders and teachers for whom the advancement of knowledge is the motive power in life, and who will inspire others with like ideals, and you cannot get or keep such men if your University is just a glorified school and nothing more.

Human knowledge is not at the present time a static structure which just needs to be occupied and will serve as a permanent rest-house for the jaded traveller. It is tremendously vital and dynamic, a something which is ever to be sought and never will be finally reached. It needs for its

devotees men of tireless energy and enthusiasm, who seek for the pleasure of the chase and care not overmuch for the triumph of the conquest. Such men are truly the salt of the earth. They are not discovered by Government Departments and Official organizations. It is the function of a University to discover them and furnish opportunities for their work.

The aim of University teaching should be to stimulate and guide the student on the right path, to help him to acquire habits of study and work, and to encourage him to exercise an independent judgment on problems presented to him. Such training is only possible by bringing the student into personal contact with teachers who themeselves possess great independence of outlook and live a life of strenuous intellectual activity. To deprive our alumni of opportunities of contact with such teachers and to place them under men of inferior merit is to poison the wells of learning. A University or College which converts its alumni into mere passive absorbers of knowledge is doing incalculable harm to the rising generation.

I have commented on University aims and ideals only to show how immensely important it is that the right kind of University organization is created, that the right kind of teachers are secured and that the right kind of opportunities and training are provided for our students. I have myself an immense faith in the possibilities of achievement which lie in front of a really well-organized and well-equipped University in India. I am not here referring merely to academic possibilities, but also to the services which such an organization can render to the material welfare of the community. Scientific research, as is well-known, even when inspired by purely academic ideals, leads sooner or later, to results of practical value. It is not a difficult step for a student who has acquired habits of study and research in a University laboratory to apply his mind in the same way to the practical problems he meets in later life. India has still an abundance of natural resources and it is high time that the alumni of our Universities take a hand in the utilization of those

resources and not simply remain passive spectators of their exploitation by foreign capitalists. The knowledge and the training required for such efforts to be successful, can only be acquired if our Universities are organized in the right way. I hope Andhra will realise the immense importance of the issues that are at stake, and agree to arrive at some settlement which will place the entire control of University teaching in Andhra directly under the University and enable it to be organized in a manner most beneficial to the interests of the community.

Graduates of the year, I desire to congratulate you on your successes in the University Examinations and the degrees which you have so well earned and received to-day. I hope you will go forth into the world with some enthusiasm and gratitude for what your *Alma Mater* has done for you, and help her so far as you can to attain and fulfil her destiny. I earnestly hope that the training you have received will stand you in good stead in your life hereafter. I wish you all success.

NEW CONCEPTS OF MATTER AND RADIATION *

Most of the great discoveries in Physics made during the past forty years have been the result of experimental research. They have rarely been hit upon by accident, but have usually followed from the purposeful activity of the physicist in his laboratory seeking to gain knowledge from Nature at first hand. But successful experimentation means a background of ideas and of clear thinking, and that is where the theorist comes in. It is possible to reason clearly without the use of mathematical symbology. But experience has taught us that quantitative measurement and expression of natural phenomena is the surest way to reach a right understanding of them. We have to think quantitatively, and we can only do so by using the language and methods of the mathematician. The wonderful success of the organic chemists in analysing and synthesising tens of thousands of compounds is an illustration of how with little or no mathematics and a great deal of experimental research, it is possible to build up a vast body of purely empirical knowledge. But the deeper we desire to go in our understanding of Nature's workings, the more mathematical, and I may add, the more philosophical, we have necessarily to become.

The last forty years beginning with the discovery of the properties of electrical waves by Hertz in 1888 may be described as the heroic age of physics. An astounding wealth of new facts has been discovered, many of which are of a nature hardly reconcilable with the mechanical philosophy which dominated the nineteenth-century physics. A marked feature of this advance, more especially of recent years, has been the manner in which the latest weapons in the armoury of the mathematician

* Inaugural Address delivered at the Sixth Conference of the Indian Mathematical Society at Nagpur, on the 24th December, 1928.

have had to be requisitioned for the attack on the theoretical problems of modern physics. The theoretical physicist of to-day has to be an accomplished mathematician with gifts of intuition and imagination even superior to those necessary for success in experimental research. He will certainly have no inclination or leisure for experimental work and will leave that to less gifted mortals. While the latter may sometimes make discoveries in the laboratory, the theorist will in most cases predict their results in advance and thus win glory. I hope this prospect will attract our young and gifted mathematicians and induce them to turn their attention to theoretical physics.

I will devote this address to the theoretical aspects of some recent discoveries in physics and their relation to our fundamental concepts of the nature of matter and radiation. To enable you to appreciate my discussion, I have to make some remarks of a preliminary nature.

In the early part of the nineteenth century, the science of optics made great strides forward by accepting the view that light and other forms of radiation consist of some kind of wave-motion capable of travelling through empty space. Later, the experimental discoveries of Faraday and the theoretical work of Clerk-Maxwell paved the way for the acceptance of the view that the waves of light are of an electro-magnetic nature. Heinrich Hertz brilliantly confirmed this idea by showing that waves having many of the physical properties of light could actually be generated in space using appropriate electrical circuits capable of oscillating with comparatively low frequencies. Maxwell's explanation of light as an electro-magnetic wave-motion was thus firmly established and may be regarded as a corner-stone of theoretical physics. It has never been seriously disturbed, though many phenomena were known or have been discovered which seem not at all easy to reconcile with it.

The latter half of the nineteenth century saw the rise of the science of spectroscopy. By raising a gas or a vapour to a sufficiently high temperature, or by passing an electric discharge

through it, we can cause it to emit light, and this light when examined in a spectroscope shows numerous bright lines, and in some cases also bright bands or a continuous spectrum. All efforts to explain these spectra with the aid of mechanical or electrical models of the atom were unsuccessful until Bohr in 1913 showed the way by introducing his doctrine of the discrete states of matter. Bohr put forward the idea that the act of exciting an atom or a molecule to give out light is not a single process but takes place in two distinct stages. The first stage is that of energising the atom or molecule to make it pass into a condition *different* from the ordinary or non-luminous state. The second stage is for the atom or molecule to return to a state of lower energy, giving up the extra energy in the form of radiation. The atom or molecule can exist only in one state at a time. This may at first sight seem to be a truism, but its real meaning is that the energy levels of the atom form a discontinuous series, without any intermediate states. In our classical idea of a dynamical system such as a vibrating string, we can imagine the string to be at rest or to be vibrating with a given amount of energy, or with any intermediate amount. This is not possible for atomic systems and any hope of representing the behaviour of an atom completely by ordinary dynamics is therefore futile.

The return of an atomic system from an energised state to its non-energised state or to any possible state of lower energy may be either spontaneous or be induced by some external agency. If the return is spontaneous, the difference of energies of the initial and final states must appear as radiation energy. This is the principal foundation of Bohr's theory. Different lines in the spectrum correspond to different quantities of energy radiated from the system. The relation between the energy-quantum and the frequency of the waves in the sense of Maxwell's theory is one of simple proportionality, the factor of proportionality being the Planck action constant.

As radiation is *emitted* by the atom or molecule in quanta, it follows logically from the doctrine of discrete states that it is

also *absorbed* in quanta when the system passes from a state of lower to one of higher energy. Thus radiation seems always to appear in or disappear from atomic systems in bundles or energy-quanta. Many physicists have been troubled with the question whether in consequence of this, we should not also assume that it travels through space in quanta, and many discussions have appeared as to the size or volume of the quantum of radiation, its shape and spin, and of the manner in which the quanta crinkle their way along the curved lines of flow in an interference-field, and so forth. I am very doubtful myself whether such discussions have any value or significance and shall not tire you by speaking of them. I will pass on to consider some recent experimental discoveries which may possibly however have a bearing on the question of localising the paths of quanta in space.

I shall first refer to the brilliant work of Prof. A. H. Compton done a few years ago for which he received the Nobel prize in physics last year. Compton showed that if X-rays fall upon matter, and the scattered rays are analysed by an X-ray spectroscope, the spectrum shows a doubling of the lines present in the incident radiation. He gave a remarkably simple explanation of this phenomenon, by assuming that a quantum of radiation is a travelling corpuscle which hits one of the electrons in the scattering substance, and, as the result, is deviated from its straight path, the electron itself recoiling in another direction. It is obvious that in this process the quantum will lose some of its energy and the X-ray it represents will diminish in frequency, the missing energy of course being carried off by the recoil electron. Compton's explanation of his phenomenon is supported by measurements of the change of frequency of the X-rays and by actual observation of the recoil electrons ; it has therefore received very general acceptance. I was present at Toronto in Canada in August 1924 when the physicists of the British Association listened to Compton's own account of his discovery and subsequently had a vigorous discussion on it. I was almost the only physicist present

who voiced the opinion that there was nothing in the Compton Effect which really contradicted the classical wave-principles. In November 1927, I had an opportunity of re-examining this question and wrote a little paper in which I worked out for my own satisfaction a theory of the modified scattering of X-rays on lines quite different from that of Compton. I have thought it might be worth while to print this paper in the Indian Journal of Physics, and I am distributing copies of it to the members of this conference.

The idea of my paper is briefly to regard the atom as a spherical enclosure containing Z electrons inside which they move about freely like the molecules of a gas. The paper discusses the effect of summing up the Z vibrations re-radiated by the electrons in the atom according to the ordinary principles of wave-optics. By investigating the magnitude and character of the resultant, we obtain in an astonishingly simple way the essential facts of the Compton Effect, namely that we have a modified and an unmodified radiation, and that the ratio of the intensity of two depends on the atomic number of the scattering element, the angle of observation, and the wave-length of the incident radiation in just the way that we know experimentally to be the case. Further, the theory indicates that the modified scattering is of the nature of a 'fluctuation' phenomenon, in other words, that its intensity and distribution vary from instant to instant in an arbitrary manner, and that these variations must be accompanied by corresponding simultaneous fluctuations in the state of the atom. This is just what is observed, and the fact that the classical wave-principles lead to it is very significant, and shows that the Compton Effect is to be regarded as a fluctuation in the electrical state of the atom induced by the incident radiation. By fluctuation here is meant a change from one possible to another possible state of the atom in the sense of Bohr.

One rather violent kind of fluctuation in the state of an atom is for it to throw off a loosely-bound outer electron, and in fact, this actually happens at high temperatures, the atom

becoming ionized. The Compton Effect is just the same kind of fluctuation, induced in this case at the ordinary temperatures by the impact of external radiation. The classical wave-principles suffice to indicate that such fluctuation must occur in the present case and even enable us to calculate the intensity of the modified X-radiation which accompanies it. In my paper I discuss also the question of the change of frequency of the modified scattering and explain why Compton's way of deriving it gives the same result as when we adopt the classical view that the radiation from an electron consists of spherical waves.

The treatment of the Compton Effect outlined above seems to make it easier to reconcile, in a physically intelligible way, the classical and quantum points of view regarding the process of radiation from atoms. In view of its simplicity, it may also prove of service in working out the theory of the Compton Effect, not merely for single atoms, but also for whole groups of them as we find in solids and liquids, and for finding how the free electrons are distributed in space in electrically conducting solids such as metals. Another important point is that this way of viewing the Compton effect naturally suggests that it is only one of several possible types of modified secondary radiation. It is not necessary for the atom to undergo such a violent fluctuation in its state as the ejection of an electron. The impact of radiation may induce the atom to pass from the state of lowest energy to another of higher energy in which the electrons remain bound to it. In this case, we shall find the incident quantum of radiation is, so to say, divided up, part of it being absorbed by the atom, raising its energy level, and the remaining part of the quantum going off as a new radiation of diminished frequency.

While the Compton type of scattering is observable only with X-rays and other radiations of very short wave-length, the new type of radiation indicated above is a universal phenomenon. It was first observed at Calcutta with ordinary light. As early as 1923, it had been noticed in our investigations on the scattering of light, that when sunlight filtered

through a violet glass passes through water or ice, the track of the beam of light continues to be visible through a green glass. Since the green and violet glasses taken together are completely opaque to light and are thus complementary to each other, it follows that violet light is actually transformed in part into green light by the molecules of the water or ice. Subsequently the phenomenon was studied also in many other solids and liquids and the results were published from time to time. The theoretical investigations on the nature of the Compton Effect on which I was engaged towards the end of 1927 gave me a clue to the real nature of the optical phenomenon encountered by us in light-scatteriug. This clue was rapidly followed up with very gratifying results.

The phenomena of the new radiation appear in their most interesting form when we use monochromatic light such as that of a mercury lamp and analyse spectroscopically the light after it is scattered within a transparent medium, *e.g.*, vapour, liquid, or crystal. A great many new lines appear in the scattered spectrum which are not present in the light of the mercury arc. Most of these lines represent frequencies of radiation lower than those of the mercury responsible for their generation: Some lines of higher frequency than the corresponding mercury lines are also found. The following chemical equation indicates how the new lines of both kinds arise

Molecule	+ Radiation	$\longrightarrow$	Molecule +	Radiation
(normal)	(high frequency)	$\longrightarrow$	(excited)	(low frequency)

We have the normal reaction when the molecule is initially in the normal state, and the reverse reaction when the molecule is initially in the excited condition owing to thermal agitation.

It does not lie within the scope of this lecture to describe the many interesting phenomena observed in connection with the new type of secondary radiation, or its applications in diverse fields of physics and chemistry. The subject is receiving attention from a great many physicists and chemists throughout

the world, and its literature is growing at a great pace. I am only concerned to-day with some of the theoretical aspects of the phenomenon. Some will no doubt choose to consider it a proof of the quantum theory of radiation. Personally I see in it nothing really contradictory to the classical wave-principles when taken together with the Bohr theory of discrete states of matter. If we can cut up a quantum of radiation or add to it, as experiment shows, and thus diminish or increase the frequency of the radiation by any desired amount, it seems to me difficult to assign to the quantum a corporeal existence such as that which we naturally associate with an electron or proton. The idea of adding or subtracting frequencies arises in classical dynamics when we deal with anharmonic oscillators, and there is nothing specially of a quantum character involved in it. What is significant is the relation between the intensities of the lines of diminished and enhanced frequencies. The latter are usually much weaker and appear only when the molecules are excited independently by thermal agitation or otherwise, and this is strong support for the idea of discrete energy levels as enunciated by Bohr. We have to modify our dynamics to make it suit our atoms, but I do not believe that we shall have to make any startling changes in our viewpoint as regards the nature of radiation.

In conclusion, I desire to thank the Society very sincerely for the great distinction of election to the Honorary Membership which they have conferred upon me. I know the interests of the Society centre largely in pure mathematics. But I know also that some amongst you have leanings towards Physics. I earnestly trust that they will turn their attention towards the problem of radiation and its inter-relations with matter which still awaits complete solution.

C. V. RAMAN

Reviews

Sir Asutosh Mookerjee—A study: By P C. Sinha, with a Foreword by Dr. C. V. Raman and an Introduction by Sir P. C. Ray (The Book Co. Rs. 4/- pp. 532).

Mr. P. C. Sinha, a young and enterprising scholar has brought out a thoroughly exhaustive study of the various aspects of Sir Asutosh's life and character, personality and life-work. The aim of the author is "to give a glimpse of the great man in his manysided interests and wide ranging activities...to give an estimate of his complex character and his virile and versatile personality, to review his life-work and interpret his life, indicating the part it played in our national life and the forward march of our country to its nobler and higher destiny," and he has gone a long way to accomplish it.

The author is to be congratulated on the manner in which he has dealt with the difficult subject matter. Indeed Mr. Sinha's task was no light one ; for the book is not simply a narrative of the life of a great man, not solely a compilation of facts and figures; it judges the man and measures his greatness in the multifarious walks of life which Sir Asutosh strode as a collosus. The chief thing about Sir Asutosh was the versatility of his genius and the 'extraordinary abilities and personality of the man' ; to quote again from Dr. Raman's Foreword it is the combination of 'the intellectual outlook of a great scholar with the Napoleanic vigour of a man of action'; and Mr. Sinha has done more than justice to these. His treatment of Asutosh's complex character and versatile personality, and his comparisons with different leaders' thought in India and abroad are absorbingly interesting.

The narrative of his early life, his academic career and later glories is vividly told in the first hundred pages and the later four hundred pages constitute a luminous and penetrating study of the man from various standpoints, as an intellectual giant, as a brilliant Judge, as reformer in the realm of education, as a statesman, as an administrator, as a speaker, as a friend of learning, as a leader, as a patriot and as an idealist. The closer view of the man and his unique position in public life has also received due notice in this biography. The last three chapters giving us a study of Sir Asutosh as a representative man—the complexity of his character and personality and his life-work and message in a sense form the crux of

the whole book and will be read with profit by "his countrymen, young and old, both now and future generation."

The superb administrative genius never shows so brightly as in the critical period of transition, of political agitation and popular excitement of unprecedented character. No wonder that his rule of the University though centralized was characterised by the establishment of the teacher-controlled academic constitutions with the efficiency of a masterful administrator and a far-sighted genius. For several years all eyes had constantly to turn to one dominant figure in the University, more often in admiration and wonder till at last one hardly realised that a change had really come in the system of University Education and after all the advancement of learning and highest national education lay within the scope of practical politics. The author has rightly devoted ample space to this aspect of the epoch-making innovations and achievements in the University and gives a complete outline of the history of the progress of higher education and the development and expansion of the Post-Graduate Departments in Bengal.

But what constitutes the author's original contribution to our literature and history is his interpretation of the advent and work of his great national hero as a 'Representative Man.' So far our national heroes and leaders had been treated as some phenomena unconnected with the main inner current of the national life, no explanation has been offered of their advent, no interpretation of their life-work in the terms of national progress, given. In fact our 'representative men' have not been treated as such; following the footsteps of Emerson Mr. Sinha has treated his hero as a representative man and rightly characterised his advent in our midst as inevitable. With the characteristic foresight of a thinker, Mr. Sinha has dealt with the Renaissance Movement in Bengal in the last century and its connection with Asutosh's life and lifework very brilliantly.

We wholeheartedly congratulate the young author on his vigorous presentation of a most glorious and important chapter of our recent history and welcome him in the front rank of rising authors and wish him a bright future in his patriotic career.

The get-up of the book is quite excellent and is cheap for the price; we only regret that the author could not find it possible to free his splendid work from some typographical errors; we eagerly look forward to the next editions which we hope will be more perfect ones.

P. MITRA.

Essentials of Indian Economics:—by B. G. Sapre, M.A., 1927—Price, Rs. 4-4, pp. 512.

Prof. Sapre offers a substantial study treating the subject of Indian Economics as a whole and pointing out the inter-relation between various parts of the subject. As there is no place set apart for the treatment of the ordinary economic theory he has succeeded in compressing within this volume of 512 pages an interesting and valuable treatment of the subject. It will be very useful to beginners and University students of economics wishing to have a bird's-eye-view of the important subject.

Beginning with the almost hackneyed subject of discussion whether there is a " Separate Indian Economics " he discusses several important aspects of the subject such as the enonomic transition in India, the development of external trade of India, the effects of the recent war, the consequences of Imperial Development and Imperial Preference to India, the question of the pressure of population on land, and the survey of the economic effects of social institutions as the Joint-family, the caste and the village are dealt with in Part I.

Part II is devoted to a study of the factors of production. Discussing the land factor the author is of opinion that the social and the scientific aspects of the land problem are important. Measures for increasing the productivity of the land are then dealt with. The problems of consolidation of agricultural holdings and the agricultural indebtedness are next referred to. The attempts made to solvet hese are mentioned and the Co-operative Movement in India is next studied. The next chapter deals with the future organisation of Indian industries. Labour, the other important factor of production is the topic of study. The mobilisation of the internal capital resources of the country forms the subject matter of study in the next chapter. The attitude of the Government towards the development of industry is studied in the chapter entitled Protectionism.

Currency and Exchange form part III of the Book. A historical outline states the main issues and his suggestions form the next chapter entitled reconstruction of internal currency. The course of rupee prices is referred to in the next chapter. In the long chapter on Monetary stabilisation the essential ideas of the Hilton-Young Commission are carefully outlined.

Some select topics such as the National Dividend in India, the course of agricultural wages, the wages of the textile industry in Bombay, the share of landholders, the money-lenders and the state in the produce of land and the cost of living index-number of the Bombay Labour Office are studied in Part IV.

Though such important topics as land tenures, land revenue and Indian finances and taxation are not referred to, the treatment of the selected topics is extremely lucid and the recent references are alluded to in all these topics. A list of select references for further reading is also given and it includes without any jealousy, so characteristic of Indian authors, the recognised authorities on the subject. Some useful statistics are included in the Appendix. His conclusions on the different topics though not original or radical in character are stated in a lucid style. Copious quotations from Government reports enable the author to impart clear and systematic ideas.

As the author invites helpful suggestions from the reviewers it is incumbent on the present reviewer to indicate few suggestive lines of development so as to make the next edition more useful and instructive. The baneful consequences of the Imperial Development programme on India's economic equipment are not referred to in detail. There is no treatment of the migration of the Indians overseas. The chapter on Industries ought to contain more valuable information on the financing of industries and the marketing of the finished products. Measures for the perfection of the investment habit are not mentioned. There is no reference in the book at all to the doctrine of "freer trade" which the world Economic Conference is attempting to enforce on all countries. Whether this can be accepted by the intensely nationalistic modern states could be dealt with. The problem of gold shortage and how to solve this problem of steadying the value of gold should deserve better attention. In the chapter on Monetary stabilisation the author like Mr. B. F. Madon thinks that "India is the only country in the world that has stabilised its currency at a higher ratio than the pre-war one." It could have been pointed out in this connection that there is another country which did likewise though in the pre-war days. That country is Siam. There is no mention of the consequences of the newer method of making remittances by Government by the purchase of sterling in India by tender. We would advise the author to fill the gaps above referred to while issuing the next edition of this useful book. By so doing, he would command a wider public than the occupants of the school-room.

B. RAMACHANDRA RAU

The Gita and Spiritual Life: by D. S. Sarma. M.A., Professor, Presidency College, Madras; published by the Theosophical Publishing House, Adyar, Madras. The get-up of the book is good.

The author rightly points out that the Gita is a yoga-sastra and that this small Sanskrit word ' yoga ' is the key to the whole scripture. The sense in which the word is used in the Gita does not contemplate the obstruction of the mental vrittis by certain prolonged mental exercises in concentration, but it simply means union or fellowship with God. To quote the words of the author himself.

" The supreme happiness of man consists in detaching himself from the world and the pleasures of the flesh and living union with God and doing His work in the world. That is true yoga." Is the system of yoga inculcated in the Gita mysticism? The author replies, we think rightly, that true mysticism is the very heart and centre of religious life. If the endeavour of man to apprehend God directly in his own soul and to become united with Him is mysticism, then yoga as taught in the Gita is certainly mysticism. The author, next, passes on to the question of yoga-siddhi. Mr. Sarma the author shows by citing texts from the Gita that one who has attained yoga-siddhi sees God everywhere and sees everything in God. This is also the highest stage of bhakti according to the Srimatbhagavad. The author, in the next place, says that the Gita does not specifically develop the highest cardinal vitues of Hinduism, namely, satyam and ahimsa.

Herein we differ from the author. If the Gita is a yoga-sastra, then the Gita is expected to give all that is necessary for true yoga and nothing else. Why should it develop specifically the so-called cardinal vitues of Hindusm? Further, according to Samkara,—" तदिदं गीताशास्त्रं समस्तवेदार्थ सारसंग्रहभूतं दुर्विज्ञेयार्थम्." In Samkara's opinion, the Gita gives the quintessence of all that is contained in the vedas.

Mr. Sarma, next, illustrates the character of true yoga by reference to the religious experience of Srī Ramkrishna Paramahamsa who was a veritable superman. The author concludes:

" In the roll of the illustrious witnesses who have repeatedly borne testimony to the living truth of the Veda from age to age, among the many names of *rishis* and *sannyāsins*, of *avatars* and *ācharyas*, who have guided the footsteps of Indian humanity in the ways of the Lord, the latest name is that of Sri Ramkrishna Paramahamsa." In our opinion, the book is a highly readable one. We can safely recommend the same to the students European and Indian.

A. GUHA

Mir'at-i Ahmadi by Mirza Muhammad Hasan, surnamed Ali Muhammad Khan Bahadur.

Mir'at is a very extensive and rare history of Gujrat in Persian from the earliest times to the defeat of the Maharattas in A. H. 1174=A. D. 1761. The author, better known as Ali Muhammad Khan, was a Persian by descent, whose forefathers came from Persia and settled in India. His father having accompanied Aurangzeb to the Deccan established himself at Burhanpur when the author was only eight years old, his father took him to Ahmadabad and placed him in a local madrasah where he received his education.

The author states in the preface that having been appointed *Dewan* of Gujrat towards the close of the reign of Muhammad Shah, he began to compile, with the assistance of Mitah Lal Kayath, in A. H. 1161=A. D. 1748 an extensive revenue return to which he gave the title of مرآت احمدي صوبهٔ احمد آباد گجرات and to which he added an appendix dealing with historical events. Subsequently he detached the historical portion from the Revenue by the advice of some of his friends and expanded it into a separate work. This new composition he began in A. H. 1120=A. D. 1756. He has also stated that when the province of Gujrat was bestowed on Jahandar Shah as a *jagir* by Emperor Bahadur Shah, he was appointed by him a *wagayi'nigar* or the chief reporter of events. From internal evidences it appears that it took the author nearly ten years to finish his work. He has himself stated that he has drawn materials for the earlier part of his work from Mir'at-i Sikandari, Akbarnama, Jahangirnama and Padishahnama. But the latter part is an original composition derived by his own experience and in most of the events he himself took part.

The *muqaddima* or introduction contains an account of Gujrat and its revenue in former periods ; it is followed by chapters dealing with the history of the origin of Hindu Rajas ; the introduction of Islam in Gujrat the history of the kings of Gujrat ; brief sketch of the Timurid dynasty ; Akbar's conquest of Gujrat ; Gujrat under Jahangir, Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb, Bahadur Shah and other Muhammadan rulers up to Shah Jahan II. The *khatima* or the conclusion contains a description of Ahmadabad and its suburbs ; its sacred places and the saints and Sayyids buried there ; the inhabitants ; Hindu tribes and temples ; measures, weights, etc., district and parganas of Gujrat ; ports, rivers. mountains and curiosities of the province.

The book under review is a publication of the *Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, published under the authority of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja of Baroda.

M. K. SHIRAZI

Ourselves

The 70th Birth-day of Sir J. C. Bose.

We most cordially join the Syndicate in their recommendation to the Senate to offer their felicitations to Sir Jagadischandra Bose, Kt., C.S.I., C.I.E., M.A., D.Sc., F.R.S., on his 70th birth-day and their congratulations on the great work done by him for the advancement of Science of which we are legitimately proud.

* * *

Professor Ganeshprasad's Recent Researches.

We are glad to reproduce the following communication received from Professor Henri Lebesgue, Member of the Institute of France, Dated Paris, the 19th October 1928.

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of "Six Lectures on recent researches in the theory of Fourier series" by M. le Prof. Ganesh Prasad.

I have pleasure in finding in that work a simple and clear exposition of the actual state of advance of certain of the most important problems concerning trigonometrical series. *The documentation is true and complete*; it is only once that I have had occasion to find anything in which the erudition of the author appears to be in default. M. Kobnogoroff, pursuing the studies indicated on p. 53, has obtained an example of a function of summable square of which the Fourier series diverges everywhere.

For justifying the enunciation which he gives, M. Ganesh Prasad utilises the original demonstration of the first author; then he gives a historical note, very interesting. By the side of the old demonstration M. Prasad gives always, whenever possible, as simple a proof as the question under consideration would allow. *Many of these proofs are due to M. Prasad himself*; for example, that which M. Prasad gives on pages 60-61 for a criterion for the summability (C 1) which I enunciated at another time.

M. Prasad presents his researches, elegant and interesting, by which he has carried further the classical works of du Bois Reymond.

* * *

The Late Prof J. N. Sammadar.

We announce with deep regret the premature death of Professor Jogendranath Samaddar, B.A., F.R.H.S., of the Patna University at the early age of 49 after a long illness of about 2 years and offer our sincere condolence to the bereaved widow and children. Prof. Samaddar's researches in History won for him a high reputation and his latest labour of love was the production of a very valuable Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume containing rich contributions from distinguished Orientalists, Eastern and Western. Among his well-known published works mention may be made of

1. Glories of Magadh.
2. Indian Economics.
3. Lectures on the Economic condition of Ancient India.
4. সমসাময়িক ভারত

* * *

Post-Graduate Department Committee

A Committee consisting of the following members has been appointed to report to the Senate by 31st March, 1929, on the present condition,—academic, administrative and general—and the future progress of the Post-Graduate Department of the University, and its relationship to the general work of the University and the Colleges, together with the financial questions connected therewith, with a view to securing the most efficient and economical organization :—

(1) The Vice-Chancellor.

(2) The Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, or an Officer of the Education Department who is on the Senate, nominated by him.

(3) President of the Post-Graduate Council in Arts or a representative of the Post-Graduate Department, who is on the Senate, nominated by the Executive Committee of Arts.

(4) President of the Post-Graduate Council in Science or a representative of the Post-Graduate Department, who is on the Senate, nominated by the Executive Committee of Science.

(5) President of the Board of Accounts or a representative of the Board nominated by the Board of Accounts from amongst themselves.

(6) R. B. Ramsbotham, Esq., M.B.E., M.A., B.Litt.

(7) Prof. Herambachandra Maitra, M.A.

(8) Rai Upendranath Brahmachari, Bahadur, M.A., M.D., Ph.D.

(9) Rev. Father F. X. Crohan, S.J.

(10) Charuchandra Biswas, Esq., M.A., B.L.

(11) Syamaprasad Mookerjee, Esq., M.A., B.L., Bar.-at-Law.

(12) Jadunath Sarkar, Esq., C.I.E., M.A.

(13) Prof. Jnanendranath Mukherjee, D.Sc.

(14) Khan Bahadur Aziz-ul-Haq, B.L., M.L.C.

(15) W. A. Jenkins, Esq., D.Sc.

(16) Sir Devaprasad Sarvadhikary, Kt., C.I.E., C.B.E., M.A., LL.D., M.L.C.

(17) Sir Rajendranath Mookerjee, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., M.I.E.

(18) Rev. G. Howells, M.A., Ph.D., B.Litt., B.D.

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UNIVERSITY READERS

(1) The Syndicate to recommend to the Senate that Dr. D. S. Margoliouth, M.A., D.Litt., Loudian Professor of Arabic in the University of Oxford, be appointed a Reader of this University to deliver a course of lectures on " Arab Historians " on an honorarium of Rs. 5,000.

(2) The Syndicate to recommend to the Senate that Prof. Dr. Schaub, Head of the Department of Philosophy of the North-Western University, Illinois (U. S. A.), and the Editor of the *Monist,* be invited to deliver a course of lectures, as a Reader of this Uniuersity, on a Philosophical subject to be approved by the Syndicate, on an honorarium of Rs. 1,000.

(3) The Syndicate to recommend to the Senate that Prof. Arthur Percival Newton, Rhodes Professor of Imperial History in the University of London, be appointed a Reader of this University to deliver a course of lectures on " The Principles of Historical Investigation," on an honorarium of Rs. 1,000.

* * *

A New D.Sc.

Mr. Manmohan Sen, M.Sc., has been admitted to the Degree of Doctor of Science on the recommendation of Professor W. H. Perkin, Sc.D., LL.D., F.R.S., Prof. J. F. Thorpe, C.B.E., D.Sc., F.R.S., and Prof. R. Robinson, D.Sc., F.R.S., members of the Board of Examiners on Mr. Sen's theses on—

(1) Studies in the Chromone Series.
(2) Studies with Pyrylium Salts.
(3) Syntheses in the Triazine Series.
(4) Rubiadin, Part I.
(5) N. Alkylated Amidines.
(6) Synthesis in the Thianthren Series, Part II.

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Kamala Lectureship.

The subject mentioned in our November—December issue (Vol. 29 : No. 2 & 3) of Kamala Leeture for 1928 has since been changed by the Senate into "Ideals of Hindu Culture."

* * *

University Cricket Team.

In connection with the Cricket Match arranged between the Calcutta University Team and His Excellency the Governor's XI to be played at Ballygunge on Friday, the 18th January, 1929, His Excellency has been pleased to invite the Vice-Chancellor and the University Team to lunch with him on that date and the invitation has been appropriately accepted.

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Annual Convocation, 1929.

The Private Secretary to His Excellency the Chancellor has intimated to the Vice-Chancellor that Saturday the 16th of February, 1929, will suit His Excellency for the next Annual University Convocation.

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Result of the D. P. H., Examination, Part I, 1928.

The number of candidates registered was 9, of whom 4 were successful, 4 failed and 1 was absent.

* * *

University Examinations, 1929.

		Date of commencement	Last date for submission of fees and application.
Matriculation,	1929	20th March 1929, Wednesday.	18th January 1929, Friday.
I.A. & I.Sc,	1929	27th February, 1929, Wednesday.	4th January, 1929, Friday.
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GERMAN THOUGHT OF TO-DAY

German thought of to-day is founded on that of the 19th century of which it has risen. If we try to analyse it from our point of view of to-day we must distinguish four periods which of course are of a somewhat different length of time and are not equal to each other in intrinsic value. The first period begins about 1800, and ends with the death of Goethe and Hegel. It saw the days of Napoléon's empire, the downfall of Prussia and its resurrection. It was the time of the universal acceptance of Kant's philosophy, the zenith of the speculation of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, the great time of classical poetry, of the awakening of romanticism, when a new religious intensity made itself felt. The second period is characterised by the struggle between liberalism and reaction, between ecclesiastical orthodoxy and the radical criticism of Strauss and Feuerbach. The third period is marked with the German revolution in 1848 which did not bring about the expected national unity but still succeeded in strengthening the political instinct for unity until it finally became fulfilled by the masterly statesmanship of Bismarck in 1871. It were the natural sciences which took an enormous development during this time, whilst on the other

hand philosophical speculation decayed so that by this materialism became dominant. The fourth period finally began with the foundation of the German Empire and lasted till the end of the century. It is the time of the great industrial development and also the beginning of the labour-movement, of the "Kulturkampf," of the new awakening of religious and philosophical interest, of naturalism in poetry and art.

Our present time we cannot characterise in the same way, because we have only passed a quarter of the century and we are yet too near to be able to judge what it will bring in the future. It must be left to a later time to find out the great leading ideas of our age with its under-currents and by-currents and to give a historical criticism of the tendency to which it will lead the world. I must therefore confine myself to give a short review of the different ideals of thought and to show the connection of the present with the past. I will therefore begin to note the various movements in science, philosophy, and religion, that is to say, the different types of what the Germans call "Weltanschanung" (general view of world and life) in an objective manner. I think it will be best if I proceed in a systematical way by first speaking of materialism and naturalism which in their teaching treat solely of *this* world. Later on I shall turn to the various systems of idealistic philosophy. then I shall deal with the different expressions of religious thought and shall illustrate the mystic tendencies of our age. Finally I shall sketch the views of the positivistic and pragmatistic schools, which stand in opposition to all the different dogmatisms taught by the schools formerly mentioned.

Materialism found in Germany a great expansion which it cultivated to the utmost, as after the downfall of the great speculative systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, philosophy had to play a minor part to the dominant position of natural science. Physicians and naturalists like Karl Vogt, Jakob Moleschott, Ludwig Buechner published about the middle of the century their works which with more or less stringency denoted matter

as the ultimate reality on which everything is founded and denied the separate existence of a soul and a transcendental world altogether; the activity of the soul was explained as a function of the brain. These views spread almost everywhere as the many editions of these works show. In more developed form materialism appeared later on in the "Weltraetsel" (Riddles of the Universe) of Ernst Haeckel, the zoologist of Jena. Haeckel called his doctrine "Monism" because he acknowledges only one real substance as the base of the whole universe, which owns corporeal extension, energy, and sensation. His view may be therefore called hylozoistic. The anorganic, according to him possesses already will and sensation, although in the lowest degree. With the lowest organisms a sort of psychic life is everywhere to be found, every cell has its psychic qualities which of course remain unconscious. While in the lower forms of organic life all cells take part in the psychic life, in the higher forms, especially with mankind, only a selected few perform this function; the conscious psychic life is contingent upon a central system of nerves. As a follower and successor of Charles Darwin, Haeckel has tried to show the various stages which men and the higher animals had to pass through before they reached step by step their present form. According to him at first simple organisms formed themselves by "archigony" in the way of a chemical process, from the primitive "moneras" the first cells grew, and from these gradually the different forms of living beings up to mankind. Haeckel has tried to give us the whole pedigree of mankind in all its details, making use of his theory called "fundamental law of biogenesis" that ontogenesis is a shortened recapitulation of phylogenesis. Haeckel claims his views to be the outcome of scientific investigation and thus the only up-to-date interpretation of scientific facts. In reality with Haeckel and his predecessors it is the same as with other philosophers who try to explain the universe: they give constructions full of subjective ideas. So the pedigree of mankind put up by Haeckel has been proved by great scientists to be

erroneous, as in many important points they are filled up by imaginative conceptions.

Haeckel's battle for a scientific explanation of the world and against a separation between spirit and matter found great response in many quarters. His disciples and sympathisers formed themselves into the "Deutscher Monistenbund," which started a great propaganda in support of his ideas and had their first congress in Hamburg in 1911. As the name "monism" shows the league embraces not only the immediate adherents of Haeckel, but also the followers of systems which in opposition to Christianity and dominant philosophical doctrines proclaim one principle solely as the foundation of the world. So the well-known chemist Wilhelm Ostwald, who for many years was president of the "Deutscher Monistenbund," has formed a natural philosophy which does not see in matter but in energy the principle that is the base of the world.

For the various systems set up by natural scientists from Buechner to Vogt and from Haeckel to Ostwald it is characteristic that they believe in natural science as the only way to arrive at a correct knowledge and they have no idea of the methods and results of other than natural sciences. They therefore claim for all their doctrines the same recognition as for scientific investigations. They do not see that in this method an overstepping of the limits given to science by empiria lies and an anticipation of the correctness of the results which so far have not been proved. These systems, though its authors deny it, bear the features of dogmatic metaphysics and show all the characteristics of them.

Materialism is in sharp opposition to the Church as to all ideas which see more in the universe than the mere material world around us. Many critics of these philosophical doctrines have therefore simply concluded, that the representatives of a theoretical materialism follow only material aims in their own life. Experience tells us that that is not true. The men I mentioned, especially Haeckel, were men of idealistic tendencies.

With some of them, notwithstanding their feeling against the Church, one may not even speak of a complete lack of religious feeling, as they seek to arouse in their adherents religious feeling towards nature and mankind and even try to form their followers into congregations with cult and preaching. The very meagre result of these endeavours has shown that materialism cannot be regarded as a "system" which appeals in the same way to the results of scientific investigations and also to the idealistic requirements of mankind. It has shown further that only personalities who in themselves are idealistic, can be happy in materialism and in opposition to its egoistic ethics realise a moral life.

In common with materialism a number of philosophical doctrines, which may be called naturalistic, take up together the fight with the traditional ideas. Like materialism also naturalism stands under the dominant influence of natural history, but it puts the criticism of the traditions of moral and religion and the fight against the supranaturalistic tendencies in a still more decided manner into the foreground. The first great representative of naturalism in Germany was Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), who regarded it as the duty of his time to put anthropology in the old place of religion and who tried to give a naturalistic history of religion. A more individualistic thought came into naturalism with Max Stirner's book called "Der Einzige und sein Eigentum" (published in 1845). In his radicalism Stirner goes so far that he preaches an absolute egoism and 'sets the Self,' the ego, against family, society and state.

The reaction against the total levelling of all society found its greatest exponent in Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). He has left us no regular system, but laid down his thoughts in aphoristic and poetic forms. He is one of the best German stylists and was more of an artist, who is fond of strong contrasts and arbitrary exaggerations, than a thinker who ponders and weighs every word before he gives it utterance. It was his aim to bring about an "Umwertung aller Worte," *i.e.*, a total

change of all traditional values. The existing moral as represented by Christianity he denounces as a moral for slaves and teaches in opposition to it a moral for masters. He prophesies the uprising of a higher species of mankind, the so-called "Uebermensch" (Superman), who in pride and vigour and regardless to the want of the great herd displays his will to power. Nietzsche's criticism of sanctimonious morals and his fight against the traditional restraint of all natural desires and needs of the individual have gained him a host of adherents, but a practical realisation of his ideas in a community is absolutely impossible; even his most devoted followers have limited themselves to the aesthetic enthusiasm for the romantic ideal of their master, but have not tried to put it into practice. It has been aptly said of naturalism that it may be compared to a phenomenon of nature: "It acts the part of a furious whirlwind, which clears the air and knocks down by hundreds withered branches or faded leaves and blossoms, but bears with it no fruit-giving seed which may bring forth a new revival."

What we have seen so far were the currents of ideas which opposed the traditional forms of German thought; now we shall turn to those tendencies, which uphold, in contrast to materialism and naturalism, idealistic views. Within them we must distinguish three groups: the philosophy which tries by discoursive thought to attain a knowledge of the natural and supernatural world, religion which contends that it has received its knowledge by divine revelation, and mysticism which endeavours to gain the knowledge by intuition gained by meditative training.

German philosophy of to-day continues the tradition of the great speculative systems that grew up in the first quarter of the last century. To-day as well as then the work of Kant is the starting-point of development. Kant in his "Critique of Pure Reason" has investigated the limits of human understanding and proved the impossibility of transcendental knowledge; but he has put up God, immortality and freedom as postulates of

practical reason ; to morals he gave a new foundation through the categorical imperative. The vast richness of Kantian thought makes it easy to understand, that soon after his death and even already during his life-time the results of his work were liable to the most different interpretations. Already Schiller says justly regarding Kant and his interpreters : " Wenn die Könige bauen, haben die Kärrner zu tun" (When Kings build, carriers have plenty of work). After the great cry " back to Kant " has become the shibboleth of influential philosophical schools in Germany, the number of interpretations of Kantian philosophy has become almost infinite. Some, like Hermann Cohen, see Kant's only importance in his criticism of knowledge; the final aim of the Critique is to be disintegration of the given data into the functions of knowledge, all realistic tendencies of Kant, as his doctrine of the thing in itself are understood also in this manner, no duality of knowledge and object is admitted. Others, like Kuno Fischer, see the kernel of Kant's system in his idealism. To have shown the existence of empirical reality side by side with transcendental ideality is, according to him, the great work of Kant. F. A. Lange and the great scientist Helmholtz have found a corroboration of these doctrines of Kant in the results of modern physiology. The subjective idealistic interpretation of Kantian criticism found its great advocate also in Arthur Schopenhauer. To him this doctrine was, so to say, the spring-board for a metaphysical system, which denotes the will as the thing-in-itself and which shows in its form strong influences of Platonic and Indian thought.

To conquer the dualism between appearance and the thing-in-itself was the problem that the three great stars on the philosophical firmament of Germany, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, tried to solve. Starting from the idea that the formative principles of human reason must also be those of the world-reason, they looked for the common principle of existence and thought. According to Fichte the Ego itself has brought forth by its activity the Non-Ego.

Schelling at first tried to develop Fichte's doctrine, but then adopted new views. He leaves all Existence, Spirit and Matter, to originate from a common base and sees in nature a system of different stages of organism striving for the realisation of the Spiritual, of the return to absolute identity. In a different mode Hegel sets forth the doctrine of the identity of the Real and the Ideal. For him the Idea is the Absolute and all Reality is merely the outcome of the Idea. The self-development of the idea proceeds according to a fixed logical scheme, therefore the whole development can be understood by analogy of the logical process. Hegel's dialectical doctrine of identity has for many years reigned supreme and has given to many thinkers a fruitful stimulus ; orthodox theologians, as well as free thinkers, believers in the great historical mission of Prussia, as well as Socialists, founded their theories on his teachings. But for any length of time Hegel's system like those of his predecessors could not ensure lasting predominance. The doctrines of Kant's critical philosophy were all given up in them and in their constructive manner they lost themselves in pure speculations. The arbitrariness of many ideas, especially in natural philosophy, could not withstand criticism and in consequence the whole kind of this philosophy lost all credit. The great ideas however, which were contained in these systems, as the idea of the universal connection of all phenomena of the material and spiritual world and the thorough evolution of all beings, have not been lost, and if to-day the study of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel is taken up again with new vigour, it is especially aimed to the working out of the eternal truths inherent in these systems, not to dogmatically retain doctrines, which owe their existence to the erroneous use of philosophical ideas in the domain of experience.

As an adversary of the philosophy of identity Kant's successor on the chair of philosophy in Koenigsberg, Johann Friedrich Herbart, had developed criticism in a peculiar way,

and especially he deserved great credit in his researches on scientific psychology. His own system tried to combine Kant's doctrine of the things-in-itself with the monadology of Leibniz, in setting up a plurality of monad-like beings, called by him "Reale" ("reals"), all in quality different from each other. Still more than Herbart, Jacob Fries made psychology the chief part of his system, and so also Eduard Benecke, who brought Herbart's realism to its last consequences. The curious parallelism between the philosophical endeavours of the beginning of the 19th century and those of the 20th, in which our time repeats the various idealistic doctrines in a higher sphere, is manifest in the remarkable phenomenon, that also Fries' school has found its continuation in the present time.

The speculative idealistic systems of the beginning of the last century were in general interest forced into the background by the successes of natural science; this explains the fact, that materialism, which was the domain of the naturalists, gained a lot of ground about 1850. It is therefore easily understood, that with the renewal of idealistic tendencies philosophy first of all tried to set matters straight with the natural sciences, to show that materialism is not an entirely satisfactory explanation of the world, but that a full acknowledgment of scientific facts may be combined also with idealistic systems. Herman Lotze, for instance, himself a physician, was beginning with a scientific atomism. He explained the material phenomena as expressions of spiritual force-centres, and Fechner, professor of natural sciences in Leipzig, has taken body and soul to be different forms of manifestation of one substance. It follows from Fechner's doctrine of a thorough psycho-physic parallelism that he teaches that also plants, animals, stars, etc., have souls. To the Spinozistic doctrine of the parallelism of the Material and Spiritual Wilhelm Wundt also goes back, but puts in the place of the substantial idea of soul an actualistic one; the world is a complexus of will-centres, that

combine to ever higher unities of will. Eduard von Hartmann also gave to his system a broad scientific base. His teaching is a blending of those of Hegel and Schopenhauer. The absolute is the "Unconscious" which is Idea and Will at the same time; the goal of the world's process is the universal annihilation of the Illogical by the Logical, the salvation. Hartmann was a champion of vitalism. The protagonist of a vitalistic school, which opposes a mechanistic explication of life, is in our days Hans Driesch. Starting from biology, he has developed an organic-teleological system which proclaims the autonomy of life and assumes a reality of a higher order as the final base of all existence.

Leaving aside natural sciences, but founded upon the traditions of idealistic philosophy, the system of Rudolf Eucken maintains the independence of spiritual life in opposition to natural laws. According to him, thought creates a new reality, the reality of an inner life, which reposes in itself. Whilst Eucken tries to establish the difference between nature and thought as regards practical life, the German south-western school of Windelband and Rickert proclaims the theoretical divergence of natural and cultural science and claims for philosophy to be a critical science of universal and necessary value. An influential school is that of the "phenomenologists." Their representatives are Eduard Husserl and Max Scheler. Phenomenology tries to explain what has been given by intuition and been contemplated in its essence. In some representatives of this school we find strong religious tendencies.

It cannot be our task here to mention all the philosophical schools of the Germany of to-day. What I have said will be sufficient to give you an idea of the strenuous efforts that are made everywhere to build up an acceptable system of thought. If we cast a look back at the philosophical doctrines that are in existence to-day, we find a great variety of endeavours to solve the enigma of life. Many as the variegated

opinions are, one thing is common to all: the firm belief that the outer world of daily experience is not the finality of everything, but that behind it stands a reality of a higher degree from which it receives its laws.

So we see in the systems of idealistic thought, more or less pronounced, a strong tendency towards the great life-power, in which, as Hegel says "all the different forms and ramifications of human conditions, activities, pleasures—everything which is of value and estimation for man, in which he seeks his happiness, his glory, his pride, finds its centre"—religion. The importance of it for our German life, has changed in many respects during the 19th century, but we may remark in general that the deep foundation of religion in the German soul has not been diminished nevertheless, although the opposition against the spiritual tutorship of the clergy has induced many thinkers to protest against the form, in which religion is taught by the Church.

Since the time of the Reformation Christianity has found expression in Catholicism, in the various Protestant Churches and in sectarianism.

Catholicism has found a revival in the 19th century. Its political influence had at first been diminished at the beginning of the century by the secularisation of the episcopal states; but in consequence of this secularisation the foundation of a clergy entirely devoted to the Pope was the natural outcome of this measure.

A new source of power was the new invigoration of the position of the Pope who made his arrangements with the secular states by a variety of concordats invariably favourable to him. In its struggle with the temporal power the Pope was generally victorious, as the so-called "Kulturkampf" has shown, where even Bismarck had to give way. In the history of the last hundred years in a growing degree an increase of the power of the Pope within the Church is to be noted. Some liberal

movements within German catholicism have not brought any important results. The exhibition of the holy robe at Treves (1844) separated the so-called "Deutschkatholiken" from the body of the Church, the proclamation of the infallibility of the Pope in 1870 resulted in the secession of the "Altkatholiken." Both movements never played any great part and remained insignificant and everywhere a strong discipline in the Cchurch is marked.

Since the war Catholicism, thanks to the political strength of the clerical party, the so-called Central Party, has gained a great increase of power in inner politics. Characteristic of this time is the tendency of overspreading Protestant countries by a host of Catholic convents, to reconquer the territories lost to the Church in the time of the Reformation. This is made easy to the Catholic Church by its being an international universal church, to which even from many sources outside of Germany great sums are given, which it uses for a clever propaganda.

As firm as the organisation of the Catholic Church is the unity of its doctrine. Because its possibilities are kept down by the censorship of the Church, independent thinkers, who interpret the doctrines according to their own ideas, are impossible within the Church. This is especially the case since the publication of the bull "Aeterni patris" issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1879, by which the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas has been made the official philosophy of Catholicism, and every deviation of it has been officially denounced as modernism. We meet therefore in Catholic theology and philosophy with all scholarly and incisive criticism of worldly philosophy a strict rigidity towards the old scholastic tradition.

Protestantism in Germany, although its followers are superior in number to the Catholics, in consequence of its being split up in many territorial churches and theological convictions and persuasions cannot be compared to it. The separation of Church and State brought about by the Revolution, deprived it of

all authority of state, a draw-back that hindered it all the more, as Protestantism is not carried on by an international organisation that may be compared to the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, after a period during which religious indifference and materialistic propaganda alienated many members of it, it has found a certain strengthening again at the present time. This is a consequence of the union of all Protestant Churches in the "Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund," an organisation which intends to defend the common interests of all Protestant Churches of Germany. This union was founded in 1921; that it could not take place earlier had its cause therein that formerly courtly and other reasons prevented such a union. The "Kirchenbund" is a federation which leaves to all churches in the various states complete autonomy in confessional and administrative matters, so that every church enjoys in every way its own independence.

The inner invigoration of Protestantism is evident by the increased congregations that assemble in church especially in the towns, and by the strengthened feeling of responsibility among the clergy, as we see in the formation of funds for benevolent institutions, and in the growing interest for the inner mission. The tendency for artistic adornment is now very pronounced in opposition to the former tradition of German Protestantism and has resulted in a high-church movement.

German Protestantism has brought forth very many theological persuasions; not only is it divided into Lutheranism, Calvinism and so on—a difference which is now less important than formerly as most churches are united as "evangelisch" through the juncture established by the union of 1817—but there are also many theological schools. At the end of the 18th century rationalistic views prevailed in the Church, but in opposition to this also a pietistic and orthodox form of belief had its followers. The time of Napoleon and the war of liberation brought about with its national resurrection also a religious one. The change of the times was felt in double capacity:

Firstly in the return to confessional forms, as the renewal of orthodox Lutheranism and in many "awakenings," *i.e.*, conversions to biblical-supranaturalistic faith and pietism, and secondly in the uprising of important theological schools which combined theology with the new philosophical views and the romantic understanding of history. The most influential theologian of the new time was Friedrich Schleiermacher, who joined deep Moravian piety to the acumen of Kantian dialecticism. His followers have developed his teachings in various ways. Besides Schleiermacher we find theological groups which, influenced by Schelling and Hegel, taught a speculative dogmaticism and others who in the so-called "Theology of Awakening" tried to give to the old supranaturalism a deeper meaning and combined it with idealistic romanticism. With the publication of David Friedrich Strauss' "Life of Jesus" (1835) and the works of Bauer and the so-called "School of Tübingen" a new criticism came forward, that used the idea of evolution to the history of the Church and tried to explain its gradual development as a purely historical process devoid of all supernatural causality. In contrast to the critical school of Tübingen that of Erlangen, whose chief representative was Joh. Chr. Konrad von Hoffmann, wished to bring about a new revival of confessional orthodoxy. Between these two extreme parties the so-called "Vermittlungstheologie," *i.e.*, "mediating theology" represented by Karl Immanuel Nitzsch and others, tried to reconcile in an eclectical way, by using Schleiermacher's arguments.

The most important Protestant dogmatist after Schleiermacher was Albrecht Ritschl. He denied, following some ideas of Kant, all metaphysics that do not originate in ethical principles. With him the whole Christian faith is ruled by the religious-ethical idea of God's kingdom as the objective purpose of the divine revelation and by the moral activity of the congregation. Religious knowledge and worldly knowledge are two totally different things, the former is not touched at all

by the second and has its value in itself. The orthodox as well as the critical theology turned against Ritschl, but nevertheless he has influenced indirectly at least most of the new dogmatists.

In German Protestantism of to-day we find all theological schools together, from the most extreme liberalism, which makes far-reaching concessions to historical criticism and natural science to the severest confessional orthodoxy which retains the old Biblical and supranaturalistic belief. A new trait in the life of the Church since the revolution is the appearance of socialistic preachers, who endeavour to oppose the want of religiousness among the lower classes by a radical religious socialism. A leader of this new school is the Swiss preacher Karl Barth, who has been professor in Göttingen since 1921.

Whilst since the time of the eighties the chief interest of Protestant theology was devoted to the study of the Bible and to the history of the Church, new systematical theology is taken up again chiefly through investigations in the field of religious psychology.

The Protestant Churches did not satisfy the religious needs of some quarters. Within the Church therefore some separate congregations of strictly orthodox-pietistic character, formed themselves, the so-called "Gemeinschaften," that served to meet the devotional wishes of their members and took up the inner mission with great ardour. For some time in these congregations a strong opposition against the state-Church became prevalent, so that it appeared possible, that these might secede from the Church. The needs of the times and the greater conciliation shown by the Church now to the wishes and needs of the "Gemeinschaften" have prevented this danger.

Besides the state-Churches there exist Old Lutheran Free-churches, Free-religious congregations and a greater number of sects. Among these many are of English and American

origin, as Methodists, Christian Scientists, Salvation Army and others. The influence of all these sects on German life is not very great so far, though they do much for the individual by using his personality in the service of their ideals.

Since the great war the influence of the Jews has grown very much. Among the German Jews a liberal party, represented by the "Zentralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens," has the preponderance ; besides it are of importance the Conservatives and the middle parties. The Zionists are also very strong but among them the socialistic party "Poale Zion" has only a few adherents. The Zionists stand with their demand for autonomy on a national base in sharp opposition to the programme of the liberal party, which wishes to see the Jews treated as members of a purely religious congregation within the German state.

It is very remarkable for the religious life of our time that a great interest in the religions of Asia developed itself in Germany. Especially Indian thought occupied German thinkers, since the brothers Schlegel, Wilhelm von Humboldt and Friedrich Rückert gained many friends for it in Germany. In opposition to Hegel, Schelling and especially Schopenhauer were enthusiastic admirers of Indian wisdom.

A further dissemination of Indian ideas has been brought about in combination with occultistic and theosophical movements. Especially the Theosophical Society has propagated Indian thoughts all over the country. In Germany the different branches of Theosophy are all represented. The mystic movements are very numerous, which coming from many various quarters devote their attention to unravelling the Supernatural and its phenomena. Since the war, more than formerly, the different occultistic movements have developed enormously. I shall not go into the details of the different movements of Spiritualism, Astrology, Alchemy and so on, because they are not of indigenous German growth but are international and occur in all countries as with us. Here, however, I must

speak of one movement which originated at the beginning of this century in Germany and found many adherents there: the anthroposophic movement of Dr. Rudolf Steiner.

Rudolf Steiner had come from Hungaria by way of Vienna to Weimar, and occupied himself in many literary ways, for instance, we owe to him a good edition of the scientific works of Goethe. At the beginning of the century he began to develop a philosophical system of his own, joined the Theosophical Society and became General Secretary of it. Differences with Mrs. Besant led to Steiner's separation; and in consequence of this Steiner founded with his followers a new union which he called "Anthroposophical Society." This association has since the last years of the war till the recent death of Dr. Steiner won many members. As a centre for their ideas a temple was built in Dornach, near Basel, the plans of which were made by Steiner himself. Steiner has taken over many doctrines of the Theosophists. Whilst Mrs. Besant kept her teaching closely to the doctrines of Indian wisdom—she even said once in a speech "Theosophy is Hinduism in a modern garb"—Steiner claims for his teaching to be a sort of esoteric Christianity and is very fond of using Rosicrucian symbols. He endeavours to found his teachings on philosophy and represents them in his work "Die Rätsel der Philosophie" as the goal of all the philosophical endeavours in Europe. Philosophy tries by thought, hampered by the senses, to find the truth of the world and never reaches its aim; but Anthroposophy will bring about a complete knowledge of the world and superworld by the soul itself, delivered from all obstacles of earthly influences. The common consciousness is only fit to empower the soul, but cannot unveil the Transcendental. Only the separation of the soul from the consciousness fettered by the instruments of the body and its ascending to higher stages of spiritual experience, effected by special training, leads man to the actual knowledge of the transcendental essence of the soul, of its connection with all existence and of the laws which framed

the past and will frame the future of the world. Steiner has described in many books the results of his clairvoyant investigations, won by meditative intuition. His revelations deal with the powers of the astral body, with metempsychosis, with the pre-historic history of mankind, with submerged continents, etc. Steiner's doctrine has been brought into contact with many branches of science, for instance with medicine, with agriculture, etc., and has also tried to play a part in the political and economical life. The adherents of Steiner believe that his teaching denotes the beginning of a new period of human thought, a view with which they stand alone, since to sober-minded critics the assertions of Steiner, brought forward with a proud self-consciousness, do not seem convincing. For all these who do not possess Steiner's "spiritual eye" they are not proved, and seem to be rather fanciful.

The different modes of thoughts which we have endeavoured to set forth in what we have said, are all more or less dogmatic. Each of them, from the materialism of Haeckel to the mysticism of Steiner, tries to explain the world and each of them claims—more or less outspokenly—that it alone was able to solve the enigmas of life. In contrast to these dogmatists there are other thinkers who deny the possibility of reaching the truth by speculations which go beyond experience altogether. They demand the limitation of investigations to facts. Ideas of this sort appeared at first in France and England. During the 19th century they found their way into Germany. Among their adherents are many scientists, who like Dubois-Reymond think that human understanding cannot transgress the limits of nature, and set their "Ignorabimus" against all endeavours to solve the riddle of the universe. Even new researches, like Einstein's theory of relativity, have shown on what an unfirm basis some results of scientific investigation stand, which have been presented to the world as absolutely proved. Other adversaries of a metaphysical explanation of the world are representatives of an "immanent philosophy" like Schuppe,

Rehmke. From another starting-point the "Empirio criticism" of Richard Avenarius, the "Wirklichkeits-Philosophie" of Eugen Dühring, and the positivist doctrines of Ernst Mach strive for the same goal. Mach explains everything as complexuses of sensations and sees in the "Self" like Buddhism also a complexus of only relative stability.

Positivistic in its tendency is also the "Philosophie des Als—Ob" of Hans Vaihinger. Vaihinger shows in his famous work how mankind is dominated by the most various theoretical and practical fictions. These fictions are deliberately false conceptions, which, notwithstanding the contradictions inherent in them, are necessary, because they serve to dominate experience and to satisfy the demand of human feeling. In this tendency Vaihinger approaches the doctrine of F. A. Lange and the pragmatism of William James.

Starting from a historical point of view Wilhelm Dilthey denies the possibility of scientific metaphysics. As religious or philosophical systems are not the outcome of our thinking but originate in personal experiences, different, as he says, 'Weltanschaungen' stand opposed to each other with equal claim to be right. Aim and goal of a theory of the "Geisteswissen-schaften" it is to understand the typical forms of them and to explain them from their historical conditions.

The close contact between the different endeavours to explain the world and the cultural conditions has been shown shortly in a work that undertakes to set forth the future of the culture of the Occident—in Oswald Spengler's much-read book "Der Untergang des Abendlandes." According to Spengler there is not one universal human culture, but only a succession of cultures which differed from each other as expressions of specific psychic conditions. Spengler compares every culture with a plant; like it, it grows up, has its time of blossom, and then decays by law of nature. He affirms that there have been eight cultures that reached full maturity: the Egyptian, the Babylonian, the Indian, the Chinese, the Ancient Greek, the Arabic,

the Mexican and that of the Occident. Spengler makes the duration of a culture to be about a thousand years, after the lapse of this time it exhausts itself, unless it has not been destroyed before by an outward catastrophe. Every culture has its own expressions in art, in science, in philosophy, in religion. As with different plants, different as their blossoms and fruits may be, the ways in which they grow and decay are similar to each other, so it is with the cultures ; their growth and decay show certain conformities. On the ground of his researches Spengler believes that he can designate the various phases of the course of the present occidental culture. His comparisons lead him to the result, that our present culture since about 1800 is in the last stage of its course, in the state of a merely outward civilisation. He thinks therefore to be able to prophesy its imminent decay or its complete rigidity.

Spengler's book full of artistic merit has found much enthusiastic applause, but also many critics who deny the justice of Spengler's speculations. Many details have been proved incorrect, many of his cultural-morphological parallels arbitrary. The work as a whole is certainly full of stimulating thoughts and is an interesting document of our time. It is certainly not proved that the decay of the Western culture is so imminent. Our present age may show many signs of decay, as the general tendency of levelling everybody and everything, but still the quick and vivid thought of our time proves that a state of rigidity of our culture has not yet been reached.

I have tried to represent to you the essential currents of philosophical and religious thought in the Germany of to-day ; a complete review of the tendencies of our time ought to include also the expression that the currents of thought have found in literature, in art, in music, in political economy, in public life—a task that goes far beyond the time which is allowed to me here.

You will have learned two things from what I have said ; firstly : how strongly the interest for philosophical and religious

questions is felt in Germany and with what earnestness they are studied ; and secondly : how great the divergence is among the many endeavours that are to solve the problems of life.

Is this divergence a sign of overflowing productivity of thought or is this a sign of decay ? From the stand-point of a firmly fixed dogmaticism all differences from one teaching, which is regarded as the only right way, are to be deplaced as aberrations. We do not believe, however, that the uniformity of thought, as it has been realised during the Middle Ages or as it is aimed at, in an opposite direction, to-day in Russia, is the salvation of mankind, but have the opinion that every one has a claim to build up his own ideas of the world. Who shares this opinion, will see just in the divergence of religious and philosophical views a sign of the creative energy of thought. Hegel declared liberty to be the essence of thought, and one of the philosophers who was in his early time a follower of his, Karl Marx, has expressed the same idea in a somewhat flowery language, when he says : "You admire the wonderful variety and the inexhaustable abundance of nature, you do not demand that the rose has the odour of the violet, but the richest of all, thought, is only to exist in one way."

History tells us that at all times endeavours have been made to solve the great enigmas of life in many various ways. If Socrates or Plato came back to the world now, they would find everything altered, but in philosophy they would find the same contrasts as in their own time. This is not strange. For thoughts on life rely on the character really, and the characters of men have not altered all these thousands of years. In all times in which personality is allowed to unfold itself freely, a divergence of systems will spring up. And that is good so. For this multifariousness will prevent the levelling of thought ; the permanent strife of the different explanations of the world gains new movement of itself. Out of the understanding of the necessary variety of thought tolerance rises like a ripe fruit ; tolerance which, firm in its own belief, leaves other opinions the

same right and admires the inexhaustibility of thought that seeks always to solve the riddles of life in new ways. Especially in this country which was a home of philosophy already at a time when culture had not yet dawned in Northern Europe and which is proud of always having been a home of tolerance to philosophical and religious views of every description, this many-sidedness of thought will appeal to the very heart, as it is the result of the free development of individuality.

HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE HIGH PRICE OF FOOD-GRAINS IN INDIA.[1]

The Extent of the Inflation of Food Prices.

Historians tell us of almost incredible stories of low prices prevailing in pre-British days. We are told that in the 17th century, when Shyasta Khan was the Governor of Bengal, the price of rice fell to 8 mds. a rupee. The phenomenon was marked by the closing of one of the gates of the city of Dacca with an inscription on it that the gate was to be opened by one whose rule should see the price of rice falling as low. And it was opened by Sarfaraz Khan during whose rule the price again came to that level.

Coming to more recent times we still find records of fabulously low prices of food. In 1710 fine rice at 1 md. per rupee and coarse rice at 1 md. 10 srs. per rupee were regarded as famine prices in Calcutta. In 1729 the price at Murshidabad of the 1st sort of rice is reported to have been 1 md. 10 srs. per rupee, and of coarse rice, as much as 5 mds. 11 srs. per rupee on an average. As regards wheat, in the same year, the price was quoted at 3 mds. per rupee for the 1st sort, and 3 mds. 30 srs. per rupee for the 2nd sort.[2]

In those days no systematic records of prices were kept, and in order to get an idea of the price-changes, we have to come down to the post-Mutiny period. A comparative study of the average prices of food grains in India in different years since 1861 [3] sheds sufficient light on the inflation of food prices

[1] A paper read at a meeting of the Dacca University Economic Association on the 8th August, 1928.

In this paper I propose to deal particularly with rice and wheat which form the staple food crops of India, and to leave out of account the inferior crops such as jower, bajra, maize, grams, etc.

[2] I have taken all these price-quotations from Dr. J. C. Sinha's "*Economic Annals of Bengal*," pp. 7n. and 53n.

[3] See Index Number of Indian Prices, 1861-1918. Department of Statistics.

and on the serious proportions the problem has assumed in recent years. During the whole of the year 1927, for example, the lowest rate to which the price of rice dropped in the Calcutta market was approximately Rs. 8 per md. (in January). This year in the early part of August we found the price at Rs. 7 for *Ballam* and Rs. 7-10 as. for *Seeta* No. 1. For wheat in the Lyallpur market the lowest rate in the whole of 1927 was approximately Rs. 4-8 as. per md. (in September). This year also in the early part of August the same price was found to rule.

To a poor population like that of India this great rise in the price of food is a matter of serious concern. This is why we find lakhs of people starving every year, millions of people living on one meal a day, and crores of people living on things like rice-water or *Marh,* as it is called. The Indian Fiscal Commission of 1922, while reporting on the export of food-grains, suggested that it was the poverty of purchasing power and not the scarcity of food-grains that was responsible for the suffering of the people. Whatever that might be, the fact remains that nearly 32 million people that inhabit India are to be fed ; and in order that food may be made available for the teeming millions, its price must be reasonably low. The present price of rice and wheat is prohibitively high, and a great many people do not possess sufficient money to purchase the ordinary necessaries of life.

Fundamental Causes of the High Price.

India is an agricultural country, noted for its supply of food-grains and raw produce. How is it that in a land such as this where, as the poet would say,—" The gentle breeze waves through the green meadows "—the problem of food has taken such an acute form that people have to purchase foodstuffs at more than famine prices ? In other words, what are the fundamental causes of this inflation of food prices ? Broadly speaking, the price of a commodity depends, on the one hand, upon

the demand and supply of the commodity in question, and, on the other, upon the quantity of money. A variation in price may be brought about by a variation in either of the two. In this paper the present writer will not be concerned with the money side of the question. Admitting that the inflation of currency in the country has got something to do with the rise in the price-level, and for the matter of that, with the rise in the price of food-grains, we cannot, after all, ignore the fact that a considerable portion of this rise has been due to causes relating to the demand and supply of food-grains. And it is these that are of greater significance. Money may be said to disturb only the surface ; but there are the under-currents which though deep are far more important. In fact, in so far as the rise in price is due to the inflation of currency or credit, the effect is more apparent than real, and the remedy lies in the judicious control of currency and credit.

The present high price of food cannot be attributed solely to monetary causes. This is evident from the fact that prices of food show a rise much more rapid than the general price level, as the table given below will show :

TABLE I.[1]

Year.	Index number of general price level.	Index No. of the price of rice.	Index No. of the price of wheat.
1873	100	100	100
1883	89	110	103
1893	105	162	127
1903	99	160	129
1913	143	255	177
1914	147	254	200
1915	152	246	227
1916	184	234	193
1917	196	215	205
1918	225	228	270
1919	276	357	341
1920	281	376	310
1921	236	355	360
1922	235	326	315
1923	220	308	356

[1] Index Number of Indian Prices : Summary, Tables I and III.

This indicates that while the general price-level rose since 1873 by 120 p.c. in 1923, the prices of rice and wheat, the staple food stuffs of India, show a rise of 208 p.c. and 256 p.c. respectively. The reason lies in the mal-adjustment of the demand and supply of food.

Increase of Demand.

On the side of demand, the increase can be seen in the enormous growth of population. The census report of 1921 tells us that the total increase of population between 1872 and 1921 has been 112,780,120.[1]

With this large increase in the population of the country, the scramble for food has been naturally very great. Besides, the home demand has been accompanied by a growing demand for food from Western countries. Since the Industrial Revolution, the population of many European countries rose by leaps and bounds, but absorbed as they were in manufacturing industries, their food-supply fell short of the demand. As a result of this process of over-industrialisation, in 1918, there were, in Europe, we are told, a hundred million more persons than the continent could support out of its natural resources. England, for example, would produce, before the war, even less than half of the foodstuffs necessary for its population. Consequently these Western countries have had to turn to the East for the satisfaction of their demands for food. Indeed it is this food problem which may be said to lie at the root of what is called the Economic Imperialism of the West. This movement found a strong stimulus in the opening of the Suez Canal, and the development of other facilities of transport, which enabled India to take an active part in international trade.[2] The result is that prices in India have been raised to the world price-level.

[1] In 1872 the population recorded was 206,162,360, and in 1921 it was found to be 318,942,480. The increase has been by more than half the number existing in 1872.

[2] "India's participation in the world's wheat market dates from 1870 when the opening of the Suez Canal brought the wheat-fields of the U. P. within thirty days of Europe."—Cotton, Handbook of Commercial Information for India, p. 155.

Shortage of Supply.

The supply, on the other hand, has not kept pace with the demand for food. It is, of course, very difficult to find out the total demand actually existing in India ; but we do it roughly on the basis of the official estimate as to the minimum required by individuals. The Prices Enquiry Committee appointed in Bengal in 1920 reported that according to a recent estimate 50 million tons of food-grains constituted India's requirements for human consumption, and 15 million tons more for purposes of seed and cattle food. Taking this figure to be the normal demand of India, we see that she seldom produces this aggregate amount of 65 million tons. Between 1920 and 1926 there is not a single year in which India's total outturn of food crops reached this point. I give below the total outturn in different years of food crops including Rice, Wheat, Barley, Jowar, Bajra, Maize and Gram :

TABLE II.

Year.	Total yeild (tons.)
1920-21	47,015,000
1921-22	62,036,000
1922-23	62,478,000
1923-24	54,939,000
1924-25	56,499,000
1925-26	52,969,000

So India hardly produces in a year even sufficient to meet her own requirements of food-consumption, not to speak of the foreign demand which is also by no means insignificant.

Is India, then, over-populated ? Many able writers on Indian Economics have tried to show that there is Malthusian

danger in India and a restriction of population is the panacea of all her economic evils. But is it, as a matter of fact, a case of over-population, or under-production, or both? This is a serious problem for India which requires careful examination.

Looking at the density of population it apparently seems as though India's population problem is not so keen as is often supposed. According to the latest census, over the whole of India the population per square mile averages 177. On the other hand, with respect to many advanced countries the density of population is much higher.

TABLE III.

Countries.	Population per sq. mile.
Belgium	654
England and Wales	649
The Netherlands	544
Germany	332
Japan	215
France	184

But density (meaning as it does a simple arithmetic of dividing the number of population by the number of squre miles in the country) is more or less unreliable and is not a sufficient clue to the pressure of population. In India the population is predominantly agricultural and here the density must necessarily be lower than in the industrial countries of Europe. Look at the density in America where the population per square mile is only 32. Moreover the physical and economic conditions of the country being extraordinarily diverse, the problems of the aggregation of population are also very complex here. Take the case of Bengal : there are some districts where the population is unusually dense. In certain areas, *viz.*, Noakhali, Tipperah,

Dacca, the number of population per square mile is more than one thousand.

Districts.	Density per sq. mile.
Noakhali	1,202
Tipperah	1,027
Dacca	1,145

The reason is that in these regions land is more productive and has got higher capacity to support population. But still so much aggregation impairs the standard of living. In Europe, so far as the agricultural population is concerned, the standard of living has been adjusted to a density of not more than 250 persons to the square mile. Hence, we may say, India's economic condition does not warrant a higher density.

The problem of population, however, is to be studied in relation to production, and the economic aspect of density in India resolves itself into the question of the relation between the population and the productivity of the land. The total quantity of food-grains produced in the country is, as has been already seen, not sufficient to support the entire population. But considering the potentiality of the country, from the point of view of both extensive and intensive cultivation, it may be said that the scarcity of food-grains and their high price are due more to under-production than over-population.

In 1924-25 only 32 p.c. of the total area of British India was cultivated. Making allowance for the current fallows, forests and other lands not available for cultivation, there was still 21 p. c. which could be, but was not, cultivated, and which might be taken as cultivable waate. This shows a lack of enterprising spirit in the people.

The yield of food crops per acre of land is also very low as compared with that in other countries. The following comparative statement showing the yield per acre of rice and wheat in

different countries gives us an idea of the position of India in this respect.

TABLE IV.

Rice.

Countries.	Yield per acre (1925).
	lbs.
Egypt	2833
Formosa	1513·2
Indo-China	1012
Italy	3895
Japan	3074·4
Siam	1558·2
Spain	5619
U. S. A. of America	1657·7
India	833

Wheat.

Canada	1121
Egypt	1572
France	1428·4
Germany	1845·7
Italy	1321·6
Japan	1542
United Kingdom	2040·8
U. S. A. of America	986·8 (1924)
India	639·8

Hence Gokhale was not very far from the truth when he said that the crop yield per acre in India is the lowest in the

world. Along with this low yield per acre must be considered the increasing pressure of population upon land, so that the labour cost of food production is intensely high in India. Lack of irrigation and the absence of scientific methods are responsible for this unfortunate situation. An elaborate system of irrigation is calculated to increase the yield substantially. In Bombay, for example, the normal yield per acre of wheat in irrigated areas is 1,032 lbs. as against 711 lbs. in unirrigated areas. But then the irrigated area bears a very small proportion to the total area cultivated in India. In 1924-25 only 25 p.c. of the area cultivated for rice was irrigated, and 35 p.c. of the area sown with wheat was irrigated.

It is interesting to examine here the validity or otherwise of the prevailing belief in India that the productive power of the soil is diminishing. It is somewhat risky to make a dogmatic assertion with regard to this question, the production of food crops depending upon so many factors external to the quality of the land. It is no wonder, however, that in an old country like India, agriculture still carried on under stereotyped, antiquated methods, will be susceptible to the influence of the law of Diminishing Returns; and the statistics at our disposal do not prove the contrary.

TABLE V.[1]

Year.	Average yield per acre.	
	Rice.	Wheat.
	Lbs.	Lbs.
1900-05	964·1	673·8
1905-10	890·6	593·3
1910-15	905·2	711·7
1915-20	901·8	682·1
1920-25	860·3	679·4
1925-26	833	639·8

[1] The pressure of population upon land went on increasing. See below.

To avoid the influence of external circumstances, the average yield of rice and wheat per acre has been compared with respect to different quinquennial periods, during which those disturbances might cancel one another ; so that the average yield per acre as shown in the above table may be regarded as an index of the real productivity of the soil during these periods. Thus whether it be due to the inclusion in the cultivated area of new and comparatively less fertile lands under the pressure of population, or to the exhaustion of the soil, the production of food in India has been obeying the Law of Diminishing Returns.

Exports.

It has been observed that since the opening of the Suez Canal, India has been exporting food-grains to Western countries. These exports operate as a principal factor in bringing about a shortage of supply within the country, and consequently in raising the price of food-grains. It is argued that the total exports of food products bears an insignificant ratio to the total output. But so far as rice and wheat are concerned, which constitute the principal foodstuffs of India, the export, small as it is, cannot be regarded as altogether negligible. The following table containing the index number of the relative increase in the production and export of rice and wheat throws light on how exports affect the home-supply.

TABLE VI.[1]

	Rice.		Wheat.		
Year.	Production.	Export.	Production	Export.	
1892-97	... 100	100	100	100	
				Wheat.	Wheat flour.
1901-06	 105	142	152	140	176
1911-16	... 142	139	164	147	213

[1] Wadia and Joshi, *Wealth of India*, p. 216.

We find the annual increase in production practically absorbed in exports; so that the home consumption during the years noted in the above table remains almost stationary inspite of the growth of population in the country.

There are other causes also, no less important of the high price of food.

Middlemen's Tolls.

The middleman system and its tolls are a great burden on the consumer. They contribute to increase the cost of marketing of the commodities and thereby to raise their price. The process of distribution of goods through different centres has been made so complex owing to the existence of a host of middlemen that the cost of marketing is now no smaller than the cost of production as such. In America, for example, 'Fifty-cent Dollar' is a common cry,—meaning that the producer practically gets half of what the buyers actually pay, the rest being appropriated by the middlemen. In more recent years the out-cry is against the farmers' "30 cent. dollar." The condition in India is no better. Here also a large portion of the profit from agricultural produce is appropriated by the middleman at the expense of the cultivators. In the case of paddy, for example, it is marketed in Bengal through as many as five agents besides the original cultivator. The chain of middlemen begins from the village *Faria* who collects paddy from the *ryot*. It is then sold through a *Paikar* to a *Bepari* who again carries it to an *Aratdar*. Then there is the *Dalal* through whom it finally goes to the mills.

High Freight Charges.

The situation has become much worse in view of the inadequate development of warehousing and transport. The policy of Railway rates, for example, is anything but satisfactory. The

following table will go to show how very costly freight is in India :—

TABLE VII.[1]

Railway system.	Freight for carrying one ton of wheat through 200 miles.
	Rs.
United States	7·56
Madras and Southern Mahratta Railways.	10·32
Great Indian Peninsular Railway ...	11·97

Moreover there are inequalities in the rates with regard to different kinds of traffic. As against goods for internal use, those moving to the ports for exports have got favourable rates. The practice has continued to exist since the time of Lord Dalhousie who introduced it with the purpose of developing the exports of raw materials and the imports of manufactures. Difficulties also arise from 'block rates' with regard to internal traffic. In connection with 'block rates' the Indian industrial commission observed :

"There may be justification for these expedients in many cases but it would appear that they often affect traffic undesirably. They have accentuated inequalities, and have, on the whole, tended to the disadvantage of internal traffic." [2]

Then again disparity is also observed between shipping rates from one Indian port to another, and those on goods carried from an Indian port to a foreign port—a consequence of the shipping monopoly of Britain.

This rate policy, then, is to some extent, responsible for the high price of food for local consumption.

[1] The Table was compiled by Rao Bahadur P. C. Patil and quoted by Dr. H. Sinha in his paper on '*Cooperative marketing*' published in the Indian Journal of Economics, 1928—Conference Issue.

[2] *Vide* Report, p. 206.

Remedies.

There has been, so far, an enumeration of some of the broad forces that have operated to bring about an inflation of food prices in India. Now the question is—"Is it to be a permanent feature, or are there any remedies against the evil? Are the teeming millions of India destined to remain in perpetual hunger, or might measures be adopted to bring down the prices of food to a lower level so as to make it reach the mouths of the poor?"

There is, of course, no 'magic wand' whose golden touch will automatically bring forth the desired end. Certain suggestions can, however, be made, which, if adhered to, may go a long way in solving the problem.

Restriction of Population.

First of all comes the question of population. It has been observed that the growth of population in India has played an important part in raising the demand and hence the price of food. So a restriction of population is desirable. A fall in the number of population will act on the demand and consequently on the price. The argument that restriction of population will mean that so many hands will be off, with a proportionate fall in production, cannot stand in view of the fact that Diminishing Returns have set in; so that the reduction of food supply will be proportionately less than the mouths to be fed.

The only means to carry it out is to raise the standard of living. Between population and standard of living there is a sort of interrelation. Population is as much an effect as a cause of standard of living. If the latter can be pushed up a little, the number of population will automatically fall off. The Indian standard of living is proverbially low. Our business will be to raise it to a respectable level. The initial process

is to create new wants in the people. This will give rise to greater activities, and their standard of living will be screwed up. And it is only by the dissemination of education that new wants can be created for the people. Unfortunately in the sphere of education India is extremely backward. While recognising the progress made by her in this direction during the last half century, it cannot be forgotten that in point of literacy she suffers terribly in comparison with other civilized countries. The reason lies, of all other things, in the fact that undue stress has been laid in this country upon higher education to the neglect of primary education. Hence in the introduction of compulsory primary education there is an economic side as important as the intellectual or the moral side.

The chain of reasoning may be thus repeated. Diffusion of primary education among the masses will lead to the creation of new wants. New wants will create new activities, and the standard of living will rise. This higher standard of living will in its turn act upon the number of population which will automatically fall off and be adjusted to the new standard.

Increased Production.

More important is the other aspect of the question, *viz.*, the production and supply of food-grains. How can the total supply be increased ? It has been seen that in India there is scope for both extensive and intensive cultivation. The amount of area cultivable but still uncultivated is not negligible. People flock towards those quarters where lands are cultivated and in these cultivated areas the density of population has gone beyond its limit, while there are areas which are sparsely populated. We have noted the unusually high density of population in certain districts of Bengal, *viz.*, Noakhali, Tippera, Dacca. Of course there are many natural causes of high density. It is quite natural that an industrial

centre will be more densely populated than an agricultural one ; and among agricultural areas, those places will be more densely populated where the soil is more fertile, the climate is more genial, the rainfall less deficient. But then there is no denying the fact that the human factor plays no small part in determining the density of population. Apart from the natural factors already suggested, people instinctively flock towards those centres where the population is already dense, and once settled they have a peculiar knack of sticking to those places inspite of economic difficulties. In so far as the gregarious habits of the agriculturist and the spirit of inertia are responsible for a higher density, it is quite uneconomic, and ought to be guarded against. The distribution of population in different areas must be such that the marginal productivity of the cultivator may be equal.[1] What is required, then, is a spirit of enterprise in the cultivators.

Secondly, in view of the fact that in India agricultural productivity is much lower than in other parts of the world, our lands are capable of more intensive cultivation. Hence, promotion of schemes like Sukkur Barrage, extension of irrigation, and the introduction of scientific methods of agriculture are required. So much has been written on it in different papers that the point hardly needs any further emphasis.

It is a happy sign that attempts are being made to carry out the scheme of scientific agriculture. Government have been paying attention to this problem since that great Viceroy, the late Lord Curzon, inaugurated his policy of agricultural developments based on research, experiment, education and demonstration. We get a further evidence of the recognition of its importance in the appointment of the Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture which has just published its report.

The progress, however, has not been up to the mark. With respect to rice, the premier crop of India, the area sown in

[1] Density has not been adjusted to agricultural productivity, for, how else can the fact of a discrepancy in the standard of living of different places be explained ?

1924-25 with improved seeds supplied by agricultural departments was not even one per cent. of the total area sown with the crop. In respect of wheat, in the same year, the area sown with improved seeds was something like five per cent. of the total area.

Still what little has been done and is being done speaks of the interest the question has evolved. As a matter of fact nothing substantial can come out in the face of the present wide illiteracy of the cultivator. The foundation must be laid well, and then the superstructure is to be erected. Cultivators must be taught the fundamental principles of agricultural science, and then offered scope for applying those principles. The knowledge garnered in the Agricultural Institutes must not remain restricted within a limited area, but must be broadcasted and made available to every village cultivator. The recent scheme of the Bengal Government to train teachers of High Schools in the Science of Agriculture so that they may introduce new methods in their respective institution is a step towards popularising scientific agriculture. But, for all this again, the introduction of Compulsory Primary Education and the diffusion of a knowledge of the three R's among the ignorant cultivators are of fundamental importance.

Restriction of Exports.

Then again it has been observed that exports play no minor part in bringing about a rise in food prices. Exports are allowed on the plea that in normal times there is an exportable surplus. But that is a misconception. Although the average ration that has been calculated to show the deficiency in food production in relation to population may rest on a rough estimate, still the fact remains that famines are almost chronic in India, and that a considerable portion of the population starves every year. We find an exportable surplus because

the home demand cannot assert itself. As soon as the price falls, the effective demand within the country must expand. The foreign demand is more effective at present, for many people of India have not got sufficient number of coins to purchase food at this high rate. Steps therefore should be taken, as far as practicable, to conserve the supply of food-grains.

The Indian Fiscal Commission of 1922 dwelt at length on this question of restriction on the export of food-grains and put forward certain objections against any such restriction in normal times. But certain misconceptions centre round their arguments. The fundamental hypothesis on which they have based their recommendation is that India has in a normal year a surplus both of rice and wheat which is available for export. So they hold that if India is to grow enough food to feed herself in bad years, there must be considerable surplus in good years. But this assumption itself, as I tried to show above, cannot be substantiated. Moreover, the premium which they propose to pay for insurance against the risk of 'bad years' seems to be too high. On the contrary, measures ought to be adopted so that the risks of crop failure may be avoided as far as possible, for example, by a careful selection of seeds, by manures and so on.

Another point which the Commission raised is that the effect of any artificial depression of the price of food-grains would mean a blow to agriculture. "If the policy is successful," they say, "it is clear that it would involve a considerable diminution in the resources of the agriculturists." But these people lose sight of the fact that prices of other necessaries of life move with those of foodstuffs, so that though the producers of food, in case of any restriction of export, would get smaller prices for their commodities, still, considering the decrease in the other necessaries of life, they would not, on the whole, stand to lose. If encouragement is to be offered to the cultivators, it is to be done not through high prices, but rather

through some such things as co-operative selling organisations so that they may get a fair share of the real value of the things they grow.

Thirdly, the Commissioners object to any such restrictions on the ground that "the attempt to lower the price of food-grains artificially would fail," inasmuch as "any depression of the price of food-grains would naturally lead to the substitution for them of crops such as cotton, jute, and oil seeds" and a diminution in the production of food. But it seems the contingency of such substitution is a doubtful one, for lands suitable for cultivation of food crops may not be always suitable for other crops. But taking, for the sake of argument, their hypothesis to be absolutely correct, it may be asked, will this probable substitution of other crops and a consequent fall in the supply of food mean a rise in the prices of the latter ? I have reasons to believe they will not. It has been shown how the production of rice and wheat is carried on in India under Diminishing Returns. If that is so, any reduction in the production of rice and wheat will mean a recession of the margin of cultivation, for the displacement of producers, if there is any, will be certainly from the margin. Now, this shifting of the margin will be followed by a fall in the marginal cost of production, the ultimate effect being a fall in the price of food-grains.

All these analyses lead me to the conclusion that an introduction of export duties upon rice and wheat, adequate enough to stop their exports in times of rising prices in India, is economically sound,—the duties to continue so long as the production of the commodities conform to the Law of Diminishing Returns, and so long as the yield of these crops has not been increased sufficiently to create a real and substantial surplus. The export duty will act as a safety valve, allowing the commodities to escape for export only when there is an adequate pressure in the shape of a very low cost of production at home or a very high price-level abroad.

It cannot be denied, however, that any such artificial restriction may involve certain difficulties.

The displacement of agricultural labour that is to follow such a measure may cause unemployment. But it will not be so serious as it appears on the face of it. It will be a temporary phase, in as much as the labourers thus displaced might be more profitably employed in industries. In case there is a simultaneous expansion of industries, the artificial reduction in the price of food-grains cannot affect the labourers unfavourably. Did the repeal of the corn laws in any way hit the British agricultural labourer? Corn Laws were introduced there for the benefit of the agriculturists by securing higher prices for them. The repeal was certainly followed by a fall in the price of corn. But it synchronised with a rapid industrialisation of the country, so that the village labourers displaced by that so-called blow on agriculture were quickly absorbed in industries.

But, will this natural economic force operate in India ? That is the problem. Even at the present moment our economic situation demands a shifting of agricultural population to urban areas. We know, while our industries badly suffer from an inadequate supply of labour, surplus population still remains in the land. As early as in 1880 the Famine Commission pointed out this fact of our economic system ; and since that time the problem has been growing more and more serious. The proportion of those depending on agriculture rose from 61 p.c. in 1891 to 73 p.c. in 1921. This excessive pressure of population in agricultural areas has resulted in a sort of under-employment of labour. In the words of Mr. H. Calvert it may be said that under present conditions, " there are too many people employed for too short a part of their time in extracting too little produce from too large an area." [1] In fact, the retardation of the material progress of our country may be traced to this lack of harmony in the employment of the labour

[1] *Agricultural Journal of India*, Vol. XXI, Part II, p. 113.

force. In the interest of maximum production, therefore, a re-distribution of labour is necessary,—a re-distribution in such a way that the margin of profitableness is reached with regard to both manufacturing and agricultural industries. In agriculture the investment of labour has been pushed beyond the margin of profitableness, so that the transference of a part thereof from agricultural to manufacturing industries would mean a more economic use of labour.

But still that natural economic adjustment is not taking place. There are causes—both natural and artificial—for this peculiar phenomenon. So far as natural causes, *viz.*, conservatism of the labourers, their love for village life and dislike against industrial conditions are concerned, they are removable by a spread of education. Among artificial causes may be mentioned the concentration of industries in few centres and bad housing conditions. These difficulties also may be mitigated. The policy of railway rates has been to a great extent responsible for the congestion of industries in Port towns. If industries are diffused and decentralised through a change in that policy, and if the housing problem is successfully tackled by the factory legislators, there is no reason why there should be any shyness of labour in coming to industries. Family attachment will not stand in the way; for, the people shifting to neighbouring industrial areas will very well be able to keep connection with their village homes.

The next difficulty arises with regard to the balance of trade. The policy of such artificial restrictions is likely to produce a disturbance on the balance of trade. But to my mind, restriction on the export of food-grains is a just complement to the policy of discriminating protection which the Government have launched,—one reacting on the volume of imports, the other on that of exports.

So far regarding the question of the export of food-grains. It has been seen that a restriction of export is economically sound. It may also be seen that it is a practicable proposition.

The Government did control the export of food-grains, and did keep down their price during the abnormal conditions of 1920. That was purely a temporary measure, and the Fiscal Commission recommended temporary export duties only under such abnormal conditions. But it is, as a matter of fact, very difficult to foresee the state of things clearly, so that in order that the expedient may be effective it must be a normal feature,—normal, let me repeat, so long as the condition of production of the crops remains as it is at present.

Co-operation

Let us now turn to certain other measures which may be supplemented for the purpose of cheapening food prices. In the matter of marketing of foodcrops the rôle of middlemen in some cases is superfluous and makes distribution extremely complex and costly. Many of them have been rightly dubbed as 'parasites.' They should be eliminated as far as possible by the introduction of Co-operation. Considerable success has been made in this line of Co-operative marketing of agricultural products in Western countries like Germany, Denmark and also in America. German sale and supply societies numbering about 4,000 in 1921 are admirable examples of the success of co-operative marketing. This organisation, as Darling remarks, made German agriculture before the war the most efficient in the world. In America the conspicuous progress of this movement is seen in the fact that in 1925 in co-operative selling there were well over 10,000 separate Associations with a volume of business amounting to about $2,000,000,000 a year. In India up till now agricultural co-operation has been taking the form of Co-operative Credit Societies. Other forms of co-operation are still in their infancy. Credit has made the start, because, for India that is the most important, in view of the appalling poverty and agricultural indebtedness. Attempts, however, are being made to

introduce Co-operative Purchase and Sales Societies in certain Provinces. But the progress seems to be extremely slow. In 1925-26 in the whole of India, including Native States, the total number of Purchase and Sale Societies[1] amounted only to 349 as compared with 66,318 Societies for agricultural credit. Moreover, all these Societies are not on a strictly co-operative basis. For anything like a success in this direction, again, is required good training of agriculturists in co-operation.

A successful organisation of such Societies, by avoiding unnecessary intermediaries lessens the cost of distribution and is also calculated to bring a certain amount of stability in trade and as such in the price. For further marketing facilities, the introduction of co-operative reserve stores for food-grains would be most useful. In this connection Farmer's Co-operative Grain Elevators of America may serve as a model. The question of Grain Elevators was taken up in India as early as in 1906. But up till now no result is visible, save one solitary case at Lyallpur.[2]

When we are considering agricultural co-operation we shall do well to take note of another aspect of the question, *viz.*, consolidation of agricultural holdings on co-operative lines. The defect of fractionalisation of holdings to the extent that we find in India cannot be over-estimated. In Bengal, for example, the average size of agricultural holdings is 3·12 acres, whereas in France it is 15·05 acres, in Germany 19·25 acres, in England 26·95 acres. Moreover in those countries the petty areas are not devoted to food-grains in the manner usual here. Though these simple averages do not warrant

[1] Both Limited and Unlimited. The total purchase by members' products amounted to Rs. 67,36,725.

[2] The Royal Commission on Indian Agriculture finds little possibilities of Grain Elevators. The advantages of an Elevator System, they say, are too problematical to justify it. But, looking at instances of reduced costs of marketing by Co-operative Grain Elevators, amounting, in some cases, to a saving of 12 or 14 p.c. of the average price in America, we cannot dismiss the question altogether.

any generalisations with regard to the question of 'Economic holdings' in India, depending as it does upon soil, means of irrigation, etc., still there is one fundamental fact, that in many parts of India is to be found an increasing sub-division of land and a scattered character of holdings which form a serious impediment to agricultural progress. Our land system with its rigorous laws of inheritance is mainly responsible for this chronic nature of sub-division of holdings.[1] So a co-operative attempt to consolidate as far as possible these sub-divided and scattered holdings is essential in the interest of economic farming. A resolution to this effect was submitted by the Board of Agriculture to the Local Governments. But no practical steps have been taken in the Provinces, except, of course, in the Punjab where the movement has been started with considerable success. In the Annual Report on the working of the Co-operative Societies in the Punjab for the year 1925-26 we find sixty-seven new societies which by a re-adjustment of holdings succeeded in raising the average size of a block from ·6 to 3 acres, and we also find stories of enhanced rents paid by contented tenants.

Reduction of Freight Charges.

Then again, in connection with the marketing of food-grains, the question of rates, which I have referred to as one of the factors affecting their prices, must not be lost sight of. If, for example, the freight rate for coastal trade is reduced, the distribution of food-grains as between Burma and other Provinces is rendered easier and smoother. The present high rates for coastal trade are the result of the shipping monopoly of Britain. This is why the Hon'ble Mr. V. J. Patel recently emphasised the question of an Indian Mercantile

[1] Our whole land-system is in fault. It is a pity that land revenue administration was not included in the terms of reference of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India; for, bad land system is a positive hindrance to good farming.

Marine before the Burma Chamber of Commerce. Water transport which concerns chiefly Bengal, Assam and Burma is anything but satisfactory. Channels of internal trade may be increased through improved waterways. Through the manipulation of Railway Rates also considerable help may be rendered. The extent to which freight rates and port charges can help in this direction may be seen by a study of the position of the Continent in relation to England in the matter of the supply of rice. It is a curious fact that the Continent of Europe which obtains rice from India largely through British shipping firms and brokers has been able to compete with such success in the British home market as to supply about 40 p.c. of the British consumption of polished rice, rice starch, etc. (1920). And the chief cause which enabled these foreign competitors to secure this position lies in the favourable port charges and favourable railway rates on the Continent as compared with those in England.[1]

This is an outline of the measures whereby we can secure an improvement in the position of food prices in India. It must be noted, however, that artificial measures such as concession freight rates or restriction of exports are mere palliatives, and are not an unmixed good. The real trouble lies in the character of the people. So long as the cultivators are steeped in the darkness of ignorance, so long as 94 p.c. of the population are forced to remain illiterate, any scheme of agricultural improvement is a myth. It is only when they will learn "to know, to understand and to put forth their efforts" that there is any hope for progress.

AMIYAKUMAR DAS GUPTA

[1] See Indian Trade Enquiry by the Imperial Institute : Reports on Rice.

INDIAN PICTURES

I. To a Blind Beggar.

The flame-tree flings out myriad blooms
Of red and gold above your head,
But its beauty is wasted on you
Who know nought of such burgeoning.
You tap your way along a street,
A stick and begging-bowl your all ;
You move in shadows through the throng
Of busy men and teeming life ;
Of "Alms for Allah's sake" you sing,
Or mutter blessings as you hear
The clink of coins fall in your bowl.
Skies blue or grey, what matters it,
Or palace or hovel, rich or poor,
Or clatt'ring horse, or motor-car ?
All merge in one dull sound for you
Who never knew the light of day,
And all the joyous pageantry
Of vivid, seething, tropic life.
A place to lay your head at night
Or blows if you have failed to move
The charity of men ; O Soul
What compensations do you know ?
Is Allah deaf, and must your prayers
To him for ever be in vain ?

II. To a Trained Bear.

To-day I saw a ragged gipsy-man,
Leading a sad-eyed bear upon a chain ;

The molten sun beat down in cruel rays
As beast and man lurched slowly down the road.
The bear, poor mountebank, in coat of fur
Seemed tortured in that glowing Indian sun.
What crime did you commit that you should go
Upon the leash of low-caste men, a slave
To all his brainless whims ? Methinks if fate
Were kind, the scene would be reversed ; the man
Would follow on all-fours, debased, and you,
As master, lead him shuffling on the chain !

III. To a Monkey.

Pathetic image, travesty of man,
Bewildered childish eyes, and tiny form
Mocked with the motley garments of a clown ;
Tied to a string and pulled down dusty road
To act a wretched part for callous louts
More monkey-like than you could ever be !
Poor beaten captured thing, what thoughts are yours
When looking on with wrinkled brow at all
The human clods belittling you, and who
Deceive themselves with thoughts of their own worth?

IV. A Sacred Bull.

An old priest, clad in saffron and brown beads
Walks down the dusty road, and leads a bull
All gayly-decked in cowrie-shells, brass bells
And flower-chains. The patient beast may wear
His sanctity with pride, but mild eyes look
At you and seem to say, "I symbolize
The great *Shivaji*, that is true, but I
Am longing to browse again in gracious

Fields with others of my kind ; to nip
The lush green grass in freedom ; or lie in
Deep cool shade beneath the trees at sun-time.
But I am forced to wear these holy bonds,
To have a ring within my nose, captive,
And led along by this old charlatan
Who calls himself a priest and makes me act
A sacred part, though I am but a bull!"

V. To a Snake-Charmer.

Borne on the shimm'ring silences
Of sun-warmed air, there comes the thin
And plaintive whine of Pan-pipes, near
And nearer, then a strange figure
Strides slowly down the dusty road
Beyond my compound-gate. It is
A snake-charmer, in saffron rags,
With moon-shaped rings of polished brass
Within his ears, catching the light
Like gold. His wild dark eyes are fixed
On space, as he goes by, wooing
A magic tune from his gourd-flute.
Across his shoulder hangs a pole,
With wicker baskets on each end,
And cobras in the baskets hide
And wait his call to dance and sway
In rhythm to his vagrant tune.
He passes from my sight, the sound
Grows fainter now, but I am filled
With nameless longing to follow
Where he leads, and learn the secret
Charms he scatters on the pulsing
Air. Wand'ring, reckless, lawless, free,

A vagabond, mysteriously
Appearing, then vanishing, like
The echo of a Pagan dream.

VI. A Bullock-Cart.

Stepping daintily, two milk-white bullocks
Pull a bamboo-cart along the roadway.
Encircled with a chain of turquoise-blue
Their necks, and little tinkling bells of brass.
The dark and turbaned driver, Buddha-like,
Squats on the cart and lightly twists the tails;
His beasts switch to and fro, and lazily
He utters words admonishing or kind.
Then he begins a tuneless song that seems
One with the fading sun-set's glow, and the
Dusty tree-enshadowed road. Or he sleeps
And sleeping, dreams, trusting his faithful beasts
To make their way into the country-side;
Then, waking, he lights the little lantern
Swinging from the bottom of the cart. And
When the night comes, its yellow gleam will
Move like a great glow-worm, shining in the
Gloom. And then at last the driver and his
Milk-white bullocks will merge mysteriously
Into the misty shadows like a dream.

LILY S. ANDERSON

THE PROBLEM OF SECONDARY EDUCATION[1]

I deem it a privilege to have been called upon to associate myself with the present annual gathering of High School teachers of this district. I consider it to be a high honour when I remember that I do not have either the official position to render you any effective material help nor that immediate contact with your work which might prompt you to enquire how the products of your labour—your intellectual progeny—are shaping themselves year after year. For more than ten years now my work with Intermediate students has ceased entirely, and I must confess that I do not have the necessary data from which to judge how, during these years, school instruction has improved in the province as a whole and in the district of Dacca in particular. It is, therefore, with a certain amount of diffidence that I approach the problem, and had not I had friends who are engaged in the actual work of school-teaching and wards whose progress I have to watch, I would probably have declined the honour with thanks.

But as a spectator sees more of the game than one who actually takes part in it, it is not impossible that one whose own interest is not involved is somewhat in a better position to judge of the trend of events than one who is in the current of operation and controversy. It is not impossible that when educational ideals and institutions are in the melting pot, you should turn to people like myself, if not for guidance, at least for the sake of variety. I shall not foolishly presume that you turned to me for effective remedy, but I am prepared to concede that you turned to me just as sick men, disappointed with systematic

[1] Presidential Address to the Dacca District Teachers' Conference, 1928.

treatment, still turn to quacks for miraculous cure. I could probably tell you something more informing about the abilities of teachers whom I have to examine every year in their Training course ; but of the schools themselves I have, to employ a useful distinction drawn by Plato, more opinion than knowledge. My observations are, therefore, to be taken as opinions expressed by one who has been forced to bestow a certain amount of thinking on the subject as it has loomed large before the public for a pretty long time and, as a matter of fact, in a very unenviable disparaging light.

It seems to me that the attention of the thinking public has for an unconscionably long time been divided between University and Primary education. As such, the problem of secondary education is not even a topical subject of discourse. The fight between the Government and the Public has centred of late round University freedom and finance and free and compulsory Primary Education. Even the Education Department is beginning to lose interest in high schools as its power is sought to be curtailed by the new School Code of the Calcutta University in respect of dismissal and management. The effect has been that Secondary Education is fairly bidding to be the Cinderella of the educational world. Apart from all extrinsic causes, forces are at work inside the secondary education system itself to bring about an apathy of the general public. Although during the last quinquennium the number of High Schools rose to about a thousand (an increase of about 100 in five years), of Middle English schools from 1,468 to 1,616, of High Madrassahs from 1,196 to 4,904 and Junior Madrassahs from 23,840 to 46,795, the fact must be faced that the orientation of Secondary Education in the Province is changing definitely towards a new ideal. The fall in the number of Middle Vernacular Schools from 217 to 74 has been ascribed to a want of their opening up into any avenue of employment. But can it not be said that all the forms of secondary education have the same gloomy prospect before them? The Matriculation or School Leaving

Certificate is no longer a passport to any respectable occupation or profession. The presence of a large number of candidates with higher qualifications is affecting adversely the admission of Matriculates to such vocational institutions as Medical and Engineering Colleges and Schools. It is only such doubtful and poor openings as shorthand, typewriting and telegraphy provide that matriculates can aspire after. Even office assistantships, either in private firms or under the Government, are slipping out of their grasp, especially where competitive examination decides the fate. The perfunctory vocational training imparted in some institutions to school children leads nowhere and is more in the nature of a camouflage than a serious attempt to tackle the bread problem of the future citizens of the province. The net result is that after a brief spell of disappointment produced by the non-co-operation movement, scholars are aimlessly returning to schools and drifting towards University education irrespective of its economic value and their own competence to profit by such a course of study. One not acquainted with the reasons will perhaps see in the rapidly increasing number of schools and the well-filled undergraduate and post-graduate classes, an increase in the intellectual asset of the Province which is destined to benefit society in the long run. Let us hope that it will, but in the meantime the only visible result is the tightening of the marriage market and the desire of the parents to recoup educational expenses from the bride's party when no other form of return on educational investment is in sight. The Law classes tell their own tale—of tragic waste of human materials in a pursuit of financial phantom, not to speak of their false implication that the populace suffer from a morbid spirit of litigation ready to absorb any number of legal practitioners according to the law of demand and supply.

The system of separating the two communities from the very beginning can cause only alarm in the mind of a nationalist. It is a welcome sign that the Musalmans are taking largely to western education; nothing can work off ignorance,

fanaticism and misguided zeal so effectively as education, whether among Hindus, Musalmans, backward communities, untouchables or women. But when education takes from the beginning a communal turn and no opportunity is provided to any section of the people to learn the manners and customs of the other sections, all hopes of eventual rapprochement are at an end. That Muslim children should be withdrawn in increasing numbers from general high schools and sent to high madrassahs is a sign that the communal consciousness of the Musalmans is being accentuated out of all proportion to the religious needs of the community and that at no distant date the cultural contact between the two communities at the most impressionable period of life would come to an end. The Government of Bengal Memorandum to the Education Committee of the Statutary Commission has pointed out that if the two top classes of high schools are excluded, the fall in the Muslim percentage in high schools is appreciably sharp. The type of education provided in these madrassahs being of a peculiar type, provision had to be made all through for special courses to which it might lead for Islamic Intermediate Colleges, Islamic Graduate and Post-graduate courses at Dacca. In its wake has come an educational institution, I mean the Islamia College at Calcutta, professing to impart the normal type of education but apart from all non-Moslem contact The time has come to utter a note of warning, for the separatist movement can never be welcome from the nationalistic point of view, and one only regrets that the same tendency should spread upwards till we have in the country not only communal schools and colleges but also communal universities. A spirit of give and take cannot thrive in these circumstances. A communal electorate is the logical outcome of a system of education that keeps the communities apart and does not allow one social group to see the difficulties and viewpoints of the others. Already the communal troubles have initiated among urban population communal concentration in

different areas. The education imparted will accentuate communal differences still further and thus the liberalising influence of education will be neutralised by communal aggregation in which conduct is dominated by social feeling rather than by liberal culture. Is it not a pity that when the ban of interdining between the two communities, except in respect of prohibited food, has been practically lifted and even a common hostel would not be resented by a large number, we are introducing into the educational world factors that do not make for concord and assimilation of each other's culture? The mediaeval theologians were sorely taxed with the problem as to whether an omnipotent God could open and shut a window at the same time. There is no doubt, however, that the present academic gods have managed to secure liberalism and narrowness at a stroke among the Mussalmans by providing them with communal institutions. This is, however, by way of digression.

Primary education and University education are more fortunate in that, for different reasons, there is a regular social backing for both at the present moment. The intelligentsia of the country have been accused of representing only themselves in their political opinions and the Government have claimed that they and they alone represent the dumb millions whose safety and interest cannot be entrusted to the self-constituted leaders of the different communities. The political leaders have felt partially the force of this contention and have come forward to remedy this defect by demanding insistently that the illiterate masses should be made to understand their own political interest with the help of their own intelligence and education. If universal adult suffrage is to be the basis of the future democratic constitution of India, the electorate must be sufficiently educated to exercise intelligently its voting right and to take intelligent interest in the political development of the country. As self-government spreads, and union boards, district boards and municipalities begin to touch the everyday life of the meanest citizen, it is almost inevitable

that each community should try to capture the self-governing institutions in order to increase its power, prestige, and patronage and for that it is necessary that political education of the backward members of the community should grow apace. As a pre-condition of that political consciousness, the literary culture of the community has to move ahead and compulsory primary education is the surest way of achieving that object.

So much for the politicians. The social reformer scents in universal literacy the possibility of working off ignorance and superstition, crude and unhygienic mode of living, and class and caste privileges. Social inequality, which proved such a potent cause of communal defection in the past among the Hindus, can be effectively attacked only by rousing the masses to a sense of their own unmerited inferiority, and it is being hoped that with the advance of education all caste distinctions will cease and a homogeneous Hindu sect will be evolved to resist conversion to other creeds. Already the upheaval of class occupations has brought the castes much nearer to one another ; the finishing touch awaits the hand of universal literacy and intercaste marriage. I need not refer to the communistic hope that universal education will mean the passing away of the distinction between the capitalist and the proletariat, the landlord and the landless. Any one who has followed the debates of the Bengal Legislative Council with intelligence and interest will have noticed that in Bengal the matter is complicated by the fact that the majority of the landowning class belongs to the Hindu community while the Muhammadans form the bulk of the labouring class. Naturally, therefore, the Musalmans are more interested than the Hindus in quickening the pace of literacy. Thus from all sides the demand for Primary Education is likely to grow as years roll by, although it is difficult to foresee the effect of a sudden transition from the illiteracy of one generation to the universal literacy of the next. Certain it is that the increase of education at the lower stage will mean a larger number of scholars at the

secondary stage, and thus indirectly the secondary education of the province will have to handle a larger population in the near future. Never before was it more necessary to put the secondary education in order than now when the onrush of students from quarters hitherto unenlightened is in sight. Let us hope that in our eagerness to enlighten we are not raising a Frankenstein whose potentialities are totally unknown. That great social and educational upheaval will take place is sure ; as educationists, let us bless the new movement although for the moment we lose the social affection which was so long primarily ours.

University Education has managed to be in the forefront of social consideration, thanks to the untiring zeal of the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee and the report of the Calcutta University Commission. . All educational activities in Bengal have hitherto been subordinate branches of University instruction, with their aims, ideals and policies controlled by the University. It is only recently at Dacca that a new experiment was made, but it must be confessed that by the side of its more powerful neighbour it has failed to achieve anything striking and the sword of Damocles is hanging over the head of the Dacca Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education. It is almost certain that while your work will in future be controlled by the various social interests the Intermediate education will continue to be in the custody of the Universities, or of Calcutta University alone. The heart of the intellectuals of the province is on the Universities and the unhappy quarrel between the Government and the Calcutta University, begotten of personal distrust and nourished by political discontent, has served only to rally the people round their cherished idol in no uncertain attitude. The Muslim determination to make up for lost grounds in higher education together with favourable Government backing ; the foundation of the Dacca University with academic, residential and financial facilities offered to the Musalmans ; the persistence of the filtration idea that the growth of higher education will

automatically diffuse culture all through the community ; the fact that all preparations for a professional career must be through the University, *e.g.*, Law, Engineering, Medicine, etc., that training in political leadership must, with a very few exceptions, be acquired with higher culture ; and that for the highest ideals we must look to the Universities—have all conspired to invest University Education with a charm which is not to be found in lower stages of academic culture. We may waive for the present the fact that the higher classes have long taken an educated life as the minimum equipment of their particular social grade and also that even when higher education does not open up rosy prospects of affluent livelihood the classes concerned persist in University education for want of other occupations. There is no doubt that as brighter prospects reveal themselves in the earlier stages of education, there will be no necessity to proceed ahead for the majority who, owing to a defective non-remunerative system of education, find themselves obliged to move on in the forlorn hope that further on their academic journey they will find an opening that will fit them exactly.

Unfortunately your difficulties are so many and are of such varied character that unless you are willing to admit their existence and try manfully to solve them even at the risk of some unpopularity you will not be able to achieve the highest ideals. You have your financial difficulties. All schools are not in receipt of aid from Government and those that are, can just manage with the Government grant. Some of you possibly prefer independence to official dictation ; there is obvious merit in such a step provided you are able to maintain the highest standard of efficiency. There is no virtue in carrying on an inept institution imparting unsatisfactory education merely for the sake of independence. If society wishes you to grow in independence, let it maintain you in dignity if not in affluence. But it does just the reverse. It expects you to charge moderate fees for instruction. The class primarily benefited by secondary schools are supposed to be incapable of paying adequately for the education

of its children. Your problem is difficult indeed : there is no local help to talk of and you are asked not to charge high fees. The multiplication of schools in near neighbourhood means immediate desertion by scholars the moment you attempt to raise the fees. At present your scholars number on an average about 230 and with this figure it is not possible to maintain a school decently without considerable financial backing from Government or society. The proposed educational cess for Primary education, if and when imposed, will still further tighten the fist of the benevolent public and then you will have to agitate either for enhanced grant from the public revenues or for enhancement of fees. Personally I cannot see why if people are obliged to pay more for every commodity now-a-days, they should be unwilling to pay for the education of their children, and I do not for a moment believe that a slight enhancement of fees will be followed by a rapid fall in number provided there is a simultaneous rise in fees in neighbouring schools (thus preventing underbidding) and this is accompanied by judicious exemption in deserving cases. City schools may obviously charge more than village schools for generally living is cheaper in the villages and there are no distractions to divert the family income. If you wish to utilise the services of an expert staff, you must pay it well and for that you must get more out of your students than you do at present unless benevolent patrons place your institutions above financial anxiety and enable you to dispense education cheap.

Then you have your eternal quarrel between the Secretary and the Head Master. The former who is not generally an expert in education but is very often a social magnate, wishes to keep power and patronage in hand and very often interferes with the academic control of the Head Master. The Secretary is a necessary figure if he can act as go-between between the school and the society and get together scholars and funds to keep the school in vigour. But he becomes an intolerable nuisance, when he sits in judgment over the academic merits of scholars and draws up the list of students to be sent up to the Matriculation. Here you

must resist him. The best plan is to make the Head Master the Secretary of a school *ex-officio* ; but where that is not feasible, the Secretary must have well-defined duties and powers with the minimum hand in academic control. If you are against entrusting any one individual with excessive power, then have an academic council in each school to deal with purely academic questions, such as promotion, sending-up to the Matriculation, selection of text-books, etc., with the Head Master as the Chairman. To prevent sycophancy on the part of the staff, put your teachers on a permanent tenure and a graded pay and try to introduce something like the School Code approved by the Calcutta University. Nothing improves the morale so much as good pay and prospects and permanent tenure—agitate for them in the first instance ; that would be your *pou sto* from which you will be able to move the whole educational world. A house divided against itself cannot stand and unless your Secretary and your Head Master are able to make up among themselves (and if the teachers are divided in their allegiance to the authorities of the school) you can never hope to have a consistent and progressive school policy directed solely towards the improvement of your instruction. Avoid as much as you can party faction and communal management. Let the school be the academic venue of the entire locality and above local politics. Only one type of rivalry is permissible within the temple of learning, *viz.*, a rivalry to better the institution financially and academically.

Apart from all non-academic difficulties, you have sufficient troubles about the recruitment and retention of a qualified staff. How to get hold of *bona fide* teachers who would stick to their jobs and not migrate frequently from institution to institution? Having had the benefit of a legal training myself, I do not think that a law degree is a disqualification for a teaching post ; on the contrary, law quickens the brain as very few other educational courses do. But you cannot afford to have practising lawyers on your staff or those who are biding their time for a

legal career. These would not have their heart in their work and teaching is an exacting mistress. It is a pity that the best intellects of the country should go to law; but when society holds up only to the teachers the ideal of poverty it is no wonder that people would rather starve in a law-court in the hope of making a fortune in future than accept the blank prospects of a school-master's life. Let there be a fair pay for honest work and I am sure that if you then care to have a District Roll of *bona fide* teachers for appointment to teaching posts, you will have a number of eminently qualified men in the list. A good initial pay, a graded scale, a permanent engagement, a reasonable system of provident fund or gratuity—these in their totality form the irreducible minimum that you must fight for. Too often have school-masters in their old age been unable to maintain themselves and their families, and more frequently still have their dependents been left destitute and thrown upon the mercy of an uncharitable world. You cannot marry your daughters cheaper for their intellectual inheritance cannot be valued in terms of cash. Your sons are not educated free or even at a reduced charge in consideration of the fact that you have devoted your life to education. There is a better etiquette among medical men for they charge little fee for attending on a fellow doctor or his family. Why cannot that be done among school-masters so far as the education of their children is concerned?

You cannot prevent migration altogether, for qualified men whose prospects are barred at one place will naturally seek better appointment elsewhere. But if you can offer attractive pay and if the schools in any particular locality agree to have a uniform scale of pay for different posts, the chances of migration would be enormously minimised. For different qualifications you might institute different starting salaries and for each you may have a grade. Do not forget that some men hate to approach authorities for any increase of salary and, after waiting for a few years to see whether justice is done to them, they leave the ungrateful institution that won't recognise merit. Keep your

staff above sycophancy and above need, and then you will have a permanent staff and a continuous tradition. But after offering attractive salary you insist on whole-hearted service. No private tuition in the morning and evening with a coaching class thrown in between after the school hours. The teachers must conserve all their energy for class work and must utilise their spare hours for self-improvement. Economic necessity drives them to the desperate devices of private tuition and crib-making both of which are soul-killing. Have you as institution done all that is in your power to give the teachers sufficient to occupy themselves with? Personally I am of opinion that here the State may do something really useful. It may endow every school with a good working library for the benefit of the staff without any condition attached to the grant. The grant-in-aid is swallowed up by the staff ; a specific library grant every year to every school to keep the teachers up-to-date is an immediate necessity and I am sure that representation in proper quarters is likely to bear fruit. The schools themselves can do something in this direction. It is not unoften that the village school is the intellectual centre of the locality and the teachers are the most learned men of the locality. You can see to it that the members of the staff possess as varied qualifications as possible and these of the highest degree. Fortunately for the institutions, though unfortunately for the teachers themselves, it is now possible to have persons with the highest degree in their own subjects for a reasonable amount; at any rate Honours men are easily got. Remember that whereas in administrative and ministerial posts, especially those of a routine nature and not frequently demanding any personal initiative, the minimum qualification may suffice, in educational appointments you require the maximum qualification, for on teachers depends the training of your children and you cannot afford to be deflected by any communal consideration from the duty of giving them the best training available for the money. This would be communalism misplaced; but for the fact that the race of

intellectual giants from England who shaped India's educational policy in the past is gone or not available for the money India can afford to pay I would have even pleaded for less Indianisation in the educational world. Once you get a good staff with diverse qualifications, you can surely arrange for lectures by each teacher in his own subject for the edification and information of the rest and for the benefit of the students and the general public. The attendance would probably be small at the beginning and you would probably take some time to rouse popular interest; but like good things it will grip the imagination in the end. One sure result will be that your teachers will be obliged to keep themselves up-to-date (and you are to see to it that they get the necessary library facilities) and to learn the art of easy and interesting delivery. You will thereby diffuse general information among the staff, the students and the general public and help materially in the cultural quickening of the population even in the remotest villages. You will then have given something more wholesome than silly gossip and mischievous slander which largely fill the village life at present. If you could arrange something on similar lines for the women too, you will earn the blessings of society as a whole and lay the foundations of a liberal movement which is long overdue; you will at least impart oral instruction to those who used to get in the past their culture from *kathakatas* or recitals of heroic and religious exploits by rustic bards and indigenous scholars. Occasional visits from eminent men and periodical lantern lectures will keep the people in touch with the great world beyond, and you are the agency that can arrange for these without any material expenditure. In these days of national regeneration no call from you for assistance in the social task of educating the laity is likely to be ignored by any educationist of standing. All that is wanted is initiative and imagination on your part and a deep sympathy with the less fortunate members of the community, the education of whose children you have taken in hand.

There is one more educational problem which confronts you and that is the question of trained teachers. You are now required to keep one or two trained teachers on the staff, and provided your teacher is otherwise qualified, a training certificate is certainly desirable. I cannot help feeling that the insistence upon a training certificate is coupled with a vague notion that otherwise the teacher in question is not qualified enough to undertake the duties of his post. That for higher teaching posts, say in Colleges and Universities, you do not require trained men is proof positive that either these teachers are regarded as qualified without training or that schools have a special need of trained teachers to make education palatable to the beginners who have not yet acquired any taste for intellectual advancement. Whatever be the reason, I for one think that a training course is of great advantage provided that the teacher is not sent to a training college after he has developed manners and mannerisms of his own. It ought to be laid down as a general policy that after a teacher has been in a school for five years (even that is too long a period) he is to be either taken or left but not deputed to a training college for improving his method of teaching. Men get into educational ruts long before forty when they are supposed to be incapable of profiting by new experience. It is not the chronological age but the period of active service that stereotypes the method of instruction, and it is either extreme optimism or vain conceit or downright foolishness that begets the hope that the habit of years can be broken by a nine months' drill of the most mechanical kind.

My idea of a training course is radically different from the existing one. There ought to be provision in every University for education in the B.A. Pass course and there the preliminaries of a training course can be taught as a theoretical subject. History of Education, Psychology and Educational Psychology might very conveniently go into such a course and prepare the students for a thorough grasp of the practical side of education in a training college later on. For such students a

nine months' course as at present might suffice. But I cannot help feeling that for a batch of students, the majority of whom had no previous acquaintance with the rudiments either of Psychology or of Education, a nine months' course is fatal to all initiative and imagination. The whole time is swallowed up in learning up cut-and-dried lecture notes and keeping pace with assignments and exercises. Any deviation from the pattern set by the teacher is generally viewed unfavourably and has harmful consequence at the time of the final examination. The administration of training colleges by prospective Inspectors of Schools and Directors of Public Instruction affects adversely the spirit of free thinking, especially when, as now, the training colleges exist primarily for the benefit of Government servants and teachers of aided schools. We must change the composition of the staff and the class alike, setting up a purely academic teaching staff and enrolling *bonafide* students. For those who have already had teaching experience we might institute short summer courses or holiday courses for theoretical instruction and a short practical course during term. That would minimise the period of deputation provided we do not aim at a thorough system of instruction for these teachers. Refresher courses at the end of every three or five years to bring these teachers up to date will achieve far better results than a hurried course of nine months and a complete abandonment for all eternity thereafter.

But I am not concerned with the teachers at all. I think that the time has come when a broader vision is needed for shaping the training course. Get hold of the youngmen that pass out of the University every summer and put them into a training college in July or August and take them through the theoretical course till the end of the session in March or April. Take them up again in July for teaching for practical training and dismiss them in December. That will give you five terms or about a year and a half for the entire course. Such teachers will be ready to take up their jobs at the beginning of the school session in January. You can do something within a year and

a half by a judicious distribution of the theoretical and the practical courses even though they come raw and without previous training in Education as a B.A. subject. There is no doubt that the training colleges will have enough applicants for such an extended training course. I am amused and annoyed at the remarks of the Department of Education, Bengal, that teachers still think that for their particular vocation a training is not a necessity. Here are the figures of the Dacca Teachers' Training College for 1927-28 and 1928-29. In the former year there were 300 applications for admission and only 23 could be taken. This year there were 400 applications and only 30 teachers from aided schools and 25 non-teachers were admitted. It does not lie in the mouth of the Government to say that people are not eager to have training. I am sure that the David Hare Training College will supply equally illuminating figures, and even when the Chittagong scheme will come into effect the demand for more institutions will be on the increase. Either the Government must establish more training colleges or private venture must supplement the work of the Government in this direction. The time has come when the Government might seriously contemplate a change of policy regarding the training college system. Let one institution, preferably the one at Calcutta, be reserved for non-stipendiary students (I would even support a moderate fee) and run by purely academic teachers who would never be Inspectors of Schools. The curricula and the period of training will not be changed in a day but the composition of the Calcutta College can be altered without any serious difficulty. Only men fresh from the University are to be admitted—youngmen unspoiled by previous personal methods of teaching. Let these go out into the educational world after receiving their training certificate. As years roll by, spare the teachers and take the youngmen in hand. Extend the course to a year and a half and if necessary reduce scholarships and charge fees. Put only your best men into the training college, for indifferent teachers are the worst instructors

for a training college. Only then will new ideas sprout forth in that academic region.

The time has surely come for a revision of our ideas regarding the needs of high schools. The time was when the Government schools set the standard of excellence in the different districts and the private schools followed at a respectable distance. But a study of the Matriculation results discloses that in the near past the private schools have done as well as the Government schools in spite of serious handicap. If we could be sure that the disappearance of the Government schools would not mean setting up a low standard of pay, we might even have gone the length of suggesting the diversion of the money now spent on Government schools in advanced districts towards the improvement of private institutions and the distribution of their teachers among struggling schools. In backward districts and poor localities it will be necessary to retain Government schools, but the justification of their retention in such places as Dacca and Calcutta is of doubtful wisdom. The Government can, if it so likes, maintain a high standard of excellence in these places in the schools attached to the training colleges. There is no doubt that if no substantial help can be given to the private schools except by retrenchment elsewhere, this is a plan that might work. In some other localities the task of imparting high-school education in the lower forms might be left to private enterprise and the Government school might include only the top forms, say from the seventh standard (Fourth class) onwards. The idea that every school must teach from the lowest to the highest class may in many localities be profitably abandoned. In towns some schools may combine to run the higher classes as a joint venture just as University Post-graduate classes are run with the help of the teachers of various private colleges. For such an efficient institution, limited only to the higher forms, an enhanced rate of fee might be levied and the staff picked from the private schools of the locality. This academic co-operation will be all the more necessary if what is

suggested below regarding a new dichotomy in the educational sphere attracts attention in responsible quarters.

The problem of the immediate future is the place of the Intermediate Colleges in the scheme of Indian education. The Sadler Commission Report has borne one costly fruit—the separation of the Intermediate course from the Degree course for purposes of instruction and administration. In some parts of India the high school and Intermediate courses have been placed under a single Board for purposes of Government control and the same has been the case at Dacca. But when the question of a Secondary Education Board for Bengal has been raised the magnitude of the task has prompted the Government to drop the Intermediate Colleges from the operation of that Board and in all probability the Intermediate Colleges will go back to the Calcutta University, even though the Dacca University has claimed the right to determine the courses of those situated within the town of Dacca. The more rational solution seems to me to *abolish the Intermediate Colleges altogether.* Their existence is a continual confession of educational failure in the secondary stage. In many parts of the world nothing intervenes between the Matriculation and the graduation. The time has come for overhauling the educational machinery and to assign to the Matriculation its rightful place in the economy of society. The Intermediates are mere birds of passage between the school and the University or the vocational institutions, and owe no deep allegiance to their temporary house of instruction. They look back to the schools or forward to the University ; the majority would be glad to terminate their training at the Matriculation stage if that would ensure an opening in life, and the rest consider the intermediate stage as an irksome impediment on the way to academic progress. The intermediates are regarded at best as matriculates with superior qualifications, and they jostle with the mere matriculates for inferior appointments and admission to junior courses of training. They form an academic rabble who are neither practised

fighters for academic ideals nor docile camp-followers of academic leaders. They are too near the matriculates to be seriously considered and also too near the graduates not to be conceited. Can we not interpose a greater gap between the different academic grades and prevent that overlapping of functions which congests social occupation to an alarming extent at the present moment ? Not only in the interest of education but also more so in the interest of social occupation we ought to prevent the present jumbling up of educational samples and restrict the field of each. In the land of the caste-system the introduction of an academic caste-distinction will not be a great innovation, especially as such a thing exists elsewhere also.

My idea is that the present two years of the Intermediate course may profitably be divided between the High School and the University, extending them both by a year. In the extended Matriculation, backed by the improvements suggested already, will be included rudiments of science and such cultural subjects as Civics, Economics, Logic, etc. The standard of teaching and examination must be appreciably higher than the present and weak institutions must be allowed to go out of existence altogether in the struggle for academic existence. After all, the school exists for the boys and not boys for the schools. A system that does not allow the boys to put forth their best and to stand on their legs as soon as possible has no right to continuance. It is false sentiment to patronise struggling schools with inadequate finance, inefficient staff, imperfect equipment and ill-equipped scholars. The low standard of the Matriculation enables many schools to escape the fate of those who are unable to pass a certain percentage of scholars for three years in succession, *viz.*, disaffiliation (and some manage to drag on an ignoble existence even after disaffiliation). Fix a time within which all the existing schools must come up to a certain standard of excellence either by raising fees or by a more concrete help of the community which wishes its continuance. Those that fail must remain satisfied with imparting instruction

up to a certain standard, say Seventh standard (Fourth Class of West Bengal), arranging with fully equipped institutions for the taking over of their boys thereafter. For that length of time the present Intermediate Colleges might continue to function as the Matriculation class of a High School and later on they may be allowed to add certain lower classes to be converted into High Schools teaching the top classes only

These improved Matriculates will in future supply all offices with junior assistants ; schools with teachers for the lower forms (but only after a junior training certificate) ; medical, engineering, technical and vocational institutions with their freshmen and apprentices ; and law courts with junior pleaders. The prospects of the matriculates must be such as not to induce the graduates to compete with them—not at least at the initial stages. With the disappearance of their most formidable rivals—the intermediates—the matriculates will have an assured future before them in respect of modest openings. Not that the competition will be less keen, for there will be many more matriculates then than now, but the competition will be confined within their own class and no ordinary intermediate will defeat a brilliant matriculate by virtue of his superior degree. Incidentally, the educational system will be rid of one examination, for between the matriculation and the degree examination there will be no full-fledged examination as a passport to future academic progress. If, as I think it desirable, there be any compartmental system of examination for the degree, the burden will not be very heavy and failure at the examination once will not mean automatic stoppage of studies.

After the matriculation the University course will divide as now into Arts, Science and Commerce, each of three years' duration, and also into Junior legal, educational and vocational courses, each of two years' duration, and medical and engineering courses of a somewhat longer duration. The degree courses in Arts and Science will be, for both Pass and Honours, three years' courses. For a member of the Dacca University, which

prides itself on its three years' Honours course, this is a disloyal statement to make ; but I am more and more convinced that the experiment at Dacca has failed to attract the best type of students (at least Hindu students) to the Honours course when in the near vicinity the Calcutta University is bestowing the Honours degree in two years. Besides, I consider the present system at Dacca inherently weak and not conducive to the highest type of educational effort. For brilliant students a year of delay in the getting of the degree is a serious handicap, especially for those who are not above needs. It is unreasonable to expect that all Honours men will proceed to the M.A. and finish with a research career ; many more will and should go into some occupation after taking their degree and there is no reason why we should retard their journey by interposing an additional year's course. Besides, the Honours men find one year too short for any original type of work for their M.A. degree. That within seven years of the foundation of the Dacca University only one student should get his M.A. degree by thesis is an eloquent testimony to the difficulty of encouraging research at the M.A stage on the Arts side. On the Science side, by a more liberal exemption from the written examination, more satisfactory results have been obtained. I have no doubt that a two years' course would be far more productive of original work on the Arts side. So long as their own communal clamour, Hindu delicacy and Government backing help Muslim youths, they are not material losers ; and as financial and other facilities attract the best Musalman students to Dacca, as they seem to be doing, they would suffer less from a three years' Honours course. But even they would not be able to put forth their best in a one-year M.A. course. I need not dilate upon the futility of attempting to do anything serious for Pass students proceeding to the M.A. course, in their first six or seven months' time. The Preliminary M.A. examination is most unsatisfactory and proposals are before the responsible bodies of the Dacca University to stiffen it materially so as to bring Pass men

into some sort of level with the Honours men in the second-year M.A. class, at the end of which there is a common examination for all students, Pass and Honours. If we institute a three years' Pass as well as Honours course and differentiate the students from the very beginning, we shall be able to achieve more solid results with the Honours men, and at the M.A. we shall encourage them to proceed to Research M.A. course. The diffident ones might go in for the M.A. degree meant primarily for the Pass men and taken two years after the B.A. degree.

We shall be also able to do something more for the Honours men. At present our graduates lack that essential knowledge of French or German without which it is difficult, if not impossible, for a scholar to keep pace with the latest developments in his particular subject. Years elapse before a foreign classic or an important article is translated into English with the effect that the Indian scholar, not knowing the original language, is absolutely ignorant of the latest things in his own line. An English student generally knows at least one another European language and he suffers less than an Indian boy in this matter. We must make a determined attempt to introduce one or both of these languages into the Honours course. If our students can pick up these languages in less than two years when they go abroad for higher studies, there is no reason why a systematic training for three years should not suffice to give them that elementary knowledge which prompts further efforts in the same direction. The Vernacular may remain in the Pass syllabus, but a foreign language other than English in lieu of Vernacular is an immediate desideratum in our Honours course. With this equipment and adequate library facilities the amount of original output at the M.A. and thereafter will be much greater than now and the cultural gain will be immense. It may be that many Colleges will find it difficult at the beginning to get the necessary staff for instruction, but the demand will call forth the supply at some near future and some expedient will be found to tide over temporary difficulties. The first step

of any great undertaking is always difficult and not unoften unpopular ; but we must look to the future and to the good that a step is likely to achieve and I am sure that, judged by that standard, the need of an instruction in French or German for higher educational work is paramount. If the schools with an extra year can raise the standard of the matriculation and if the three years' Pass and Honours courses are run efficiently and with a compulsory knowledge of either French or German, according to the subject chosen on the part of the Honours men, then I have no doubt that the level of culture and originality will be materially raised in the near future and the world will hear more of the achievements of Indians in the educational world. We must have broad vision and adequate courage to tackle educational problems. India was never before more in need of men of the type of the late Sir Asutosh Mookerjee to defy conventions and social unpopularity. The community's educational burden will increase but that is inevitable if it wants a better and more productive type of education.

And we want not only intelligent youths but strong youths. Too often have schools been identified with all work and no play. The scholars' stoop is premature in Bengal and woeful tales are told of the health of your boys. To instil vigour into their drooping frames, to make education a thing of joy and to establish a friendly relation between teachers and students you will have to look to the physical side of education. You have been obliged to introduce compulsory drill, but have you introduced compulsory tiffin during the recess time ? Your scholars actually lose strength through the compulsory drill, for the majority cannot get sufficient food to recoup the energy lost through exercise. Half-famished children do not constitute a national asset in later life. The schools ought therefore to take up the question of compulsory tiffin along with compulsory drill. The addition of a rupee or two to the school fee will provide children with some sort of tiffin ; the poor students may be exempted from this small payment and provided with free tiffin just as in

respect of their schooling fees, the school making some contribution towards that object. In your hostels, too, you ought to follow the same plan. In addition to the two major meals you should provide for tiffin before the students go out to play (and see that they do play or take some sort of physical exercise). Encourage them to join Boy Scout Associations and participate in their periodical outings. Organise pic-nic and touring parties, or, if your finances are low, take your scholars out to the neighbouring village, if no farther. Introduce novelty into their life's environment, inure them to physical hardship and develop in them that comradeship which comes only out of games and playful occupations. The inexpensive plays of the last century are gradually disappearing and, together with them, the healthy manhood of Bengal. When children are not childishly occupied they busy themselves with more serious things and turn politicians; there is ample time for that later on—let the occupation of each age have its due share of the children's attention.

I shall wind up this long discourse with reminding you of your own importance. There are about 1,000 high schools in Bengal at the present moment with about 22,000 teachers and 2,33,000 students and you spend about a crore of rupees in imparting secondary education. An educated body like yourselves ought to make your presence more intensely felt in society, and for that you want only unity and organisation. In Municipalities and District Boards, in Secondary Education Board and the University you ought to have sufficient representation and you ought to fight for your rightful place in the educational system of the province. Suppressed communal grumblings are audible just now about the future Secondary Board for Bengal and popular agitation may be set up in your part of the province for a separate Board for East Bengal. Resolutely refuse to play into the hands of narrow patriots who fail to see the sinister significance of this educational and cultural partition of the province. The rivalry of two Boards will clog the wheel of educational progress and lower the standard of the Matriculation,

The Dacca Board is a sufficient warning; do not repeat the mistake of the Government by clamouring for a separate Board at Dacca or Chittagong. If you feel that a particular interest is likely to suffer by want of sufficient representation on the Calcutta Board, bring that to the notice of the Government. As I have already said, in education communalism and minority interest have no meaning, for no major community can afford to fix a low standard just to spite other communities or interests. If you analyse the situation, you will find that the main objection is not against fixing the standard of study or examination but against the choice of text-books and examiners, *i.e.*, the financial interests of some people have been overlooked. Rectify that mistake of the past as far as is consistent with educational efficiency but let not the impression go abroad that you care more for the income of your authors and teachers and less for the mental development of your scholars.

Here then is sufficient task for the future. I purposely omit all reference to the education of girls for I am less competent to talk on that subject than on the education of boys. But you must face the fact that with the rise of the marriage age of boys owing to economic reasons the marriage age of girls is also bound to rise and that the present unsatisfactory ratio of 1 in 280 in the top classes among girls must be immediately improved. As men become engaged in harder struggles of life a part of the children's education will in future fall on the mothers; and the disintegration of the joint-family system will necessitate matrimonial alliance with capable housewives, old and trained enough to shoulder at once the responsibilities of a household. Let there be more light, but let it come to all, irrespective of sex, community and class. On education hinges the whole social and national machinery. Educate the public and educate the Government too for no large-scale social venture can succeed without adequate financial support.

H. D. BHATTACHARYA

MOONLIGHT: THE MARINA MADRAS.

High above winking harbour-lights, above
Slim minarets and mist-enchanted towers,
Over the sea indifferent sails the moon,
Casting her radiance carelessly upon us,
Turning with powerful beauty every dung-heap
Into a pile of silver, lovelier far
Than sunlit mosques or giant battleships,
Those diverse creatures of man's urgent mind
And the sure tokens of its absurdity.

Quietly, imperceptibly, swart clouds
Batten upon the whiteness of the moon,
So that we realise how dark indeed
And how like death the night is. Even so,
We muse, shall promenades grin vacantly,
And beaches gape for bathers, and in vain,
When the shrunk air freezes about the world,
And all man's hopes of immortality
Cry no astonishment at the death of others,
Being themselves already dead; forgotten
Even in the heart of things, that heart dead too.

Then book shall stand with book and fall to dust,
Unread, unwanted. Towers decay, and chasms
Receive their fallen, futile pride.

But still
The moon unchanging, the lifeless, vacant moon
Shall swing on in her orbit, showing no sign
(Being powerless to show, even if she would)
No sign of having seen catastrophe
Swim o'er the surface of the genial earth;
Green spots of vegetation shrink thereon,
Dull colours melt and mingle and congeal ;
Snow drearily sifting down and covering up
Men, monkeys, dreams and monuments for ever.

F. V. WELLS

THE TRAVELLER.

I was a traveller to the land no one knows,
A pilgrim to the shrine of Devotion ;
I bore in my heart a beautiful rose,
That stirred with the faintest emotion.

But before this unfortunate journey was ended
My heart was all bleeding and slain,
For the thorn and my soul had eternally blended ;—
To whom shall I now complain ?

BYRAM K. TALOOKDAR

A LOCK OF HAIR OF RAJAH RAM MOHAN ROY

Prefatory Remarks.[1]

As President of a public meeting at the Ranchi Brahmo Samaj Mandir on the 27th September, 1928, to celebrate the 94th death-anniversary of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy, I had a talk with Mr. Sukumar Haldar (late of the Provincial Executive Service, Bihar and Orissa, now settled at Ranchi) about his father, the late Babu Rakhal Das Haldar, who had made great efforts while residing in England in 1861-62, to collect documents, papers, letters and other materials relating to Rajah Ram Mohan Roy with a view to write a complete account of the activities of the Rajah during the last days of his life in England. Mr. Sukumar Haldar while regretting the loss of nearly the whole of the collections left to him by his father, showed me, however, a most valuable relic of the Rajah which was no other than a tuft of hair (a mixture of black and grey) removed from the Rajah's head by Dr. Estlin (who attended the Rajah during his last illness) on the day previous to his death. This had been preserved in the family of Dr. Estlin for a good many years and Babu Rakhal Das Haldar received it from Miss Estlin, a daughter of the doctor, as a memento, since kept in the Haldar family as a sacred treasure.

Greatly interested in the holy exhibit, I suggested to Mr. Haldar its safe keeping in the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad which had a museum, located at the "Romesh Bhaban," possessing a valuable collection of manuscrpits, inscriptions, ancient coins, sculptures and images, ancient architectural designs of the Hindu and Buddhistic periods and also personal reminiscences in the shape of head-dresses, shawls, autograph letters, inkstands, pens, etc., of some of the eminent scholars, writers

[1] A Bengali version of this was read at a special meeting of the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad on 25th November, 1928.

and great men of Bengal. This museum already was in possession of a *pugree* (head-dress) of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy and a cheque bearing his signature, and so the tuft of hair of the Rajah would be a valuable acquisition and would be greatly appreciated both by the authorities of the Parishad and by the public.

Mr. Haldar, an old member of the Parishad, readily and kindly acceded to my request and made over the valuable relic to me to be placed in the museum of the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad together with a few letters from persons like Miss Mary Carpenter, Miss Sophia Dobson Collet, Miss Estlin and others.

A short history of the life and career of the late Babu Rakhal Das Haldar may not be altogether out of place here. He was born at *Jagaddal* (a village on the left bank of the Hooghly opposite the French Chandernagore) on the 21st December, 1832, just one year before the death of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy, in an orthodox Hindu Brahmin family. His father, noted for his piety and charity, was an officer of great trust and ability under the Honourable East India Company for a long period. Babu Rakhal Das Haldar publicly joined in 1852 the Brahmo Samaj established by Rajah Ram Mohan Roy, but there are good reasons to believe that shortly before his death, he accepted *Vaishnavism* under which his earlier life had been spent.

Educated in the Hooghly Collegiate School, he became a writer of prose and poetry both in English and in Bengali, and published Bengali verses in the *Sudhiranjan* and the *Pravakar* in 1848. He left India in 1861 and stayed in England for about fifteen months, defraying his expenses by his earnings as a teacher in a University and as a contributor to Charles Dickens' "All the Year Round" and some newspapers. He passed the Law Examination in England. He kept an interesting and informative diary of his visit in England which has since been published by his son, Mr. Sukumar Haldar, and from which I make an extract below relating to his visit to Stapleton Grove

in Bristol where Rajah Ram Mohan Roy breathed his last. There is a foot-note in the diary which refers to the acquisition of the tuft of hair from Miss Estlin.

Extract from "The English Diary of an Indian Student."

(Pp. 30-31.)

"*17th June (1861).*—After breakfast, Mrs. Brown and her mother came in a phæton; the Rev. Mr. James and myself joined them; and we drove to the house of Miss Estlin. She is the daughter of Dr. Estlin who was brother-in-law of Dr. Pritchard, author of the Physical History of Mankind, and who attended during Ram Mohan Roy's last illness. Miss Estlin showed us a cast of Ram Mohan Roy's head which was taken a few hours after his death on the 27th September, Friday, 1833.[1] The Rajah's shawl-turban was brought out and Mrs. Brown placed it on my head. The turban was made of crimson *alwan* and *hasia*; it was a huge thing, literally a load, and was soiled with oil which Ram Mohan Roy applied to his head. It appeared that the diameter of the crown of Ram Mohan Roy's head was greater than mine by an inch, and my head is by no means a small one..... We then drove to Stapleton Grove where Ram Mohan Roy stayed with Miss Castle as her guest in the autumn of 1833. Stapleton Grove is a most lovely spot and I thought that the Rajah's death had taken place in a paradise. We entered the room where my illustrious countryman drew his last breath."

On his return to India in 1862, he was appointed a Deputy Magistrate and Deputy Collector and did valuable service to Government in the matter of land settlement as a Special Commissioner under the Chota Nagpur Tenure Act II of 1869 in

[1] R. D. H. (Rakhal Das Haldar) received from Miss Estlin, as a memento, a tuft of Ram Mohan Roy's hair, which was cut off the day before his death by Mr. Estlin at Stapleton Grove. This and some moss taken by him from the Rajah's tomb are still in the possession of his family."

the Chota Nagpur Division, and also as Manager of the Chota Nagpur Estate under the Court of Wards. He died while still in harness on the 23rd November, 1887.

The knowledge and experience of the province of Chota Nagpur and its people enabled him to render valuable assistance to Col. Dalton in the preparation of his "Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal," to Dr. W. W. Hunter in the compilation of his Statistical Accounts of Bengal, and to Sir H. H. Risley in the publication of his celebrated book on the "Tribes and Castes of Bengal." He was a member of the Asiatic Society of Bengal and contributed several papers to the Society's Journal on inscriptions and copper plates found by him in Chota Nagpur. His most valuable contribution was an "Introduction to the Mundari Language" which was published in the Asiatic Society's Journal in 1872. He was a regular contributor to the *Hindu Patriot* and to the *Somprakash*.

He was the author among others of the following books :—

(1) Bengali translations of Lamb's Tales from Shakespeare, Othello, Pericles, Cymbeline, As You Like It, King Lear, and Romeo and Juliet.

(2) Sri-Ram Charita (Life of Rama), a second edition of which was published by his son in 1902 under the distinguished editorship of the late Professor Ramendra Sundar Trivedi, M.A., former Secretary of the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad.

(3) Bengali translation of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy's "Precepts of Jesus the guide to peace and happiness," at the instance of the Rev. C. H. A. Dall of the American Unitarian Mission.

(4) An edition of Mr. William Adam's "Lecture on the Life and Labours of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy."

(5) The English Diary of an Indian Student (1861-62).

I cannot let this occasion pass without making a reference, however brief, to the life and work of the great Rajah Ram Mohan Roy.

Love of truth, freedom of thought and a keen desire for emancipation from all kinds of bondage, intellectual, political, social, and religious were the three basic principles in the life of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy, and these found full expression in his character and in the many-sided activities of his life. The great work of reform that he inaugurated and attempted to introduce in the life of his countrymen had its origin in and received its impetus from his innate love of truth and liberty and his unswerving loyalty to the dictates of his conscience. His sympathy was not confined to the people of his own land but was freely extended to men all over the world, irrespective of race, sex, creed or nationality ; in fact, it embraced whosoever was found struggling for emancipation from the bondage of intellectual, social, political or spiritual domination.

The cult of nationalism which forms to-day the outstanding feature in the mentality of educated India and which lies at the root of all her present-day activities, had its seed first sown in Indian soil about a century ago by Rajah Ram Mohan Roy. The forecast of the national ambitions and aspirations which animate and inspire the life of the educated Indians of the present day was made out about a century ago by Rajah Ram Mohan Roy to a degree of accuracy which excites our admiration and involuntarily exacts our homage to his great genius and towering intellect.

To my mind, the Rajah's greatest gift to his countrymen was the introduction and general adoption of the Western system of education in India in place of the time-honoured indigenous types. He was far in advance of his times and far ahead of the people of his age when he conceived the idea and preached the necessity of supplanting the indigenous system of education by the Western system, both in the case of Hindus as well as of Mahomedans. His clear vision and sound judgment helped him to realise that unless and until the speculative and contemplative Indian system of education was replaced

by the more practical and realistic system of the West, India would never be able to rise to the level of the powerful civilised countries of the world and to hold her own in the comity of nations. The Rajah, therefore, strongly advocated the study of science, history, mathematics, political economy and the literature of the West on experimental basis and under Western methods. He had to fight a hard battle for many years before he had the satisfaction to see the realisation of the most cherished hope of his life. The Orientalists opposed him vehemently, and this opposition grew in volume and strength by the support of many short-sighted European officials and non-officials. The Rajah, however, came out victorious in the end and the Directors of the East India Company ultimately accepted the revolutionary innovation inaugurated by the Rajah. It was in 1824 that the East India Company sanctioned a grant from the Public Treasury for the establishment and promotion of the Western system of education on Western lines in Bengal. It was a great day in the history of Bengal, for this epoch-making reform inaugurated by Rajah Ram Mohan Roy has made India what it is to-day. It has brought the people of the various provinces, separated by distance, religion, caste, nationality, dress, habits, customs, ideas and thoughts, into closer union with many common interests in life, inspired by similar ambitions and aspirations and animated by a sincere desire to serve the mother-country. All right-thinking people will agree that it is English education which has made it possible for the Educated India of to-day to realise the idea of a nationhood among conflicting diversities, and to aspire to the attainment of self-government, a process which, in many countries in the West, has involved a life-and-death struggle for freedom on the part of the people extending over many a generation. India will never be able to repay the deep debt of gratitude she owes to the Rajah for this most precious gift of the Western system of education which came into being almost through his single-handed efforts.

Rajah Ram Mohan Roy's earnest efforts to effect reforms in the religious and social life of the people are too well-known to need detailed mention here. As a religious reformer, he wanted to restore to his countrymen the practice of worshipping *One God in Spirit* which was the most precious heritage from their illustrious ancestors—the ancient sages of India. It is not of foreign origin but is truly indigenous. The Rajah devoted his whole life in convincing his erring countrymen of the richness, purity and glory of their ancestral possession. He founded the Brahmo Samaj of India and built a church in Calcutta where people of all nationalities and denominations could muster and offer their homage in spirit to One Common God of all humanity.

His greatest achievement in the domain of social reform was the abolition by legislation of the practice of immolation of Hindoo widows on the funeral pyre of their deceased husbands. The Rajah's heart bled at the cruelty practised on unwilling victims, stunned by the grief at the death of their husbands, by custom-ridden and bigoted relatives, which he had several opportunities to witness. He put before his countrymen a higher ideal of the life of a Hindoo widow enjoined by the Shastras—the ideal of *brahmacharyya* (renunciation, self-control and service to humanity) and fought for the abolition of the cruel custom. He met tremendous opposition, and at one time, his life was in danger. But he would not give way and at last succeeded in getting an Act passed in 1829 in the Government of Lord William Bentinck, making *Suttee* penal all over British India. Thus Truth and Humanity at last triumphed, and the name of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy was made immortal in the history of social reform in India by the passing of the *Suttee Act.*

EXHIBIT I.

The lock of hair of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy was cut off by Dr. Estlin on the 26th September, 1833 (the day before his death) at Bristol.

It is fixed on to the back of a visiting card of Mr. Estlin of 47, Park Street, having the following writing above and below it:—

HAIR OF RAJAH



RAM MOHAN ROY.

The specimen is enclosed in an envelope having the following writing on it:—

"Hair of the Rajah Rammohan Roy cut off the day before his death, by Mr. Estlin at Stapleton Grove, Bristol, September 26, 1833."

This was further enclosed in another sealed envelope bearing the following:—

"Mr. Rakhal Das Haldar
with Miss Estlin's respects."

EXHIBIT II.

Letter from Miss Mary A. Estlin to Rakhal Das Haldar, dated June 4, 1862.

It appears that Rakhal Das Haldar published a letter in the *Inquirer* asking for supply of information relating to Rajah Ram Mohan Roy during his stay in England and this is one of the letters received by him in reply.

The writer of this letter, Miss Estlin, gave the tuft of hair to Rakhal Das Haldar as a memento. The hair was removed by her father, Dr. Estlin, who attended the Rajah during his last illness, on the day before his death.

EXHIBIT III.

A letter from Mrs. Hardmeth to Rakhal Das Haldar dated May 13th * * * in reply to his request for information published in the *Inquirer* in the beginning of May.

The information supplied by her appears to have contained certain remarks relating to Rajah Ram Mohan Roy in a long letter written by a friend of hers, who was a Captain in the 29th Regiment, Native Infantry, and who lived and died in India.

EXHIBIT IV.

A letter from R. L. Carpenter (brother of Miss Mary Carpenter) to Rakhal Das Haldar, dated June 6th.....

The letter states that the writer had no original papers relating to the Rajah Ram Mohan Roy.

EXHIBIT V.

Sonnets on the death of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy.

Composed by M. C., and read after his interment at Stapleton Grove, Friday, October 18, 1833, by Rev. Dr. R. L. Carpenter.

Copied by M. C., for his followers.

Note.—These are five sonnets touching the death of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy and one on his memory, all in the handwriting of Miss Mary Carpenter and appear to have been composed on October 27th, 1833. This copy (to be preserved in the museum of the Bangiya Sahitya Parishad) was made by Miss Mary Carpenter on July 31st, 1861, for Rakhal Das Haldar.

CHUNILAL BOSE

EXHIBIT VI.

A letter from Mary W. Estlin, dated July 3, 1862, to Rakhal Das Haldar.

In this letter, Miss Estlin stated that she would send an original letter from Raja Ram Mohan Roy to Rakhal Das Haldar.

EXHIBIT VII.

A letter from Sophia Dobson Collet (author of the *Life and Letters of Rajah Rammohan Roy*) to Rakhal Das Haldar, dated July 7, 1882.

In this letter, Miss Collet writes about the various materials she had collected for the compilation of a complete biography of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy and asks for certain information from Rakhal Das Haldar.

EXHIBIT VII(*a*).

Memorandum by Miss S. D. Collet *re* discovery of writings of Rajah Ram Mohan Roy and forwarded by her to Rakhal Das Haldar as an enclosure to her letter (Exhibit VII).

The memorandum appears to be an extract from the appendix to Miss Mary Carpenter's book, "The Last Days in England of Rammohun Roy," page 254 (1866). Certain passages are underlined in red ink by Miss Collet herself witn an endorsemnnt at the bottom in her own writing:—

"The red lines are mine.

S. D. COLLECT."

EXHIBIT VIII.

A letter from Raj Narain Bose to Rakhal Das Haldar written from Deoghar, dated 30th July.....

This letter enclosed a letter from Miss Collet to Rakhal Das Haldar sent open to Raj Narain Bose for his perusal.

CHUNILAL BOSE

HATE AND LOVE.

I

The pardoner Thou of darkest sins,
The giver Thou of joy serene,
Of worlds all Thou the king supreme
And of my living heart the queen.
When king and queen not two but one
In bliss of love below, above,
That oneness sinks in love, that's love
The love that ends not, ne'er begun,
Who knows not love in his own life
Shall ever live with love at strife
Oh! love is life and love is death,
Of life eternal love is breath.
Who loves-not love himself must hate,
What him but love can be?
The tinted many love but dyes—
All we feel, all we see,
When little love's trod down by great
To little men then love is hate.

II

Be I a fool, be I a sage,
Be I a rogue, be I a fop,
Love is love for ever and now,
Love knows no start nor stop,
If love against I ever stand
Then love o'erwhelms but me.
Love frowns, Love smiles, I cry for Love,
She feigns but hate to be,
Throw off thy mask, show thy sweet face

And me and all my race embrace—
Embrace eternal Him, all bear!
But let me feel it now and here!

III

Forgetting Thee the only pain,
Remembering thee the joy,
Be thou my life, be thou my heart,
Gold-Love, without alloy!
Forgive the hate I heap on thee,
Forgive devotion's pride,
Embrace thy cripple lover, Love,
Thou meekest, sweetest bride.
O Mother thou and Father, Friend,
O, kinship Thine can know no end—
O, nearer Thou than I to me
Love none can utter, none can see.

IV

Repentance? Self-love's ownest bride,
She shuts the door on Falsehood's pride:
She decks herself as reparation,
She smiles to Truth sweet admiration,
Now closed are eyes, closed ears and mouth,
Now all are one, East, West, North, South,
Now hate is love and Love is Love
In depth of Hell and Heaven above,
Now war in Love is peace serene
And world's a song from lyre unseen.

MOHINI MOHAN CHATTERJI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHELLEY[1]

Preliminary Remarks.

A word of Explanation.

I hope, like Don Quixote, I am not proposing to tilt with purely imaginary adversaries in assuming that some of you have come to this meeting with something like an amused curiosity as to what a speaker or writer really means by the Philosophy of Shelley, or by Philosophy in Shelley's Poetry in particular. To be quite frank, I too, in my own way, have sometimes winced at such a critical estimate. But, you know, I have been anticipated by a number of writers who have seriously said quite a lot on the philosophy of this or that poet even including Shelley. I have another excuse too. We have not only the philosophy of poetry or the philosophy of history, from authoritative writers, sufficiently great to silence all opposition but the latest (July, 1928) issue of a philosophical Quarterly like the Hibbert Journal heartens me a good deal by publishing a contribution of Dr. G. A. Johnston, M.A., D.Phil, entitled "The Philosophy of Industry" which, we are told, is a *new philosophy* we owe to Germany and America that is now rapidly developing internationally. When I accepted a philosopher[2] friend's invitation to talk in a philosophers' club on the philosophy of Shelley, I did so with a misgiving due surely to a sense of my own presumption in speaking to philosophers on philosophy, but secondarily, also, to my half-hearted assent to the assumption that a poet like Shelley has indeed a philosophy that is worth an exposition. To-day, however, I am grown wiser and bolder

[1] This paper, with the exception of the Introductory Part, was first read at a meeting of the Presidency College Philosophy Seminar (Calcutta) on the 28th of August, 1928.

[2] Dr. Surendranath Dasgupta, M.A., Ph.D., President of the Presidency College Philosophy Seminar.

too. I feel I can claim a philosophy for poetry, if an *international* claim can be set up for a philosophy of industrialism.

Yet one cannot do better than follow the guidance of Socrates. I will therefore define my purpose and meaning regarding our theme.

First and foremost, I am not a philosopher by training or profession, but willy-nilly a man must philosophize if he seriously and systematically applies himself to the task of interpreting fundamental truths, or, better still, life, be it life reflected in literature. Secondly, the subject of my study too was not a philosopher[1] but a great romantic poet, and as a lyrist, a poet of poets.[2]

Shelley, I do not forget, was not even like Coleridge a logician and metaphysician, or like Wordsworth a professed teacher of mankind. Far less was he one like that sublime egotist, Milton, bent on justifying the ways of God to man. Shelley was not a Goethe adhering to Spinoza's pantheism and, as a naturalist, experimenting on plants and the human anatomy, while practically spending the best part of a long life on his *Faust* (1770-1800), where he starts with "I have also now mastered philosophy." Yet, like Goethe, Shelley preferred "to pursue the ideal to the ideal itself." Finally, Shelley, though having an affinity with the great Dante (1265-1321) in his Platonic ideal vision of the perfection of Love and Beauty, not realised, however, in a living Beatrice, does not like the

[1] I do not forget, however, that among his friends Shelley's nick-name was that of a philosopher to which Shelley sarcastically alludes, for instance, in his letter to Hogg (of 26th April, 1811) when he says that Harriet Grove does not any longer permit a "*philosopher*" to correspond with her (Ingpen I. 62). *Cf.* Shelley's "I philosophize" (Let. No. 40) and "I will not philosophize" (Let. No. 39), or that he should be classed with "bigots in philosophy." (*Ibid.*)

[2] Though confessing to his *passion for reform* and inspite of his daring *speculations* on a number of ultimate questions regarding Reality, Shelley assigns to Imagination what appears to many competent critics an importance, nay supremacy, not justified. The Imagination is made by Shelley a great *moral agent* and in his Defence of Poetry the discussion of the relation between poetry and morality is grounded on the Shelleyan estimate of the Imagination.

Italian poet-philosopher sum up an entire philosophy, ethics and theology as does the *Divine Comedy*. I surely cannot claim in Shelley's case anything approaching the position of the Roman poet of the 1st century B.C., Lucretius, whose *De Rerum Natura* embodies Epicurean philosophy and even to-day occupies its undisputed sovereign place in World Literature as a landmark of free thought and of the spirit of rationalistic defiance and to whom Shelley refers, in another connection, in his Preface to the *Revolt of Islam* (1817). Remembering thoroughly all this, I request you too to remember one pertinent fact and it is this.

Both my poet and my humble self, as a devoted lover and honest interpreter of his works,—yes, both of us, Shelley the "mad atheist," kicked out for a youthful freak by even the renowned home of lost causes, and I—perhaps, not very sane in thus admiring and appreciating one who till the end of the 19th century was very little understood by his own countrymen, —happen at least to be sincere and earnest students as much of poetry as of philosophy which, to my mind, are inseparable and indivisible.[1]

Poetry and Philosophy.

On this important point of a very close intimacy between philosophy and poetry a word or two, may perhaps, be said here to further clear the ground. Commonsense view, I do not permit myself to forget, is inclined to put these two kinds of human activity somewhat severely apart. It supposes that poetry's concern being with feeling and emotion, the poetic activity *ipso facto* is not only a different kind of activity, which certainly is very true, but also antagonistic to the philosophic one which deals with concepts. So, it infers, there must be an *antithesis* between the two rather than an affinity. Such a view

[1] *Cf.* Coleridge's "No man was ever yet a great poet, without being at the same time a profound philosopher" and para. 8 of Shelley's "Defence of Poetry."

mainly relies on what is called a scientific mental attitude which holds that in the generality of cases man's real knowledge is knowledge of the external world, *i.e.*, of things actual and not imaginary having an outward existence, whereas poetry creates its own world of "make-believe."

Let us see what a great scientist like Huxley has to say (in his Collected Essays on Descartes).

In answer to the query "What, then, is certain?" Huxley's reply is "Why, the fact that the thought, the present consciousness, exists." He goes further to add—"More than that, so far as we are concerned, existence is thought." He then gives an example—"I take up a marble, and I find it to be a red, round, hard, single body.....all these qualities are modes of our consciousness.....Whatever our marble may be in itself, all that we can know of it is under the shape of a bundle of our own consciousness."

In a word, Huxley is here accepting the interpretation of the external world which is called *Idealism*. Let me quote his conclusion too. "Thus," says he, "it is an indisputable truth that what we call the material world is only known to us under the forms of the ideal world." In effect, Huxley, the scientist *par excellence*, repudiates the ordinary man's comfortable belief.

The next point for us to bear in mind is that poetry fundamentally is an æsthetic activity and also that our mode of getting hold of what is known as an external appearance is to present its impression to our consciousness by the creation of a perception or intuition.

What is the essence of Poetry.

Poetry, considered as an artistic production which serves to enlarge or deepen the human consciousness, gives an external æsthetic form, a local habitation and a name, by expressing in rhythmic, musical words to such an intuition or perception.

Its mode of operation is different, that is all. It does not, as in science or philosophy, use chiefly the logical method of comparing, classifying, generalising

Its mode.

percepts or concepts. Still, thought, idea, opinion, belief may be, indeed are, made subjects of æsthetic activity, of poetic presentation under conditions of artistic beauty, by poetry which uses as raw materials what are the finished products of man's reasoning power. Poetry is thus the medium for the presentation in rhythmical and melodious speech and in concrete beautiful imagery of man's creative activity in ecstatic moments of deepened consciousness, *i.e.*, in essence, of the human spirit by means of which the entire world, the totality of existence is placed before man's consciousness.

Thus the gulf between poetry and science and philosophy is, at least practically, bridged.

Its range and scope.

But in enlarging man's consciousness poetry happens to function as an explorer of new realms of gold held in fealty to Apollo and the Muses as much as of new regions of thought supposed to owe exclusive allegiance to Reason. Poets aspire to regenerate[1] the world of prosaic realities, to establish according to their ideals of beauty and love a new Jerusalem here on earth. They therefore reconstruct life and society and attempt to found it on a new basis. They thus revolutionise our very outlook on life and life's possibilities. It is such a constructive ideal that was at the very bottom of Shelley's revolt against the existing social and political order. The millennium which was his poet's dream could not arrive except through a radical change.[2] We are going to understand the character of this revolution sought to be achieved by Shelley in and through his poetry which aimed at effecting

[1] *Cf.* the Shelleyan scheme of the millennium shadowed forth in Canto V of his "Revolt of Islam" in which—

> "Our toil from thought of all glorious forms shall cull,
> To make this Earth, our home, more beautiful,
> And science, and her sister Poesy,
> Shall clothe in light the fields and cities of the free."

St. II, sec. 6 (Cythna's harangue to the assembled multitude).

Cf. also *Queen Mab* last two cantos and *Prometheus Unbound* and *Hellas.*

[2] *Cf. Revolt of Islam*, Canto V, St. 28, and Canto VIII, St. 29, and *Prometheus Unbound*, III, Sc. IV, the last speech of the Spirit of the Hour.

in men and women a change of heart. Shelley practically adopted Wordsworth's soul-stirring utterance as his motto—"We must be free or die." An occasional piece of February, 1812, written as a tribute to the successful setting up of a new Republic in Mexico, contains the lines—

> "Catch the warrior's grasping breath
> Murmuring "Liberty or death."

A philosophical poet no system-builder.

Though thus admonishing you against this mistaken commonsense view which separates poetry from philosophy, I must also warn you at the beginning that I should not be taken as approaching my study as the study of Shelley considered as anything like a system-builder[1] or unifier of all knowledge. I repeat, Shelley was a poet and nothing but a poet—but a poet in the making of whom the philosophy of the East and the West—ancient, mediæval and modern—played a dominant part. He was one deeply influenced by Platonism,[2] Neo-Platonism, mediæval mysticism, Indian pantheism, Persian Sufism as much as by the writings, more or less of a political or social nature, of Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, some of the Church Fathers, Grotius, Luther, Calvin, the Scotch Catholics, the antimonarchist 16th century political writers of pamphlets like the *Vindicae contra Tyranos*,[3] which appeared in 1576, Filmer (whose criticism of Grotius, Hobbes and Milton appeared in 1652 as Observations concerning the Original of Government and Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings, in 1680) and Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651). Shelley came also under the influence of Bacon, Hume,[4] Locke,[4] Berkeley,[5] the French[4] Encyclopaedists, Rousseau, Godwin,[4]

Influences on Shelley.

[1] *Cf.* Preface to *Revolt of Islam*, paras 1 and 2.

[2] *Cf.* Letter No. 431 (Mr. Roger Ingpen's 2-vol. edition of Letters of Shelley).

[3] Lecky's "Rationalism in Europe," Vol. II, pp. 70-71 (R. A. P. Reprints).

[4] *Cf.* Shelley's letter to Godwin, dated Nantgwilt, 3rd June, 1812 (Mr. Ingpen's edn., pp. 313-14, Vol. I). Also Letters Nos. 55, 80, 147 and 167, and "Defence of Poetry," para. 36.

[5] Shelley read Berkeley (*vide* Letter 151 in Mr. Ingpen's edition, Vol. I, p. 347) while in Cumberland lent to him by Southey who borrowed it from Lloyd (*vide* Letter No. 332, *ibid*, p. 722, Vol II).

Priestley, Price, Paine,[1] and a whole host of modern philosophers from Descartes and Spinoza to Schopenhauer and Schleiermacher.

Finally, in the Preface to his "Prometheus Unbound" (1819) this poet seriously avers—"My purpose has hitherto been simply to familiarise the highly refined imagination of the more select class of poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware that until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure,—reasoned principles of moral conduct are seeds cast upon the high-way of life, which the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the harvest of his happiness."

Words these—true, wise, illuminating and full of that candour which best harmonizes with the nature of one who was the eternal **child**—yes, child of nature, unsophisticable—which I may accept as my guiding principle in this brief survey of Shelley's contribution to, not the philosophy of the accredited "**schools**" of that most valuable kind of knowledge and discipline, but the philosophy of life's myriad and disconcerting problems and phases that even now await solution.

My conclusion.

Poets have in a rough and ready way been classed as objective and subjective. I am reminded of Walter Bagehot's dread of what he so humorously calls "the perpetual round of *omject and somject*," while using words which to many well-meaning innocent persons savour of nothing but pedantry. Now, even objective poets like Chaucer or Shakespeare in his dramas and poetasters like Crabbe, not to speak of Denham and Dyer, can be made to yield a body of thoughts, ideas and sentiments to form a basis for erecting on them a reasonable and comprehensive idea regarding their estimate of life and their general attitude towards its problems. The greater surely is our chance of a

Why Shelley's writings must yield us a philosophy.

[1] *Cf.* Letters Nos. 113 and 122 (Ingpen).

successful interpretation of life's philosophy when it results from a careful study of the self-expression made by what we call subjective poets, say, like Blake, Shelley, Swinburne and possibly even Gray, Cowper, Burns, Byron, Coleridge and Wordsworth.

Now, Shelley is admittedly a subjective[1] poet *par excellence*, and in a manner, *sui generis*. Though in the present attempt I shall have to take account of such of his longer poems as *Queen Mab*, *Revolt of Islam* (which are narratives), *Prometheus Unbound* and *Hellas* (which are dramatic), *Adonais* (which is a semi-pastoral philosophical elegy) and *Epipsychidion*, and *Triumph of Life*, my emphasis will however, be on Shelley as a lyrist which, I claim, he never ceases to be even in his longer pieces.

A subjective poet's utterances are pre-eminently personal. Self-revelation is his key-note. Therefore no apology or explanation will be necessary for my paper which proposes to subject Shelley's works to an analysis with a view, for the purposes of our business to-day, to cull together an authoritative body of thoughts, ideas, sentiments, opinions, conceptions, notions, however presented these may be in an emotional garb, that may justify me in arriving at a clear and well-defined idea regarding Shelley's view-point and intellectual attitude towards ultimate problems of human existence to which one may be permitted to give the name of philosophy. I hope this makes my meaning clear and adequately defines the real scope and aim of my paper.

We have equally to carefully bear in mind that after Milton England produced four great writers who in a real sense were pioneers of political and spiritual rebellion—Byron, Shelley, Landor and Swinburne. Then again, all English poets between 1780 and 1840 have, more or less, been noted for their strong philosophical strain. Louis Cazamian very rightly observes—" The keen desire to get at the

Additional Reasons.

[1] *Cf.* Browning's Preface to some spurious letters of Shelley especially, Garnett's Introduction, pages 8, 11, 17, 18 and paras. 4-5.

basic principles governing conduct is very much in evidence with the contemporaries of Hume. Towards the last quarter of the 18th century the new-born science of æsthetics began to replace ancient codes and traditional rules and precepts of antiquity till literary criticism became at the beginning of the 19th century a philosophy."

I can only refer here to Sir Joshua Reynolds' "Fifteen Discourses" delivered in the Royal Academy (1769-1790) which still cling somewhat to the classical school, to Hogarth's "Analysis of Beauty" preceding these (1753) and opposing mere imitation of nature, to Joseph Warton's "Essay on Pope (1756-1782) advocating the supremacy of the creative imagination, Edward Young's "Conjectures on Original Composition" (1759) favouring Romantic emancipation, and, finally, Burke's well-known "Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful" (1756) championing liberty in art.

A Bird's-eye Rapid View of the Thought Movement of England from Milton's Time.

Turning for a moment to the 17th and 18th centuries we find that the Puritan Commonwealth in a tentative, dim, undefined fashion laid the foundation of embryonic ideas of equality (at first before God) and liberty and of a communistic outlook. The Restoration reaction with the Stuart court-life favoured the temporary reassertion of an aristocratic life and literature somewhat aloof from the larger interests of the country gentry and the people at large, representing the tone and temper of Provincial England. But such a literature of orderliness is bound to seek an alliance with rationalism, for rationality furnishes under conditions of reflectiveness, analysis, questioning and choice of selection and rejection, the disciplined habit of observation, clearness and precision. Science too now begins to more earnestly probe into the inner secrets of nature and the

study of the operations of the human mind and of the human understanding is about to be seriously and systematically taken up.

The foundation of the Royal Society is a sufficient proof of the new interests of thinking men showing how the spirit of enquiry is in the ascendant. Originating in 1645 it became organised in 1660 and received a Royal Charter in 1662 and Newton's famous paper on the composition of light was read before it in 1672. Even the Church was represented in it by men like Wilkins, Ward and Glanvil.

Restoration literature familiarized readers with the potency of satire and satire is no respecter of persons or institutions. Poems on affairs of state began a vigorous attack on absolutism. Marvel and Dryden opposed each other with brilliant attack and defence. The Licensing Act had to be re-established for exercising censorship against open hostility to the Crown or the Church.

In literary form, analysis, reasoning, reflectiveness, criticism, outer refinement and the extension of the spirit of research from the realm of science to that of literature—gave rise to realism, satire, comedy, parody, burlesque, lampoon, essay in verse and the spirit of literature suddenly grew over-earnest and polemic. Modes of expression more congenial to and suitable for creative imagination, tragic passion, tender sensibility, lyrical enthusiasm are excluded as not in harmony with the temper of the new age. But too much respect for mere conventions created in select bodies of thinking and rationalistic minds a revulsion.

In morals, attack on sham and hypocrisy was carried on with hardened cynicism which was less violent than political polemics, for which the ground had been more thoroughly prepared by the terrible strife of opposed schoolsof thought during the Civil War and the Protectorate. Milton's vehement and courageous championship of liberty in every form had set up a noble example and a powerful precedent. Sectarian conflicts next fed

the flame of passion and soon religious zeal was outstripped by party faction and its spirit of intolerance for which the readiest medium was lampooning. Whig and Tory pen-war was destined to soon become the order of the day. To what extent Shelley's noble soul was tormented by this spirit of intolerance and how he vowed eternal war against it are to-day matters of common knowledge, but Shelley seldom cared to historically trace it back to the 17th century or even the 18th.

We must carefully note in this connection one important consequence of all this ferment.

Boldness of speech and conduct due rather to a disregard for traditional morals and also to a somewhat cynical attitude towards religion, manners, and civil power, effected, curiously enough, in the Restoration and post-Restoration periods, a strange compromise with repression of too free an expression of thought and opinion, even though in the region of *general ideas* on man, society, nature, rationalism tempered with empiricism ruled the day.

The Protectorate had temporarily revived mediæval scholasticism in spite of Baconian science and philosophy, till gradually the supremacy of Reason as the regulator of thought and life became asserted in the next era, drawing its inspiration and vitality from the under-current of Renaissance rationalistic thought movement which Puritanism had never succeeded in completely stifling. Cambridge as the seat of Platonic idealism became also the centre of the new rationalistic tendency which was invigorated by the philosophy of Descartes. Christ Church became the focus of new rationalistic ideas. Wichcote, More, Cudworth and others less known started original speculations till the hard, cold realism and logical empiricism of Hobbes gave a new turn to this growing rationalism. Scepticism which was already widespread, though not yet concentrated into a system of thought, free-thinking, religious infidelity at least among the fashionable upper classes, and the triumph of Reason among highly-cultured thinkers now conspired together against

orthodoxy. This important aspect of English thought movement is not without its significant and suggestive application to a conscientious study of Shelley's philosophy.

With Hobbes the collective will of all citizens is a *Leviathan* and this philosopher is credited with having anticipated—(1) modern scientific materialism, (2) associationist psychology, (3) utilitarian ethics, (4) positivistic sociology and, possibly, (5) 18th century deism, which are, more or less, connected with Shelley's speculations and practice.

Philosophical and scientific rationalism affected religious thought and the latitudinarians diminished orthodoxy by connecting religion with science and broadening church doctrine. Even Baconian induction was sought to be applied to apologetics. Barrow (1630-1677) was rigorously scientific and rational in his thinking in his famous *Commentaries*. This effectively dissociated theology, now in the process of rationalisation, from mysticism, largely favoured by the Cambridge Platonists like Cudworth. Religion is subordinated to ethics, virtuous life being considered to be moral life; and morality is interpreted as an enlightened and wisely-directed self-interest in harmony with that of others forming the social organism. An actively virtuous life is considered the surest way to salvation.

Then came the persuasive, sober, clearly expressed intellectual ideas of the sermons of South, Tillotson and Stillingfleet.

History, Biography, Memoir, Diary—all follow the direction given to literature by logical reason. Analytical and deductive method of studying man's mind creates psychology. Following in the footsteps of scientists, theologians, preachers, moralists, historians and psychologists, came a group of semi-philosophical writers on life and action whom I may name as precursors to the political thinkers beginning with Hobbes till we come to Priestley, Price, Paine, Godwin and Burke.

Thus, scholastic tradition, orthodox form, mystic faith now begin to yield place to commonsense, clear thinking, free

discussion, inductive reasoning, close observation, analysis, logical deduction—in a word, rationalism begins once more to reign supreme. The essay as a medium of expression, influenced by Montaigne as an exemplar, becomes dominant.

In politics, the period from the Restoration to the accession of the House of Hanover was, generally speaking, an era of interesting transition due to political instability and a feeling of restlessness which practically continued up to the middle of the 18th century. A conflict, sometimes sharp sometimes mild, now open now disguised, was visible in State and Church alike between the opposed forces of absolute authority and constitutional liberty and orthodoxy or dogmatism and toleration, considered as regulative principles. Deism encroaches on religious orthodoxy and the growing power of the middle-class (mainly industrialists and merchants) on aristocracy and court life. Locke's empiricism gains supremacy as the representative note of the new age of liberty and toleration.

Locke starts from a state of nature passing on to Social Contract theory, basing both, however, on close observation of actual facts, especially contemporary facts. Individuals are accepted as born free but they subject themselves to moral law and therefore *delegate* their rights to the collective will of their *representatives* which, however, are *revocable* at need, government being a device for public services and utility.

In theology, Locke recognises moral needs of conscience but religion being a *personal* matter tolerance for opinion follows as a corollary—only the social compact must not be interfered with. Hence there can be no tolerance for Popery and atheism.

Locke, it will be seen, is no advocate of pure and logical (and therefore somewhat abstract and theoretical) rationalism. He adapted rationalism to the peculiarities of the English temperament, which is nothing if not practical and pragmatic. This aspect of a sober, practical, commonsense view found a powerful exponent in George Savile (1633-1695), Viscount

Halifax, whose political pamphlets carried on the new spirit further to the verge of *opportunism*.

So far as pure literature is concerned, philosophical rationalism, which primarily affected political thought, expressed itself particularly in dramatic literature in the shape of a hard cynical intellectualism which rode rough-shod over morals and manners. Restoration comedy and its later development into sentimental comedy with its reaction against the keen wit, irony, satire and realism of the earlier phase, is the natural fruit of this intellectualism. The revolt of middle-class morality against this spirit is at least embodied in Jeremy Collier's famous "Short View of the Profaneness and Immorality of the English Stage" (1698). In 1642 the Puritans had suppressed theatres altogether but about 1700 the Church was up in arms in defence not simply of morality but also of the clergy and of religion in general.

Collier's work of reform was practically carried further by Addison and Steele (and subordinately by Defoe), the accredited representatives of middle-class morality, good taste, refined manners, elegance, decorum, social propriety, religious observance, classical standard and taste in literature and art, correctness of behaviour, nobility of sentiment—which softened the hard and cold intellectualism of the pre-Augustan age.

Moralising tendency and awakened refined sentimental correctness now shook hands with each other in their joint opposition to cynicism and intellectualism. In critical thought, dominated yet by rationalism, though modified by the note of correctness, Swift became supreme—followed at a great distance by Gray, Arbuthnot and Defoe.

The Eighteenth Century.

Moral unity gives to the new literature of the beginning of the 18th century also an artistic unity. The classicism of the age of Pope (1700-1744), if indeed it deserves such a title,

is noted for its *intellectual* activity—of which the function is chiefly to analyse, judge, value according to code or rule, adopt and finally lay down the law, that is, *legislate* in matters of art and taste. In a strict sense, literature degenerates into an intellectual criticism of life, everything being reduced to a system explained in terms of rationalism. Appeal to established authority is its motto. Horace, Quintilian, Cicero (but seldom Aristotle or Longinus), nay even Boileau, are invoked as literary law-givers.

This intellectualism is raised almost to the level of philosophical interpretation of life in Pope's "Essay on Man" (which embodies Bolingbroke's deism), in his Epistles and Satires and partly even in the *Dunciad*. Intellectual energy is seldom displayed with as great a vigour in English literature. The result, though not first-rate poetry, is surely a rare kind of intellectual beauty which harmonizes into artistic unity, precision of thought, clearness of idea, aptness of phraseology, regularity of rhythm, terseness of language, brilliance of eloquence and perfection of orderly sequence of ideas of which the appeal is not to our heart or imagination but to our reason, to moral judgment and to our sense of the ridiculous.

How this phase of literary intellectualism degenerates in the hands of Pope's followers is best illustrated, for example, in Prior's *Alma* or *the Progress of the Mind* (1714) and *Solomon* or the *Vanity of the World*. Rational (as opposed to emotional) inspiration, abstract theme, intellectual style are the outstanding features of this type of classicism *even in poetry*. The elimination of the personal (lyrical) note thus achieved leads to universality of appeal and creates a nobleness of effect, and thus literature tends to be aristocratic, by excluding passion which is the common possession of man as man irrespective of culture and tradition, traced back to remote antiquity. Traditional literary *motives* take the place of spontaneous impulses and cut-and-dried expression replaces freedom of natural phraseology. The reaction against this rigidity,

set up by the precursors to the Romantic Movement of the 19th century of which Shelley is an acknowledged representative, is slightly foreshadowed by such minor poets as Tickell in his *Elegy on the Death of Addison*, Parnell in *A Nightpiece on Death*, Ambrose Philips in his *Pastorals* and *Collection of Old Ballads*, not to speak of the more important *Gentle Shepherd* (1725) of the Scottish Allan Ramsay which marks a definite stage in the slow undercurrent of romanticism that flowed beneath the surface of 18th century classicism.

It must be noted here that the classical age both widened the range of free rational enquiry and deepened and intensified its potency. A ceaseless polemical warfare was kept up in vigorous and telling prose in science, philosophy, politics and religion, for, the age was the age of controversies concentrated on the conflict between authority and liberty—a conflict which gives to Shelley's philosophy of life on its socio-political and religious sides all its importance, vigour, and significance.

In theory controversy of a vehement and at times even violent character connected itself with Deism about which I shall say more in the second part of my essay somewhat elaborately. The next important controversy, not less keen, was about politics and here the Jacobite Bolingbroke is the first prominent figure with his *Idea of a Patriot King* (1738) and *Dissertation on Parties* (1727-1731) meant to oppose Walpole's policy and Parliamentary corruption. Bolingbroke laid the foundation of a constitutional as against an absolute monarchy at the head of a nation united by patriotism, which means a distinct advance on the comparatively antiquated ideas of Hobbes, and his method was still more rationalised by Bernard Mandeville who in his *Fables of the Bees* (1723), preceded by *Free Thoughts on Religion* (1720), examined the very basis of society and the State in a highly unconventional and bold manner and was an original thinker.

Bentley vigorously attacked atheism in his *Confutation* (1713) and deism in his *Remarks upon a Late Discourse of Freethinking* (meaning that written by Collins, in 1713).

Religious controversy, factious party warfare, cynical satirical vein—all tended to produce an atmosphere of scepticism, moral doubt, restlessness of spirit due to unsettled ideas and loosened convictions, and, finally, a spirit of negation of which the remote consequence was Godwinian philosophical anarchism which influenced the young Shelley so powerfully. The political supremacy of established order upheld by hereditary aristocracy was gradually undermined by the growing wealth and power of the middle-class and its sentiment, as well as by the spirit of dissidence and psychological renovation making a demand for the play of free imagination. These are distinctly *bourgeois* elements in life, manners, politics and literature.

Socially, the new class, created by rapid commercial progress and prosperity and modern industrial conditions was, however, yet a little conservative in temperament but it was destined before long to undergo a radical change in mid-eighteenth century. *Bourgeois* insistence on accepted morality and established disciplined order was well represented in Samuel Johnson who did all he could to resist the onrush of sentiment and emotion as precursors to growing romanticism and for a while stood four square against the invasion of change and innovation in politics, manners, letters and religion. But the growing tide of this coming onrush could not long be successfully stemmed and so we begin to have even then the new poetry of sentiment, sensibility and imagination from Lady Winchelsea, Littleton, Thomson, Young, Warton, even Byrom, the Scottish Logan, not to mention Gray, Collins, Shenstone and Goldsmith. But it was the *novel* (of sentiment) which more than poetry that gave free play to the new tendency and we have the great literary figures of Richardson, Sterne, Fielding, Smollett and Goldsmith's *Vicar* to reckon with.

An apparent stable order in society and an outwardly placid political development along the line marked out by the much talked-of "glorious" Revolution (of 1688) managed, no doubt, to conceal for a time but never to subdue the growing spirit of unrest and change which broke out openly after the middle of the 18th century, when the long-continued Whig regime came to an end. The political unrest, which had been slowly gathering force underneath the deceitful surface current of peaceful progress accomplished by the Whig oligarchy, temporarily successful in assimilating to itself the rising power and importance of the industrial and commercial middle-class element in society, began to make itself articulate in the sixties of the 18th century, through a new medium of political journalism, which in a way was the creation of the Whig policy of requisitioning the services of able writers to further the cause of a political party in power, under its fostering patronage. Pamphleteering soon assumed a very important place in the periodical literature of England. We cannot forget that Shelley in his extravagant youthful enthusiasm for effecting immediate reform assumed the rôle of a socio-political preacher in his pamphlets, say, on Atheism or Catholic Emancipation, for which his mentor Godwin once took him to task.[1] In this new literary field, Addison, Steele, Swift and Defoe had already done the pioneer's work to be followed up by Smollett's *Briton*, set up in defence of the royal prerogative, which provoked a vigorous opposition from John Wilkes, whose advocacy of the people's cause in the *North Briton* (1762-1763), gave rise, we all know, to the first fierce clash and conflict between the Parliament and the City and gained him a notoriety almost verging on celebrity. Wilkes is a born political agitator of the most popular type and may have made a Thomas Paine possible.

[1] In his dedication of *The Cenci* to Leigh Hunt Shelley significantly says: "I lay aside the presumptuous attitude of the instructor, and am content to paint, with such colours as my own heart furnishes, that which has been" (page 690 of Ingpen's Letters of Shelley).

But Junius (whoever he may be, though Sir Philip Francis, the rancorous enemy of Warren Hastings has been identified with him) was a very adept in highclass polemics and his famous *Letters* in the *Public Advertiser* (January 1769 to the end of 1771), directed mainly against the Grafton and North ministries, created quite a *furor* by the impassioned attacks on arbitrary power as much as by the analysis of political principles and the masterly marshalling of facts and details and the lofty tone of public spirit and ardent patriotism which inspired them. In this connection, to compare, of course, great things with small, one is reminded of the lofty disinterestedness and absolute sincerity of Shelley's spirit of self-sacrifice evinced in 1812 for the cause of the oppressed and downtrodden Irish people.

To my mind it strikes as if dying classicism sent out its last brilliant flash before being extinguished by thus becoming revived with fresh vitality, however short-lived, and being transferred from the correct school of poetry or even purely literary prose to the civic sphere, reminding competent readers of the stoic strain of ancient Roman political idealism as an anticipation of the spirit of the French Revolution. As a representative of the industrial and provincial middle-class, Junius recalls the patriotic republicanism of the Roman Brutus fighting courageously in a hopeless conflict between a foreign ruler's oligarchic and aristocratic clique and the constitutional larger body of united citizens proud of an indigenous national tradition of their own. With a necessary and even fundamental difference, Shelley too fought as a Republican bravely and in vain against a very powerful but extremely reactionary and well-organised official clique supported by conservative England in the first quarter of the 19th century. I may refer here, *in passing*, to Shelley's short tribute of a poem in 4 stanzas to the successful setting up of a new republic in Mexico in 1812 and his allusion to his "Republicanism" in his letter of 7th February, 1813, to Thomas Jefferson Hogg from Tanyralt (Tremadoc).

Political pamphleteering was succeeded by powerful political oratory—by the orations of the fiery Chatham on the side of the struggling American Colonies along with those of Burke. The same growing influence of the middle-class was responsible for the vogue of the domestic drama which for a short time held the English stage (1730-1750). Political themes are handled by such plays as *Pasquin* and the *Historical Register* which were in part responsible for the Licensing Act of 1737 which inaugurated a new era of censorship and check on the free expression of opinion for which Paine, Eaton (the printer), Finnerty, the Hunts and lastly Shelley had to suffer tremendously. With the exception of Shelley's troubles arising from his theory of love, his life became mostly embittered and was considered by him to be tragic through his conflict with those in authority in all spheres of life simply because no price was deemed by him to be too high to pay in order to enjoy man's primary and inalienable right to think for himself independently as a rational and responsible being with its corollary of an unhampered free expression of thought.

The eighteenth century is generally described as the Age of Reason. The need of enlightenment felt more strongly in feudal France created a demand for intellectual enquiry all over Europe. Exchange of thought, idea, opinion between France on the one hand and England and Germany on the other day by day gained greater currency. French political thinkers were at first almost obsessed by their measureless reverence for the much-vaunted principles of the glorious English Revolution of 1688. Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot in their turn influenced the English mind. Philosophical essayists, analytical critics, even diary and letter-writers, not to speak of constitutional historians, showed a decided bias for cultural intellectualism prone to favour radicalism in thought and the spirit of revolutionary ardour.

Rationalism flourished very successfully between 1740 and 1770. Mr. A. W. Benn defines rationalism as "the tendency

to use reason for the destruction of religious belief (especially as presented under the organised form of theological creeds),'' distinguishing it from rationality which custom (not etymology) interprets as ''submission of all belief to pure reason.'' ''A peculiar odium became attached to the anti-religious aspects of pre-revolutionary philosophy as if they were responsible for the Terror or for Napoleon's devastating career '' owing to '' the accidental association of (rationalism as) negative criticism with the destructive fury of the French Revolution.'' In reality the denial of revelation professed by religion of a supernatural world goes back to ancient time and it may be probable that '' the progress from lower to higher forms of religion has been everywhere determined by something like rationalistic criticism.''

I reserve a detailed consideration of this matter for that section of my thesis which will deal with Shelley's theological ideas. It will suffice if I state here that Hume, called the English Descartes, in his works which appeared between 1739 and 1754, held the position of the leading empirical thinker of the age. Hume's originality is indicated by his philosophical view of man's innate character or nature as the centre of his system, which he opposed to such systems as make reason, opinion, climate (as in Montesquieu), political institutions (as in Godwin and Shelley), education, environment (physical and social) the shaping factors and regulating forces governing man's actions. Hume's view furnished even Kant with something like a basis for his famous *Critique* and lent all its vigour to Burke's political philosophy.

Human nature is considered to be a bed-rock which no change in circumstances and institutions can substantially alter. This view stood in sharp contrast to that of the champions of revolution, justified by infinite perfectibility of mankind, like Holbach, Helvetius, Condorcet, Holcroft, Paine, Priestley, Price, Godwin and later on Shelley.

All these apostles of infinite hope for man's regeneration and perfectibility founded their programme of man's progressive

evolution to perfection not merely on the reconstruction (through, where necessary, initial destruction) of *all human institutions* but, what is more important and fundamental, on the infinite possibility and feasibility of amending and ameliorating *human nature* itself (*cf.* Shelley's "Lines Written among the Euganean Hills, 1818," last 22 lines and particularly, "Julian and Maddalo," ll. 170-191, 202-211).

This grand idealistic vision and inspiring hope gave, we know, wings to Shelley's soaring imagination which looked forward with unspeakable conviction to man's complete social, political and spiritual emancipation as the one goal of his life and which therefore could create such noble pieces of poetic idealism as "Prometheus Unbound" and "Hellas" that open unto us a long vista of progressive change and ideal reconstruction of the family, the society, the Church and the State. This sublime ideal is somewhat crudely suggested even in his less mature but more fervid "Revolt of Islam." Now, Hume shows (especially in his History) a leaning towards the royal prerogative and, what for us is more important, an instinct for law and order and is recognised even to-day as the most complete type of the 18th century intellectualism in England.

In the last 30 years of the 18th century classicism was fast yielding place to revived romanticism which meant greater sensibility, reawakened imagination, regeneration of feeling, renascence of wonder, mediæval revival, renewed interest in the remote in place and time, keen appreciation of the picturesque and the storied past, longing to probe deeper into the mysterious, interest in mythologies of the East and in those of Greece, Scandinavia and of the Celts, interest in Oriental tales, love of legends of mystery and fear, stronger and deeper feeling for all aspects of Nature and close study of the natural man. What is more important and intimately associated with the romantic temperament is a religious awakening due to Methodism which set the power of intuitive vision and mystic emotion against the intellectual creed of the Deists, the religious rationalism of the

philosophers and the apologetics of churchmen. Its emotional fervour and enthusiasm produced in men of classical taste a revulsion against religious fanaticism and in revolutionary reformers an antagonism to its advocacy of the established order. Then came the well-known tales of terror with their strong appeal to middle-class sentimentalism which in the second half of the century modified a good deal the rationalism of the classical period. Shelley evinces in his juvenile poems and in his prose romances his keen interest in these tales of marvel.

The Scottish philosophers headed by Dugald Stewart also helped, as a counteracting force to pure intellectualism, the advent of a philosophical outlook half empirical and half idealistic. The cold calculation of utilitarian intellectualism was modified by romanticism with its dominant egoistic individualism. Earnest logical pursuit of truth in the uncompromising spirit of a scientist in men like Hartley, whose *Observations on Man* (1749) influenced Priestley's *Disquisition relating to Matter and Spirit* (1777) and Price's *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals* (1757), was strangely modified by a thoroughly practical sense of reality. Though supporting the theory of divine revelation, Hartley paved the way of a pantheistic materialism which is not without its effect on Shelley's philosophy which at the same time takes its colouring from Priestley's stronger rationalism and Price's vigorous intellectualism and his staunch advocacy of citizens' rights as well as the ideas of the American and the French Revolutionists. The complexity of Shelley's philosophical idealism was further increased by his discipleship of Godwin, the pioneer of philosophical anarchism, and by his sincere admiration for Thomas Paine, whose knight-errantry in the championship of liberty led him to modify Franklin's dictum of "Where Liberty is, there is my country" into his own fighter's motto of "Where is no Liberty, there is mine"—the motto of "every man who prizes striving above enjoyment" as was, for instance, the case with Lafayette while he was a

volunteer in America, with Byron in Greece, and with Shelley in his *Ode to Liberty*.

Shelley, like Paine, "loved to think of himself as a woodman swinging an axe against rotten institutions and dying beliefs" but, being what he was by birth and tradition, the Quaker Paine "weighted no guillotines" whereas Shelley improved further on Paine by his out-and-out insistence on *non-violence* in his "Address to the Irish People" (1812) as also in his "Prometheus Unbound" where his creed of non-violence is carried well-nigh to the length of non-resistance in imitation of Christ's ethical ideal and somewhat after the fashion of Godwin and his friend Thomas Holcroft, both of whom had anticipated Tolstoy before Shelley. The proceedings of the Privy Council record how Holcroft talked of his opposition to coercive means urging the more powerful operation of philosophy and reason to convince men and disarm his enemies. Shelley appears to have thoroughly imbibed this spirit of Holcroft. In his "Address" he says, for example, "what are the means which I take for melioration? Violence, corruption, rapine, crime? Do I do evil that good may come? I have recommended peace, philanthropy, wisdom. So far as my arguments influence, they will influence to these; and if there is one *now* inclined to say that 'private vices are public benefits,' and that peace, philanthropy, and wisdom will, if once they gain ground, ruin the human race, he may revel in his happy dreams; though were I this man I should envy Satan's hell. The wisdom and charity of which I speak are the **only** means which I will countenance for the redress of your grievances and the grievances of the world. So far as they operate, I am willing to stand responsible for their evil effects. I expect to be accused of a desire for renewing in Ireland the scenes of revolutionary horror which marked the struggles of France twenty years ago. But it is the renewal of that unfortunate era which I strongly deprecate, and which the tendency of this 'Address' is calculated to obviate" (page 259, Vol. I of Richard

Herne Shepherd's edition of the Prose Works of Percy Bysshe Shelley, 1912).

The means adopted by Shelley was always "intellectual opposition to grievances." Let me quote one or two passages more from this *Address* of Shelley :—

"I agree," he says, "with the Quakers so far as they disclaim violence, and trust their cause wholly and solely to its own truth. If you are convinced of the truth of your cause, trust wholly to its truth ; if you are not convinced, give it up. In no case employ violence ; the way to liberty and happiness is never to transgress the rules of virtue and justice. Liberty and happiness are founded upon virtue and justice ; if you destroy the one you destroy the other. * * If you descend to use the same weapons as your enemy, you put yourself on a level with him on this score * *. But appeal to the sacred principles of virtue and justice, then how is he awed into nothing! * * I extend my view not only to you as Irishmen, but to all of every persuasion, of every country. Be calm, mild, deliberate, patient, recollect that you can in no measure more effectually forward the cause of reform than by employing your leisure time in reasoning or the cultivation of your minds. Think, talk and discuss : the only subjects you ought to propose are those of happiness and liberty. Be free and be happy, but first be wise and good." Again, "Associations for purposes of violence are entitled to the strongest disapprobation of the real reformist. Always suspect that some knavish rascal is at the bottom of things of this kind, waiting to profit by the confusion. All secret associations are also bad. * * Hidden arms, secret meetings, and designs violently to separate England from Ireland are all very bad." "But if a number of human beings, after thinking of their own interests, meet together for any conversation on them, and employ resistance of the mind, not resistance of the body, these people are going the right way to work. But let no fiery passions carry them beyond this point." * * "The French Revolution, although undertaken

with the best intentions, ended ill for the people, because violence was employed." * * "Let the Irish votaries of Freedom resist oppression, not by force of arms, but by power of mind and reliance on truth and justice."

This will suffice, I am sure, for impressing on even Shelley's adverse critics a clear idea of his pacifist and highly ethical methods. Every student of Shelley's "Prometheus Unbound" thoroughly understands to what extent this high ethical ideal furnishes the dramatic *motif* of that noble poem dedicated to the cause of liberty, human emancipation and the regeneration of the race. But I must not digress. Let me conclude this portion of my rapid survey of thought movement which leads to Shelley's philosophical attitude by referring in this connection to Articles IX, XII, XVII and XVIII of Shelley's "Declaration of Rights."

Art. IX: No man has a right to disturb the public peace by personally resisting the execution of a law, however bad. He ought to acquiesce, using at the same time the utmost powers of his reason to promote its repeal.

Art. XII: A man has a right to unrestricted liberty of discussion. Falsehood is a scorpion that will sting itself to death.

Art. XVII: No man has a right to do an evil thing that good may come.

Art. XVIII: Expediency is inadmissible in morals. Politics are only sound when conducted on principles of morality: they are, in fact, the morals of nations.

I may just mention that in the first part of Article XXX too Shelley emphasizes the need for sobriety of body and mind in those who would be free.

Coming nearer to Shelley's own time, we note the significant fact that the attitude of hostility to fundamental *ideas*, simply because they are radically subversive of current or accepted ones, represented by men like Burke, Scott, Southey, the later Coleridge and Wordsworth, not to mention the

promoters of the notorious *Anti-Jacobin* (November 1798 to July 1799), conducted rather ably by George Canning, Hookham Frere and William Gifford, harmonises more with the deeper trend of the insular type of the English mind and the English temperament. Louis Cazamian observes that "Revolutionary literature reflects the conflict in the minds of men." "The great Revolutionary drama appeals to the whole of human nature, and calls all its rival faculties into play ; it rouses souls to a pitch of enthusiasm, or tears them by an inner conflict." Shelley was thus "*roused*" exactly as Wordsworth became "*torn.*" The defence of abstract ideas and general principles, favouring root-and-branch change advocated by political and moral theorists, whose main appeal was to reason and not to history and tradition or orderly slow progress from precedent to precedent, was as vehemently taken up by Priestley, Price (both Unitarian ministers), Paine (a Quaker), and even, at first, by the timid Mackintosh (of the *Vindicæ Gallicæ* fame, 1791) destined too soon to be honoured with a knighthood, and by the extreme intellectualist and rationalist, William Godwin (1756-1836) whose whole nature burned then with a passionate zeal for truth and justice and who was fast drifting towards anarchism, and Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), Godwin's wife and Mary, Shelley's mother, whose "Vindication of the Rights of Woman" (1792) started the movement for female emancipation in Europe and contained the germ of modern "feminism."

Most of the new-fangled ideas of these advanced thinkers of their day considered then to be outrageously monstrous and terribly injurious to human peace and happiness and to law and order, have, we must now candidly admit, in the course of a century of progress of thought been actually incorporated in the system of Western social and political life, so much so that in certain matters to-day an urgent demand is being vigorously made for a step forward beyond the wildest dreams of those early reformers or their ardent admirer and follower, the poet Shelley.

We must gratefully acknowledge that the lead was, however, given by Wordsworth's early zeal for the French Revolution and his republican sympathies in 1791 to 1793 which even the Reign of Terror could not permanently destroy and which at any rate left a residuum of democratic faith even when, after 1818, he wrote his Ecclesiastical Sonnets (published, 1838) and strongly opposed all proposals for reform. "The doctrine of the 'Lyrical Ballads' (1798) is," holds a critic, "an aesthetic application of sentimental democracy." Wordsworth's scientific taste for truth is tempered by an edifying moral fervour of which the utilitarian purpose often diminishes the *artistic* value and appeal of his poetry, which is over-weighted with meditative reflectiveness at times bordering on didacticism. Shelley more than any other younger contemporary was Wordsworth's poetical heir, though the difference in their philosophy of life was too wide and pronounced.

The blending of art with philosophical ideas or even definite doctrines is a well-marked feature of the romantic age and Wordsworth's *Excursion* (1814) presents a whole philosophy and sociology of the new era. His love of Nature is illuminated by a mystical Pantheism (as in "Tintern Abbey" and the "Prelude") which sometimes makes his poetical expression a little too abstract, giving undue prominence to the intellectual note which subdues the emotional. This lends support to the critical estimate of Wordsworth as "the psychological poet among all others." As regards his social philosophy, I may barely mention the communistic principle underlying the extravagant Pantisocracy scheme (of Wordsworth and his intimate associates, Southey and Coleridge). Coleridge's was, of course, a more philosophical, or, to be precise, more analytical, psychological and metaphysical genius and he established the Anglican belief on a surer and firmer basis and, in politics, elucidated the ideal of an organic order (under the influence of German thinkers) opposed to social individualism or even nationalism. In literature Coleridge was the father of an original type of

criticism based on new aesthetic values derived from the differentiation of Imagination from Fancy, though it must be confessed that he made much of his "*esemplastic*" faculty.

It would certainly be a very interesting study to follow, in greater detail than my space permits or purpose justifies, the successive stages through which 18th century intellectualism[1] thus passed on into early 19th century analytical and rationalistic attitude of mind and criticism of life, as also that scientific spirit of enquiry which transforming sensibility and sentimentalism into romantic idealism and rational individualism tried to fulfil its mission by a staunch advocacy of change. Such a study would prove, in a way, an excellent preparation for a proper appreciation of the place that Shelley occupies in Western thought movement.

Scientific mental attitude joined with economic and social forces created a new outlook on life altogether. It gave rise to a positive perception of facts and realities and a utilitarian moral bias (the last of which is very strong in Shelley).

(*To be continued.*)

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

[1] Brailsford accounts for Godwin's failure as a political thinker to influence the later philosophic anarchism of the Continent by the fact that "his entire psychology, both social and individual, is vitiated by a naïve and head-strong intellectualism."

Reviews

Hindu Law and Custom : by Dr. Julius Jolly. Authorised translation by Batakrishna Ghosh. Double crown, pp. 314 and ix. Greater India Society's Publication No. II. Price Rs. 10-8.

It is a sign of the times that increased attention is being paid to the past with a view to explore the basis of our civilization and culture which in spite of our political degradation holds its head still high in a new and everchanging world of progress. To make a new India we must know the India of the past, so that our progress must be in keeping with the spirit of our culture. A knowledge of the past will not only help us in our regeneration, but the traditions of the glorious past will infuse new spirit into us. A recollection of our past glories will make us live again.

The new historical spirit manifests itself in all the branches of Indian life. Literature and Philosophy had been receiving the attention of by far the most numerous section of Indologists. The Study of Hindu Law was also a favourite subject with many and impetus was given to it by the new rulers of India who came to govern a vast mass of population with laws, manners and customs which bore little resemblance to those of their Christian conquerors, and as early as the days of Warren Hastings digests were made of the Gentoo law to help European Judges in settling the disputes arising between Indian litigants. These, however, were based on the later *Nibandhas* or on even later digests made on the basis of the Nibandhas themselves. For a more systematic study of Hindu law, we had to wait for a longer period. In course of the next fifty years, the Sanskrit language attracted the attention of Western scholars who mastered not only classical Sanskrit but also the antiquated language of the Vedas.

Gradually innumerable texts were edited and the more important of them translated, into the principal languages of Europe. When this was accomplished scholars got proper materials for a systematic study of Hindu Law. Legal texts as old as the literature subsidiary to the Vedas were discovered and these brought home the fact that in matters of juridical speculations the Indians were not below the standard of excellence they achieved in other spheres of life.

The beginnings of Hindu Jurisprudence go back to that hoary antiquity which saw the composition of the Vedic hymns. Consequently tradition attached to the hymns the importance of being the sole sources

of law or as it was conceived by the Hindus "Dharma." This Dharma concept grew into being out of the older concepts of Ṛta and Satya, which according to Vedic thought were the inspiring principles of creation and the upholders of the universal order. The preservation of this moral order was entrusted to King Varuṇa, the Judge *par excellence* among gods, who looked to the normal working of the cosmic principles not only in the universal system but also among individuals. The exercise of his authority was marked by the working of that dual principle which is recognised even now as the basic element in our judicial and legal system, *e.g.*, reward of virtue and punishment of wrong.

Side by side with these abstract conceptions practical codes came into existence which were based more or less on customs handed down from time immemorial or from *a priori* principles laid down by eminent lawgivers. The king too or the assembly in his absence did the part of a judicial authority, settled disputes or awarded punishment according to customary regulations or the voice of public opinion. Customs of locations or of communities hardened into laws and these received the sanction of the ruling authority. The germs of the earliest laws or of customs are to be found in the Vedic hymns or in the Brāhmaṇas. Thus we have the law of fines for murder, the law of debt, and clear references to the customary laws of inheritance and division of property in the oldest literature that has survived down to our times.

In the Dharmasūtras of which four old texts, *e.g.*, those of Āpastamba, Gautama, Vaśiṣṭha and Bodhāyana have come down to us, we have not only clear attempts at codification, but discussions as to the sources of law and the means of interpretations. They seem to be unanimous on the main principles but there exist ample differences of opinion as has been pointed out in modern works of researches. The laws of evidence as well as that of procedure also makes their appearance and these books may be taken to represent the earliest effort towards judicial systematisation.

With social complexities and with political changes the laws became more or less obsolete. Different legal schools arose based either on diversity of interpretation or of local custom. With the rise of the Empire, the old codes became obsolete and the Arthaśāstras rose to prominence. The authors of these utilised the old legal texts or traditions and to these were added chapters on torts and crimes, the number of which increased with the promulgation of royal edicts laying down rules of social and political conduct. The deficiencies of the old codes were made good by the issue of ordinances and edicts which practically created new law.

Only one such Arthaśāstra has come down to us and with all disputes relating to its date and authorship it is bound to prove not only a storehouse of information on legal matters, but also a systematic work which indicates the line of development in our legal and administrative history. In this respect the discovery of the work has to some extent revolutionised our knowledge of the past so far as the history of Hindu law is concerned. Kauṭilya mentions politico-legal schools like the Mānavāḥ, Bārhaspatyāḥ, Auśanasāḥ and his chapters on Dharmasthiya and Kaṇṭakaśodhana seem to be the earliest codes of the law which were really applied and administered by the government.

With the fall of the Empire, there was a reaction. Regal legislature or codification received a check and in an age of revolution and Brāhmanical revival the Dharmaśāstras came into prominence. Based more or less on the legal texts and traditions of the past, they absorbed much of the Arthaśāstra material, though giving prominence to the old Dharma ideal which seemed to put an end to regal legislation and tended to give to law a character of rigidity. Innumerable treatises were written and of these the most prominent are the texts of Manu, Yājñavalkya and Viṣṇu. Later on arose the commentarial school represented by Nārada, Kātyāyana and Bṛhaspati. There were many more but they exist only in quotations.

The last phase of Hindu legal history is represented by the able writers of commentaries or the compilers of Nibandhas, who are all too well known to be mentioned here. They profess to create or lay down no new law but they serve the useful purpose of modifying laws to suit the changed requirements of times. Some of the commentators like Vijñaneśvara proved themselves at least equal, if not superior, to the Jurists of other countries, who have contributed to the evolution of modern law. In the field of researches in Hindu law and Jurisprudence many European and Indian scholars have already contributed their quota. The names of Bühler, Jolly and Burnell are too well known to be repeated. Among living Indians may be mentioned the names of Dr. Jha, Jayaswal, and a host of other men who are contributing to our knowledge of ancient Hindu law.

The volume under review is a valued contribution to this branch of study. Neither the book which is an authorised translation of the "Recht und Sitte" published in 1896, nor its eminent author Dr. Julius Jolly, the veteran German Indologist of Würzburg, requires an introduction. The book is divided into six principal sections dealing with (*a*) the sources, (*b*) the family law and inheritance, (*c*) law of property and contract, (*d*) crime, penance and punishment, (*e*) Judicial procedure and (*f*) custom

and usages. Each chapter is comprehensive and utilises all the available material. The bibliography is up to date and includes the most recent compilations. Only one work is not seriously taken into account, namely the Arthaśāstra in which the learned author is an expert himself and which he has edited and critically analysed. The utilisation of the Arthaśāstra would have helped the author in revising some of his views and would have thrown important sidelights on important questions like the relation between sūtras and the later ślokas. So far as the early history of Hindu law and custom is concerned, very little can be said against the views of the author, but in regard to the immediate post-Dharmasūtra period, much remains to be said.

In some places there is room for difference of opinion. To cite one instance, the author's views that child marriage was looked upon with favour even in the earliest times, is sure to give rise to difference of opinion. Perhaps it would have been better if the author made himself more clear by noting a number of forces and social factors which made it incumbent on parents to marry their daughters early. The author's reliance on modern practice is not a very good principle. Criminal law ought to have received more attention.

With all these, the work is bound to remain a classic and will prove useful to succeeding generations of scholars.

We heartily congratulate the author and next to him, the young translator of the volume who has acquitted himself very creditably. His notes are very useful and add to the value of the translation.

Finally our best thanks are due to Dr. Kalidas Nag, M.A., D.Litt. (Paris), and the other active members of the Greater India Society, who are doing so much to revive the glorious traditions of the past. We hope that this volume will find its place in the library of scholars and students of Hindu law, not to speak of practising lawyers.

N. C. B.

The Next Rung : by K. S. Venkataramani, published by Svetaranya Ashrama, Mylapore, Madras.

The get-up of the book is good. The author in this book writes essays on different subjects. By these essays, the author thinks, he will help in some way to drive the world's chariot along right path, and to scatter a ray of light that will show us the way to the Next Rung in the New Ladder of Human Life. In his Essay *On Education*, the author observes:

"Our Schools and Colleges are erected on a sandy waste, strewn with the bones and the skeletons of a nightmarish past." The author wants to introduce a drastic change in school and college curricula to achieve a future for the race worthy of its own inner prophecies and higher tendencies. Perhaps the author will admit that there is something excellent in the past of India which went a great way in its making. Is it to be treated as nightmarish? In his Essay on *Some Problems of Swaraj India*, the author observes:

"We want Swaraj, we want freedom for all, not only for our own sake. For, the present Indian unrest, though immediately political, is finely saturated with the compassion and the culture, the refinement and the emotion, of Buddhistic India. Swaraj India has a message of service to the whole world. He is a traitor to the human cause who seeks to stifle this voice or imprison this aspiration." We are of opinion that the book is readable. It contains some good thoughts.

A. GUHA

Lectures and Essays, Vol. II, by Benoyendra Nath Sen, M.A., Professor, Presidency College, Calcutta, published by Navabidhan Trust, Calcutta. Price Re. 1.

The get-up of the book is not bad. The book contains some Lectures and Essays by the late Benoyendra Nath Sen, distinguished Professor, Presidency College, who passed away some years ago. They did not see the light, we think, previously in the form of a book. These Lectures and Essays are theological and attempt to explain to the world particularly the Spirit and Principles of the New Dispensation. With regard to the object of the New Dispensation, the author first notes, "to reconcile and harmonize the various systems of religion in the world." Every religion of the world has a peculiar growth of its own, and so we think, it is hardly possible to reconcile all Dispensations in the way Keshub Chunder tried to reconcile. Paramahamsa Ramkrishna, with whom Keshub Chunder mixed very intimately, observed with reference to the New Dispensation: "If with the head of one being, the breast of another, the hands of another, the legs of a different being and the other limbs of another yet, you want to construct a human being, it will be simply hideous and terrible." Time has shown the correctness of the above statement. In our opinion, to make all churches in the East and the West one undivided and universal Church of God, in the way Keshub

Chunder wanted to do it, is an impossible task. But the book has a high moral and religious tone. The power of expression of the author is excellent. In this respect, we can safely recommend the book to the reading public.

A. GUHA

The Good-Natured Man: by Oliver Goldsmith, with Introduction and Notes by Robert Herring, M.A., pp. xix and 107. The English Literature Series. Published by Macmillan & Co.

This book forms one of the admirable series already noticed in our issue of October, 1928.

K. B. R.

Ourselves

Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, M.A., D.Litt.

We are glad to announce that Professor S. Radhakrishnan, M.A., D.Litt., King George V Professor of Philosophy of this University, has been invited to deliver a course of six lectures at two University centres of Great Britain on the subject of An Idealist Philosophy of Life as the Hibbert Lecturer for 1929. He shares this unique distinction with such persons, among others, as Ernest Renan, Pfleiderer, Dean Inge and Rabindranath Tagore (who was elected for 1928, but owing to failing health was unable to deliver his lectures). We offer our hearty congratulations to our Professor.

* * *

Preliminary Scientific M.B. Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 192 of whom 161 passed, 30 failed, none were expelled and I was absent.

* * *

Result of the First M.B. (New) Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 64 of whom 31 passed, 31 failed, none were expelled and 2 were absent.

* * *

Result of the First M.B. (Old) Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 50, of whom 19 passed, 29 failed, none were expelled and 2 were absent.

* * *

Result of the Second M.B. Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 369 of whom 266 passed, 89 failed, none was expelled and 14 were absent. Of the successful candidates 2 obtained Honours.

* * *

Result of the Third M.B. Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 72 of whom 38 passed, 34 failed, none was expelled and none were absent. Out of these 38 who have passed, 8 who have failed in Pathology, should not be declared to have passed.

* * *

The D.P.H. Examination, Part II, December, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 17, of whom 11 passed and 6 failed.

* * *

Calcutta Mathematical Society.

Messages of congratulations, from famous mathematicians all over the world, have been received by Professor Ganesh Prasad, the President of the Society, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of its foundation. We gladly publish the following :—

(1) From Prof. Sir Joseph Larmor (*Cambridge*) : "May I offer cordial congratulations to the Calcutta Mathematical Society on its twenty years of fruitful activity, which has established its position among the main sources of mathematical science in the world. May the great age of Indian Mathematics be revived in our time."

(2) From Prof. Horace Lamb (*Cambridge*) : "The Calcutta Mathematical Society is to be congratulated on attaining its present anniversary, with its long record of valuable work in promoting the study and the development of the science. I most cordially wish it continued success and increased prosperity."

(3) From Prof. Maurice Frechet (*Strasburg*) : "Please receive my hearty congratulations on the excellent work performed in the past by the Society over which you preside and my wishes for its prosperity in the future."

(4) From Prof. E. R. Hedrick (*California*) : "Let me express to you and through you to the Calcutta Mathematical Society my congratulations upon the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the Society and my sincere wishes for the future growth and scientific success of the Society."

(5) From Prof. F. Riesz (*Szeged, Hungary*) : "Please communicate my best wishes for the Calcutta Mathematical Society."

(6) From Dr. Charles Chree (*Gloucester*): "Please receive my best wishes for the success of the commemoration volume."

(7) From Prof. R. Fueter (*Zurich*): "I congratulate your famous Society on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of its foundation."

(8) From Prof. J. Hadamard (*Paris*): "Please receive the expression of my heartiest sympathy for colleagues and your Society on the important and beautiful occasion."

(9) From Prof. L. Bieberlach (*Berlin*): "On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the foundation of the famous Society, I send my heartfelt congratulations. May the Society, in the following decades, in continuation of its so brilliantly begun work, further successfully serve the development and diffusion of mathematical science by its works and earn new fame."

(10) From Prof. W. Sierpinski (*Warsaw*) and Prof. S. Mazurkiewicz (*Warsaw*): "On behalf of the directors of the Journal, *Fundamenta Mathematical* we offer on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Society, whose activities have been so fruitful, our most sincere congratulations and our warmest wishes for its continued prosperity."

(11) From Sir F. W. Dyson, Astronomer-Royal of England (*Greenwich*): "Allow me to offer to the Calcutta Mathematical Society my congratulations on the amount of good work it has done since its foundation. The output of mathematical research from India is considerable and of high quality. I feel sure that this is stimulated and encouraged by the existence of the Society. Let me wish the Society an even more useful and distinguished life in the future."

* * *

Professor S. Mukhopadhyay's Researches.

We are glad to publish the following extracts from letters received by Professor S. Mukhopadhyaya of the Calcutta University from distinguished savants all over the world appraising his work.

Professor J. Hadamard, Paris: "My interest in your *New Methods in the Geometry of a Plane Arc*, which I had expressed in 1909 in a (anonymous) note in the *Revue Generale des Sciences*, has far from diminished since that time.

Precisely at my colloquum or seminaire of the College de France, we have reviewed such subjects and all my auditors and colleagues have been keenly interested in your way of researches which we all consider as one of the most important roads opened to Mathematical Science."

Professor F. Engel, Geissen: "I am surprised over the beautiful *new* calculations on right-angled triangles and three-right-angled quadrilaterals (in hyperbolic geometry).... Your analogies in the Gaussian Pentagramma Mirificum are highly remarkable."

Professor W. Blaschke, Hamburg: "I am much obliged to you for your kind sending of your beautiful geometrical work. When, as I hope, a new edition of my Lessons in Differential Geometry comes out, I shall not forget to mention that you were the *first* to give the beautiful theorems on the numbers of Cyclic and Sextactic points on an oval."

Professor F. Cajori, California: "I congratulate you upon your success in research. If ever I have the time

and opportunity to revise my history of mathematics I shall have occasion to refer to your interesting work."

Professor T. Hayashi, Japan: "Sincerely I congratulate you upon your success on *New Methods in Geometry*, specially on the *new concept of intimacy*."



THE CALCUTTA REVIEW

MARCH, 1929

GERMANY—TEN YEARS AFTER THE WORLD WAR

Munich, Nov. 11, 1928.—This morning when I looked out from the window of my room, I saw a strange sight—large black flags were flying from all the important buildings of the city and national flags were at under half-mast. Ten years ago Germany had to sign the armistice, the terms dictated by her enemies, during the World War. To-day the whole German nation paid its homage to their war-dead and solemnly observed the day as the Day of National Humiliation.

Although the official ceremony of paying homage to the war-dead, before the War Memorial of the city of Munich and the state of Bavaria was scheduled to be held at 11-30 A.M. literally tens of thousands of people were solemnly waiting in the streets, as early as 9 A.M. to watch the procession of the veterans and to participate in the solemn ceremony. Never in my life I saw a more impressive as well as simple ceremony as I witnessed this morning. The crowd was solemn and even meditative in temperament. The black flags and the whole atmosphere of the incident left the impression that this great people would never permanently submit to the unjust treaty of Versailles. They will recover their dominant position in the world. Just as France lost the Franco-Prussian War in 1871 and lost the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, but she never stopped thinking of recovering the lost provinces, until she did

recover them as the result of the World War, similarly the German people will never stop thinking and consciously working for the recovery of their loss. They may not get back the very possessions they have lost ; but they will secure a new dominant position, even if it takes half a century to accomplish this end. What is half a century for a living and growing nation !

Ten years after the World War it is apparent to me that Germany is not a crushed nation ; on the contrary, the people in general are determined to work harder than ever to become greater than ever before. The German people recognize their vast loss and humiliation. *They certainly do not recognise they were solely responsible for the World War ; but they feel that German diplomacy committed blunders which resulted in isolation in World Politics: Yet the people as a whole do not live thinking about their past, nor do they eternally grumble because they are suffering great hardships as victims of circumstances ; but they are working for a bright future.* What have the German people accomplished during the last ten years, under the most adverse internal and international conditions? To many impartial observers it would seem that they have accomplished something like a miracle ; and I shall try to note a few outstanding features of their great accomplishment.

II

Overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic in Germany is the most outstanding change in German political life. The most interesting feature of this change was that *Emperor William II abdicated and left Germany for Holland according to the advice of his military leaders who thought it to be the best course for him to follow, to save the country from an internal revolutionary outbreak and external military pressure. It was thought by many sincere patriots of Germany that if the Emperor had not abdicated the enemies of Germany, especially America (Woodrow Wilson), would not have*

agreed to the conclusion of an armistice and march into German territory, inflicting incalculable loss of German life and devastation of the country. Thus the change from monarchy to a republic in Germany did not come through a bloody revolution of the type of the French Revolution.

With the establishment of the republic, the old ruling class and the members of the princely families have lost considerably, as they have been shorn of their power and property. It is too much to expect that within ten years German aristocrats would give up all hopes of recovering their power and position through the re-establishment of monarchy. Let us remember the fact that more than half a century after the establishment of the Third Republic in France even to-day there is a Royalist Party of some influence in France. The German Nationalist Party, under whose banner the advocates of the Old Order rallied is every day losing its strength ; and it became very evident at the last election when they lost a large number of seats whereas the Socialists and Communists gained their numbers in the Reichstag. Furthermore the Nationalist Party has been split up on the very question of the re-establishment of monarchy. A considerable number of German Nationalists think that they will not be able to re-establish monarchy by popular consent and it is better for them to drop that issue and concentrate their efforts to rebuild Germany under the leadership of the Conservative elements on a conservative line, opposed to the radical, socialistic or communistic programme. While the extreme right wing of the German Nationalists (Monarchists) and the extreme left wing of the German Socialists (Communists) are in the lime-light for their ultra-conservative or reactionary and ultra-radical views, none of these two political parties has any chance of gaining dominant position in German political life in the near future. It is clear from the past incidents that if the monarchists ever make a serious attempt to overthrow the republic, then the Communists, the Socialists, the Centre Parties (the Catholic parties), the Democrats, the Liberals and others will

make a common cause to uphold the republic ; similarly if the Communists ever strive to establish Sovietism in Germany, they will be opposed by the Socialists and all other parties. Although the German nation is torn into political factions to such an extent that the present government is not even a coalition of various parties, but is merely a Government of personalities, *yet it is safe to say that there is no immediate danger to the Republic. This is a great accomplishment.*

III

What has Germany accomplished in the field of national prosperity? Several important and large volumes have been written by competent German and foreign authors on this very subject and I shall only mention my general conclusions. During the first five or six years after the World War the economic condition of Germany was in greater chaotic condition than its political condition. It must not be forgotten that during the last two years of the World War, the whole German nation was in a semi-starved condition. *Germany surrendered because of the weapon of blockade and the new military pressure due to America's active participation in the war.* Ten years ago the German people did not have enough food to live upon, they did not have the necessary raw materials to run their industries, they did not have the necessary capital and credit to revive their foreign trade. Inflation ruined the nation. Yet during the last five years Germany has not only revived her principal industries, stabilised her currency, but recovered her foreign trade to such an extent that she is economically stable. Her economic stability has been aided by international support, specially American confidence ; as America has poured in billions of dollars into Germany to enable her economic reconstruction. To be concrete, although Germany lost very valuable coal and iron mines as the result of the Treaty of Versailles, to-day her steel production is

nearly on the pre-war level; her merchant marine has again secured a dominant position in the field of world commerce, her chemical industries are in a flourishing condition, her electric industries are on the upward grade. Germany surpasses all nations in commercial aviation. German industries are reorganised by utilising the most scientific and up-to-date improvements.

The greatest asset of a nation does not lie in its material resources or economic power, but it is the national intelligence and national health. The German Government and people, since the World War, have devoted great deal of their energies towards the educational betterment of the nation and promotion of national health. In these fields Germany surpasses most of the nations of the world ; and foundations are being laid for greater progress.

IV

Germany was defeated in the World War not because of her military weakness, but because of the diplomatic blunders of German statesmen which resulted in her complete isolation in World Politics. Ten years ago when Germany was forced to seek armistice, it was quite clear that the peace terms to which she would be forced to submit would curtail her independence. Long before the Treaty of Versailles was signed the victorious allies agreed to pursue a policy of permanent isolation of Germany in world politics. How far has Germany succeeded to overcome the serious drawback of isolation in world politics ? To answer this question is to make a survey of Germany's relations with all the important powers ; and I shall give a very brief sketch of it.

(*a*) No practical and far-sighted statesman should ever give up an alliance, without finding a better substitute for the abandoned one. When, after the fall of Bismarck, German statesmen practically gave up the alliance with Russia, they did not

try to have a better substitute. In fact although Great Britain, on several occasions before the conclusion of the Entente with France, tried to form an alliance with Germany, yet the vascillating German statesmen, especially Prince von Bulow and Kaiser Wilhelm II, did not accept the offer which they should have done, as they were not sure of Russia. If Great Britain could have secured an alliance with Germany, then she would have remained contented with an Anglo-German-Japanese Alliance against the Dual Alliance of France and Russia. *As she (Great Britain) could not get Germany to side with her unconditionally and also because the German naval programme was opposed to her own interests, Britain joined with France and Russia in the Triple Entente. Russian enmity to Germany was one of the surest causes of the World War and Germany's loss in the World War.*

It should be to the eternal credit of the late Walter Ratheneau (who was a Jew, but a true German) that he as a far-sighted statesman entered into a friendly understanding with the Russian Soviet Government. The late Walter Ratheneau (who was later on assassinated by misguided German nationalist youths who hated him as a Jew) and M. Tchicherin signed the Rapallo Agreement, after the failure of the Genoa Conference in which France and England refused to treat Germany with consideration and ignored her requests to enter the League of Nations. By the Rapallo Agreement a new page of German-Russian relations was opened. Fortunately for these two nations, under the most adverse circumstances German statesmen have refused to give up the policy of Russo-German friendship. When Germany entered the League of Nations, she definitely stipulated that she would not be a party against Russia. When the Locarno Pact was signed many people thought that German statesmen would actively participate in the activities of Great Britain and France to bring about isolation of Soviet Russia. *When Germany refused to follow Great Britain by breaking off diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia*

after the shameful Arcos Raid in London, it became apparent that maintenance of Russo-German friendship was the cardinal factor in the German foreign policy of to-day. Russo-German friendship is needed to serve the best interests of Russia and Germany and as long as Russo-German friendship continues, there is **no** *possibility of complete isolation of Germany in world politics.*

(*b*) Some of the German statesmen now realise that Germany might have been able to win victory in the World War, if Japan were not an ally of Great Britain and Russia. Some German statesmen rightly recognise the fact that if Germany had accepted Japan's demand of Germany's giving up all claims to Tsingtao and the region of Kiao-chao, then Japan might not have entered the World War against Germany. In that case Russia would have been forced to maintain a large force in Siberia, fearing Japanese designs in Manchuria, Mongolia and Eastern Siberia. This would have made it impossible for Russia to march into East Prussia; and then there would not have been a defeat of Germany at the Battle of the Marne, which was really the beginning of the German defeat in the World War. Then again if Germany could have kept Japan out of the World War against her by making concessions, then America would never have entered the World War and in that case Germany would have won the war. Thus next to Russo-German enmity, German-Japanese enmity was a serious factor in Germany's downfall. What has been done to re-establish German-Japanese friendship?

Japan's anti-German policy was of Germany's own making. After the first Treaty of Simonoseki (after the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War), Germany took the initiative to make common cause with Russia and France against Japan. It is said that German statesmen took this step with the hope of diverting Russian attention from the Balkans to the Far East and also to pave the way for a Franco-German-Russian understanding. However, this policy proved to be abortive with the

net result of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japanese hostility to Germany. Since the conclusion of the World War, German-Japanese relations have been cordial and measures have been taken both in Japan and Germany to promote intellectual co-operation. The conclusion of the recent commercial treaty between Japan and Germany has cemented German-Japanese friendship. This is a distinct gain for both the nations.

(*c*) If America had not entered the World War in favor of the Entente-group of powers, and if unrestricted submarine warfare were continued, then Germany could not have been defeated. At best the Entente-allies would have ended the war, according to the formula of "peace without victory." At the last stage of the World War, America became the determining factor. After the World War, America emerged as the strongest nation, economically and industrially; and it became clear that no nation could ignore America's political as well as military power. What is the present situation between Germany and the United States of America?

Politically there is no conflicting interests between these two nations and Germany has loyally co-operated with the United States in all larger issues of world politics, including the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact. The United States withdrew her army of occupation from the Rhineland on her own initiative and has extended every form of economic and political support to Germany. It is quite conceivable that American-German relations will be friendlier, as time goes by.

(*d*) Anglo-German relations are not what they should have been under normal circumstances. At times, during the last five years British statesmen showed decided preference for German co-operation; but since Germany refused to be a party to Britain's policy of isolating Soviet Russia, British Conservative statesmen chose to revitalise the old Anglo-French Entente, which might be used effectively against Germany, Russia and even diplomatically against the United States. However the British Conservative

Government had to issue a statement to the effect that the proposed Anglo-French Naval Pact was not directed against Germany. This fact and the recent efforts of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald at Berlin to win the confidence of German statesmen, assuring determined opposition of the British Labour Party to any Anglo-French Entente against Germany, promises for a better relations between Great Britain and Germany.

(*e*) Inspite of the Locarno Pact, Germany's entry into the League of Nations, France depends upon her allies—Belgium, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Rumania—for support against Germany. France under Poincare believes in pursuing the policy of isolation of Germany and she is sticking to it for all its worth. Although much improvement has been made in Franco-German relations, through commercial treaties, payments of reparations, yet Franco-German cordiality is not deep enough to insure confidence. As long as French, British and Belgian forces remain in the Rhineland there is no genuine possibility of healing the wound. However the very fact that these nations are anxious to start a fresh negotiation for the evacuation of the Rhineland and settlement of reparation questions shows that Germany's position in World Politics has secured some strength.

(*f*) Although Italy was a party to the Triple Alliance, she entered the World War against Germany because Italy wanted to recover certain parts of the *unredeemed Italy* which was under Austrian control and occupation. Italy did not want the existence of Austrian naval power in the Adriatic. With the destruction of the Austrian Empire and creation of a new and insignificant Austria, Italy has no direct reason to be unfriendly to Germany. On the contrary, there is every reason for Italo-German co-operation, because of the existing doubtful relations between France and Italy.

(*g*) Nationalism was one of the causes of the World War, and Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia, Hungary and other free nations have come into existence to fulfil the demands of

nationalism and "self-determination." *German-Austria and Germany must in course of time be united into one state to fulfil the demand of national unity of German-speaking people in Europe.* At present there are various obstacles in the way of Austro-German union but the process of union has begun with various forms of co-operation among these peoples. It is a mere question of time when some of the present opponents of Austro-German union will be anxious to support it for their own interests and then it would be easier for Germany to accomplish the desired object.

(*h*) When the World War ended Germany was regarded as the pariah among the civilized nations. Unjustly all the blame for the World War was heaped upon her and she was not even allowed to become a member of the League of Nations —which was really the League of Victors created to preserve the spoils of the war. But to-day Germany is in the League not as an ordinary member of this international diplomatic organization, but as a permanent member of the League Council, having equal authority with Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. German colonies were taken away by the victorious nations under the garb of the mandate system; and to-day Germany has a special representative in the League's Mandate Commission. To-day of all the great powers in the League of Nations, Germany's moral influence among the small nations—members of the League—is the greatest, because of her stand on the question of General Arbitration and Disarmament. This is a considerable gain for Germany.

(*i*) Spain and the Scandinavian countries remained neutral during the World War; and it is gratifying that German relations with these nations are as cordial, if not better, as they were before the World War.

(*j*) As a result of the World War, Germany has lost all her colonial possessions in Asia; and this is in a sense a blessing in disguise. To-day all Asiatic nations feel that Germany has no designs against their independence. This

attitude of about 90,000,000 peoples of the awakened Asia is a great political asset for Germany's future. Germany's relations with China are most cordial. The Government of Chiang Kai Sek has not only concluded a new commercial treaty with Germany on terms of equality, but the nationalist government of China has already appointed several German advisers, including Colonel Bauer, the famous artillery officer of the former German General Staff. Germany has no political ambition in India ; on the contrary, the German people feel sympathetically towards Indian aspirations for freedom. Germany's cultural and economic expansion in India will lead to ultimate Indo-German co-operation in other fields. Germany's attitude towards Afghanistan has been friendly and this has been demonstrated by German hospitality to His Majesty King Amanulla during his recent visit in Europe. German influence in Persia is purely economic and commercial. It is noteworthy that a German financial adviser has been appointed by the Persian Government to take the place of the former American adviser. Several German engineering firms have secured contracts for building railroads in Persia. Although no Turko-German alliance is in existence any longer, yet the relations between these two nations are most cordial. Asia's friendship and confidence in Germany will be a great asset for her future greatness.

During the first five years after the conclusion of the World War, Germany's position was desperate and gloomy. German statesmanship, German endeavours in the field of finance, commerce and industry as well as education and national health have produced most sanguine results. More than seventy millions of German people, most progressive and industrious of all European nations, can never be kept down permanently. A new and stronger Germany is in the process of assertion.

TARAKNATH DAS

HOW FAIR MY WEAKNESS

Ah! How fair my weakness finds thee
Slender lily of the vale ;
How thy graceful beauty blinds me
As thy voice chants Hymen's tale!
And thy soft lustrous eyes
As they love and sympathise
Ah! How fair my weakness finds thee—
Beauteous Maid!

Ah! How cold my manhood finds thee
Fickle lily of the vale ;
When my self-respect reminds me
That thy love is false and frail!
Crafty beauty that you be
But you'll make no slave of me
Ah! How cold my manhood finds thee
Fickle Jade!

Ah! Perhaps my memory haunts thee
Lurid lily of the vale ;
For thy smile no longer taunts me
And thy love brings no avail!
It is good that I am free
From thy gilded slavery
Ah! May be my memory haunts thee
Let it fade!

K. LENNARD-ARKLOW



VII

EXAMINATIONS

It has already been noticed that the results of Education, materialse long after the Education itself has passed out of the control of those responsible for it, and in the article on the choice of students, it has also been emphasised that some appraisement of these results is necessary at almost every stage of the student's career. It is obvious, therefore, that we have in this the need for a present estimate of the ultimate value of a process in its germinating stage a problem of first class importance and difficulty well worthy of a careful and comprehensive study from all points of view.

Expert opinion is practically unanimous in declaring that our popular system of testing the student's work by means of questions, usually written, and to be answered in writing within a limited time, is very unsatisfactory. It is not as unsatisfactory, perhaps, as this unanimity would seem to prove. A fair proportion of the chorus of condemnation comes from teachers and students who have been unsuccessful in the examinations, and who, for reasons easily understood, may be expected to condemn any system with a vigour proportional to its efficiency.

The great virtue of the written examination is its absolute incorruptibility. The papers are numbered, but not signed, and as a rule the person who sets the question, and he, very often not the same, who examines and values the answers, know nothing of the candidates or their teachers. This, complete fairness as between competing students, and the sporting instinct to which the competitive character of the examinations appeals, have so far sufficed to make them the most popular way of grading the students, both with the students themselves,

and with those employers who regard education as a useful attribute of their employees.

The defects alleged against them are as follows:—They test only the memory and the power to reproduce a given form of words in writing. The time limit adds to these the qualifications that the successful candidate must be free from nervousness, and must throw what he knows on to the paper at top speed, and without wasting time in thought. These faculties they (the experts) say have no necessary connection either with real knowledge of the things which the forms of words represent or with the student's intelligence. They say also that the cramming of the memory and the attention which must be given to acquiring the art of expressing one's ideas in writing absorb time and energy, which ought to be devoted to real education, and thus react with evil effect on the whole of the school work preceding the examination. Also, not all subjects are suitable for testing by means of written questions. One does not require any expert knowledge, for instance, to realize that an examinee might be able to answer all possible questions on the theory of music, without being able to compose or play a single bar that would be worth listening to. It is the analytic faculty rather than synthetic power that is tested by questions. Furthermore; not all students can be fairly tested within a time limit. It is characteristic of a certain powerful type of mind, that it is abnormally slow in appreciating what the question really is: but which, when once it gets away has penetration far above the average.

There is a good deal of truth in this indictment. There is in fact a type of mind which is able to commit vast stores of prose to memory without understanding it. It is even not uncommon, and at the top of examination lists, unless the papers have been very carefully framed to exclude it, it may be prevalent. The more usual type of mind, however, is not made in this way. A Chinese or an Arab student ignorant of English if asked to commit the contents of this page to memory

would consider it a matter of indifference whether he began at the top or the bottom, but most people, would prefer to use the meaning as an aid to memory. In that case something more than mere memory is implied by a successful effort. It is not impossible, if care is taken, to so frame an examination paper that this interaction of memory and reason is indispensable. It would be a mistake to exclude the memory question altogether. Memory though not a faculty of first class importance to a race possessed of the arts of writing and reading is still necessary in some degree for all connected thought, and ought to be given its share of education. In certain subjects, foreign languages, and the elements of their grammar for instance, memory is of prime importance.

There are good as well as evil reactions of the examination system on the teaching which ought not to be lightly sacrificed. To tell a boy of, say, ten years of age, that what he is now learning will be of great value to him when he is twenty-five, is equivalent to telling him that the results of his work will only materialise when he is dead. He cannot at that age realise the desires and ambitions of manhood which are not yet born in him. We ought to remember that a decade seems like a century to a boy. However interesting we make the work there must always be a residue of matter to be absorbed which will be distasteful and which will call for patient resolution and systematic labour not enjoyable in itself. The cultivation of this far-seeing endeavour is a legitimate part of education, and the temporary use of some such goal as an examination a year away is not to be despised. Even a boy of only ten can sometimes distinctly see an event as near as that though it would be invisible at a greater distance.

A properly managed system of external examinations, even if they are only written examinations, may also have a very stimulating effect on the teachers. Many of them are isolated in small provincial towns, or in the country, where they find themselves the most learned member of their community, a

position which tends to breed slackness. Periodical examinations set by some first class man from outside, which contain questions that not only trouble the students but send the teacher to his books as well, may do a far greater work than they ostensibly pretend to.

The work of setting examination papers, and marking the answers, is at present given as a perquisite, usually to teachers fully engaged with their ordinary work. It comes (at least the marking does) either at the busy end of the session, or in the holidays. The faster the examiner can do it the more of this useful money he can make. He may have anything from a dozen to a hundred answer books for each paper. Only the first half dozen are at all interesting. The examiner may spend 15 or 20 minutes over the first book, but the fiftieth is lucky if it gets three minutes. Nine out of ten of the candidates are found to choose the same questions and make the same mistakes. It seems almost superfluous to add that any student within 10 per cent. of the border line might just as well toss up to see whether he has passed or not. Speed in getting through the papers is greatly facilitated if the questions are of the type where definite data lead to a definite result. The answer is either right or wrong and the question gets full marks or none. There is no need to consider the method of attack at all. If the candidate has to choose say 5 questions, and gets three right and two wrong that is 60 per cent. Three minutes is ample!

If one had time, however, to examine carefully those books over which the candidates have agonized for three hours, the questions with wrong answers or those with workings that have not reached solution, would be found to abound with indications of the student's character, and ability. Here and there would be found a book where one question only had been attempted, and treasures of original thought lavished on what in the end turned out to be a blind alley. Plucked, of course! At the most he could only have got 20 per cent. even if he had

been correct. The student who allows himself to get interested in any question in an examination is lost.

Examining under the present system is like the English Evening Class : a spare time job with the money as the principal motive, and very badly done. It is just as far as it goes. A candidate who gets all his answers right (or most of them) will certainly pass. But he may be merely an uninspired swot, with a retentive memory. The one who does not get any (or hardly any) correct will certainly fail. But he may be that original type of mind that can never be content to do things in the conventional way. Probably he is simply an ass but he *might* be a genius. If he was, the examiner would never know it.

The academic succession is very evident in most examination papers. Certain text-books (in India, and in Technical subjects incredibly ancient books in many cases) are specified for the student's study. It is from those books that most of the questions set are taken. The questions the young Indian Engineer will have to answer in his professional career are, however, not to be found in text-books, as a rule : certainly not in text-books 20 or 30 years old. The urgent questions are being asked all over India by the business men who are trying to establish India's industry. It is on these questions that the young student should be trying his teeth.

It should not be very difficult to find out what these instant problems are. The organization for collecting them is already in existence. Nearly every province in India has its Department of Industries. If that department is at all ably conducted it ought to be a natural focus for the problems that the industrialist is working upon. It is not suggested that those questions could be directly put to students; but it seems only reasonable that they should very strongly influence both curriculum and examination. The great desideratum is organic connection between Industry and Education for participation in Industry.

Under the existing system this connection, though not entirely absent, is very casual, the serious discontinuity being between the expert advisers of the Departments of Industry and the Examiners. The first are or ought to be of an extremely practical turn of mind without pedagogic affinities at all. The examiner, on the other hand, is as described above; probably of the academic succession, and not in the habit of taking his work as an examiner very seriously, nor at all realizing its very great potentiality for good.

Our reasoning has brought us to a heresy that is likely to be loudly denounced as such by all those teachers who rely on examination fees to pay their rent; but the conclusion appears inevitable. It is that examination should be a full-time job, and the examiner, a kind of liaison officer between the Department of Industries and the Education Department. The Department of Industries cannot set a fair examination paper because it knows nothing of the school organisation, nor of the mentality of the candidates. The part-time teacher examiner can set a fair paper, but he cannot give the schools a lead, because he has usually only a very vague idea of what the industrial world wants to know, or what it will require of the graduate; and even if he had, has neither time not energy to complicate his task with these extraneous considerations.

The duty of the Department of Industries as regards Industry is to return prompt practical brief answers to all questions, uncomplicated by discussion, and untainted by pros and cons. All inquiries should be reported to the Board of full-time examiners; which should carefully analyse them. Some would require dissecting with reference to the school organisation and the classes into which science is divided for teaching purposes. Groups of others would focus in some general principle. If it was found that the same question was asked repeatedly, it would indicate a gap in education, and it would be the duty of the examining board to keep the teachers informed of such gaps, and by making questions based on it a prominent

feature of their papers, encourage its elimination. Certain difficulties would no doubt suggest, not written examination questions, but laboratory experiments, groups of experiments, new forms of apparatus, research, and general modifications of teaching method. The point is that, with this double tap root into adult activity and into the schools, the divergence of the Academic succession from the world's work would be impossible. Those in charge of Education would know what the things are that trouble this generation and what they have to prepare the next for. At present they have only confused and contradictory rumour.

The opposition will say:—"This is too Utopian; no State has has ever grandmothered its manufacturers as you propose the Department of Industries should do. It couldn't possibly deal with the enormous variety of questions, if they were submitted, and, even if it could it wouldn't get the chance. Every firm of repute has its own expert far more conversant with its details than these gentlemen could be. The whole thing would be a ghastly failure."

It is indeed too true that the growth of such a department would be very slow and disappointing. It would be found that in about two cases out of three, the manufacturer refused to adopt the solution offered to him. It would be too expensive, too troublesome, or (though this would not be explicitly stated) too much in conflict with preconceived ideas. People always treat expert advice in this way at first. But if the advice is sound, and there is no insuperable difficulty in the way of that, it would earn respect in time.

The academic objection to Utilitarian Education, also, would be certain to turn up again, if anything of this kind became a possibility. It would be said as usual that Education is an end in itself and that this attempt to bind it to the wheels of industry would be a crime.

We need not waste many words on it in this connection. We have been dealing with industrial Education only, and the

proposed full-time examiners would be concerned only with that. There is no reason why there should not also be an Artists' Consultative Board, a Musicians' Consultative Board, or even a Stockbrokers' Consultative Board, or so far as the manufacturer is concerned, why there should. Humanistic Education is not necessarily belittled because it is not specifically dealt with here.

It need not be assumed that because examinations occur only at certain seasons of the year, the examiner will have nothing to do at other seasons. If he prepares his questions with care; if he reports fully on his results; if he classifies them properly before doing so; if he adds to his duties the inspection of the actual teaching; and, above all, if he realises the importance of his work, the influence which it has and the number of problems which it presents, he will have ample to occupy him all the year round.

It seems likely that the best examiner will turn out to be one (not too old) who has been a good teacher. The teacher is one who unseals the mind of his students, as much as he is one who imparts information and this unsealing is akin to what an examination ought to do. But it is a full-time job. It should not be allowed to remain a perquisite with negligible duties as it is at present.

Some consideration should be given to the time limit. It would be extremely awkward for the organizers of an examination if time was unlimited of course; but the object of the examination being primarily to test the student's knowledge and ability, that difficulty should not be allowed to carry as much weight as it does. Great haste is not very favourable to thought; and it will not often be found that the man who comes quickly to a decision is right in his conclusions; nor that he has ploughed very deep. Many examiners realize that, and require an amount of work in 3 hours that could normally be done in two—but not all. There should always be a substantial margin of time. If that is provided the worst that can happen is that an unfit student will fill his papers with alternative

guesses, in the hope that some of them will be right ; but that trick should not defeat an intelligent examiner.

The examination in a number of subjects within a week or two at the end of a year's work, gives more credit to memory, and less to steady industry and natural ability than it ought, with the result that there is a good deal of unwholesome idleness at the beginning of the year, and in many cases dangerous over-pressure as the time of the examination draws near. A wiser system would make it impossible for the student to hope that any effort could possibly redeem an idle year at the last moment, no matter how great that effort might be.

Whenever it is left to the teacher to declare whether a student has passed or not, merely as a result of his observation during the year of the student's work, a great many are allowed to pass who should have been stopped ; partly because of the decent teacher's love for his students, and partly because, a high percentage of passes is supposed to reflect credit on him. On the other hand when the matter is left entirely to the external examiner, a great many pass who have crammed their text-books at the last moment, only to forget them as soon as the examinations are over. Both these phenomena are well known, and for that reason, it is usual to require the student to satisfy both external and internal examiners ; it being usual to distribute subjects pretty much at random between the two classes of examiners.

In technology and in science, however, there are certain subjects suitable for external examination and others that are not ; certain subjects that can only be properly examined by day by day observation of the student's work, and others in which it is possible to make a fair estimate of his progress by means of a question paper. The technological subjects suitable for internal examination extending over the whole session are :—

(*a*) all forms of Drawing and Design,
(*b*) all forms of Workshop practice,
(*c*) laboratory work.

None of these can be at all fairly tested within a time limit during which the student is deprived of the use of books and notes. The time-limit written examination at the end of the session, should be designed to test the student's grasp of those general principles that should be always in the mind of a competent professional man ; and his skill in applying them to the solution of problems. It should not require an encyclopaedic recollection of detail having no general significance.

L. D. COUESLANT

FORGET-ME-NOTS

Flowers for remembrance,
Forget-me-nots of blue,
Memories for the future
Dreams and thoughts of you!
Hopes, and dreams, and wishes
Forget-me-nots express,
Wishes—O! such wishes!
Lips could not confess.

God watched o'er these flowerets
Wiped them clean of fret,
Gave them you to send me
That I should not forget.
And so, this rose I'm sending
All diamonded with dew,
A sweet red rose that's bearing
My fondest love to you!

LELAND J. BERRY

LAW AND MORALS

The question of the relation between Law and Morals may appear in a manner to have been prejudged by the statement made in my previous address on "Law and Truth," that it is the business of Law at all times effectively to reflect that complex of beliefs and practices which is styled the *mores* of the day. I confess that do what I may, subjecting myself repeatedly to a discipline Cartesian is severity and thoroughness, I have found myself, at the end of every such process of intellectual self-flagellation, back to the fundamental conviction that Law must be subordinated to Morals and through Morals to the Conscience of men.

But what are Morals ? And what is the character of this relation of subordination?

I have deliberately preferred the term "Morals" to "Ethics." Under the category of "Morals," I wish to include every rule of good conduct, and rules of good conduct spread a good deal beyond what is implied by purely ethical conduct. Conduct which may be indifferent in ethical value may yet be opposed to the *mores* of the day, as being indecent or crassly thoughtless. Equally opposed to the *mores* of the day may be that pedantic over-accentuation of formal ethicism which bears the ill name of "priggishness" and which is twin-brother to that other vice, sanctimoniousness.

Where again in the *mores* of the day is the place of faith in religion, of conformity to religious practices? Modern States comprise people of different religious beliefs—of communities conforming in varying degrees to different religious and social practices, eating different foods, observing different fasts and festivals, affecting different modes of esthetic enjoyment. What

are the *mores* of the day at any given time in a modern State? And are there more than one body of morals operating at the same time within the same political jurisdiction? In the presence of such and other particularistic conflicts, where are the *mores* of the day and how is the Law to seek to reflect and realise them?

To say that it is the business of Law to reflect effectively the *mores* of the day is therefore clearly not to solve the problem. It is merely to formulate it. The finding of the right rules of law and their application have, as I have already stated, always been and must be a serious and difficult business. With the progress of complexity in social arrangements, the seriousness and the difficulty have increased rather than diminished. And, mark this, there is no finality in the rules found, just as (and because) there is no finality in social adjustments. The laws and the manner of their application must undergo perpetual adaptation. But through all the changes, there must (as I have taken pains to stress in my address on "Law and Logic") be maintained a character of stability. Whatever is stable for the time being, however, is not for that reason static, though in order to be dynamic (as Law is and must be), it need not, I affirm again, be in a state of Heraclitean flux.

Rules of Law are first and foremost rules of human conduct, that is to say, rules which must directly or indirectly determine human action. So must moral rules, understood whether in the narrower sense in which they are usually spoken of, or in the wider sense I have indicated. But these last by no means exhaust the whole range of human conduct. What I mean is that all rules of human action do not necessarily have a moral implication understood in even this wider sense, and let us be thankful to the mysterious Powers that rule human destiny that they do not. Only a fraction again of the moral rules, so understood, take rank as legal rules. All legal rules (except mere rules of procedure and what are styled enabling statutes which are law only by courtesy) must be moral rules in the wider

sense but all moral rules cannot and, as I shall explain later, should not embody themselves in legal rules.[1]

It follows that all legal and moral rules must possess certain general characteristics which should be noted here. Let it be noted, first, that both varieties of rules are intended to govern the voluntary acts of individual human beings. I have used the term "govern" because the rules (of both Law and Morals) are in a sense mandatory and not conventional, and are often spoken of as "commandments" because men are *required* to follow them. But they have to follow them (and this I may say is one of the main theses of my address) not because they are commanded but because on the whole men feel that they have to be followed for the attainment and maintenance of their highest well-being, individual and communal. What I am anxious these words "govern," "mandatory," "commandments" shall *not* convey to the philosophical student of law and morals is that these rules are compulsory in the sense that they deprive the individuals to whom they are addressed of the option, if they so choose, to do the opposite. They are originally and essentially *appeals*

[1] It may be argued that the laws of all nations abound with rules which lack all moral significance and may even appear to be immoral and unjust. To that my reply is that if through mistake, wrongheadedness or negligence the field has been sown in part with tares, that does not mean that the object is the cultivation of tares.

It has to be observed also that the legislative machinery as perfected in the last century has lent itself readily to purposes of organising social institutions in ways of which the moral significance in the stricter sense is not apparent but which are explicable rather as experiments in methods of expediency and economy. I do not condemn this use of the legislative machinery as illegitimate any more than I do the utilization of the surplus resources of a Government Printing Press to job printing for private persons, or jail industry, to cite an instance of another sort. These regulations of legislative origin are bye-products for which a name will have to be found some day, in the interest of precision and scientific classification. What is the exact ethical basis of Working Men's Compensation laws and unemployment insurance? Where should we place them in a classification of laws? One thing is certain however that these and similar schemes of social reorganisation will not receive legislative sanction unless somehow they fit in with the prevailing scheme of morality of the times, and in any case not if they are opposed to it. They must not be polarised contrariwise.

to the individuals' civic and moral consciences. There are no doubt characteristic *sanctions* attached to them in their respective spheres. But what have specially to be noted is that the sanctions do not operate until the addressees of the so-called commandments have had a chance of disobeying them. An act would not be voluntary, if the option not to do it was not *there,* and I am posing no paradox when I say that by depriving a man of the option to do wrong you deprive him of the privilege of doing right. Rules of law and morals, I say, are commandments which those to whom they are addressed are free to obey or not, at their own risk. *Men are not to be driven on rails nor yet by reins.* There is no merit in converting autonomous human beings into automata and I for one would not go into ecstasies over the peace of a king of whom it might be said:

रेखामात्रमपि क्षुण्णादामनोर्वर्त्मनः परम् ।
न व्यतीयुः प्रजास्तस्य नियन्तुर्नेमिवृत्तयः ॥

which freely translated may be rendered into English as follows: "Such a fine driver of the State chariot was he that his subjects did not deviate by a hair's breadth from the path marked out for them since the days of Manu." A moral rule, I say again, will cease to be moral if it compels people without choice to be moral. Equally, a legal rule ceases to be legal if it compels obedience without option of violation. Were it otherwise, would not prison-houses be ideal nurseries of law and order?[1] And what a prison-house it would need to make

[1] To insure the safety of the body politic Law has to sanction and maintain prison-houses and for the same reason to ordain certain measures aimed at preventing rather than punishing the commission of offences. All these provisions agree in being directed against persons who have been *found* to be so far abnormal that special measures of restraint have, by way of exception, to be taken in their cases in the interest of the community. Law, in other words, does not treat them as normal, moral and responsible individuals because they are not. Prevention of offences of the graver sort when they are being or are about to be committed is also justifiable on the grounds of the proved failure of moral restraints.

all men law-abiding! It is not sanction but conscience which coerces, if anything does so at all. Sanctions are *ex post facto* visitations. Legal sanctions are merely marks or *indicia* that a breach of a rule to which they are attached will be punished or penalised *after the event by the State itself*. The binding character of legal rules is not derived from their sanctions.

It follows that the difference between legal and moral rules rests outwardly on the difference in the respective sanctions by which in cases of breach the violator of these rules are visited and the agency by which the sanctions (not the rules) are enforced, the intrinsic character and the ultimate purpose of both sets of rules being the same. As previously stated, most legal rules are, at bottom, moral rules, but all moral rules (because of their far wider extension and scope) are not legal rules. The same rule may thus be simultaneously supported by legal as well as moral sanctions and enforced at the same time by State agencies and by the various methods and influences by which outraged social, communal or sectional opinion may make itself felt. The delimitation of the province of law from the wider domain of morals has been, it will be observed, a familiar device of social economy in all ages and climes. The boundary line has never been rigidly drawn and is always shifting. But patent as the distinction between law and morals may superficially appear to be, it is by no means easy to formulate general reasons why some matter or matters only and not others should be made over to law and not left to be secured like the rest by the force of moral judgments alone.

It is usually affirmed that law is concerned with requiring conformity to an external standard, it has nothing to do with what lies in the hearts of men. "The Devil himself," said a 15th century Chief Justice of England, "knoweth not the thought of man." But if courts of law must in this matter confess themselves to be even less discerning intellectually than Satan, how much more helpless must be my friends and

neighbours regarding the inner motives and intentions of my acts? The plain fact is that courts of law equally with one's neighbours (and let me add, *now* the ever watchful Public Press) are constantly engaged in judging of men's inner motives and intentions. *Per contra* has not Mrs. Grundy always shown more concern for my failures to conform to standards of decorum as manifested by outward acts than for what I think and feel? And the reason of that fact is plainly this that laws, equally with morals, have their roots deep down in the hearts of men. A rule of law or morals is not what it pretends to be if it finds no echo whatever in the moral consciousness of the community. They must all, without distinction, be such as will command general respect irrespective of the sanctions provided for their enforcement. It is unfortunately the case, for all that, that neither legal nor moral rules are universally respected or obeyed. But some of these rules are so intimately bound up with the vital forces of the community, that even a casual snapping of these rules has to be instantly remedied and repaired for the safety of the organism as a whole. The organised force of the entire community has to take charge of infractions of rules, the observance of which, so to speak, insures the safety of the body politic. The setting up of legal rules over moral rules does not thus mean a surrender by the latter to the former. Laws, I say, are never meant to replace morals. They are made to meet those exceptional cases where the moral forces left to themselves would prove too weak in operation to prevail unaided, and yet it is necessary for the safety of the community that they should prevail. The evil consequences of law *displacing* morals would be as serious as those of the parallel contingency of Mrs. Grundy dislodging all individual consciences and taking *sole* control of the morals of a people.

It has nevertheless to be admitted that the assumption of control by law does as a rule result in an appreciable weakening of the moral forces. State interference like that of Mrs.

Grundy's is thus an evil and not the less so because it is an unavoidable evil. Both species of interference have for this reason been likened to poison, bearable and beneficent only in moderate or attenuated doses. Also discrimination in application is in both cases indispensable to success. Law is physic not food as morals are, and not every moral disease will admit of exorcism by the big stick of law. Where morals suffice the law should hold its hands just as Mrs. Grundy would be always well-advised to turn her prying eyes the other way when men's individual consciences suffice to keep the moral atmosphere sweet and savoury.

I am *now* prepared to concede that law should *as a rule* confine itself to standardising the external conduct of men, for to pry too nicely into men's hearts for the sake of those hearts would be to interfere with what had best be left to individual consciences. Law should be very careful not to undermine morals by fussy and quixotic interference where it should well let things alone[1] "*Laissez faire*" should still be the guiding spirit of Law. "State interference," it has been truly said, "is an evil where it cannot be shown to be good." And the onus, be it added, is always on the maker of the Law.

[1] The "Omnicompetence of the Legislature" became the watchword of social reformers in the earlier part of the 19th century. The accumulation of social abuses called for this formula of peaceful and progressive self-amelioration as the only alternative to revolutions, the evils of which had been only too recently demonstrated in the bloodshed and butchery initiated with the Fall of the Bastille. A beneficent instrument in the main, one can hardly blame the exponents of this dogma in the century that followed for having worked it wellnigh to death. With the overweening self-confidence of inexperienced youth, the Legislatures of the World have in this period set themselves to shaping and reshaping it without much thought or foresight. The time has come now for greater discrimination in the use of this new-found power, and I have here but touched on one direction in which in my judgment it can be usefully done.

One subtle implication of the doctrine of "Omnicompetence of the Legislature" and all the more dangerous for that reason, *viz.*, the denial, except with its leave, of any competence, in any other social organ or institution—has, I am glad to believe, been go over already beyond the danger-point.

I have no fear that Law whose methods must necessarily be very often rough and crude [1] will ever replace morals any more than that public opinion will displace the still small voice in individual bosoms—the voice which I regard as a more potent instrument of Law and Order than either law or public opinion. Nobody indeed need fear that the social structure will be so inverted that the apex will replace the base. But I do feel that the attempt which is being constantly made by zealous legislators to encroach upon the sphere of morals and the even more insidious encroachments of both law and public opinion upon the domain of conscience are materially vitiating public and private life in modern societies. *There is no modern tendency which I deplore more or regard with greater misgivings than the tendency to measure all moral obligations by the legal standard* —a tendency which is based on the fundamentally mistaken notion that the bounds of law limit also the domain of morals and the jurisdiction of conscience. A man feels free to make himself un-neighbourly to the point of being a nuisance to people around him so long as he does not overstep the bounds of law. Is A justified in making night hideous to people over the way, simply because the law does not make such a course illegal? Why in such a case should A smugly assume that he is doing a favour by not making himself a cad, when to the inmost core of his being he should feel that in being neighbourly to his fellow creatures he is simply doing what he should and that to do otherwise would constitute a breach of a higher law than the law of the State, a breach indeed of that from which the laws of the State derive their sanctity. Other instances will readily occur to those present here—both Hindus and Mahomedans—so

[1] Take for instance the rules fixing the age of majority and responsibility in civil or criminal law. An arbitrary standard which will fail to satisfy the requirement of morals in individual cases has to be maintained because it will secure results consonant with moral ends in the majority of instances. The rule has to serve in the absence of a better, but must be discarded the moment a better rule is found.

readily indeed that I can safely refrain from specifying them for the purpose of pointing my moral.

I admit that it is not easy always to define with precision the boundary between laws proper and morals. It must sometimes require acute judgment and delicate discrimination to draw what I regard as the *line of safety*, the line where law shades off into morals and *vice versa*. Twilight here confuses the boundary between night and day but that is no justification for calling day night and night day. Provided the object is kept constantly in view, no serious legislator or judge need fail in sensing, roughly at least, where Law should stop and leave the field clear to Conscience. But to the common man, the subject of all laws (legal as well as moral) the matter should present *no* difficulty. Let him only not get into the bad habit of asking first what the law requires or permits him to do. Let him begin always rather by enquiring what his Conscience tells him. In ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, he will not need to consult the other two oracles, Public Opinion and Law.

And I affirm, further, that the obligation to consult the higher oracle of Conscience is not confined to the subject alone. It rests equally on rulers and their agents, including governing corporations. I have previously denied that law is or at any time was, the capriciously willed command of the ruler. Therefore I am not called upon to demolish or circumvent the extravagant doctrine that the State is above law. I have said that Law sits enthroned on the communal and in the last resort on the individual conscience. But it may be urged that the Government at the present day is seldom an individual ; it is a body corporate ; and if Government servants are ordinarily natural persons, many of the most important functions of Government are now discharged by bodies corporate, Municipalities, Rural Boards and Universities, for instance. Corporations, it has been sometimes said, have no soul and no conscience. If this description be true, then it is high time that they borrowed a soul and

cultivated a conscience. Even Law, I am glad to say, has been casting aside this ancient superstition. It is now being confidently asserted by writers in legal journals that it is no longer impossible for Courts to convict corporations of crime involving *mens rea*. So far at least as law goes, therefore, a corporation is no longer a creature without a body to be flogged or a soul to be damned.

What then is the relation between Law and Morals ? The relation is one of close interaction. But it is also a relation of subordination of Law to Morals and, through Morals, to men's Consciences. The power of Law, I have said, does not rest on its sanctions. The sanctions operate remedially or at the best as prophylactics. The power rests ultimately on the moral assent of the community. *The paramount power, I repeat, is Conscience, the power that normally works without sanctions.* The "Divorce of Law from Morals," of which one heard so much three decades ago, is to my mind inconceivable. A Law, I say, cannot be law unless it is also moral, or at any rate polarised that way.

This however does not mean that a rule to be a rule of law must be born *first* as a rule of conscience and *then* be adopted as legal rule. A rule of law need not necessarily be posterior in point of time to the rule of morals of which it is the counterpart. A rule of conscience may be born, like Minerva, in the full panoply of a legal rule. Conscience may thus exceptionally discover itself for the first time as a rule of law ; and communal conscience, dull and unintrospective, may (more rarely still) blaze into self-consciousness only after the rule has been habited as law. But these instances in no way detract from my thesis that Law has its roots always in the moral consciousness of the people. Where that is not the case, the so-called law soon becomes a dead letter, if it is not still-born in fact.

To conclude, I declare that the social machinery cannot be worked and is not intended to be worked by intellectual opportunism alone. All three motive powers which go to make up

the mind of man, Heart, Brain and Conscience, must work together, or else the machinery will inevitably be thrown out of gear. And primacy within this Sacred College belongs, first and last, to Conscience.*

N. N. GHOSE

HINDUSTAN

Vast land of by-gone emperors and kings,
Who won their kingdoms in many a fight ;
Thy spell entices like jewels so bright
That their charms and superstitions oft brings!
Its visions of wonders, the greatness of things
Unique and mystic. The wanderers' sight
Is dazed, as in some Arabian night,
Where one can view the East as from the wings
Of some gigantic bird, that soars on high,
Then India, looks a land—elysian!
A land of art and temples then it seems
Which offers its enchantments to the sky,
Descend but off thy bird, and the vision
Will vanish, like other fanastic dreams!

K. LENNARD-ARKLOW



* Read at a meeting of the Law Association of the Dacca University on the 1st of December, 1928.

INVINCIBLE MAN

By clang of hammer, grip of steel,
By mortar, iron and stone,
Is modern progress given birth,
And civilization grown.
By simple might of brain and brawn
The sons of man aspire,
To prove themselves invincible
To realise desire.
They cleave unchartered space at will,
By harnessed lightning driven,
And sink their submarines beneath
The waves by war-ships riven.
They tunnel mountains, blast great cliffs,
And span the mightiest streams,
And now achieve the wondrous works,
That once were vaguest dreams!
Wise Mother Earth has given up,
Secrets and riches untold,
To dauntless man who would not yield,
Who was daring, brave and bold.
There are no heights that he cannot reach,
Nor depths that are left untried—
His aspirations are unplumbed,
And are as the Heavens wide!
Man who is clean in soul and mind,
With strength that can do and dare,
Is one who uplifts his brother man,
And one who can answer prayer.
There are no powers that are not his,
Who attunes his heart to Right—
Forces of Nature all bow down
To one who is true in might.
'*When half-gods go, the gods arrive* ;—
And master workman is king—
So of the man of brain and brawn,
Invincible man, I sing!

TERESA STRICKLAND

EARLY BANK NOTE ISSUES AND THEIR LESSONS

There is indeed a great demand for accurate and correct information about the early bank note issues in India. It is unwise to safely rely for this information upon recent books which have devoted great interest to this subjet. In a recent book [1] dealing with Paper Currency in India published in 1927 we find the following statements regarding the details of bank issues. "The Union Bank which arose out of the ruins of a number of trading or agency firms in 1829 had a respectable circulation for some years. Starting with Rs. 3,63,020 in 1830 it reached its maximum issue in 1837 when the circulation stood at Rs. 7,05,175. Then it declined." The second statement runs as follows: "Another bank not mentioned in his (Cooke's) book, the bank of Western India (Die Bank des Westlichen Ostinden) founded in 1842, also seems to have a note issue. But no details of its circulation are available. Perhaps this was the same bank as the Nordwest Bank von Indien which Huebner mentions but gives no details of its issues. Huebner also mentions two other banks, *viz.*, the Oriental Bank Corporation and the Agra and United Service Bank of Agra as having a note circulation. The amount of the note circulation of the former was approximately Rs. 5,18,910 in 1851, of the latter approximately Rs. 10,00,000 in 1852." Before referring to the second writer it is necessary to warn the readers to receive the above information with caution. In the interests of accuracy and truth it must be pointed out that the first statement referred to above is not correct and as there is no source mentioned from which this information has been taken, it might be a hurried reproduction of figures mentioned by Cooke in his Banking in India. According to Cooke the maximum was reached in 1840 and stood at about Rs. 7,48,629. Coming to the second statement there are unfortunately very many errors. Firstly, it is

[1] See B. B. Das Gupta, Paper Currency in India, pp. 22-23.

only a very hurried reproduction of Cooke's information that must have made the author remark that the bank was not mentioned in the book. On p. 141 of his book the name of the above bank was mentioned. Secondly, it is erroneous to consider the Bank of Western India as the Nordwest Bank von Indien mentioned by Huebner. The latter writer might have been referring to the joint-stock Bank of the North-West Provinces entitled the North-West Bank of India and it did not issue notes. Thirdly, Cooke himself mentions the fact that the Agra and United Service Bank issued notes for a while and as the Government refused to encourage the note issue it was given up. A comparative study of both sources of information would have enabled the author to avoid most of the errors. Dependence on primary instead of secondary sources would have saved him from making unsupported creations of his fertile brain.

Passing on to the second writer who comments on the advantages conferred by the action of the Early European Banks the same lack of detailed information on note-issues as well as the other operations is to be noticed. Both the writers make use of the hackneyed quotations about the early note-issues and although some specimens of the other bank notes are easily available only that of the Bengal Bank and the General Bank of India alone are quoted. The second writer could have made use of the specimen of the Hindustan Bank note preserved in the Victoria Memorial Hall of Calcutta. There are ten real notes of the Hindustan Bank and the Bank of Bengal preserved with much care by the Curator of the V. M. Hall.[1] Even the change in the form of the notes of the Bank of Bengal can be seen by a close examination of the 1857 form from that of the earlier form.

[1] More information as regards the form of the notes would be forthcoming in my monograph on Organised Banking in the Days of John Company. Several other mistakes committed by the earliest writers on bank note issues would be corrected on the basis of reliable information collected from authoritative documents.

Now that a Central Bank of Issue is about to be created in this country this essay attempts to set forth the various aspects of the early note-issues and any clear understanding of their essential features would point out which way progress lies in Indian currency and banking matters.

No Legal Definition.

The modern legal definition or the bank note is that it is an evidence of the debt due from a banker and delivery of this note assigns this right in that person to any other, just like payment by cheques. However such a clear-cut conception did not exist during this period. Bank post bills, promissory notes and Treasury notes of the Government were also included under this category.[1] "The Promissory notes of the Government were only obligations to pay interest per diem whose value varied considerably from time to time." The Bank of Bengal was created with the express object of retiring ? Treasury Bills and it was later on settled to pay notes in specie on demand.[2] Even so late as in 1831 the people considered the Treasury bills as notes. The following statement from the "Bengal Chronicle" quoted in the Asiatic Journal clearly proves this fact. The Government notified that Treasury Bills which were hitherto issued for nine millions bearing interest at 5 per cent. were no

[1] See James Brunyate, An Account of the Presidency Banks, p. 55. See also Mc Culloch, Dictionary of Commerce—Article on Calcutta. See the Calcutta Review, Sep. 1856 —Article on Indian Finance based on the H. of C. Report, 1853. The defects of the Promissory and Treasury notes which restricted their circulation as paper currency are well brought out in this article.

[2] Symes Scutt says, "At the first inaugural meeting it was resolved at the suggestion of Director Tucker to gradually withdraw Treasury Bills from circulation and replace them by bank notes. It was also resolved to pay all bank notes of less than the denomination of Rs. 1,000 in specie and that the signature of one Director instead of three should suffice." From 11th Feb. 1807, Bank notes of any description were paid in specie on demand. See also H. St. George Tucker, Papers relating to the Establishment of the First Public Bank, Calcutta. *My thanks are due to Hon'ble Mr. Ramaprasad Mookerjee and Raj Resheecase Law through whose courtesy I could gain an access to the Library of the Imperial Bank of India, Calcutta Branch.*

longer to be issued. The Bengal Chronicle refers to this fact and rejoices over the situation for " money which was formerly freely invested in these *notes which were nothing more than bank notes having five per cent. rate of the interest largely payable at sight* for they were received as cash in all Government payments and in all transactions in the Calcutta Bazar would now be available to satisfy the commercial needs of the people." [1] Even in the balance-sheet of the Bank of Bengal published in 1856 the bank notes were lumped up together with bank post bills in a single item.[2]

Plurality of Issues.

Though all the earlier European Banks had the privilege of note-issue their note-circulation did not amount to much. Almost all banks started prior to 1833 enjoyed the privilege of note-issue. The Bank of Hindostan, the Bengal Bank, the General Bank of India, the Carnatic Bank, the British Bank, the Asiatic Bank, the Bank of Bengal, the Union Bank, the Commercial Bank, the Calcutta Bank, the Bank of India and the Mirzapore Bank, and the Presidency Banks started after 1833 issued notes. Some of the non-Presidency Banks started after the year 1833 were never allowed this privilege and all banks which were projected in London sought to obtain this privilege. They always failed to secure this coveted privilege for the Court of Directors always considered it unwise to permit them to issue notes in competition with the Presidency Banks which were bound down by regulations framed in their charters

[1] Italics mine.

[2] Any number of the balance sheets of the Bank of Bengal relating to its business after 1836 can be reproduced from the pages of the newspapers of this period. But in no instance has the writer come across a separate statement relating to the bank notes alone as different from bank post bills. As Holt Mackenzie who was one of the Government Directors of the Bank of Bengal said, " publicity was the sole aim of the Bank of Bengaland annually two statements were published and put up before the proprietors and the balance sheets were published." Brunyate however quotes figures relating to the assets and liabilities of the Bank of Bengal in 1820. See his Account of the Presidency Banks," p. 5.

of incorporation. It also considered it unwise to allow private banks directly concerned with commercial speculations to issue notes in competition with the Presidency Banks and as they had no power of control over the note-issue of private banks in those days of free banking at Calcutta, they thought it would be impossible to check them if they were to push these issues without a sufficient reserve of funds. In 1836 a proposal was made by an influential body of merchants interested in Indian trade to start a gigantic banking establishment under the immediate patronage of the East India Company whereby all the financial operations of the Government might be carried on through the medium of an extended paper currency.[1] One of the arguments for vetoing this proposal was that extended paper currency would be fraught with mischievous consequences and any closer connexion between the Government and a banking establishment than the one already existing in the case of the Bank of Bengal would greatly embarrass the administration and evolve a host of practical evils.[2] Similarly the Bank of Asia projected by R. M. Martin sought this privilege. It was also refused this concession.[3] Many of the joint-stock banks of the N. W. Province started in 1844 did not issue notes.[4] The Oriental Bank was issuing notes in Ceylon as a result of its amalgamation with the Bank of Ceylon. The other Indian Banks started in the decade of 1850-1860 did not covet this privilege.

The Growth of the Issue.

Although the earlier banks did issue notes several of them could not issue them to any great extent for in the absence of

[1] See a pamphlet entitled "Reasons for the Establishment of a New Bank, London, 1836.

[2] For a more detailed statement of the reasons see Fullarton's Minute on Banking in India drawn up at the request of the Governor-General and published by the Bank of Bengal. He was the Director of the Bank of Bengal for quite a long time.

[3] See the very clear and able Minute of Mr. H. T. Princep, dated 7th April, 1841. Correspondence relating to the projected Bank of Asia. Parliamentary paper printed 7th April, 1843.

[4] See Mr. Allen's Memorandum in Thomson's Despatches, Vol. II.

proper encashment facilities they could have had only limited circulation at the place of issue and in the immediate neighbourhood. The Banks of the Agency Houses fared better in this respect and due to their encouragement these banks could issue some appreciable amount of notes.[1] During the period 1833 to 1860 the notes of the Presidency Banks had virtually a monopoly of the field and though their authorised note-issue amounted to £5,000,000 against which one-fourth had to be held in specie their maximum note-issue did not reach this figure and the lowest amount to which the note-issue shrank during the troubled days of the Sepoy Mutiny in 1857 was about £2,000,000. The lowest issue of the Bank of Bengal was £1,030,000. But the actual issues of the Presidency Banks at the time of the organisation of the Government Paper Currency Scheme were as follows :—

The Bank of Bengal	...	£1,964,000
The Bank of Bombay	...	£1,087,000
The Bank of Madras	...	£266,000
TOTAL	...	£3,317,000

The Presidency Banks were virtually "the sole banks of issue" as Samuel Laing terms them and as a result of "fair play" compensation was granted to them on the score that the deprivation of this note-issue was "morally unjust and practically inexpedient."[2]

So far as the note-issues of the Non-Presidency Banks were concerned the following table shows their maximum and

[1] See C. N. Cooke's "Banking in India."

[2] See Samuel Laing's Minute on the Government Paper Currency Bill.

average note-issue :—

A Tabular Statement of the Note-issue of the Banks of this period.

Name of the Bank.	Period of note-issuing operations.	Average amount of note-issue. Lakhs of Rs.	Maximum note-issue. Lakhs of Rs.
The Bank of Bengal.	1806-1862	176 lakhs last year of issue.	279 (1860) [1]
The Bank of Bombay.	1840-1862	81 (in 1857, 1858, 1859).	128
The Bank of Madras.	1843-1862	15 to 16	30
The Union Bank	1829-1848	4 to 5	748620 (1840)
The Commercial Bank (managed by McIntosh & Co.).	1819-1833	16	Not known.
The Calcutta Bank	1824-1829	20	,,
The Bank of Hindostan.	1770-1831	2 to 3 20 to 25	20 to 25 [2] 40 to 50
The Bengal Bank	?-1791	Eight lakhs at the time of failure.	
The General Bank of India.	1786-1791	Details not known to any writer. [3]	
The Carnatic Bank	1788-1805	,, ,, ,,	
The Agra Bank	1833-1900	Issued notes for a while and gave it up as a non-paying proposition. [4]	

[1] This figure is mentioned by Symes Scutt. It differs from the one given by Brunyate and Cooke in their books. An Account of The Presidency Banks, p. 60. Rise and Progress of Banking in India, p. 97.

[2] The two different estimates are those of Cooke and Holt-Mackenzie. The higher figure is given by Holt-Mackenzie.

[3] A recent writer who comments on the limited liability feature of its shares as a very important discovery although it was pointed out already in the Selections of the Calcutta Gazette does not say anything on the volume of its note-issue. He does not explain his inability to quote any statistical facts pertaining to the quantitative aspect of the business of the Earlier European Banks. A statistical Department was opened only in 1840 as a branch of the Home Department and Government servants were requested to transmit accurate information on local details for tabulation on land, water, lakes, canals, population, wealth and commerce. One or two headings under the subject of Commerce have reference to banking operations such as lending and borrowing and exchange. But the Statistical Abstract relating to British India from 1842 to 1865 contains no particulars on banks and their operations, rates of exchange and bank note circulation and hence it is with great difficulty that one can generalise on such imperfect details as are available.

[4] The original letter of the Agra Bank is quoted in full but the Government refused to consider the bank notes as cash although an equal amount of Government securities were to be deposited in the hands of the Government. See the Asiatic Journal, May, 1837, p. 27.

The Denomination of the Note-issue.

The denominations of notes of the Bank of Bengal were Rs. 10, 15, 16, 20, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500, 1,000, 10,000 and 20,000.[1] The other Presidency Banks might have issued similar denominations. So far as the non-Presidency Banks were considered the minimum denomination[2] was Rs. 4 and the Union Bank issued notes of the minimum denomination of Rs. 8. It seems peculiar why the Presidency Banks did not take into consideration the character of the pecuniary transactions of the people and suited the denomination of the notes to the minute character of the extreme number of these transactions. They seem to have entirely ignored the historical parallel furnished by the contemporary bank notes of the foreign countries of this period. A reference to the practice of the contemporary foreign banks would have guided them in the right channels. To suit the transactions of the fishermen of the Island of Newfoundland notes of one Dollar were issued as a safe and convenient circulation. In the Island of Mauritiuso notes equal to 5*s.*, circulated for years under Lord Grey's principle without abuse and were extremely useful to the planters and the public. The Bank of Ceylon issued 5*s.* notes for several years and when the minimum denomination was raised to 10*s.*, at which it stood in 1859[3] it was

[1] This denomination was not mentioned by other writers. But Holt-Mackenzie mentions this as the maximum denomination of the notes. He also mentions that the large size notes from Rs. 100 upwards were largely in circulation. But he contradicts the statement as regards the maximum size and says the note of Rs. 10,000 is the maximum one. See Answers to Questions 514 and 575 Evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, 1832.

[2] See the Memorandum of the Manager of the Oriental Bank before the Mansfield Commission.

[3] A note of the Bank of Hindostan for Rs. four (Sicca) is carefully preserved in the Victoria Memorial Hall. It was first issued to Connylall Burrell or bearer on 28th November, 1823—No. 3985. There is another note of the Bank of Hindostan—No. 2530—for a sum of sicca Rs. twenty. It is curious to note that all the eight notes of the Bank of Bengal are bearer notes and the name of the first holder is not mentioned as in the case of the other bank notes. A note of the new form issued in 1857 is also to be seen in the Victoria Memorial Hall.

regretted both by the planters and by the public. Throughout Prussia and other German States notes of the denomination of one thaler or 3*s.*, were greatly used in circulation. In all these cases the security behind the note was not of such a strict character as was the case with the Presidency Bank notes.[1] This fact was recognised by Wilson as well as the Secretary of State and hence they insisted on the Rs. 5 note as the minimum denomination note to be issued by the Government.[2] But unfortunately the framers of the 1861 Act did not realise this advantage and refused to consider the issue of the five Rupees note as a desirable step.

The Cover of the Issue.

So far as the earlier European Banks were concerned there was no legislative interference in the matter of their note-issue. Neither notes nor deposits were legislated upon nor hedged about with restrictions and red tape and the policy of the *laissez faire* was pursued in this direction. Even in the early years of the Bank of Bengal, *i.e.*, from 1806 to 1823 bank notes were not differentiated from other liabilities and the law stated that the total liabilities of the Bank could not be greater than the total paid-up capital of the bank, and cash reserve to the extent of one-third of the total liabilities had to be kept by it. In 1823 this proportion was still further lowered to one-fourth and the note-issue was not differentiated from the other liabilities. Symes Scutt mentions the suggestions of the Court of Directors made in 1829 to restrict the note circulation to one crore of Rupees.

[1] See Right Hon'ble James Wilson's Minute respecting a Paper Currency, dated 25th December, 1859.

[2] While introducing the Paper Currency Bill in 1860 the Finance Member said, "If we bear in mind that the highest denomination of coin in circulation is one of only a single Rupee or two shillings, while in England the common coin is one of twenty shillings, it would appear that we should be justified in adopting the old practice in Ceylon and the present practice in many countries and adopt notes of a denomination as low as two or two and a half rupees."

As these suggestions were stoutly opposed by the Bank Directors nothing in the direction of regulating the note-issue was passed at that time. The 1839 Charter did not materially differ from the previous charter. So far as regulations of note-issue were concerned, the maximum circulation of the note-issue was fixed at crores Two and no specific cash reserve was fixed against the note-issue. Articles 25, 26, and 31 of the 1839 Charter Act refer to the regulations concerning the note-issue and these were reimposed in 1840 and 1843 in the case of the Bank of Bombay and Madras ; the only difference being that the Bank of Madras was allowed to circulate notes only up to one crore of Rupees.

These regulations were not imposed on the other banks of issue. A few of these however seem to have consciously imposed such regulations concerning their note-issue. The Oriental Bank proposed to maintain one-third cash reserve limit against the total volume of notes issued by its head office and all its non-Indian branches. This proposal amounted in fact to maintain a separate reserve for the notes. It must however be realised that this Bank secured this right to issue notes as a result of its amalgamation with the Bank of Ceylon. So far as the Union Bank was considered it was proposed to restrict the circulation of notes to one-fourth of the paid-up capital of the Bank. The main reason why the other bank notes were unregulated like the Presidency Banks was that the latter did not enjoy any special privileges [1] and the note-issue was received at the Government Treasuries even in the Lower Provinces in payment of revenue, but as this right was not granted to the non-Presidency Banks it was thought that they would gradually disappear in course of time, leaving the field open to the Presidency Banks and this forecast of events was so completely realised in 1861 that Samuel Laing termed the Presidency Banks " the sole Banks of Issue."

[1] See F. C. Harrison, " Economic Journal," 1891, Vol. I, p. 726.

Form of the Note-issue.

Like the Goldsmiths' notes of England and the earliest English Bank notes the notes of the early European Banks were made out both to order and to bearer. Notes bearing one director's signature, or that of the cashier acting on behalf of the Directors and Proprietors of the Bank and countersigned by one director, were generally put into circulation by the Bank of Bengal and the General Bank of India, respectively.

So far as the note-issue of the Bank of Bengal was concerned it was originally proposed that three directors were to sign the notes and this regulation was altered and the signature of only one director was considered sufficient. A new form of bank note was adopted in 1857 and from April, 1858, notes of the Bank of Bengal were signed only by the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary and the Accountant and not by one Director of the Bank as was the custom up to this period.[1]

Forgery of the Bank Notes.

It is clear that sufficient precaution was not taken in the matter of the note-issue for the notes of the Bank of Bengal were easily forged on several occasions and, in spite of exemplary punishments being meted out to the delinquents, there was evidently no check to this dishonest practice.[2] The first mention of a forged note for Rs. Fifty was in the year 1809. Symes Scutt records "that a forged note for five hundred Sicca Rs. was actually paid in cash on the ground that a refusal to pay would be attended with the most injurious effects to the circulation of bank notes. It was considered expedient to pay all

[1] See Symes Scutt, "The History of the Bank of Bengal."—See the notes preserved in the Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta.

[2] One Ramcomul Singee was convicted by the Supreme Court and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in 1839. See Cooke, p. 105.

other forgeries upon the Bank when presented by persons who have become fairly possessed of them."

The modus operandi of the Forger.

From the method of forging adopted by one culprit some glimpses of the manufacture of bank notes can be obtained. The forger usually secured the silver or bank note-paper from the bazar and cut it into proper shape. The paper was slightly rubbed with oil to render it more transparent. A slip of the prepared paper was laid over the face of the bank note and being closely extended the character on the note beneath were easily traced with a common pencil upon the blank paper. The sketch being removed the whole was carefully filled up with copper-plate ink laid on with a fine brush of camel's hair. A coat of slaked lime was then laid upon the back of the forged note and these being exposed to the sun the superfluous oil was taken up by the lime which on being rubbed off left the note nearly complete. The signature of the Bank Director and entering clerk were then added with pen and ink and the operation of forgery was thus complete. The whole process was so finely executed that even bank officials could not have detected it as a forged one but for the unfortunate omission of the word "entered" and the addition of Mr. Tucker's signature instead of Mr. Cox's.[1]

Another kind of forgery consisted in altering the genuine bank note of a low denomination into one of a high[2] denomination. In 1824 a genuine 10 Rupees note was altered into 100 Rupees note by cutting out the former amount which was in German text and substituting the latter amount. They then in similar manner changed the Persian and Bengali characters and afterwards tore the note and put it together again by pasting pieces

[1] See the Bengal Harkaru, March 18, 1824, quoted in the Asiatic Journal, July to December, 1824, Vol. XVIII, p. 425.

[2] See the Asiatic Annual Register, 1807, p. 22.

of paper on the back taking care that the pieces in the back covered the amount they introduced in the note, the more easily to evade detection.

The forgeries continued in spite of heavy penalties and in 1840 the Bank of Bengal presented a gold watch to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Mr. McMunn, for rounding up several gangs of forgers of bank notes.

Symes Scutt records that in 1856 "about seven hundred rupees were paid for secret service" which consisted in detecting forgeries.[1]

There were extensive forgeries of bank notes of the Bank of Bombay during the years 1848 to 1851 and this led to the entire circulation being temporarily reduced.[2] It is on account of this reason that the circulation during 1843 and 1852 fell below the 1843 figure which[3] stood at Rs. 63,50,000. The average during these years was only 35,000.

The forgeries in the case of the non-Presidency Banks were no less grave in nature and the Bank of Hindostan had to instruct the general public of Calcutta as to the mode of distinguishing genuine from forged notes which warning was misconstrued and a regular run ensued and notes worth 18 lakhs had to be encashed in 1819. When Palmer & Co. failed in 1829 there was another run on the Bank of Hindostan and about twenty lakhs of Rupees had to be paid in cash to satisfy the claims of the panic-stricken creditors. The notes of the Bengal Bank and the General Bank of India were also forged successfully now and then and the General Bank of India had to instruct the unwary public as to the right method of testing the genuineness of its new notes. It was apparent that these notes were the first to

[1] See G. P. Symes Scutt, History of the Bank of Bengal, p. 51.

[2] See Cooke, Banking in India, p. 168.

[3] Information given by Huebner and quoted by B. B. Dasgupta, Paper Currency in India, p. 21. Dasgupta does not however mention the above reason for its restricted circulation.

contain watermarks in them.[1] It is indeed a wonder why the Banks did not treat this matter seriously and why effective measures were not taken to prevent the easy forgery of the bank notes. The Bank of England notes were not forged so easily. Horsley Palmer, one of the Directors of the Bank of England, says, " the forgeries upon the branch Bank notes have been very few. There might have been probably forgeries of the Bank of England paper constantly in circulation but at present only to a limited or small amount,[2] Mr. Wilson was shrewd enough to realise this and he borrowed this knowledge from the Bank of England so as to make the Government Paper Currency difficult to be forged by the people.[3]

Restricted Growth of the Note-issue or " Imperfect Circulation."

Facilities for the due encashment of notes in the interior did not exist to any extent. Hence the poor homing power of the bank notes in the interior. Notes of the Bank of Bengal were convertible only at the Head Office alone and people were often put to serious straits when they attempted to convert these notes in the inland cities and towns of the lower provinces.[4]

[1] See the Calcutta Gazette, July 30th, 1789 : " Notice is hereby given that all notes, bank post bills and cheques now issued by the General Bank of India have a water mark in the paper containing the words the General Bank of India in the centre of the notes or cheques which is easily discernible in holding the paper up to the light. The holder of such notes not having the water mark are requested to send the same for payment to the Bank."

[2] See his Evidence to Lord Althrop's Secret Committee of the House of Commons, 1832 quoted by M. J. Quin, in his Trade of Banking in England, pp. 201-202.

[3] See Right Hon'ble Wilson's Minute on Paper Currency.

[4] See the Englishman, April 17th, 1837 : " Of the one crore twenty lakhs in circulation upwards of fifty lakhs were for sums of Rs. 1,000 and upwards. Out of Calcutta and its immediate vicinity paper currency is little known and considered as an unsafe security on which to advance money even by regular bill-brokers. A gentleman at Aligarh could not get a single shroff in the neigbouring town of Coel to cash the notes of the Bank of Bengal to the amount of Rs. 350 though they were in daily communication with Calcutta. Another individual at Subathers was refused discount on any terms of a Bank of Bengal note of Rs. 100 by a shroff whose business in hoondies extended to Calcutta. The same note was afterwards cashed at Meerut at a loss of Rs. 6 annas 10 and pies 8."

When the Bank of Bengal proposed to open a branch at Allahabad in 1836 the difficulty of encashment of notes of the Head Office had to be taken into account. It was decided by the Bank to issue notes at the branch payable therein and encashable at the Head Office only if funds would permit such a procedure. This plan clearly foreshadowed the later development of the circle system of the Government Paper Currency organisation. But the Government did not however consider the plan favourably and were of opinion that a change in the Charter would be necessary to permit this procedure. Nothing particular in this direction was achieved.

Again rivalry between the existing banks in Calcutta led to the non-holding of the rival's notes and the habits of reissuing of these notes did not exist. The circulation of the notes of the Union Bank was limited by such a procedure on the part of the Bank of Bengal. "In order to strangle the infant Hercules" it was decided in 1834 by the Bank of Bengal not to accept the notes of the Union Bank as cash. Although repeated overtures were made by the leading merchants of Calcutta[1] and the Union Bank itself[2] the Bank of Bengal remained firm in its attitude.[3] Consequently the Union Bank refused to reissue the notes of the Bank of Bengal from 1840.[4] Though this spirit of rivalry existed we do not meet with such instances of bad blood between competing banks as had been witnessed in the Scottish Banking circles. The Bank of Scotland used to present a large number of notes of the Royal Bank of Scotland and *vice versa* mainly in order to create embarrassments.[5]

[1] Symes Scutt says that in 1834 February about "fifty-nine merchants of the leading firms protested against this decision but the Bank remained firm."

[2] For a detailed statement of the relations between the Union Bank and the Bank of Bengal see the Asiatic Journal, May to August, 1834.

[3] See the rules published By the Bank of Bengal in 1840. The first rule was to receive and pay its notes only." Quoted from Symes Scutt.

[4] See the Asiatic Journal, Sep.,-Dec.. 1840.

[5] See the Memoirs of a Counting House by Sir William Forbes-Bart, published in 1860. "Large numbers of notes of the rival banks were collected and presented for

Even in Madras where we find three contemporary banks conducting business in the last decade of the 18th century and in the first decade of the 19th century much rivalry existed among the three banks in existence, the Carnatic Bank, the British Bank and the Asiatic Bank and due to this keen rivalry they could not make any headway and the Government Bank had to be started by Lord William Bentinck.[1]

The Attitude of the Government.

Two main reasons for the restricted circulation of the Bank notes, namely the lack of facilities for encashment of notes and the refusal of the rival banks to consider the Bank notes as cash, have already been mentioned. Even if the obstacles had been removed there would still have been restricted circulation, for the Government never pursued a strictly benevolent policy towards the quasi-state banks even. The Bank of Bengal had to deposit twenty lakhs of Sicca Rupees on 19th January, 1809 with the Treasury as security against the receipt of Bank notes at the Public Treasuries in the Lower Provinces. There was also a standing notification issued to the Treasury never to permit a larger holding of Bank notes than 50 lakhs at any one time. The rest were to be returned to the Bank for proper encashment.[2] The Government never cashed these notes even in the Lower Provinces and only re-issued these notes when requested to do so by customers anxious to circulate these notes. Attempts were made by the earlier European Banks managed by the Agency Houses to obtain legal tender privilege for the note but this was never granted throughout this period

encashment at the counter of the competing rival bank. At such times the practice of the Edinburgh Banks was to tell out in pennies in payment of its notes to holders acting in *mala fide* to embarrass the banking firms."

[1] See H. Dodwell, Account of the Records of Madras.

[2] In spite of this notification the Government Treasuries had sometimes to hold nearly 75 lakhs of notes as in the year 1837. Holt-Mackenzie says that the deposit was given up in 1828 ; after that date the Government pursued a benevolent policy. Mr. Mackenzie says " Bank notes were reissued whenever requested to do so by customers."

of our study. They did not succeed in convincing the Government of the utility of this privilege in extending their note issues and this question was not re-opened at any time during the whole of this period of bank note issue.[1] But the Agra Bank and the Union Bank strove to increase their note circulation and agreed to deposit equal value in Government securities in the hands of the Government if only they could be received in the Public Treasuries as cash.[2]

In spite of this step-motherly treatment the notes of the Bank of Bengal circulated in the interior "up to Benares a distance of 560 miles from Calcutta—no mean distance in those days when there was a total lack of communications." So far as Upper India was concerned "no notes of the Bank of Bengal could circulate"[3] and this was undoubtedly the result of a separate currency existing in that province. The lack of uniformity in currency restricted the circulation of the notes of the Bank of Bengal which were expressed in Sicca Rupees and these evidently were of little use in Upper India as the Furrackabad Rupee was the current coin. Till uniformity in currency was attained by 1835 Act even the Presidency Bank was helpless in this matter.

Some Minor Reasons.

Fourthly the mode of living of the natives made it difficult for them to preserve the paper currency. The habits of the natives and the material used combined with the prejudice against the novelty must also have restricted the free acceptance

[1] See the letter to Lord Cornwallis by the Chiefs of the Agency Houses. Quoted by H. Sinha, Early European Banks.

[2] See the Asiatic Journal. Under the Secretary Mr. G. J. Gordon's management, the Agra Bank made an endeavour to secure the coveted privilege for the notes to be considered as cash and received at the Public Treasuries. But as there was no assent on the part of the Government for this proposal it was given up.

[3] See Major Hyde's Evidence before the Mansfield Commission. Reply to Qns. 61 to 68. "I do not remember ever having seen a note of the Bank of Bengal in Upper India."

of the Bank notes. The custom of the people was to circulate sealed bags supposed to contain Rs. 1,000 each and it was so thoroughly established in Mirzapore that even Government paper currency could not become popular immediately.[1]

The uneducated people might have also failed to understand the hieroglyphics of the notes and their inveterate love for metallic currency must have impeded the growth of the note-issue. It is also possible that non-Presidency Banks might have failed to inspire sufficient confidence among people and as a result of this sad feature there might have been restricted note-circulation. Above all the bank notes were not legal tender. Without this privilege bank paper could never afford to become "national paper currency."

Silver Lining to the Cloud.

In spite of these obstacles there was a limited growth of the note-issue. This they were able to accomplish because they could feel the pulse of the money market and issue notes so long as people required them. The banks purchased bullion with the Bank notes and sold it on credit to the Government. In the then peculiar circumstances of the country the Government connection with the Banks aided them. This must not have been the sole reason for their circulation. Banks are ideal agencies of issue and it is these that can make any headway against popular dislike for novelty. This must have been the other reason why the Bank notes could circulate to any extent. There was also a third reason why the Bank notes were in

[1] See the Evidence before the Mansfield Commission. Brunyate also refers to this practice and remarks that though a currency agency (the Branch of the Bank of Bengal) had been established for several years it failed to displace the 600 bags which were still current in 1866. Account of the Presidency Banks, p. 59, foot-note. *The author owes a deep debt of gratitude to Prof. Satish Chandra Roy whose kindly interest in the author led him to spare the above book of Brunyate from his valuable library. One copy of it exists in the Imperial Library but almost all the appendices are missing.*

demand at that time. They sometimes commanded a slight premium of 6 to 8 per cent. They were required for remittance purpose and when bullion remittance was difficult individuals either had to buy bills from shroffs or secure these Bank notes as a means of remittance. The great charges made by the shroffs forced the business firms to remit money sometimes under armed escort. Bank notes like bills on the mercantile houses were at a premium in the interior and as these could be cashed in Calcutta formed one of the essential means of remittance available at that time. They were consequently sought for eagerly as a means of remittance available at that time to remit money from the interior Districts to the capital. These facilities increased the note circulation but *Bank currency did not and could not become the principal medium of payment nor even a useful auxiliary to metallic circulation. Bank currency was no more than a subsidiary medium of exchange in the Presidency towns. They must have been practically viewed as a sort of commercial paper.*

No Abuse or General Destruction of Bank Credit.

Although bank notes became gradually established by convention there were no instances during this period when bank credit in the shape of issuing notes was seriously abused. It is indeed creditable to record that bank notes never became divorced from money. It was undoubtedly true that in the interior where encashment facilities did not exist a slight discount of 4 to 6 per cent. was attached to the notes of the Bank of Bengal. This discount was chiefly due to the charges made by the shroffs in the bazaars for converting the notes into coin.[1] Such a discount was attached even to the

[1] See Mr. Onslow's Precis to the Mansfield Commission. It is unfair to say that there is only one copy of this valuable report in the whole of India and that it exists only in the Library of Bengal Chamber of Commerce. Such statements are evidently useful in doctorate theses to impose on the examiners the impression that no one else other than the author has studied these reports for the present. A copy of it exists in the Imperial

Government paper currency during the early years of their circulation.[1]

In the absence of a rallying point like the Central Bank any attempt to abuse bank credit would have become conspicuous. In the United States[2] of America there was a crisis in 1857 which led to a premium on legal tender money as the banks suspended cash payment. Money had to be bought simply as a commodity and it soon rose to a premium over bank credit.[3] Even in England the country banks which issued notes fared miserably. Greenfell says, " in 1793 about 100 out of 400 of them suspended cash payment. In 1810 about the same number failed; many failed in 1812. In the years 1814, 1815 and 1816 about 360 went down and within six weeks in 1825 about seventy succumbed.[4] It reflects much credit on the management of these earlier Indian Banks to record that there was not this kind of credit abused. We cannot say that there were no takers of these notes or else there might had been an overissue. So late as in 1861 the note-issue was more important and was actually greater in volume than the deposits of the Presidency Banks. Even in other directions the earlier banks did not materially help to quicken the circulation of bank money as a counterpoise against the sluggish velocity of metallic currency. Any abuse of credit would have been reflected in an increase of the general price level of the country. But the most signal feature in the early half of the XIXth century was that prices have fallen. There were indeed other causes also

Library and as it is an all-India Library economic students wishing to understand the state of Paper Currency would do well to consult this report as well as the evidence.

[1] See Hon'ble Mr. Massey's Minute on Paper Currency.

[2] In 1814 almost all banks with the exception of those in New England suspended payment. To remedy this crisis the Second Bank of the U. S. A. was started in 1816.

[3] In 1857 there were more than 5,000 different kinds of note issues circulating among the people. From this it can be easily gathered that the chaos must have been a profound one. See the Memorandum on the History of Financial Crisis. Document 538 of 61st Congress, the U. S. A., 2nd Series, 1910. Quoted by the Report of the National Monetary Commission.

[4] H. R. Greenfell, Banking and Currency.

tending to produce this effect but the sluggish circulation of metallic currency which amounted roughly to £100 or 150 ms. and the paucity of bank or credit currency must also have been responsible for the same effect.

Brunyate and other writers mention that only once was there the infringement of the Bank Charter so far as the Bank of Bengal notes were considered. In 1860 exactly one year prior to the starting of the Government paper curreney the Bank of Bengal was permitted to issue greater number of notes than the statutory limit of two crores of rnpees.[1] This was due to the fact that the subscription to the Government 5½ per cent. loan created a great demand for the Bank notes and as notes above the statutory limit could not be issued without fresh legislative sanction a request was made to the Government to permit the overissue of notes. The Government had to sanction the overissue of notes up to 275 lakhs but as excess notes were held in the treasuries and presented an advance to the Bank it had to pay five per cent. interest on the daily balance of issue above two crores of rupees. Both[2] Cooke and Brunyate say that two crores fifty lakhs were actually issued and this evidently must have been the maximum amount of its note-issue.[3] It is evident that there was no provision tending to secure elasticity of note issue on emergent occasions without previous legislative sanction. In spite of this valuable precedent it seems strange that the framers of the Paper Currency Act of 1861 made no provision for introducing this highly desirable element of elasticity in the note-issue. At any rate Germany seems to have profited by this example and the 1891 regulations of

[1] See extract from the Report, dated 5th July, 1860 by the Directors of the Bank of Bengal for the half-year ending 30th June, 1860, 3rd para. Enclosures No. 6 to W. D. Cruickshank's letter dated 2nd Dec., 1899 to the Government of India.

[2] See C. N. Cooke "Banking in India," p. 97. See also Brunyate; "An Account of the Presidency Banks," p. 60. See also Macdonald "Banking in India. J. of the Institute of Bankers, May, 1890.

[3] Symes Scutt repeats this incident but says that "the maximum point touched was 279 lakhs of Rs." See p. 57, "History of the Bank of Bengal."

note-issue were clearly modelled on the 1860 measures adopted in India.[1] Mr. Goschen proposed to legalise similar issues in England on the Indian model so carefully adapted to German conditions by the German Parliament in 1891. But it proved a failure.

Bank Issue versus *Government Issue.*

It has already been remarked that the Presidency Banks were deprived of the note-issue in 1861. The chief reason for this was the anxiety on the part of the Government to increase the total monetary circulation by extending the portion of the paper currency. "In the peculiar circumstances of India" it was thought desirable that the Government should issue notes possessing legal tender quality. Both Wilson and Laing were staunch supporters and believers in the Banks and considered them better fitted to issue fiduciary paper than the Government. Sir C. Wood whose ideas finally prevailed was disinclined to believe in the efficacy of Bank issue. It was not recognised by him that banks had greater power to feel the pulse of the money market and had special means for strengthening the reserves and contracting their issues which the Government did not enjoy. So increase or decrease of the circulation of bank paper currency could be done by special means which were denied to the Government. Banks can extend the note-issue for they enter into direct dealings with the trading public and can induce their customers to take notes instead of silver by offering them more favourable rates. Safety as well as elasticity, which cardinal features a paper currency should possess, can be secured only if a bank issues it. The Government issue can easily become subjected to a profit and

[1] See the letter of Mr. W. D. Cruickshank, Secretary and Treasurer of the Bank of Bengal, dated 2nd Dec., 1899, to the Secretary of the Government of India, Finance and Commerce Department. "It will be seen that the charge made for the excess issue of notes sanctioned in 1860 was the same as that adopted by the German Parliament in 1891 and that the action taken by the Bank was entirely successful."

loss philosophy and in days of economic pressure the state would not fail to take advantage of this right of note-issue thus endangering stability of prices. The danger is so great that it is always an accepted doctrine that the Paper Currency should not be caught in the clutches of the general finances of the country and be used for filling up the gap between revenue and expenditure.

Though the ideal of convertibility of note-issue should not be lost sight of every attempt has to be made to secure the seasonal elasticity of note-issue. Long-period elasticity is no less essential and if these advantages of bank note currency are not aimed at the realisation of the other minor advantages of paper currency is immaterial. It tantamounts to the grasping of the shadow instead of the real substance.

Throughout the earlier period of our study there were a number of issuers and the absence of restriction on the note-issue was a noteworthy feature alluded to already. These failings were common to European and Indian paper currency of this time. While centralisation of note-issue was secured consciously as a result of 1844 Bank Charter Act in England, events brought about similar circumstances in this country during the latter half of the period of our study.

B. RAMCHANDRA RAU

LOVE'S PRAYER

Ah Love, dear Love, in vain I strive to calm
My Spirit fierce in reason's clear, cold tide—
I lean and look, reflected by my side
Is thy dear face, and in wild alarm,
I kneel and only pray,
"God keep him mine for aye!"

Ah Love, dear Love,—I shudder but to think
Of walking on Life's narrow way alone—
My feet apace with all my heart's deep moan,
My Spirit fettered by Love's broken link—
And blind with tears I pray,
"God keep him mine for aye!"

Ah Love, dear Love,—Life loses all her song
When thou art but a brief space from my sight;
The day grows dark, for vanished is my light,
When thou art gone, and every thing goes wrong.
Then with pale lips I pray,
"God keep him mine for aye!"

Ah Love, dear Love,—If shadows come and grief
Holds out her chalice, I will with thee drain
Each bitter drop and glory in the pain—
To share with thee will give my heart relief—
And still I'll kneel and pray,
"God keep him mine for aye!"

Ah, should the cup hold death, then will I drink,
And clasp thee dear, still closer to my heart—
So close that nought can e'en our bodies part!—
I would not from the great Unknown then shrink—
But as we pass'd I'd pray,
"God keep him mine for aye!"

TERESA STRICKLAND

"'MY LADY JUNE' PERFUME"

Maurice Parker sat back in his chair gazing admiringly at a prominent full-paged advertisement in the morning's paper depicting Parker & Co.'s famous "'My Lady June' Perfume." His daughter, who had been watching him, crossed to his side, and placing her arm around his neck murmured, "Another big advertisement, Daddy ?"

The old man smiled. "Its alluring aroma is predominant in every Ballrom in the world," he replied. "I wonder what poor old Gordon would have said if he had lived!"

"Who was Gordon ?" asked the girl.

The old man's face clouded. "Gordon Bennett," he commenced, "whom I met during my wanderings in the Central Provinces of India, was an Engineer supervising the work on the Canal of Derhi-on-Sone. He always seemed a very strange fellow, lived alone, and spent much of his time amongst the natives who always greeted him with a most gracious 'Salaam'!"

"I shall always remember one night at the end of the monsoon season. Bennett and I were sitting on the verandah chattering over our smokes, when Smutty, his Hindu bearer, silently approached us, his large black eyes blazing with indignation.

'What is it Smutty ?' asked Gordon.

'Sahib, Sahib!' screamed the bearer, 'Shapoorjee the Pansari has been murdered by the rioters. The Police have taken him to the Kotwali, and he calls for you Sahib!'

Gordon rose throwing back his unkempt black hair. 'I must see Shapoorjee,' he murmured after a moment's silence, 'will you join me, Friend ?'

I nodded consent, and hatless we made our way through the Bazaar. Entering the Kotwali, Gordon stood gazing down at a white-haired old Mahomedan lying on a charpai.

Shapoorjee struggled to rise, but with a groan fell back.

'What is it you want to tell me, Shapoorjee ?' asked Gordon, supporting him with his arm.

' Sahib ! Sahib ! I hear the call of my God. My vitality is slowly ebbing. To-night I die, Sahib ! There is much I want to say, but one cannot speak here with sincerity. Take me to my bungalow ; I would rather die in the house of my Father than in this house of the Law !'

'Very well, Shapoorjee, your wish shall be obeyed,' muttered Gordon fighting to control his emotion.

Turning to a native, Gordon gave a short command, and some minutes later the silence was broken by the rumble of an old bullock cart, and the yap of the native driver, as he urged the sleepy creatures along the dusty track.

Gordon turned to me, ' I am going to take Shapoorjee to his house. It lies at the other end of the bazaar. Thousands think he is but a Druggist, but behind those keen dark eyes is a fertile scientific brain, and without a doubt, many of his nostrums will die with him ! '

The bullock cart having now pulled up outside, we lifted the old native and laid him gently in.

' Do you know Shapoorjee's house,' he asked the scared-looking driver.

The native rubbed his eyes, nodded, and gave the oxen a dig with his short thick stick. It was some minutes before we reached the dilapidated gloomy-looking bungalow at the end of the bazaar.

Taking the lamp, Gordon moved towards the door. The whole atmosphere seemed shrouded in mystery.

Curious, I moved quickly forward peering into the dimly-lighted room ; then, with an effort, followed Gordon into the room which was practically devoid of furniture. The moon, striking through the Venetian-shuttered windows, cast strange grotesque shadows around us, and I seemed to be under the spell of some uncanny influence.

The blood in my veins ran cold, and I feared that some reptile lay hidden in the shadows. Even Gordon did not move. He stood holding a lamp above his head nervously peering about the room.

'Good Lord! man, this mysterious aroma has got me spell-bound,' he murmured.

'Shapoorjee had often spoken to me about his perfume, but I hardly credited its irresistible influence!'

A sobbing cry outside caused us both to hurry to where we had left Shapoorjee. Handing me the lamp, Gordon called, 'Shapoorjee! Shapoorjee!' but there was no answer. He had heard the call of his God!

Lifting the body we carried it into the bungalow. Suddenly the lamp fell to the ground with a crash and Gordon collapsed and lay on the stone floor groaning.

I was mystified. Then the native driver commenced to beat the floor furiously with his stick, and there, by the light of the moon streaming through the doorway, was a cobra withering beneath the blows. I did all in my power to save poor Gordon, but he died in my arms.

In a state of frenzy I left the bungalow retracing my steps to the Kotwali and reported the tragic incident to the magistrate, who insisted on my returning to the bungalow.

Kneeling by Gordon's prostrate form he examined the wound. For a moment I stood watching in silence, then, attracted by a number of odd-looking vessels standing on a crude wooden bench, I removed the stopper from one of the stone jars. The magistrate joined me. 'What a strange alluring odour,' he remarked.

'Isn't it,' I replied.

The old man hesitated, seeking the eyes of his daughter. "And that is the secret of "'My Lady June' Perfume," he murmured, stroking his chin slowly.

CLIFFORD STANLEY DEALL

"A WEIGHTY QUESTION!"

The garrison on the Waziristan Frontier had for some days and nights been pestered by the attacks of the Hill tribes. Snipers, under cover of the thick growth, peppered at the slightest movement into the valley below and, as their position commanded the situation, for the safety of his men, the Officer Commanding deemed it advisable not to retaliate. Native agents in the employ of the authorities were sent out to warn the tribes that if this continued drastic measures would be taken to curtail this incessant interference. Apparently this had no effect upon the independent tribes. In a moment of desperation the Officer Commanding issued orders to the Air Squadron to locate the offending tribesmen and, if necessary, drive them from their hiding place. At the same time he posted his men in such a position that, as soon as the Wazirs were driven from their places of concealment, a shower of bullets would follow in pursuit. To his amazement the airmen failed in their endeavours, for, as soon as they circled the hills, all was quiet.

Returning to their quarters, the infantry awaited orders to open fire and found themselves surrounded. The only alternative was to make a fight for it.

During the operations that followed a portly General, kneeling in a very prominent position, surveyed the situation through his field glasses. A stretcher-bearer near by called to him to lie down, without any response. The Officer still glued his eyes towards the offensive.

"I say, Sir," again shouted the bearer, "you'll get potted as sure as you're an Hofficer!"

The General gave him a hasty glance of reproof, then resumed his observations without a word.

Ping! Ping! Ping! whistled the bullets all around him. The bearer lay watching him, his heart in his mouth, expecting to see him fall at any moment.

"Blimy!" he exclaimed, "they only want a couple of inches to find yer 'eart, Sir!"

Still the General remained unperturbed.

"Damm it!" roared the exasperated stretcher-bearer, "you 'll get a 'Blighty' in a minute that won't take yer home alive! Can't yer see they 're finding yer range?"

The Officer, turning towards the scared-looking soldier murmured, "Alright, my good man! Alright!"

The words had hardly left his lips when a bullet lifted the *topee* from his head. He needed no further words of advice, but promptly lay down.

"What did I tell you, Sir? Another one would have given me a job I shouldn't have fancied very much!"

The General smiled a rather sickly smile. "It was very good of you to warn me, and I appreciate your interest in my welfare!"

"Welfare be blowed," shouted the stretcher-bearer, "it wasn't yer blooming welfare I was thinking about, it's yer weight!"

CLIFFORD STANLEY DEALL

LOVE AND PRAISE

I

Ah! love of praise unlove of Him
From whom descends all men can praise ;
They praise on water the shining spot,
Unmindful of Sun's glorious rays.
Take heed, O man, with greed of praise,
Of what as thine thou canst proclaim
Lest thou shouldst seek to prison mind.
Forgetting Truth, to worship name,
And what is name but lifeless sound,
By air begot by air devoured.
If points it not to Him—Truth's joy,
In every heart by love-embowered.
If thou and what's in thee can raise
A single heart in that Joy's praise
Then blessed all and blessed thou
In Joy eternal for ever and now.

II

I ask my soul if she loves praise,
A whisper touches inner ear—
"I love men's praise for God's grace gifts,
And I and mine forgotten there,
If for myself men's praise I claim
All faithless vile I am, for sure
To use my Master's healing gifts
To kill myself and not to cure."

III

Great King art Thou of universe
For ever Thou in Thee complete,
Thou rulest all from all within ;
O, string me tuneful to life's heat !
May I my heart, Love, Theeward raise
And witness ever Thy endless praise !
In Duty, Love, may I Thee find
Unknown to sight but ever in mind !
All words are dumb and silence pure
Is praise that loves for Love secure !

MOHINIMOHAN CHATTERJEE

THE MARCH OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY[1]

My first duty is to thank the Executive Committee of the Indian Philosophical Congress for the honour they have conferred upon me in electing me President of this section. I only wish their choice had fallen upon a worthier person.

This is the fourth time the Indian Philosophical Congress holds its annual sitting. It has already stimulated philosophical research as is evidenced by the large number of papers that are received every year and the large number of persons that take part in its discussions. It is quite in the fitness of things that the southern presidency has been chosen as the place of meeting of the Congress. For it is South India which has produced the greatest thinkers of India. The great Adwaita philosopher, Śaṅkarāchāryya, hailed from this province. His great opponent and founder of the Visishtadvaita school, Rāmānujāchāryya, also belonged to this province. South India also produced the great founder of the dualistic school, Madhvāchāryya. As if to show that the province has not lost its virility in philosophical reflection, it has in recent years given birth to a philosopher of world-wide reputation. I refer to my friend and the Chairman of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Prof. Radhakrishnan.

The history of philosophy is the history of what is vital in humanity and is therefore very different from any mechanical evolution. It shares in the first place with history its essential dynamic character and in the second place, it emphasises that the historical process here is the process of what is most vital in man, namely, thought. History has to record not only the movements where man's freedom is quite evident, but also where it is less obvious. But it is the privilege of the historian

[1] Presidential Address delivered in the History of Philosophy Section at the Fourth Indian Philosophical Congress, Madras, 1928.

of philosophy to record only the movements of the freest aspects of human nature. And that is why the essential dynamism of history is present in a specially marked form in the history of philosophy. That is why a static conception of it, a derivation of it from the lifeless forms of logic, is absolutely out of place.

This brings me to the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy. Hegel believed that the history of philosophy is itself philosophy. This is no doubt a very grand conception. But unfortunately, he weakened the force of this conception very considerably when he asserted that the movements of the history of philosophy are identical with the processes of thought as described in his logic. Just at the moment when we expected from him a vindication of the dynamism of the history of philosophy, we were treated to a narrow, and partly even a static, conception of it. For the development of the processes of thought, as described in his logic, suffers much from excessive rigidity. The stiff framework of his logic is certainly most inadequate for the vital processess with which the history of philosophy deals. The dance of life, the play of colour, refuses to come into the grooves of a ready-made logic.

The shortcomings of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, as following the lines of his logical scheme, have indeed become a matter of common knowledge. Even Schwegler, a thoroughgoing Hegelian, had to admit the limitations of his master's conception of the history of philosophy. Indeed, Hegel had to twist the facts of history in order to make them fit into the grooves of his logic.

I do not want to press the charge, because, as I have already said, it is admitted by the Hegelians themselves. But what I want to say is that if the Hegelian conception is not adequate to express the movement of thought, it is because of the essential dynamism of thought. The question may, however, be asked: Is it possible to express in terms of thought at all the process of development of philosophy?

The question seems paradoxical, for the development of philosophy is really the development of thought and we appear to be uttering nonsense when we cast doubts upon the possibility of expressing the process of thought in terms of thought. But really the question is not so nonsensical as it appears at first sight. For the development of thought can quite conceivably be due to factors other than thought. To show that it is not due to them, we have to show that thought possesses in itself the elasticity which is needed to make it a fit receptacle for the dynamic forces that move history. Until we can do this, we have to admit that, if not wholly incapable of being expressed in terms of thought, it is at any rate not possible to express with anything like completeness the dynamic process of the development of thought with the help of the logical forms known to us.

I think, therefore, in the present imperfect stage of development of the logic of the real, it is advisable to choose a more cautious line of procedure than Hegel did. Instead of launching an ambitious scheme of developing the whole of the history of philosophy out of the logical categories, we should rather content ourselves with discovering certain broad lines of development, recognising the impossibility of reducing them to any uni-linear course. This procedure may fall short of the ideal of logical completeness, but at any rate it will not do violence to reality. For, as Schwegler says, "reduce as we may the individual under the influence of the universal, in the form of his time, his circumstances, his nationality, etc., to the value of a mere cipher, no free-will can be reduced."

The course of the history of philosophy, therefore, cannot be summed up in a formula. We have to distinctly recognise the essential complexity of the movement of history. The development of history is not uni-linear but multi-linear.

It will again not do to reduce all philosophical speculation to a number of type-phenomena, as Höffding has done. There are no doubt certain fundamental directions along which human

thought proceeds. These directions no doubt serve as regulative principles, but to say that they are not merely the guide-posts but the ultimate destinations of the process of human thought is to misconceive their true import. The destination cannot be regarded as fixed. To do so is to commit the same mistake which the philosophers of the type of Höffding want to avoid. For the main charge of the philosophy of values against rationalism is that it is a rigid system, fixed completely in the framework of the logical categories. If, then, the philosopher of values ends by postulating the same kind of fixity of destination for thought as the rationalist does, his philosophy does not differ essentially from that of the rationalist and suffers from the same defect. It really matters very little if the value-philosopher's ultimates are not one but many, for the important thing is not the number of principles but their character.

I do not, therefore, think that the reduction of the course of metaphysical speculation to the discovery of certain type-phenomena really solves the difficulty we notice in the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy. For the difficulty is to maintain the dynamic character of history and this difficulty is not made a whit less by Höffding's conception of the type-phenomena as the ultimate goals of philosophical speculation. Höffding may go on crying, "Wide is the world and narrow the brain," but a real complexity his universe can never have so long as he does not shake himself free from the belief that the entire world of philosophical speculation is capable of being reduced to a few type-phenomena.

The courses of development of philosophy in the West has been from a purely external to a gradually increasing internal view of the universe. The beginnings of European philosophy in Greece coincide with the dawn of a purely external view of the universe. This external view, however, represented an advance upon the pre-philosophical period, as it at any rate showed that the mind had been purged of the traditional mythological conceptions.

In the East from the earliest times we find philosophy freed from the external bias. Man and his problems had already from the remotest times absorbed the attention of the philosophical mind, to the comparative neglect of the external world. The Hegelian categories of Being, Becoming and Definite Being cannot be applied to the understanding of the thought of the East, for it was definite Being from the very beginning, and the progress of thought rather tended to take up various aspects of definite Being, or rather to conceive the definiteness from different angles of vision. Practical considerations, again, had their influence upon the development of thought in the East, and the practical idea of Moksha shaped to a considerable extent the course of philosophy in India.

When philosophy is understood comprehensively as involving the whole of life, as it was done in India, then the logical categories become merged in the higher categories of life. When this occurs, the hopelessness of a logical scheme becomes all the more apparent.

That the Hegelian scheme could find so many adherents and was accepted for a considerable time as a fairly correct representation of the actual course of the history of philosophy, was partly due to the fact that in the West the scope of philosophy was somewhat limited and it did not absorb the whole of life in the manner in which it did in the East. Thus, although warnings were often given and the dangers of one-sidedness in philosophy were frequently pointed out, philosophy was generally confined to abstract thinking. Logic, in fact, has been the guiding principle of philosophy practically throughout the course of its development in the West. In the short periods when this was not the case, as in the period which marked the decadence of Greek culture, when practical considerations ruled supreme, philosophy practically ceased to exist. One result of this feature in the development of thought in the West has been the sharp antagonism between Philosophy and Religion.

The antagonism between the two is so pronounced in Western culture as to seem almost to be its chief characteristic. The conflict between Religion and Philosophy was particularly acute in the West in the Middle Ages. It grew with the growth of Christianity and its summit was reached in the palmy days of the Church Fathers. It steadily weakened after the Renaissance when the natural light of reason replaced the supernatural light of revelation which was the sole reliance of the Church in the Middle Ages.

This conflict is something strange to the Indian mind. Philosophy was always in closest alliance with Religion in India. There never was any opposition between them. The Indian idea of *Dharma* was very comprehensive. It not only embraced that part of our life which we associate with religious dogmas and religious practices but included the whole of philosophy. The philosophical problems, again, were never presented in their isolation but always shown as woven in the fabric of the complex spiritual life. It was on a realization of the totality of life that Indian culture was based and not on a piecemeal view of it.

If we are to describe in one word the characteristic of Indian thought it is Comprehension, and if, similarly, we want to express the main feature of Western thought, we should say it is Concentration. The West always concentrates itself upon some one feature of our complex life, to the exclusion of others. If it is the religious aspect of life that happens to occupy the focus of its attention then woe betide the advocates of the other aspects of life. If, again, philosophical speculation occupies its thought then it develops it so very one-sidedly and abstractly as to isolate it altogether from the rest of the cultural activity. In the Middle Ages the two great mutually exclusive culture-zones were religion and philosophy. After the Middle Ages they were science and philosophy. In this way the conflict always persists.

It is a happy feature of recent times that this perennial conflict in Western culture, this eternal presence of strife, is showing signs of disappearing. There is gradually dawning upon the Western mind the necessity of abandoning a one-sided view of the universe and replacing it by a more comprehensive outlook. The evils of too much isolation and exclusion are gaining general recognition, and the need is daily growing more and more acute of a comprehensive view of life.

Pragmatism, Bergsonism and value-philosophy are the different ways in which this new recognition of the need of a comprehensive outlook expresses itself. Philosophical catchwords are very much in vogue at present and if we follow the tendency, we may sum up the direction of present-day thought by the single word, Life. The present age is pre-eminently a vindication of Life against the rigidity of mechanical as well as logical systems. The nineteenth century set up two equally, although mutually opposed, rigid systems, namely, mechanism and logicism.

The idealistic movement also is at present considerably shorn of its former logicism. Bradley's Absolute is not the logician's Absolute but rather the mystic's Absolute. Bradley, in fact, declares emphatically that logical thought can never take us to the ultimate reality. Thought, he says, is relational and discursive, and if it is so, how can it contain immediate presentation? "To make it include immediate experience its character must be transformed. It must cease to predicate, it must get beyond mere relations, it must reach something other than truth. Thought, in a word, must have been absorbed into fuller experience. Now such an experience may be called thought, if you choose to use that word. But if any one else prefers another term, such as feeling or will, he would be equally justified.....For when thought begins to be more than relational, it ceases to be mere thinking."[1] In another place

[1] Appearance and Reality, p. 171.

Bradley says that thought consummates itself in something other than thought. He gives as illustrations—the river running into the sea and the self losing itself in love. Thought demands for its completeness an Absolute, where mere thought would certainly perish. The completion of thought is thus always in a reality which remains for ever an "Other" for thought.

For these reasons Bradley seeks his Absolute in an immediate Experience. His philosophy is a curious mixture of rationalism and mysticism. With the rationalists he accepts the ideal of coherence, but with the mystics he believes that this ideal can only be realised in immediate experience. This immediate experience, however, is not feeling, that is to say, subrational consciousness, but supra-rational consciousness. It is immediacy at a level higher than that of thought. It is an immediacy which is above, not below, the level of reflexion.

As I have said elsewhere, the *Advaita* philosophy of Śaṅkara also ultimately leads to the recognition of some form of supra-rational consciousness as the ultimate reality. The *turîya* condition which, according te Śankara is the highest stage of consciousness, is supra-rational consciousness. Reflective consciousness, on the other hand, occupies the lowest rung in the conscious life. The characteristic of the *turîya* or *samādhi* state is that here there is no object but only the subject. As Professor K. C. Bhattacharya puts it, in this state the self is conscious, but conscious of a blank only. "It has then the cognition of the absence of specific cognition, the consciousness of a positive nothing, and hence it flashes back on itself."[1] He beautifully expresses it as "swooning into the knowledge of noumena." There are two forms of this ecstatic consciousness recognised by *Advaita* philosophy, namely, *savikalpa* and *nirvikalpa-samādhi*. Both *savikalpa-samādhi* and *nirvikalpa-samādhi* are forms of undifferenced consciousness, but the difference

[1] K. C. Bhattacharya, Studies in Vedantism, p. 14.

between them is, as Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya points out, that *nirvikalpa-samādhi* is "undifferenced, not only in the sense that the consciousness of quality is absent, as it is even in *sushupti* not only in the sense that the unconscious ring of the unknown constituting the limitation of all noumena lower than God is removed, as it may be in *savikalpa-samādhi*, but also in the sense that even the consciousness of this removal is absent." In other words, *nirvikalpa-samādhi* is indeterminate in a still higher degree. In *savikalpa-samādhi* the subject-object distinction is overcome by making the subject expand till it embraces the whole region of objects, that is to say, by making it one with God. But in *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, there is not even the consciousness of this expansion; there is only the consciousness of a unity which has never been anything but a unity. In *savikalpa-samādhi* the self shines by outshining the object; in *nirvikalpa-samādhi* it shines because it knows nothing but shining.

We see thus that the rationalists themselves feel the need of going beyond the limits of reason and having recourse to some form of supra-rational consciousness. As I have pointed out in my book, "The Neo-romantic Movement in Contemporary Philosophy," this is due to the recognition on the part of rationalism that truth is a very complex whole and that it is not possible to express it fully by means of Reason. In other words, the basic principle of romanticism is the perception of the complexity of the real. The real is the total, it is not an isolated fragment which we can identify with Reason.

But the defect of this romantic upheaval against rationalism is that it itself commits the same mistakes for which it blames rationalism. For is not the romanticist's principle, whether it is feeling or will, quite as one-sided as the rationalist's Reason? The rationalist has at any rate this merit that he wants to see things in as clear a light as possible, whereas the romanticist by his predilection for the obscure makes things all the more hazy. For my purpose here it is not necessary to

make the distinction which I have made in my book already referred to, between romanticism and mysticism, and what I say here of the romanticist applies equally to the mystic.

The recent development of idealism in Italy, especially in the form in which it presents itself in Croce and Gentile, is also a plea for the recognition of extra-logical considerations. Croce's vindication of spiritualism, as opposed to mere logicism is a sign of the times. It is a march from the narrow world of logical forms to the wider world of life. Spirit is undoubtedly greater than logic and the sooner the world understands it, the better—this, in brief, is the message of Croce.

The rapid growth of Pragmatism and the philosophy of values is also a sign of the increasing recognition of extra-rational factors for the understanding of the universe. I am sorry that the time at my disposal does not allow me to deal fully with these movements of modern thought. They are the inevitable reaction of a one-sided assertion, and if they do not always make for a compression of the totality of the universe, they at any rate draw out attention to some palpable defects in the rationalistic edifice. The chief error of pragmatism lies, as I have pointed out elsewhere, in its having recourse to a feature of life which is far more narrow than the feature which rationalism emphasises. If Reason is to be discarded on the ground that it is too narrow, there is surely no point in holding fast to the principle of utility. Of course, there are some forms of pragmatism, notably those of Schiller and Le Roy, where wider purposiveness is put forward, but here the lines that divide them from rationalism are very faint.

The philosophy of values represents another protest against excessive rationalism. Reason, according to it, is only one among a number of values. There are values of feeling and willing which cannot be reduced to the values of reason. It is therefore impossible to look upon Reason as the sole monarch. The philosophy of values wants to dethrone Reason and treat it as co-ordinate in rank with a number of other values.

When, however, we ask: what is a value, what constitutes the essence of value ?—the value-philosophers are at their wit's end. Münsterberg defines value as an over-personal satisfaction of the self. Over-personal satisfaction of the self, as has been pointed out by Münsterberg's critics, is a contradiction in terms; for it means 'over-personal personal satisfaction.' Moreover, in what sense does an over-personal self-satisfaction differ from the 'self-realisation' of the rationalist ?

To avoid the difficulty of stating what value is, it has been said by Moore and others that value is indefinable. "My point," Moore says, "is that 'good' is a simple notion, just as 'yellow' is a simple notion; that, just as you cannot, by any manner of means, explain to any one who does not already know it, what yellow is, so you cannot explain what good is." [1] Rickert also says, "what *value in itself* is," cannot be defined but this only means that we have to do here with the final and most fundamental concept with which we think the world." [2]

An attempt has been made to define value in terms of interest. The merit of this term, it is claimed,[3] is "that it is a term which may be used to indicate what is characteristic of the strain in life and mind, which shall be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace all its varieties, and whose meaning we may refine as we proceed." But interest, I think, requires to be defined as much as value itself. A better example of '*obscurum per obscurius*' it is difficult to conceive than this attempt to define value in terms of interest.

But the worst mistake that the value-philosophers make is in setting up a contrast between the world of values and the world of reality. Both Rickert and Husserl commit this mistake. Husserl takes pleasure in contrasting the world of Essence which he fondly calls the world of "Irrealitäten" with the world of reality. Similarly, Rickert says that the

[1] *Principia Ethica*, p. 7.
[2] *System der Philosophie*, p. 113.
[3] *Vide* Perry, *General Theory of Value*, p. 27.

world of values is outside the real world. Rickert, however, gives up his case for a dualism of reality and value by subsuming both of these under a World-whole. This monistic solution is, I think, rationalism's revenge upon the philosophy of values. Apart from this, however, there is no meaning in the contrast between reality and value. It is possible to contrast reality as value with reality as thought or feeling. But there is no meaning in opposing value to reality. In fact, what Rickert opposes to value is not reality but existence or Dasein. This is clear from his statement, " A great painting is, on its real side, nothing but canvas and colour. Its value-side makes it a painting."

The philosophy of Bergson sums up in itself all the various protests that have been made against rationalism. It is the strongest assertion in modern times of the irrational and the alogical. It takes Reason to be merely a practical faculty, designed to make our lives happy and comfortable. Access to reality is only possible through intuition. Reason always moves in a concentric circle round reality : it is never in a position to hit reality. The conceptual world is an artificial world ; it is static and lacks the essential dynamism of reality. The real is movement, change ; it is very different from the spatial representation of it, which is the work of the intellect.

As I have said elsewhere, there is something peculiarly unsatisfying in this picture of continuous movement. Movement we always understand as movement towards a goal. Where there is no goal, the movement becomes more or less a chase after a phantom.

If Bergson's object was to demolish mechanism, we must say that he has failed. A flow that is not a flow towards anything, a movement that is not a movement towards a goal, is unrelieved mechanism. In fact, it is a mechanism of time. Escape from mechanism is only possible through the notion of purpose.

It is, in fact, one of the strangest ironies of fate that Bergson after demolishing the whole structure of mechanical

evolution, should have himself fallen a victim to time-mechanism. The characteristic of a creative evolution is movement guided by a purpose, change regulated by an end. Purposeless activity, whatever else it may be, is certainly not creative.

Bergson's view of Matter, moreover, is not consistent with the rest of his philosophy. Bergson thinks that when the flow of life is checked or retarded, then Matter arises. But why should the flow of life suffer a retardation at all ? If reality is nothing but a flow, how can there be anything to check it ? Does not the very idea of a check to the flow of reality introduce a dualistic conception, just as the recognition of the two faculties, intuition and intellect, does ?

The real value of Bergson's philosophy lies in its assertion of the *alogical*, rather than in any positive construction of its own. Bergson has shown the hopelessness of rationalism as we find it to-day. As I have pointed out elsewhere, unless rationalism thoroughly recasts its logic, there is no possibility of meeting Bergson's charges. Happily, rationalism seems to be aware of this and has already done a good deal to remove its original rigidity. But a good deal of up-hill work still remains ahead.

Whilst Bergson attacks the citadel of rationalism with new weapons, the schools of neo-realism of the present day assail it with the old rusty weapons. But rationalism is more than able to hold its own against this new attack. There may be valiant fighters in the realistic army, like Bertrand Russell and Moore in England and Perry in America, but unless the neo-realists change their methods of attack, they do not seem to have much chance of success.

How long, I ask, will the realists believe that they have refuted idealism by demolishing the proposition, '*Esse est percipi*' ? Which idealist of importance in modern times accepts the Berkeleyan dictum, '*Esse est percipi*' ? Yet we find Moore in his celebrated 'Refutation of Idealism' saying, "That wherever you can truly predicate *esse* you can truly predicate *percipi*, in some sense or other, is, I take it, a

necessary step in all arguments, properly to be called Idealistic." As Prof. S. C. Chatterjee said in his paper, "Is Idealism refuted ?" which he read before the second session of this Congress, "what is urged here is that modern idealists commit the same mistake as Berkeley... But a levelling statement like this cannot be accepted as true in any possible sense. It rests on a radical misunderstanding of the position of modern Idealism." Poor idealism ! The fate of idealism in the hands of the neo-realists reminds one of that of the poor man in Molière's play, "Le Médecin malgré lui," who, in spite of his protesting that he was not a doctor, would still be hailed as a doctor. However much the modern idealists may protest that they do not accept the Berkeleyan dictum the realists would go on thrusting it upon them.

Leaving aside such occasional attacks, the philosophical atmosphere of the present day must be pronounced to be extremely calm, nay even oppressively calm. As Perry remarks, "there is to-day in all quarters a declining disposition to insist on the exclusive truth of any doctrine, or to argue its negative implications."

Does this spirit of peace and mutual goodwill among philosophers help the progress of philosophy ? In one way it certainly does. It produces a mental attitude very favourable to the comprehension of the complexity of the philosophical problems. There is perhaps some truth in the suggestion that it does this to some extent at the cost of that virility of thought out of which all great systems have arisen. It is, however, far from true to say that the present age is merely an age of eclecticism and not of new constructions. There is a good deal of true philosophical activity manifest in all quarters, and if it has not so far succeeded in producing a gigantic system, like that of Kant or Hegel, it has at least prepared the ground for a rethinking of the problems of philosophy from a newer and wider standpoint.

A new orientation in philosophy may also, I think, be

confidently looked for in the new interest that has been created in philosophical speculation in India. Hitherto our attitude towards the philosophical movements in the West was that of a passive spectator, but now it has changed to that of an active participator. This happy change leads one to hope that it will be possible for India again to obtain the leadership in philosophical thought which she held for so many ages.

S. K. MAITRA

A SONG AT DAWN

O ! Beloved,
  Scatter thy voice, to Love's
    Own wide immensity...
Let it break in music, and in song,
  Upon the proud bright golden shores
    Of Dawn.
That it shall ring and sweetly echo
  Deep in the purple shadows
    Where the star-flowers nod and dream.
So that Pan, in waking, might hear thy voice
  And marvel there should be music sweeter
    Than his own silvery lute.
Sing ! Beloved, sing !
  And in the faint still depths of dawn
  My soul shall hear, and wing its flight
    To thee !

LELAND J. BERRY

A SCHEME FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL REORGANISATION OF THE POST-GRADUATE UNIVERSITY AT CALCUTTA[1]

During the period of the new regulations (1909 and after), especially since the establishment of the Post-Graduate Departments (1917), the University of Calcutta has made notable contributions to the academic life of the world as well as to the general intellectual progress of India.

The results achieved thus far constitute but a prelude to what remains yet to be accomplished. In the first place, the entire organization of the Post-Graduate Departments requires to be modernized. Secondly, a two-year M.A. or M.Sc. instruction cannot be deemed to be adequate for the requirements of intellectuals by the present-day world-standard. And finally, the demands of a higher efficiency in teaching as well as research have also to be seriously met.

As the *Questionnaire* issued by the University Organisation Committee has raised some very large issues which can be solved in the long run perhaps only by the Legislature, the time seems opportune for opening a discussion as to the possibility of a somewhat fundamental transformation of the Post-Graduate University with a view to promoting its further developments. In the preparation of the scheme for reorganization that follows, an attempt has been made to utilize the experiences of some of the latest University constitutions[2] in Great Britain, the

[1] Sarkar : *Introduction to the Science of Education* (Longmans Green & Co., London, 1912); *Steps to a University* (Calcutta, 1913); *Memorandum on Post-Graduate Studies with special reference to Economics and the Allied Sciences* in the "Calcutta Review" (August, 1926) and *Greetings to Young India* (Calcutta, 1927); *Comparative Pedagogics in Relation to Public Finance and National Wealth* (Calcutta, 1929); *The Post-Graduate University at Calcutta : An Objective Study* (Calcutta, 1929). The last mentioned publication is to be referred to for an "explanation" of the scheme suggested here.

[2] The first-hand studies on the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, London, Leeds, Manchester, Edinburgh, St. Andrews, Columbia, Clark, Harvard, California, Paris, Berlin,

Continent, America and Japan and render them as much as possible applicable to the traditions and present conditions of the University of Calcutta. It will perhaps be noticed that the scheme seeks to carry forward the ideals that lay behind the initiation of the Post-Graduate Departments to their logical consequences in the next stage of constructive evolution.

Fundamental Features of the Suggested Constitution.

1. The Post-Graduate Boards are abolished as well as the Post-Graduat Chairmanships.

2. The unit of Post-Graduate academic life is the Post-Graduate Faculty.

3. Only the higher members as well as a few others of the teaching *corps* can become members of the Post-Graduate Faculty. But not every member has the right to vote.

4. The Post-Graduate Faculty's concerns are exclusively teaching and research.

5. The members of the teaching *corps* are deprived of the right to collectively discuss appointments, vacancies, promotions, salaries, etc., or make recommendations thereon to any committee or board.

6. Grades are established in the teaching *corps*, first, as regards status, secondly, as regards salary, and thirdly, as regards academic responsibility.

7. The duties of fixing text-books, preparing the syllabus, and supervising the teaching, tutorial and seminar work are entrusted to single individuals, *viz.*, the professors, associate professors and other nominated "heads" in each course of instruction.

Tokyo, etc., and the higher technological and commercial colleges of these intellectual centres together with the personal discussions with their chancellors, presidents, rectors, deans and professors published in the present author's Bengali books on the educational, industrial and cultural institutions of Great Britain, America, France, Germany and Japan, furnish the general ideological background of the constitution that is being suggested here for the Post-Graduate University at Calcutta.

8. The courses of instruction are not grouped into water-tight compartments but are arranged as independent branches of intellectual discipline.

9. The students are allowed to take any correlation of courses offered by the Faculties subject to the approval of the Student Advisory Committee.

10. The members of the teaching *corps* offer the courses subject to the approval of the "heads" in each.

11. Appointments, etc., are made and budgets prepared by expert committees of the Post-Graduate Syndicate subject to the approval of the University Senate.

12. The Post-Graduate Senate is composed mainly of the higher members of the teaching *corps* as well as a large number of outsiders such as are members of the University Senate.

13. The system of two Councils, two Executive Committees and two Secretaries is replaced by that of one Post-Graduate Senate with one Post-Graduate Syndicate and one Secretariat.

14. Period of compulsory attendance and tuition at school for M.A. and M.Sc.—3 years.

15. Regular attendance and study for post-M.A. and post-M.Sc. examination (doctorate) contemplated.

N.B.—The terms, Faculty, Senate, Syndicate, Dean, etc., are familiar in India as categories of administration in Undergraduate University life. The same terms are being used in this scheme for the Post-Graduate University as well. In the conception of the present writer the "real University" begins indeed at the Post-Graduate stage. The schooling upto the B.A. or B.Sc. stage should not belong to the University strictly so called.

Post-Graduate Senate.

1. The two post-graduate councils are to be amalgamated into one body and constitute a common council of arts and sciences. It may be called the Post-Graduate Senate.

2. The Post-Graduate Senate is to be composed of :—

(*a*) All professors in arts and sciences.

(*b*) All "associate professors" in arts and sciences.

(*c*) Certain "lecturers" to be elected from among themselves by the "lecturers" and "instructors" in a common meeting.

The number of these elected "lecturers" is not to exceed 25 per cent. of the number of "professors" and "associate professors."

(*d*) Four members appointed by the University Senate.

(*e*) Two members appointed by the University Faculty of Science.

(*f*) Two members appointed by the University Faculty of Arts.

(*g*) Heads of colleges in Calcutta affiliated to the B.A. and B.Sc. standard.

N.B.—In regard to *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*, the regulations *re* the Post-Graduate Councils in force as at present may be retained.

(*h*) Two members appointed by the University Faculty of Engineering.

(*i*) Two members appointed by the University Faculty of Medicine.

Two Post-Graduate Faculties.

1. The Post-Graduate Senate is to consist of two Faculties: (1) the Post-Graduate Faculty of Arts and (2) the Post-Graduate Faculty of Sciences.

2. Each of these Post-Graduate Faculties is to be composed exclusively of those members of the Post-Graduate Senate who are members of the Post-Graduate teaching *corps* in arts and sciences. A certain number of non-Senator members of the teaching *corps* may be co-opted by each Faculty, as follows :—

(*a*) 10 per cent. of the "lecturers" elected from among themselves.

(*b*) 5 per cent. of the "instructors" elected from among themselves.

These co-opted members will participate in discussion but have no right to vote.

4. The Post-Graduate Faculty of Arts will have a head to be known as the Post-Graduate Dean of Arts. The head of the Post-Graduate Faculty of Sciences is to be known as the Post-Graduate Dean of Sciences.

Two Post-Graduate Deans.

1. The Post-Graduate Dean of Arts is to be elected by the professors, associate professors, lecturers and instructors in a common meeting from among the professors of the Post-Graduate Faculty of Arts.

2. The Post-Graduate Dean of Sciences is to be elected by the professors, associate professors, lecturers and instructors in a common meeting from among the professors of the Post-Graduate Faculty of Sciences.

3. The Post-Graduate Deanship is to be an annual office. No retiring Dean is to be eligible for re-election for five years.

Post-Graduate President.

1. The Post-Graduate Senate will have a head, to be known as the Post-Graduate President.

2. The Post-Graduate President is to be elected from among the "professors" by the entire post-graduate teaching *corps* (professors, associate professors, lecturers and instructors) in a common meeting.

3. He is to hold office for one year only and is not eligible for re-election for five years.

4. In every instance the Post-Graduate President is to be a different person from the two Post-Graduate Deans.

5. No two successive Post-Graduate Presidents are to be members of the same Post-Graduate Faculty.

Post-Graduate Vice-President.

1. The Post-Graduate Senate is to have a Vice-President.

2. In every instance the Post-Graduate Vice-President is to be the retiring President of the previous year.

Post-Graduate Syndicate.

1. The Post-Graduate Senate is to have an executive committee to be known as the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

2. The Post-Graduate Syndicate is to be composed of :—

(*a*) Post-Graduate President.

(*b*) Post-Graduate Vice-President.

(*c*) 2 Post-Graduate Deans.

(*d*) 6 Professors : 3 elected by each Post-Graduate Faculty from among the members of the Post-Graduate Senate.

(*e*) 6 associate professors : 3 elected by each Post-Graduate Faculty from among the members of the Post-Graduate Senate.

(*f*) 2 lecturers : one elected by the lecturers and instructors of each Post-Graduate Faculty from among the members of the Post-Graduate Senate. They will not have the right to vote.

Post-Graduate Teaching Corps.

The Post-Graduate teaching *corps* is composed of members belonging to the following grades :—

1. Professors : Terms regarding salary, tenure, hours of attendance, kind of lecture, research, publication seminar or extension work, guidance of teachers and advanced students, etc., are to be settled by the University with each professor individually at the time of appointment as well as later according to changes in the academic and financial circumstances. The salary is not likely to be less than Rs. 1,000-100 (2 years)-1,250.

On the one hand it depends ultimately on University finance as to the maximum to be paid to the professors. And

on the other the minimum demanded by the professors may at times be lower than the schedule suggested here.

2. Associate Professors: Terms regarding salary, etc., are to be settled by the University with each associate professor individually as in the case of the professors. Salary scale: 550-25 (1 year)-850.

N.B.—The professors and in their absence the associate professors are to be the responsible heads in regard to teaching, text-books, tutorials, etc., in each course.

3. Lecturers: They are to be appointed as a rule at least for 12 hours of lecture and 4 hours of tutorial work per week. Salary Scale: Rs. 300-25 (two years)-500.

N.B.—In the absence of professors and associate professors, a senior lecturer is to be nominated by the Faculty to be the responsible head *re* teaching, text-books, etc.

4. Instructors, Demonstrators, Assistants, etc.: Their chief work is to be tutorial guidance of the students according to the instructions of the professors, associate professors, and other "heads." And by advanced studies they are to qualify themselves for the work of lecturers. Salary Scale: Rs. 150-15 (1 year)-300.

Appointments and Promotions of the Post-Graduate Teaching Corps.

1. The first appointments may be made to any post and at any salary and on any conditions agreed to between the party and the University according to qualifications without reference to age.

2. Promotions to the next higher status are not to be treated as automatic. They are to be applied for by the party with statements of grounds, but not before the expiry of three to five years after first appointment. Each application will have to be considered on its own merits.

3. The increments of salary in each grade are as a rule to be automatic.

4. In regard to first appointments, promotions to the next higher status, and increments of salary in each grade, the initial authority is the Appointments Committee of the Post-Graduate Senate subject to the approval of the University Senate.

5. The Appointments Committee with the approval of the University Senate may confer a special status on or grant a special elevation in status and increment in salary to any member of the Post-Graduate teaching *corps* whenever special academic achievements or other distinctions justify such special treatments.

6. The salary is not always to depend on the status nor the status always on the salary.

7. It may not often be possible to depend on "in-breeding," *i.e.*, the gradal rise from lectureship upwards in order to fill in the vacancies in professorships and assistant professorships. The Appointments Committee is, therefore, authorized to tap external sources for these posts whenever necessary and as often as desirable.

Privileges of Post-Graduate Professors.

1. Every post-graduate professor is by virtue of his academic status a member of the Post-Graduate Senate and a member of the Post-Graduate Faculty.

2. The post-graduate professors are eligible to election as Post-Graduate Deans, as Post-Graduate President, and as members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

3. They are entitled to vote for (1) the President of the Post-Graduate Senate, (2) the Post-Graduate Dean, and (3) the members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

Privileges of Post-Graduate Associate Professors.

1. Every post-graduate associate professor is by virtue of his academic status a member of the Post-Graduate Senate and a member of the Post-Graduate Faculty.

2. The post-graduate associate professors are entitled to vote for the Post-Graduate Deans, the Post-Graduate President, and members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

3. The post-graduate associate professors are eligible to election as members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

Privileges of Post-Graduate Lecturers.

1. The post-graduate lecturers are eligible to election as members of the Post-Graduate Senate, as members of the Post-Graduate Faculties, and as members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

2. They are entitled to vote for the Post-Graduate Deans, the Post-Graduate President, and members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

Privileges of Post-Graduate Instructors, etc.

1. They are entitled to vote (1) for the "lecturer"-members of the Post-Graduate Senate in a common meeting of lecturers and instructors, (2) for the Post-Graduate Deans in a common meeting of the professors, associate professors, lecturers and instructors, (3) for the Post-Graduate President in a common meeting of the professors, associate professors, lecturers and instructors, and (4) for the "lecturer"-members of the Post-Graduate Syndicate in a common meeting of lecturers and instructors.

2. They are eligible to election as members of the Post-Graduate Faculties.

Post-Graduate Courses of Instruction.

1. The courses of instruction offered by the Post-Graduate University are to be tabulated in the alphabetical or numerical order.

2. The teachers are to be appointed according to the requirements of the courses offered. A re-shuffling of courses among the teachers may be permitted according to the needs of

the circumstances. The teachers will in any case be named after the course or courses given by them, and not according to the departments.

3. Not all the courses need be represented by teachers of the rank of professors and associate professors.

4. The students, like the teachers, belong not to any department but to the entire Faculty and may be allowed to take any combinations of courses with the approval of the Student Advisory Committee.

5. The number and kind of courses to be offered by the University may vary from year to year.

6. The Post-Graduate Senate is to settle the number and kind of courses, omitting some and introducing others as the case may be, subject to the approval of the University Senate. Those members of the teaching *corps* who are not on the Post-Graduate Senate may be invited to suggest to that body the omission or introduction of courses, from time to time but not to vote.

Functions of the Post-Graduate Senate.

1. The entire administration of the Post-Graduate University in regard to buildings, office management, teaching *corps*, etc., is in the hands of the Post-Graduate Senate subject to the approval of the University Senate.

2. All academic arrangements in regard to courses of instruction, standard of examination, teaching, research, etc., are likewise in the hands of the Post-Graduate Senate subject to the approval of the University Senate.

Functions and Committees of the Post-Graduate Syndicate.

1. The Post-Graduate Syndicate is the executive committee of the Post-Graduate Senate.

2. It will, besides, discharge all those functions, administrative and academic, which may specifically be entrusted to it by the Post-Graduate Senate.

3. The following committees will be appointed by the Post-Graduate Syndicate :

(*a*) Library Committee (experts to be nominated) : to invite suggestions from every member of the teaching *corps re* additions to the library. In case the suggestions are wholly or in part rejected the reasons are to be communicated to the party.

(*b*) Laboratory Committee (experts to be nominated) : to invite suggestions from every member of the teaching *corps re* additions to and equipment, etc., of the laboratories. In case the suggestions are wholly or in part rejected the reasons are to be communicated to the party.

(*c*) Museum Committee (experts to be nominated).

(*d*) Post-Graduate Courses Committee (experts to be nominated) : to function as the central bureau of information and organization, as the academic " general staff " as it were, in regard to the courses of instruction, correlation of courses, standard of examinations, etc., and the lines of strategic advance to be followed in regard to them in the immediate and near future.

(*e*) Post-Graduate Research Committee (experts to be nominated) : to function as the central bureau of information and organization in regard to the researches and publications undertaken by the members of the teaching *corps*.

(*f*) Post-Graduate Appointments Committee (Post-Graduate President, Post-Graduate Vice-President, Post-Graduate Deans, Vice-Chancellor of the University, 2 members of the University Syndicate, 2 representatives of the University Senate, 2 non-University experts of the subject in which the appointment is to be made, with option to invite opinion from University teachers of the subject or allied subjects) :

(*i*) To invite applications for new posts.

(*ii*) To offer posts to desirable candidates subject to the approval of the University Senate.

(*iii*) To make appointments subject to the approval of the University Senate.

(*iv*) To invite suggestions if necessary from the Post-Graduate Senate *re* new posts.

(*v*) To entertain applications for increment, promotion, research grant, travelling allowances etc.

(*g*) Post-Graduate Finance Committee (President, Vice-President, Deans, Vice-Chancellor) :

(*i*) To study the appropriations and prepare the budget through the Secretariat.

(*ii*) To place the budget before the Post-Graduate Senate in order that it may be forwarded to the University Board of Accounts after discussion.

Functions of the Post-Graduate Faculties.

1. The Post-Graduate Faculties are to have no administrative or financial functions whatsoever.

2. Their functions are to be exclusively academic and lie in the fields of teaching, tutorial, seminar, extension and research work.

3. Every academic arrangement of the Faculties is subject to the approval of the Post-Graduate Senate.

Committees of the Post-Graduate Faculties.

1. Student Advisory Committee (professors, associate professors and other "heads" with the Dean as president) : to guide students in the choice and correlation of courses.

2. Teaching and Text-book Committee (professors, associate professors and other "heads" with the Dean as President) : (1) to supervise teaching, tutorial and seminar work and (2) to prepare the syllabus of studies and recommend a list of books for compulsory reading and reference.

(*a*) The courses, curriculum and books in each course of instruction are to be fixed by the professors or associate professors.

(*b*) In those courses which are not represented by teachers of these grades the "heads" are to be nominated by the Post-Graduate Appointments Committee to fix the courses, etc.

(*c*) In every instance the views of the junior members of the teaching *corps* in each course are to be ascertained by the professors, associate professors or other heads.

(*d*) The control of teaching, tutorial and seminar work in each course of instruction is to be in the hands of the "heads" appointed or nominated by the Appointments Committee for those functions.

(*e*) Should, however, a fundamental disagreement happen to manifest itself systematically between the other members of the teaching *corps* and the professors, associate professors or other heads in regard to the courses, curriculum, etc., as well as the methods of teaching, tutorial and seminar work an appeal may be made by the former to the Post-Graduate Syndicate for an inquiry into the situation.

3. Examination Committee (professors and associate professors with the Dean as president): to appoint internal and external examiners subject to the approval of the University Syndicate.

Examination and Thesis for M.A. and M.Sc.

1. The final post-graduate degree examinations are to take place on the completion of a continuous study for 3 years.

2. The students are to be in attendance for 3 years after B.A. or B.Sc.

3. They will be required to take eighteen to twenty different courses for the final examinations.

4. Each course is to constitute the subject-matter of a half-paper for written examination extending over two hours.

5. The minimum number of lectures on each course, *i.e.*, each half-paper should as a rule be 60.

6. At the commencement of the third year the students will be required to take a theme for the subject of a thesis to be prepared during the year in consultation with one or several of the teachers and submitted at the time of the final written examination.

7. The number of hours per week that the students are to attend lectures is to be not less than 15. Tutorials not less than 5 hours per week extra.

Teaching for the Doctorate.

1. Post-M.A. and Post-M.Sc. courses of instruction may be offered by the Post-Graduate University in certain specified subjects.

2. The students will be required to be in attendance for at least two years, at the end of which there is to be a written examination.

3. They will have to attend courses in (1) a major subject, (2) a minor subject but allied to the major, and (3) a second minor subject of general cultural and methodological value.

4. The examinations will comprise (1) 3 or more written papers, and (2) a thesis, which may be submitted two or three years after the success at the written examination.

5. The 3 or more examination papers are to be examined by foreign experts appointed by the Post-Graduate Senate in Great Britain, the Continent and the U.S.A.

6. The thesis is to be examined by an examination committee composed of a British, a Continental, and an American as well as an Indian expert.

Post-Graduate Secretariat.

1. The Secretariat will be governed by the Post-Graduate President with the help of the two Deans.

2. The Secretariat is to look after the buildings, time-table, discipline of students and teachers, distribution of work, attendance, financial requirements, budget estimates, etc.

3. The Secretary is to be the official head of the entire administrative system with all-around and well-defined powers functioning, so to say, as the chief executive officer or Principal of the Post-Graduate University.

BENOY KUMAR SRAKAR



DEATH

Death as important as life
Is as the other hand of a scale ;
Between life and death,
Equal co-ordinates,
The universe of being is held :
From death springs up new life.

In death or life
Nothing is lost ;
Change into something newer—better—
Is the longing of all :
Nearer though, yet ever afar,
—The mystery of being is never solved.

Death or life,
—Every change is progress ;
Indispensable are their functions
Where nothing is stationary ;
Nearer, nearer, though ever afar,
Onward goes humanity to God.

Death life's complement
And life's prize
Must be owned to own life,
In its comprehension
Its majesty is realised ;
Through dying is reached a higher life.

Immortality is not a gift
Reserved for a chosen few,
—The thread that runs through life and death.
"O, Death where is thy victory ?"
Betrays ignorance of knowledge true :
Death owns victory as glorious as life.

If life in intensity,
Evolves in personality,
Only through death can humanity
Evolve in Divinity ;
Thus man a little less than Divine
Shall be Divine.

The evolutionary process
In the universe
Is the unceasing cry
For a new birth :
Death helps Nature's efforts
To produce perfect type.

Not to acknowledge glory to death
Is to deprive life of glory.
Behind these equal manifestations
Lies hidden the Lord of both,
—The cause of all manifestations,
The Reality of realities—Praised be ! Praised be !

G. C. GHOSH

THE ANNUAL CONVOCATION ADDRESS OF THE VICE-CHANCELLOR[1]

YOUR EXCELLENCY, LADY JACKSON, FELLOWS, GRADUATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Once more we have the opportunity of welcoming you, Sir, as our Chancellor, and we thank you for the interest you continue to take in the University and its students, an interest shown in many and varied directions.

During the past few weeks we have shared in the anxiety of the whole Empire, and it is but fitting that at this Convocation we should request you to convey to His Majesty the King-Emperor the sense of gratitude for his recovery which is felt by the largest single body of students within His Empire. We may disagree in many things, but in one thing, I think, we are all agreed, and that is in loyalty to the person of our Emperor and in thankfulness for his delivery from danger.

It is only six months since you did me the honour of appointing me to the position of Vice-Chancellor of this University, and I can speak from personal knowledge of only a part of the year under review. My predecessor in office could have furnished a more intimate account of the earlier period, had he been called upon to do so, but he must at least have that share in our proceedings of to-day which is constituted by a recognition on our part and on the part of the whole University of the great zeal and devotion with which he discharged the duties of his office and the energy which he expended upon his many tasks. He did not spare himself, and to-day, in Convocation assembled, we offer him our thanks for his sacrifice of time and strength in the service of the University.

In this rapidly changing life of ours it is not possible that a year should go by without our being called upon to suffer great losses as a University. One of our senior Honorary Fellows,

[1] Delivered at the Senate House, February 16, 1929.

Mr. Syamacharan Ganguli, an educationist of standing and a benefactor of the University died nearly twelve months ago, and about the same time we had to mourn the loss of one of the most distinguished sons of modern India, the Rt. Hon'ble Lord Sinha of Raipur, a pioneer in many new ways. Amidst his varied activities he found time to interest himself in the affairs of the University, and amongst other offices he was Dean of the Faculty of Law from 1906 to 1908. A similar position was occupied at a somewhat earlier date by the Rt. Hon'ble Sir Syed Ameer Ali, who died in August last. He served the University as a member of the Syndicate and as Tagore Professor of Law, and, although he had been separated from us by distance for many years, he was still closely connected with educational advance in this country both through his influence upon his own community and his reputation in the world of letters. The tragic death of Dr. George Ewan in July last removed, at the height of his powers and in the prime of life, one of our most able and vigorous Senators. He was an influence for good in many directions, and in a comparatively short time had come to be recognised as a trusted promoter of University progress. Lastly, we unite our sorrow with that of many leading families in this city in deploring the loss of Mr. S. R. Das, a Fellow of the University from 1923 to 1926, whose brilliant intellectual gifts and legal pre-eminence were a source of pride both to the University and the country. From reverent commemoration of the dead we may turn to the achievements of the living, and it is possible to record a period of steady successful work in the departments of academic activity most closely connected with the University. It will not imply any depreciation of the labours and energy of others of our University staff, *e.g.*, of such eminent philosophers and industrious authors as Professor Radhakrishnan and Professor Dasgupta, if I draw special attention to the wonderful discovery which stands to the credit of Professor C. V. Raman, and which has been

received with enthusiasm by the whole scientific world. I do not presume to describe this achievement, but the President of the French Academy of Sciences has referred to it as a notable discovery which opens new and fruitful avenues of research. Some seventy papers consequent upon the discovery have been published during the last few months, and the frequency with which scientific journals speak of the *Raman* effect, the *Raman* spectra, the *Raman* lines, etc., proves that Calcutta University has had the honour, as a result of the labours of its distinguished professor, of supplying a new adjective to the vocabulary of science. The Faraday Society is organising a special meeting to discuss the new phenomenon and its relation to molecular spectra, and Professor Raman has beeen invited to lecture before the Royal Institution. This latter honour, I believe, he shares with the veteran scientist, Sir Jagadish Bose, to whom the University had recently the privilege of offering felicitations on the attainment of his seventieth birthday, and congratulations on a lengthy record of scientific achievement.

Before I go on to speak of the problems which will be occupying our attention in the immediate future, may I express my gratitude to my colleagues in the University for their generous co-operation during the past few months ? Thanks to their active good-will and their passive forbearance, there has been no interruption during this period of the placidity of our existence. With so many clouds of controversy looming darkly upon the horizon, this may be the calm before storm, but I am hopeful that during our period of by no means somnolent quiescence—which is to be carefully distinguished from acquiescence—there may have been an increasing disposition to consider academic matters in respect of their merits and not merely of their origin. Just as acceptance of the evolutionary principles does not compel us to be always thinking of our ancestry, probably arboreal, so there is no reason why questions of the origin of problems or proposals

should always be in the forefront in discussion of University topics.

Our educational situation presents so many varied perplexities at this juncture that I may be accused of contempt of court if, before judgment is delivered, I allude to any one of them. But I venture to take the risk. We have discussions going on round about us and amongst us upon Primary Education, Secondary Education and Under-graduate and Post-graduate University Education ; and the Syndicate, weary but watchful Post-graduate Committees, slightly apprehensive, Trust Boards of Management not uninfluenced by the Raman effect, to say nothing of *ad hoc* committees, are engaged in the good work of discussion, guided and encouraged, aided, abetted or otherwise by Dr. Banerjea in the Legislative Council, and by Dr. Jenkins—that "universal provider" of educational contrivances—in the depths of the Secretariat. It is said that in the multitude of counsellors there is wisdom, and having got the multitude, we hope for the wisdom. We hope that a satisfactory solution may soon be reached of the problem of the Secondary Board, and that the difficulties of dualism as between the University and the Education Department may be overcome by an arrangement which will relieve the already overweighted shoulders of the University of some of the burden of the schools while still keeping in mind our traditional responsibility for them.

The mention of both Primary and University education in the same sentence brings us abruptly up against the problem of finance. However wise we may be both within the University and without it (without being used in a double sense, so as to include people who think that a University education is *worse* than useless) we cannot afford to do without money, and must join in what was the other day described as the "shrill cry" for it. We wish to learn, and to learn to think, but in order to think we must live.

In respect of finance may I urge the necessity in any country of *both* University and Primary education ? If

inadequate provision is made for the continuance of a body of public-spirited men with a University tradition and up-bringing, the desire for primary education will soon fade away. Perhaps it is more true of this country than of some others that the desire for education filters downwards, and that unless you have a considerable number of men who have experienced the benefits of education for its own sake, you will not have sufficient stimulation of those who are not so conscious of these benefits. Negatively, also, the same is true. Restriction of the University education would mean the increase of illiteracy, for in such a case efforts to establish or develop primary education would meet with little encouragement. To the promotion of University education we may surely apply the words. This ought ye to have done and not to have left the other undone. Further, it is surely true that in any state it is always possible to make fuller compulsory provision for primary education than for advanced education.

Then in respect of our own more immediate financialproblems—it has been pointed out on the one hand that the Government of Bengal has no money and that on the other hand the University of Calcutta is very extravagant. Settlements, both Meston and Permanent, are given as reasons why there should be no additional support of the University. But why—it may be suggested—should the Government of India altogether disown its oldest University child ? It has had a certain amount of responsibility for the origination of the present clamant and unsatisfied needs, and there seems no apparent reason why it should confine its present generosity merely to the little ones in the nursery—why, in other words, it should not anticipate Meston unsettlements—I do not venture to breathe a whisper of any other unsettlements.

In respect of our deserts, again—or want of deserts—it is alleged that we are extravagant. We may be so in some directions, and there is certainly a possibility of some internal redistributions, but in regard to the total sum necessary for

maintenance, to say nothing of wholly legitimate expansion, I am afraid there is no possibility whatsoever of diminution without very serious detriment.

But what I wish to plead for above all things is that in all our negotiations we should get rid of the spirit of bargaining, that we should avoid the suggestion that we are out to get all that we can from Government, with the corresponding implication that it is the intention of Government to give us the bare minimum necessary to silence our clamours. We hold strongly to the idea that we are partners in the consideration of the common good and not bargainers the one over against the other. We hold that it is the duty of the University to give boldly and honestly the advice which is asked as to the proper distribution of educational public money, and not to ask a pice more than is necessary in view of other requirements of the community. And at the same time we ask that, after an equitable distribution of the public funds has been made, confidence will be placed in us that the resources entrusted to us will be carefully administered for the greatest good of the community of which both Government and University form a part.

But it should be always remembered that there are other than Government resources in the country, and that the University has a right to appeal to private benefactors. Is it too much to hope that there may be a recurrence of some of those princely benefactions of a dozen years ago,—unless Dr. Brahmachari by his recent appeal has succeeded in diverting all the generosity of the "rich aristocracy" of Bengal into the coffers of the Asiatic Society?

We have spoken of the close connection between the University and the interests of the community as a whole, and this leads to speculation as to whether the University is properly preparing the students for the duties of citizenship. There are on the one hand those who acclaim the students as presently active and efficient leaders in all public movements, and on the other hand those who hold that it must not even be whispered

in their ears that there is such a thing as politics. Both extremes seem to me frankly impossible. But I am not going to traverse a well-worn theme, save to say that preparation for life includes consideration of political problems and that such consideration has to be permitted unless we are to force the students into one or other of the dogmatisms which produce either conservatism or anarchy. Such preparation, however, does not mean participation in the sense of a premature assumption of the responsibilities of the post-preparatory period. Difficulties in regard to this particular problem would not arise if there were more sympathy and co-operation between the University authorities and the general community. But if the University is divided within itself, or if there is a cleavage of opinion between it and the general public, such difficulties are inevitable.

The same consideration also applies to the wider question of discipline, which is of paramount importance at the present time when people who are elderly in mind, if not also in body, are shaking their heads over the restlessness of the student community, and declaring that its members have altogether got out of hand, and that discipline must be restored at all costs. It always seems to me that comparisons between one generation and another are as odious as other comparisons are. But, again it does not meet the case simply to say that the students of to-day are no worse than their predecessors, or—more lightly—to quote the familiar saying that "boys will be boys." We must go deeper. We are dealing at least with boys who want to be men, who are on the threshold of manhood, and who cannot therefore be subjected to the same kind of discipline as is suitable for school boys. Analogies in this respect between one country and another are unsafe. In England, at least in the older Public Schools and Universities, for example, boys are kept in scholastic and academic leading strings to a later age than in India or in Scotland, and whatever our opinion on the relative merits of the educational systems may be, the fact remains that we

cannot in India or even in the barbarous country of Scotland count upon the same degree of traditional pressure in the direction of conformity to rule and custom. The problem of discipline has to be dealt with in a subtler way, and therefore becomes more intimately connected with the general rapport between the Colleges and the community of which I have already spoken. Discipline can be maintained only if the academic authorities feel that they have parents and guardians on their side. To my mind the relation between the authority and the student is of the nature of a solemn contract in which the teacher promises to respect the rights and privileges and personality of the student, and on the other hand the guardian promises to support the authority of the teacher. The teacher must stand in some sense in *loco parentis*, otherwise he has no continuing security ; he cannot for any length of time stand in opposition to the parent or to the collective enlightened community. If the contract of which I have spoken be broken, and if it be broken, as may occasionally happen, by the academic authority, then the adage that discipline must be maintained at all costs prove to be mechanical, archaic and peculiarly futile. If we can maintain our discipline only by the persistent refusal to admit that there may have been a mistake, such discipline is not worth maintaining. Guardians may in that case quite conceivably exercise their right of withdrawal from the contract. But what I do urge is that the guardians should play the game : that they should either withdraw their students from the colleges, or, if they keep them there, should resolutely uphold the authority of the College. They should not allow them to remain in College, and at the same time actively or passively encourage them either individually or collectively to defy the academic authority. Otherwise the authority of the teacher, an authority which has a greater traditional strength in this land than perhaps in any other, is irretrievably ruined. No satisfactory solution of the acute problem of discipline is possible so long as the relationship between the teacher and the community is one of antagonism

or persistent misunderstanding. Discipline depends on the satisfactoriness of the general situation and cannot be considered apart from that situation. Thus the duty of the University and of all educated men is so to serve the community that the diffusion of culture may come to mean the establishment of peace and goodwill. Only then will the difficulties of the present situation disappear.

In conclusion, may I offer the congratulations of the University to those who have this day received their degree? It is one of the greatest days in your life, a day of new resolutions and new departures. You have received many benefits from the University, and yours is now the responsibility of remaining true to the ideals which you have been led to cherish. Your scientific and philosophical training ought to have created within you a desire for broad-mindedness and catholicity of judgment. You will not conceive of yourselves as having duties only to your own class, neither will you remain unimpressed by sufferings which do not concern yourselves. You will have a sense of the universal.

You will have many difficult problems to face. The problem of unemployment immediately affects some of you, as in many other countries at the present day, and you may be inclined to say that your education has been a mistake and altogether wasted. Do not rush too hastily to this conclusion. Vocational training, however desirable it may be, will not of itself solve economic problems. And the more general form of education which is given in a University can never be wasted. As was said recently, University education often helps you to do that which you can't do, or, in other words, prepares you for the emergencies of life and enables you to make opportunities for yourselves even when they do not lie ready to your hand. In looking forward to the future do not think so much of the provision of posts for you as of the preparation of yourselves for the post. Do not rely on external influence, but make yourselves fit to avail yourselves

of opportunities, taking as the ideal of the health of a society the principle that no one should press forward to a position for which he is not fit. The protection given by an influential family is a very doubtful benefit, and should not be overmuch regretted by those who do not enjoy it. In any case there are not enough influential families to provide for the needs of those who are clamouring for employment. Stand upon your own feet and make yourselves worthy of employment, and you will not fail. In virtue of your firm resolution and your high ideals, you may be agencies not in the disturbance of society but in its reconstruction, and you will succeed in your vocation just in so far as you determine yourselves to fair-mindedness, seeking to contribute to the common good rather than merely to claim your own share of it. Rights and duties belong to all of you, but you can secure your rights if you think first of your duties, not merely to your own class but to your country and to humanity as a whole.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SHELLEY

First Quarter of the 19th Century.

From 1815 to 1825 may be considered a decade of speculations, theories, doctrines which were destined to bear practical fruit through the reforming zeal of philosophical radicals like Bentham (1748-1832) and James Mill (1773-1836) in the shape of quite a number of liberal measures among which the prominent were, perhaps, sanction given to workers' unions in 1824, Catholic Emancipation in 1829, Reform Bill of 1832, Reformed Municipal Administration of 1834, and the softening of the rigour of penal laws in general. It is not my task to more than indicate the general trend of socio-political advance with which Shelley's philosophy is intimately connected.

Diffusion of ideas was considerably facilitated also by the new class of periodicals called *Reviews* that now came into existence and which, friendly or hostile, had a good deal to do with Shelley, Byron and Hunt. I need not more than mention the Edinburgh Review (of the famous Jeffrey, Sidney Smith and Brougham) founded in 1802 to represent Whig interest and disseminate liberal principles, the Quarterly (of Scott, Canning and Gifford) founded in 1809 to uphold the Conservative cause and defend traditional orthodoxy in church and state (both, more or less, hostile to the *early* group of Romantic poets), the bigotedly orthodox Blackwood's founded in 1817 by the publisher of that name with the aid of Lockhart and Wilson, against which was pitted the London Magazine which received stout support from the Westminster established later in 1824 by the philosophical radicals headed by the elder Mill. These were preceded by Cobbett's (1762-1835) Political Register (1802) as a radical organ devoted to the cause of agriculturists (from which became collected his famous *Rural Rides* in 1830).

The history that I have rapidly traced in these pages in order to justify by additional reasons the choice of my theme will, I expect, be enhanced in value by a brief reference to Shelley's own life history only so far as one or two biographical items to be mentioned here have a direct bearing on my contention that Shelley's poetry involves Shelley's philosophy in a special sense.

While at Oxford (1810-1811), Shelley and his friend Hogg read Plato and carried on endless conversation on metaphysical speculations, sceptical philosophy, pre-existence, life after death and kindred topics.[1]

Besides, speculations on science, philosophy, politics, ethics, religion were floating thick in the very atmosphere which Shelley, born in 1792 when the Revolutionary movement was in full swing, had to daily and hourly breathe. One biographer[2] of Shelley rightly says that "Shelley's melancholy is intimately connected with his philosophical ideas. It is the creed of the student of Berkeley, of Plato, of Spinoza."

Shelley we are further told "happened to be steeped in philosophical ways of thinking."

We remember also that Shelley's brain was ever full of philosophical schemes for human regeneration and emancipation. The 'Revolt of Islam' was actually composed while he was very busy with impractical schemes, political and philanthropic. His letters to Elizabeth Hitchener are practically long discussions of questions relating to philosophy. He is considered to be pre-eminently the pioneer poet of modern democratic movements.

In a letter of (probably September) 1810 to Edward Fergus Graham from Field Place, Shelley curiously enough says "you well know I am not much of a hand at love songs, you see I

[1] Dowden's Life of Shelley (1 vol. edn.), Ch. III.

[2] Shelley (People's Books Series).

mingle[1] metaphysics with even this, but perhaps in this age of philosophy that may be excused." That Shelley was, even now is, much misunderstood is largely due to this metaphysical 'bent of his mind which was, besides, disconcertingly original and unconventional and always "bent on piercing to the very truth beneath all shams and fictions woven by society and ancient usage."[2] The first fruit of such a mind is his 'Revolt of Islam' (originally called "Laon and Cythna or the Revolution of the Golden City," October, 1817, but published November, 1817), of which only 3 copies had gone forth when the publisher Ollier was frightened by its heretical opinions and compelled Shelley to make, with extreme reluctance, alterations, sometime in December 1817 (15th December at Marlow, very probably). In the Dedicatory piece "To Mary" (1819), stanzas III-V are highly self-confessional and I draw your attention only to 5 lines in particular, bearing on his life's resolve as of a sort of self-dedication :—

> "So without shame, I spake :—'I will be wise,
> And just, and free, and mild, if in me lies
> Such power, for I grow weary to behold
> The selfish and the strong still tyrannize
> Without reproach or check.'"
>
> (St. IV.)

We further learn that "thoughts of great deeds were his" when in early youth he heard from the near school-room voices that

> "Were but one echo from a world of woes—
> The harsh and grating strife of tyrants and of foes."

[1] *Cf.* Letter No. 162 in Ingpen's Edition where referring to the list of books he wanted Hookham to send him Shelley admits that his heart hankers for metaphysical works and Letter No. 14 in which Shelley informs Mr. Stockdale (Bookseller of Pall Mall, London) that he has in preparation a novel (probably "Leonora" in which Hogg collaborated) "principally constructed to convey metaphysical and political opinions" (18th December, 1810). *Vide* also Ingpen's Letters of Shelley, Vol. II, pp. 558-59, 569-72 and 575.

[2] Shelley (English Men of Letters), p. 4.

and that from that very hour with earnest thought he began to "heap' knowledge from forbidden mines of lore," working from that secret store "linked armour" for his soul, "before it might walk forth to war among mankind" in order to break asunder "the mortal chain of Custom" by his lyre that must "shake the Anarch Custom's reign and charm men's minds to Truth's own sway."

Such, indeed, was the state of intellectual ferment, that even the poet Keats, who, as a member of the second group of Romanticists, was least affected by the philosophical ideals of the Revolutionary era and whose poetry is popularly considered as chiefly sensuous and the poetry of sensation more than that of thought, curiously enough in the lines written by him at Hunt's request and at Hunt's place on seeing an 'authenticated lock of Milton's hair' and sent to his friend Bailey on 23rd January, 1818, while adhering to his well known creed of "Beauty in things on earth and things above," adds—

"When every childish fashion
Has vanished from my rhyme,
Will I, grey gone in passion,
Leave to an after-time,
Hymning and Harmony
Of thee and of thy works, and of thy life,
But vain is now the burning and the strife.
Pangs are in vain, until I grow high-rife
With old Philosophy,
And wed with glimpses of futurity."

Thus we note that even to the so-called sensuous Keats, philosophy was indeed divine and not crabbed and harsh as dull fools suppose.

Again, in his letter to Reynolds, dated Teignmouth 27th April, 1818, we read—"I shall learn Greek, and very likely Italian; and, in other ways, prepare myself to ask Hazlitt, in about a year's time, the best metaphysical road I can take,"

and in that to Taylor (from the same place and on the same date)—" I have been hovering for some time between an exquisite sense of the luxurious and a love for philosophy: were I calculated for the former I should be glad. But as I am not, I shall turn all my soul to the latter."

This should suffice to give a quietus to the sensuous-Keats legend which, however, persists to live on. Addressing his brother George and his wife on 19th March, 1819, from Wentworth Place, Keats observes : " By a superior Being our reasonings may take the same tone ; though erroneous, they may be fine. This is the very thing in which consists Poetry, and if so, it is not so fine a thing as Philosophy, for the same reason that an eagle is not so fine a thing as truth" and writing to Bailey from Winchester he says, " I am convinced more and more every day that (excepting the human-friend philosopher) a fine writer is the most genuine being in the world."

One can easily imagine from such utterances of Keats to what extent Philosophy at this time influenced the imagination of great poets, especially of a poet like Shelley who both by the natural bent of his mind as well as his early readings was made particularly interested in all problems of a metaphysical nature.[1]

Shelley was eager, while residing at Keswick, to see Southey, Wordsworth and Coleridge and then give a picture of them to Elizabeth Hitchener.[2] Mr. Roger Ingpen, editor of the Letters of Shelley, says in a footnote (to page 192, Vol. I) that Shelley met only Southey as Coleridge was then delivering his lectures in London (and the Wordsworths too were then away) and quotes an interesting remark of Coleridge who said, " I *might* have been of use to him (Shelley), and Southey could not ; for I should have sympathised with his poetics, metaphysical reveries, and the very word metaphysics is an abomination

[1] Dowden's " Life of Shelley," pp. 48, 60, 103-104, 173-174, 176, 180-181, 194 and 293.

[2] Shelley's Letter to Elizabeth Hitchener of 11th December, 1811.

to Southey, and Shelley would have felt that I understood him." I need not emphasise the significance of this valuable observation made by Coleridge. Writing to Hogg from Bracknell on 16th March, 1814, Shelley says, " I have escaped, in the society of all that philosophy and friendship combine, from the dismaying solitude of myself. They have revived in my heart the expiring flame of life."

This metaphysical turn of Shelley's genius is a very noteworthy fact that all earnest students of Shelley's writings and his conscientious interpreters should carefully bear in mind. This made him incapable of conventionally accepting without enquiry and questioning any received opinion on society, politics, ethics, religion. From his very childhood he evinced this characteristic trait of his mind. As early as 1810 writing to Hogg, Shelley says, " He (Stockdale on whom his father had called in London) mentioned my name as a supporter of sceptical principles ** and I am now surrounded, environed by dangers.** They attack me for my detestable principles ; I am reckoned an outcast, yet I defy them and laugh at their ineffectual efforts." Mr. Timothy Shelley was informed by Stockdale about Shelley's " predispositions against revealed religion " and the printing of Shelley's novel of Leonora was stopped (by Mr. Henry Slatter of the firm of Munday and Slatter of Oxford) in consequence of Shelley's " *free opinions* " in the work. A greater misfortune than all this as Shelley looked upon it then, befell him on account of the uneasiness caused by the " tone of his letters on *speculative* subjects " written to Harriet Grove which resulted in "the dissolution of an engagement between Bysshe and my sister " (says her brother the Rev. Charles Henry Grove, writing in 1857) "which had, previously been permitted, both by his father and mine." [1] To what extent a youngman's thoughts on speculative subjects may spell ruin can best be realised if we

[1] Ingpen's edition of Shelley's Letters, Vol. I, pp. 18-22.

sympathetically read Shelley's letters to his friend Hogg, dated Field Place, 23rd December, 1810, on this sudden breaking off of this intimate relation with his cousin Harriet Grove and those of 26th December, 1810, and of January, 2, 3, 6, 1811. A cursory glance at Shelley's intellectual interests, keen pursuit of all kinds of knowledge, insatiable inquisitiveness, range of studies may help us a good deal in understanding the type of mind we are studying.

Forces at work in the making of Shelley.

Born in a family atmosphere of aristocratic conservatism and living in an environment of traditional morality, customary decency, rigid observance of social conventions and formalities, even as a mere child, Shelley's genius led him into the thick of exaggerated warfare with the world around him and roused in him the spirit of uncompromising rebellion. Mere correctness of outward form and external decorum ruled the household of Mr. Timothy Shelley, the poet's father, whose *beau ideal* was Lord Chesterfield and great philosopher-friend, the good Catholic Duke of Norfolk. Into the midst of such a placid, narrow world of respectabilities and conventional decencies, the Fates conspired with the goddess of Discord, to thrust the future disciple of Godwin and the destined champion of the emancipating ideas of the French Revolution!

The boy Shelley often entertained his four sisters—particularly Elizabeth and Hellen—of an evening with wild stories in which a grey-beard alchemist (Cornelius Agrippa) always played a prominent part. He invented wierd games in which the sisters personated spirits and fiends and Shelley passed between, with a fire-stove filled with flaming inflammable liquid! To shock the pious, Shelley taught his little sisters to say "the devil!" And they instinctively obeyed their superman who often both tickled and frightened his admirers with an electric shock from a machine which in those days was an uncommon new invention. Shelley often led his sister Elizabeth and his cousin Harriet Grove to the neighbouring

churchyard [1] to amuse them with his fascinating discourse on supernatural things on earth and in heaven, finishing it with a moral lecture on the eternal conflict between vice represented by tyrants, such as kings, priests, wealthy men, statesmen, and virtue embodied in freedom, equality, tolerance, philosophy, and the down-trodden masses. He did not forget to initiate his docile pupils into the metaphysical mysteries of Love of which the essence lies in freedom and therefore marriage, as a corollary to this philosophy of love, was condemned as slavery. The fourth stanza of Shelley's representative poem "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" (1816) gives us a vivid picture of these boyish days, where we read :—

"While yet a boy I sought for ghosts and sped
Thro' many a listening chamber, cave, and ruin,
And star-light wood, with fearful steps pursuing
Hopes of high talk with the departed dead.
I called on poisonous names with which our youth is fed
I was not heard, I saw them not ;
When musing deeply on the lot
Of life, at that sweet time when winds are wooing
All vital things that wake to being
News of birds and blossoming,
Sudden, thy shadow fell on me ;
I shrieked, and clasped my hands in ecstasy."

The next stanza with its illuminating personal note deserves equal notice in this connection where he adds—

"I vowed that I would dedicate my powers
To thee and thine: have I not kept the vow?"

And he declares solemnly that the thousand hours spent by him in studious zeal or love's delight

"Know that never joy illumined my brow,
Unlinked with hope that thou wouldst free
This world from its dark slavery."

[1] *Cf.* "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty," st. V, and "Alastor," ll. 20-49,

Even then (1816, Oct. 24) "life's unquiet dream" was troubled for him by "doubt, chance and mutability." The Poet in "Alastor" [1] (Shelley's alter ego) even in his infancy was nurtured

> "By solemn vision and bright silver dream"

and

> "The fountains of divine philosophy
> Fled not his thirsting lips."

He "pored on memorials of the world's youth" till

> "meaning on his vacant mind
> Flashed like strong inspiration, and he saw
> The thrilling secrets of the birth of time."

While at Eton (1804-1810) he distinguished himself by his intense hatred of tyranny and brute force. Says Medwin (his cousin and biographer)—"The expression of his countenance was one of exceeding sweetness and innocence. * * He was naturally calm, but when he heard or read of some flagrant act of injustice, oppression, or cruelty, then indeed the sharpest marks of horror and indignation were visible in his countenance."

He organised there a rebellion against fagging. Experiments in chemistry and electricity were then his passion. In his letter to Maria Gisborne (Leghorn, July, 1820) Shelley, in a half bantering familiar tone, gives us a versified account of fascinating recollections of these days of adolescence and of his scientific pursuits and interests, speaking of himself as "a mighty mechanist." Here he earned from his school-fellows the nick-name of "*Mad* Shelley" and led an isolated life among his favourite books—particularly the works of Voltaire, Holbach, Diderot, Godwin ("Political Justice," pub. 1793).

While at Oxford (October, 1810 to 26th March, 1811) Shelley declared very significantly to his friend Hogg: "All literature is vain trifling. How much wiser it were to investigate the things

[1] *Cf.* "Alastor," ll. 50 *et seq.*

themselves, through the physical sciences and specially through chemistry" and commented enthusiastically on his chosen authors: Voltaire, Locke, Hume, Godwin. Shelley's room at Oxford was as full of books as of pistols, phials, crucibles, electrical machines, solar microscope, air pump, glasses and cups all significantly thrown pellmell in an indistinguishable heap!

The novel "St. Irvyne or the Rosicrucian" published from Oxford in 1811 by Stockdale scandalised Shelley's acquaintances by its heterodox subversive ideas. For his defiance to authority Shelley was also known at Eton as *the Atheist* (before he issued at Oxford his pamphlet on Atheism).

"Shelley's bias toward metaphysical speculation," says his biographer J. A. Symonds (E.M.L., p. 27), "was beginning to assert itself" and even Plato was approached so early, of course through translations. Though superficially viewed Shelley now adopted materialism, at heart, however, he was an idealist.[1]

Shelley gives an account of his favourite studies to Godwin in 1812 saying that "I nevertheless (illness notwithstanding), in the intervals of comparative health, read romances, and those the most marvellous ones, unremittingly and pored over the reveries of Albertus Magnus and Paracelsus, the former of which I read in Latin, and probably gained more knowledge of that language from that source than from all the discipline of Eton. My fondness for natural magic and ghosts abated, as my age increased. I read Locke, Hume, Reid and whatever metaphysics came in my way, without, however, renouncing poetry, an attachment to which has characterized all my wanderings and changes. I did not truly *think* and *feel*, however, until I read "Political Justice," though my thoughts and feelings, after this period, have been more painful, anxious and vivid—more inclined to action and less to theory. Before I was a republican: Athens appeared to me the model of governments; but afterwards, Athens bore in my mind the same

[1] *Cf.* Dowden's "Life of Shelley," pp. 174, 293 and 317.

relation to perfection that Great Britain did to Athens. * * * During my existence, I have incessantly speculated, thought, and read. * * I have just finished reading 'La Système de la Nature,' par M. Mirabaud." (Letter No. 143 in Mr. Ingpen's edition.)

Shelley attributes the "System of Nature" to M. Mirabaud not knowing that the author was one of the Encyclopaedists, Baron D'Holbach (1723-1789). It appeared in 1770 as a representative work on 18th century materialism. Shelley quotes a long extract from it in his pamphlet on the "Necessity of Atheism" (1811) and in his Notes to "Queen Mab," VI and VII (from the London edition of 1781).

His Youth.

I rest content with barely touching on traits in the youthful Shelley that have a direct bearing on that portion of Shelley's philosophy of life which relates to his socio-political ideas and ideals. His college companion and intimate associate, Hogg, bears eloquent testimony to his keen intellectual activity, unrelaxing pursuit of recondite knowledge, devotion to mystic philosophy of antiquity, all-embracing philanthropy, visions of perfected humanity, boldness of speculation, complete development of the moral sense which could not even stand a coarse jest or immodest hint, irrepressible love of liberty, universal and unlimited toleration of all opinions specially religious opinions and intense abhorrence of every kind of persecution. "His genius," we are told, "was governed by two luminaries—poetry and metaphysics—and at this time (*viz.*, of his residence at University College, Oxford) the latter seems to have been in the ascendant" (E. M. L., p. 38).

His Ideal.

His second letter to W. Godwin, "the regulator and former of his mind," dated, Keswick, the 10th January, 1812, among other interesting things relating to himself mentioned in it, refers to the influence on his character of Godwin's *Political Justice* (1793), with which Shelley became first acquainted in 1809 or 1810, to the uncongenial Oxonian Society, to his readings in romance, but

finally to what is more important for us, namely, his resolve "to lose no opportunity to disseminate truth and happiness" among mankind. He says in that letter—"I could not descend to common life: the sublime interest of poetry, lofty and exalted achievements, the proselytism of the world, the equalization of its inhabitants, were to me the soul of my soul." [1]

Poetry and Philosophy.

The inter-relation between imaginative literature and philosophy is very intimate and no philosophy becomes, really speaking, complete until it becomes translated into imaginative literature in which concepts of great value to human life are transformed into emotions presented in concrete imagery. At the same time lovers of pure imaginative literature cannot afford to neglect to bring out its fuller import and significance by always trying to appreciate its real inwardness by placing it against a background of speculative thought movement so far as such a movement is faithfully reflected in what is specially called, in a somewhat limited sense, literature proper. Even scientific truth (as in much of the poetry, for instance, of Tennyson and Browning) often finds its imaginative reflection in poetical conceptions confirming the validity and affording a convincing illustration of Wordsworth's famous description of poetry as "the impassioned expression which is in the countenance of all science." The father of Western criticism, Aristotle, makes poetry the most philosophic of all writings and Matthew Arnold in his well-known essay on the Study of Poetry does not appear to be too strong in his advocacy of poetry, when he expresses his firm conviction, in equally convincing language, that "as time goes on the human race will find an ever surer and surer stay in poetry, because for poetry, as distinguished from religious creed or dogma or theological tradition, *the idea is everything, the rest is a world of illusion,* be it of divine illusion, and because, more and more, mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us.

[1] Ingpen's Letters of Shelley, Vol. I, p. 220.

Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will," he predicts, " be replaced by poetry," and men, perceiving the hollowness of religion, busying itself with evidences (as in Paley) and philosophy pluming itself on its reasonings about causation and finite and infinite being, will prize " the breath and finer spirit of knowledge " offered to them in and by poetry. (*Italics mine.*)

The idea, holds Arnold, is everything. I fancy he means that subjective truth is the sole reality for the world of poetry. I do not forget surely that this truth in its expression or presentation must, to be poetry, be apprehended imaginatively and not scientifically or philosophically. The **mode** of approach to truth is different in these three fundamental methods of comprehension of the universe, determined, in each case, by the **attitude** of the seeker and interpreter of truth towards the entire universe. And so the resulting **manner** of presentation too is different.

Poetry, like Philosophy, ultimately aims at the presentation of the totality of our experiences to help the enlargement of our consciousness. Only, poetry selects as means the concrete or rather the universal as conceived by the individual, and this answers, I suppose, to Arnold's " **idea** as the central thing in poetry." For example, the idea of the Hamlet-type of human character, though the creation of Shakespeare's inventive genius under the stress and strain of a supreme artist's ecstatic vision of reality, happens to be a true [illegible] time and all countries of man as Shakespeare's representation may be myth. That is why in his Poetics A that poetry is superior to history by καὶ σπουδαιότερον (possession of seriousness)—by reason of its tendin whereas history deals with the part again, Aristotle is interpreted to

certain type will on occasion speak or act according to the law of probability or necessity." (Poetics, IX). I think this is why even such a satirist as Aristophanes says in his "Frogs" that "children have a teacher assigned to them but the poet is a master who must instruct *manhood* in truth and virtue." I could multiply quotations in my support even from Mill's Dissertations, Newman's Grammar of Assent, and Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science.

I can imagine, however, that even after conceding all that I have put forward one may honestly entertain a lingering doubt as to whether that dispassionate and calm view of life, which we generally associate with the balance and equilibrium of mind achieved by philosophy in particular considered as an invaluable mental discipline, can indeed be harmonised with the utterances of a poet like Shelley, whose very name presupposes in certain minds nothing constructive but, on the contrary, everything destructive, so appropriate to the character of a man full of intellectual revolt and social anarchism, and to an apostle of titanic rebellion against all that means an established order in politics, social organisation, family life and religion. Shelley's rampant, combative individualism is taken by such critical minds to be sufficient by itself alone to militate against the very idea of anything like a philosophic outlook on life.

To what extent such a doubt may be rationally entertained and how far Shelley's actual utterances lend support to such a matters which I shall endeavour to my paper.

JAYGOPAL BANERJEE

(To be continued)

Reviews

Constitutional and Legal Reform *vs.* Extra-territoriality in China.—Among the many *versuses* that constitute the economic and political polarities in the Chinese complex of to-day none is more profound and fundamental than the problems of constitutional and legal reforms *vs.* extra-territoriality. Since 1919 Young China has been challenging extra-territoriality on points like the following :—

1. Different decisions may be given on the same facts by the consular courts of different nationalities.

2. The witnesses and plaintiffs of another nationality can netiher be punished for perjury nor committed for contempt of court.

3. A foreigner who commits a crime in the *Mofusil* must be tried by the nearest consul, who however may be thousands of miles away, and to whom all evidence must be transmitted.

The extent of judicial sovereignty enjoyed in China by the foreign powers may be gauged by reference to some of the items in regard to judicial trials. Appeals from the United States Court for China, established in 1906, can go to the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals at San Francisco and finally to the Supreme Court of the U. S. Persons condemned to imprisonment for more than three months are usually sent to the prisons in the American dependency, the Philippines, or may even be transferred to American federal prisons.

The supreme court of appeal for serious cases in the case of France is located in Indo-China, a French dependency. In certain instances the highest court is really the Court of Cassation in Paris.

As regards Italy's jurisdiction, the situation may be grasped from the following fact. Only courts sitting in Italy are authorized to have jurisdiction over cases of adoption or legitimation or to transactions respecting Italian land.

So far as Japan is concerned, the highest courts of appeal from the consular courts in China are to be found in Korea and Formosa, the Japanese dependencies. The District Court or Court of Appeal of Nagasaki in Japan possesses the highest jurisdiction in certain cases. Prisoners sentenced for comparatively long terms are sent to prison in Japan.

Coming nearer home, we find that the consular district of Kashgar is juridically treated as a district of the Punjab. The highest Court of

the Punjab is the highest Court of appeal from the consular court. Offenders may be sent to Lahore for trial and convicts may be imprisoned in the Punjab. It is the Chief Court of the Punjab that hears appeals in civil cases. The Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, the Indian Civil Code and other laws of British India are applied in Kashgar. For other parts of China, the Chief Justice or other Judge of the Supreme Court of Hongkong in British China, possesses a place in the highest tribunal, the Full Court. Finally there is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Criminals may be sent to Honkong or elsewhere to serve sentences.

In regard to situations like the above, writings and writers on China are legion. And much sentimentalism as well as chauvinism are associated with the subject of extra-territoriality. But the two volumes of Keeton's **Development of Extra-Territoriality in China** (London, Longmans Green & Co., 1928, Vol. 1, pp. xvi plus 405, Vol. II, pp. viii plus 422, 42 shillings net) belong to a class apart. We are here presented with a story that seeks to wring out of the vast mass of historical materials as much of the objective stuff as possible in order to lay bare the foundations not only of extra-territorial phenomena in China, but in a sense the very logic of extra-territorialism itself.

Keeton's attitude is perfectly frank. In his system of international law the spade is only a spade. We are told that those states of non-European civilisation, which are not members of the family of nations "can possess neither rights nor obligations properly within the sphere of international law." A "civilised state has stronger grounds for exercising protection and therefore jurisdiction over its subjects within the territory of such states." And the "exercise of such jurisdiction is a limitation of the sovereignty of the territorial power."

Such states belong in Keeton's judgment to the same category as "the unappropriated sea" and "land not belonging to any community so far possessed of civilisation that its territorial jurisdiction can be recognised," as described by Hall Keeton endorses the view that in such places "persons belonging to a state community are in the same position as if on the soil of their own state."

This view of the law of nations certainly is not likely to be palatable to the members of non-European civilisation. But they will have to swallow it in so far as they happen to be "positive" in their juridical outlook. And Keeton is careful enough to indicate his positivism quite precisely. There is hardly any absence of perspicuity, for instance, in the dictum enunciated by him. The test in international law of

"civilisation," says he, is not any vague phrase such as "standard of culture" or the like, but a territorial jurisdiction that can be recognised" (Hall's phrase),—recognised, that is, as commented on by himself, by the powers who are the subjects of international law.

This sort of positivism is brutally sincere and might have been a mere camouflage for championing the *status quo* in the international complex, were it not for the fact that the "milk of human kindness" is in the present instance furnished by a sense of the dynamic in human affairs. Keeton has eyes keen enough to see and make it clear that even China has moved and has been moving on. He can therefore pronounce a judgment like the following:—

"While at the present time there is no objection to administering Chinese law in extra-territorial courts, it would have been morally wrong to do so and impossible to attempt to do so, last century."

Positivists in law, as students of facts and factual changes, do not indeed study their history altogether in vain. Even the lumber of original documents can furnish them, as it has done Keeton, with a somewhat progressive spirit in the interpretation of relations between the nations.

That the "modern courts" of China are on the whole working satisfactorily is noted by him. He likewise knows the "modern prisons" to be "on the whole satisfactory." Accordingly he feels justified in suggesting that "modern Chinese courts might well be established immediately in the treaty-ports." These courts are to be "presided over by Chinese and foreign (non-consular) judges jointly, for the purpose of administering the new Chinese codes in all mixed suits affecting Chinese and foreigners, irrespective of the defendant's nationality."

Student of positive law as he is, he cannot afford to mince matters. He therefore does not attempt to hide the fact that limitation of sovereignty is involved in the facts of extra-territoriality.

His position is identical with that of Heyking in *Das Problem der Exterritorialitaet in Afrika and Asien* in *Weltwirtchaftliches Archiv* (1926, Vol. I). There is no question of "legal fiction" in the exclusion of the consul and his nationals from the *territorialen Gebietshoheit* (territorial sovereignty) the consular jurisdictions constitute *tatsaechlich das Gebiet einer fremden Staatshoheit* (in reality the territory of a foreign state-authority) and function in co-operation with the local authority on the basis of terms established by contract. The privileges of extra-territoriality are to be found neither in "natural law nor *a priori* in the "ideas" but *auf positives Recht und*

zwischenstaqtliches Gewohnheitsrecht (in positive law and customary usages established between states).

The limitation of sovereignty is to be recorded by positivists only as a fact. So Keeton does not sentimentalize over it. And of course he is not prepared to make propaganda in behalf of the relinquishment of extra-territoriality. He would trust to the history of to-day and to-morrow to adjust the claims between these two forces. Let a new situation consisting in actual accomplishments, political, constitutional and legal, arise in China, thus he would seem to assert, and the extra-territoriality issues will be relegated to their proper sphere in the historical evolution of the past, as in the case of Japan.

For the present, the world has only to remember perhaps the dictum of Heyking that *cessante ratione die Exterritorialitaet ihre Existenzberechtigung verlieren muss* (in case the reasons disappear, extra-territoriality must lose its justification).

To the positive-minded jurist the few streaks of silver lining in the juridical situation of present-day China serve but to make the darkness visible. And Keeton's analysis seeks to exhibit the tons of medieval survivals by the side of ounces or even grains of achievements in modernism. We are asked to remember facts like the following:

There is only one modern court of first instance for nearly four and a half millions of population. There are only 1,293 trained judges in China. Their salaries are inadequate and payments irregular. Many of the provincial judges depend entirely on Court fees. Unhygienic conditions prevail in prisons, resulting in epidemics among prisoners. For lack of funds, prisoners sometimes go without food and die in consequence of many such abuses.

Obviously, says Keeton, the rights of the citizen are inadequately protected when the magistrate can create new offences and inflict punishments therefor at his discretion. It does not need a special pleading to be convinced of the danger in the regulation that all persons in military and naval services are subject to the jurisdiction of military and naval courts *for all* and not merely military or naval offences. Administrative officials have encroached on the power of the legislature and the judiciary. The central government has failed to enforce general acceptance of its legal reforms. Justice is very often "dispensed to the highest bidder," as a medical missionary of Shantung observes from an experience of twenty magistrates in two years. On the strength of the *China Weekly Review* for June 19, 1926, Keeton states that "in Northern Kiangsu things are no better now than they have been for the past 2,000 years,"

" civil cases are decided on a 'financial basis,'" " execution by cutting slowly to pieces *still prevails*," " bribery is exceedingly common," etc.

Even such a distinguished republican and patriot as Tang Shao-yi, an ex-premier of China, writes in January, 1926, in a number of the *North China Daily News* as follows: " In China, unfortunately, a system has come into existence of certain individuals regarding themselves as superior to the courts. * * * During the Republic, judges and judicial officers have been known to accept bribes. There is only one solution to that and it is that bribery should be made a capital offence for both the bribe-giver and bribe-taker."

During the period of the boycott against Great Britain at Canton (1925), legislative, administrative and judicial powers were usurped by the labour unions. Many provincial authorities defy the central government and promulgate their own laws.

The *South China Morning Post* (October 23, 1926) reports that at an execution of three men at Tientsin three strokes were necessary for the first man, and a desperate struggle ensued, and the second prisoner was decapitated after several efforts.

The progress of China in laws and law-courts is of course seen by the author through the eyes of the Extra-territoriality Commission. And it is that Commission's *Report* published in 1926 that forms the basis of the detailed studies relating to the juridical institutions of modern China as they are and as they have been growing to be under the pressure of the world-forces. Even as late as 1880 China stoutly refused to admit the necessity of reorganizing her legal system. It was after the abortive rising of the Boxers that the Chinese government began seriously to realize the importance of juridical reorganization and appointed a commission to prepare a number of codes adapted to modern conditions. And Great Britain promised in 1902, the United States in 1903, and Japan in the same year that they would relinquish the extra-territorial rights when they were satisfied that the reorganization and modernization of laws and law-courts were substantial enough to justify this relinquishment.

By 1907, *i.e.*, several years before the expulsion of the Manchus, the beginnings of a new system of codes and tribunals were laid. And in 1919 at the Versailles Peace Conference the Chinese representatives were in a position to declare that China has " adopted a modern constitution," prepared five codes of which the Provisional Criminal Code and a portion of the Law of Procedure are provisionally in force, established three grades of courts, separated the civil from the criminal law, instituted public trials and introduced, other reforms. The same statements were

repeated elaborately at the Washington Conference of 1922 convened by eight powers to discuss among other things the Pacific and the Far Eastern questions in connection with the limitation of armament. But the validity and importance of these juridical reforms were questioned both at Paris and at Washington. And the International Commission on Extra-territoriality established by the Washington Conference finds the new laws and courts still inadequate. Keeton also concludes that it is "at present impossible to renounce that special protection of foreigners which is implied by the term extra-territoriality," although he is prepared to concede, as we have seen above, that an experiment may be instituted with modern Chinese courts in treaty ports under Chinese and foreign judges for the administration of the new Chinese Codes.

The book is on the whole another powerful challenge to Young China's idealists. Their statesmen and jurists are called upon to demonstrate in the only manner that is likely to be convincing to the Powers that the actual developments in China have already reached the level of legal consummations in Japan on the eve and during the period of the abolition of extra-territoriality in that country; or, in other words, to use a societal equation, that

China (1929)=Japan (1899-1911).

The first volume discusses some of the ancient and medieval laws of China such as still are prevalent in the country. The Chinese data bearing on homicide, prisons, procedure, etc., possess a significance for the purposes of comparative criminology. The processes involved in the extension of extra-territoriality from 1856 to 1918 would furnish a back-ground in the interpretation of capitulations, for instance, in Western Asia. Altogether, the modern history of China is exhibited in its legal and international aspects which even to those who are acquainted with the subject would appear to be handled in a refreshing manner.

The 41 appendices of the book render accessible in a convenient form documents, hitherto unpublished, in the possession of the India Office as well as contemporary Chinese records. They cover some 230 pages and should prove very valuable to the realistic student of international affairs. They contain information of all sorts from a "Chinese description of Chinese prisons" (an article in the *Chinese Repository* of November, 1843), and the suspension of the trade of the East India Company at Canton in 1807 to the statistics of cases tried by the Mixed Court (1867-1868), the Act establishing the U. S. Court for China (1906), and the legislation of the Southern Nationalist Government (1926).

BENOY KUMAR SARKAR

Indian Culture through the Ages—Vol. I, by S. V. Venkateswara, M.A.. Longmans Green and Co. Price 12*s*. 6*d*. net. Pages 336.

The volume under review is a weighty contribution on the efflorescence of Indian culture through the ages, and deals with the supreme gift of India to the world—education in the fullest and highest sense of the term. It opens with an illuminating introductory chapter wherein the author has expounded, with a wealth of information, the theory that India was the cradle of civilization, though the European school of anthropologists would join issue here.

It is agreed that India, Egypt, Babylonia, China and Central America were the arena of activity of the most ancient peoples. While the glory of Egypt, Babylonia and China are but memories of the past, India has alone stood the shock of ages, preserved and propagated her cultural heritage, as it was transmitted through a sound system of education. It was not long ago that Mr. A. C. Das propounded the theory of the indigenous origin of the Aryans from internal evidence in the Rig-Veda. The author is not therefore ploughing a lonely furrow, backed as he is in his conclusions by the remarkable excavations of Sir John Marshall in Sindh, the Punjab, and in Beluchistan, which have revolutionised the domain of existing thought, and have given a new orientation to the subject.

The earliest habitat of the Aryans and Dravidians is the Punjab, Sindh, and Beluchistan, and the finds go back to 3100 B.C. The antiquity of the Dravidian culture is proved by its independence of Aryan influences, by its communal organisation, and matriarchal family. Dr. Hornell has identified the cups and bangles of India among the ruins of Lagash. The finds at Mohenjo Daro are possibly Dravidian. The discovery of a grave with contracted burial at Mohenjo Daro connects it with Adichanallur. The most remarkable evidences of contact are in the pottery and seals with pictographs. The disposal of the dead reminds one of Babylonian burial. South India is said to be the heart and centre of Dravidian culture. It is pointed out that there is a Vedic hymn that some of the non-Aryans were driven westwards. These may probably be the Dravidians.

The author then deals with the growth of the Aryan culture. There is nothing in Aryan myth or tradition to prove that they came from beyond the Himalayas. On the other hand, Aryan culture and religion is said to have spread from India westwards to Asia Minor, and that their earliest habitat is the Punjab, Sindh, and Beluchistan. At Harappa, the lay-out of the temples is Aryan. The remarkable

finds in Harappa, the early history of the horse said to be *the ears* of the East in a tablet of 2100 B.C. in Babylonia, and the humped bull, point out early migrations from India westward. Perry points out that the contact of India with the west as far as Egypt dates back to 2100 B.C.

The author then deals with the excellence of Aryan society and culture. There was no cleavage of masses, in early times, and society knew no steep gradients. Culture, not literary, was the highest aim of India, and one great mark of Indian culture was its comprehensiveness and inclusiveness. The early Aryans not only preserved their cultural institutions, but admitted non-Aryans into their fold.

We do not propose to review at length on the various aspects of Hindu culture, but would confine ourselves to education in ancient India. In Vedic times, the State had nothing to do with education as in Egypt. The schools were founded in forest regions, and they had a large number of students. The aim of Vedic education was to prepare the young and the old for social service. Unlike Egypt, punishment was unknown in the Aryan scheme of education. Discipline was considered of greater value than instruction. Regarding status of women Vedic woman was the centre of happiness and abode of grace. They were considered the better halves of the family, and retained their individuality, while taking part in all departments of family life.

In post-Vedic India, the school was the teacher's house. As learning grew more specialised, particular places acquired a reputation for special branches of knowledge. Taxila was noted for medicine, Ujjaini for astronomy, and Benares for theology. There studies were encouraged in forest schools. The Indian teacher was not a believer in imparting higher education to all. As Lord Hugh Cecil opines, education should minister to individual capacity and personality.

One effect of the spread of Buddhism was the expansion of the sphere of foreign travel. Professor Bury points out that there were Brahmans in Alexandria during the period of later Roman Empire. Tacitus speaks of a few Brahmans being stranded on the shores of Germany. They came into contact with fresh cultures, and were influenced by them. Lastly the Hindu migrations to Burma, Indo-China and Java are now beyond doubt. One great feature of the culture of this period was its cosmopolitan character.

Space forbids us further to enlarge on the Sangham Age in South India. We would commend this work to all lovers of Hindu culture.

L. A. KRISHNA IYER.

Ourselves

The Modern Review and Professor Radhakrishnan

The following letter was sent to the Editor, Modern Review, on the 20th of January for publication. He, however, declined to publish it on the ground that it was not desirable for them to interfere in the controversy between Professor Radhakrishnan and Mr. Sinha.

" To

The Editor,

The Modern Review,

Calcutta.

Sir,

It was with pain and dismay that I read the article of Mr. Sinha in the January number of the *Modern Review*. There is little in it that even distantly suggests the possibility of " Unacknowledged borrowing." Almost all the passages relate to quotations from Sanskrit texts and their translations. I suppose Mr. Sinha does not deny that Professor Radhakrishnan knows enough Sanskrit and English to use them. There is no monopoly in the sphere of dead thought deposited in ancient classics, and no one has any special claim to Sanskrit works.

In fairness to Professor Radhakrishnan, I wish to state that, as early as the beginning of the year 1922, I found him engaged in the study of Hindu theory of knowledge. As I was then planning a work on this subject, he gave me some rough notes especially from *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, *Nyāya Mañjari*, *Śāstradīpikā* and *Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa*. When I read through Mr. Sinha's article, I was much disturbed and so looked into my notes and found that a few of the passages in question were contained in the notes, which I had from the Professor early in 1922. Large portions of the notes were incorporated with slight modifications into the second volume. I reproduce the relevant extracts using within brackets the words abbreviated by the Professor.

After a discussion of the distinction between soul and body according to *Śāstradīpikā*, a new paragraph begins:

Mānasapratyakṣarūpa ahaṁpratyagamyah jñātā. The objection is raised, katham punar jñātṛjñeyatvam, na hyekasya kartṛtvam karmatvam ca svātmani kriyāvirodhāt sambhavati. Pārthasārathi believes that in self-cs. (self-consciousness) the self is both the subject and object of cs.

(consciousness). The objection about walking (gantur gamane karmatvam). The sentence is unfinished.

Kumārila holds that the self is not manifested in every cognitive act. Though it is present in every cognitive act, it does not explicitly (or) self-consciously accept (or) appropriate the object of cs. (consciousness) to itself. We know that it is a jar but not always do we recognise that we know a jar. *Śāstradipikā* says Tena .yadyapi visayavitti.....sentence not correct? p. 349, na tad vittikarmatayā avyāpteh. See also Benares Vidyavilas Press (edition), p. 482. In our ordinary cogn. (cognition) of objects (Viṣayavitti) the self is not manifested as subj. (subject) or object; but we have in addition sometimes the cs. (consciousness) of (or?) ahaṁ-pratyaya of which the self is the object. While Pka. (Prabhākara) is right in holding that the subject is always involved in the object—cs. (consciousness), it is not rendered self-conscious or explicitly manifested. Kumārila is right in holding that it is only in distinct cogns. (cognitions) of self-cs. (self-consciousness). Self-cs. is a higher degree of cs. (consciousness) than mere cs. (consciousness) of objects.

The paragraph at the bottom of p. 411, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, (No. 8 of Modern Review) is practically contained in this note; only the Sanskrit texts are omitted, abbreviations dropped and the account is put in proper form.

In another context a series of paragraphs discuss the views of Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. I shall give the first sentences which generally offer a clue to the topics considered.

If jñānam is pratyakṣam, then it becomes an object (ghaṭavat) Ghaṭam aham ātmana vedmi. Here karma, kartā, karna and kriyā are all known (...

Objection. What is the karaṇa of ātmajñāna ?.....We cannot say that jñāna can never become an object.

After these sections comes a long account which is reproduced in p. 402 note. The sentences quoted by Mr. Sinha, 12-17, occur in almost the same form. I give below the relevant passages:

Kiñca iyam pratyakṣatā (jnatatā) cognisedness apprehendedness arthadharmo Jñānadharmava? Not arthadharma. For, were it so, it must persist in the objects at other times than when it is cognised and must be perceptible to all indls. (individuals) as is the case with qualities of objects (nilatādivat). But it is not so with apprehendedness. It is present only when it is cognized and is peculiar to the cogniser na pratyakṣatārthadharmas tad dese jñānakalad anyad api anekapramātṛsādhāraṇa viṣayatayā ca' prasiddhatvāt. A good deal of elaboration nāpi

jñānadharmo' sya sarvathā.....It is not jñānadharma for K (Kumārila) holds that jñāna itself is imperceptible (parokṣa). What is always parokṣa cannot (be) the substratum of pratyakṣatā (yat khalu sarvathā parokṣam tat na pratyakṣatadharmadharaḥ).

How do you establish the exce, (existence) of 7 (knowledge)? p (perception) or anumana ? not p (perception): by hypothesis (knowledge) is imperceptible for K (Kumārila) ; not by infce. (inference) liṅgabhāvāt .....possible liṅgas are arthajñāpti, indriyas with manas, artha. Is arthajñāpti of jñānasvabhava or arthasvabhāva ? If the former, it is begging the question. Jñāna is not yet established. If arthajñāpti is perceptible, why not jñāna itself be regarded as such ? If arthasvabhāva it means only arthaprakatya, a manifestation of the object na caitad arthagrah (illegible).....ātmādhikaraṇatvenāpi prakatyabhāve ghatate P. K. M. (Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, p. 32). If parokaṣjñāna makes the objects pratyakṣa, then our 7 (knowledge) of other peoples' feelings, must also be perceived and not merely inferred (Purusāntara Jñānād api arthaprakatyaprasaṅgāt). See pp. 32 ff.

The whole passage mixes up English words with Sanskrit ones. Parts of it are omitted but the sentences from 12-17 are contained here.

It is evident thus that Professor Radhakrishnan was working on the texts even in 1922 when he had no idea of Mr. Sinha's thesis and its contents. I do not suggest that Mr. Sinha had access to Professor Radhakrishnan's lecture notes, for I do not know whether he lectured to the students or helped others who approached him in the matter. Any philosophy graduate knowing a little Sanskrit might have translated these passages for himself with the help of a Pandit if necessary.

It is therefore most surprising to say the least that Mr. Sinha should urge on the basis of similarity of language that Professor Radhakrishnan has borrowed from his unpublished, and unfortunately to us unknown, thesis.

What is painful to me is that such serious charges should be so lightly levelled against even men of the eminence and standing of Professor Radhakrishnan. If distinguished Professors cannot be sure that they will not be unfairly treated, it will be difficult for students and workers to approach them. That is an aspect of the matter that cannot be overlooked.

Yours sincerely,
N. C. GANGULY,
Principal,
College Dept., Santiniketan.

20th January, 1929.

Mouat Medals.

Two Mouat medals have been awarded on the results of the third year's P.R.S. theses to

(*a*) Dhirendranath Majumdar, M.A.

(*b*) Harendranath Ray, M.Sc.

* * *

D.P.H. Examination Date.

D.P.H. Examination, Part I—Monday, 6th May, 1929.
,, ,, Part II—Tuesday, 21st May, 1929.

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Onauthnauth Deb Research Prize for the year 1930.

The following subjects have been selected for the Onauthnauth Deb Research Prize for 1930 :—

(*a*) Theory of Sovereignty in Islam.

(*b*) Sovereign Power of Indian States and their relation to the Paramount Power.

* * *

M.B. Examination Date.

The 1st May, 1929, has been fixed as the date of commencement of the M.B. Examinations.

* * *

Results of the Final M.B. Examinations held in November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for Part I (New) of the Examination was 13, of whom 11 passed, 2 failed, none were expelled and none were absent.

The number of candidates registered for Part I (Old) of the Examination was 1 who failed.

The number of candidates registered for Part II (New) of the Examination was 88, of whom 53 passed, 32 failed, 3 were absent and none were expelled. Of the unsuccessful candidates 8 passed in Hygiene, and 12 in Medical Jurisprudence.

The number of candidates registered for Final M.B. (New Regulations) Examination was 252, of whom 83 passed, 163 failed, 6 were absent and none were expelled. Of the successful candidates Roll Cal. 14, Final M.B. (New), obtained Honours in Midwifery.

Of the successful candidates at the Final M.B. Examination (New Regulations) 5 failed in Pathology at the 2nd M.B. Examination and they are therefore not declared to have passed the Final M.B. Examination completely.

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Results of the First M.B. Examination (under the New Regulations) held in November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 64, of whom 31 passed, 31 failed, none were expelled and 2 were absent.

* * *

Results of the Preliminary Scientific M.B. Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 192, of whom 161 passed, 30 failed, none were expelled and 1 was absent.

* * *

Results of the First M.B. (Old) Examination, November, 1928.

The number of candidates registered for the Examination was 50, of whom 19 passed, 29 failed, none were expelled and 2 were absent.

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The Coates Medal for 1928.

The Coates Medal for 1928 has been awarded to Rai Bahadur Dr. Upendranath Brahmachari, M.A., M.D., Ph.D., F.A.S.B.